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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the process of urbanization in Malawi, with 
special reference to the new capital city, Lilongwe. 
At independence Malawi inherited an extremely underdeveloped urban 
system. It is argued that colonial Nyasaland's involvement in the migrant 
labour system and its reluctant membership of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland were contributory factors, both of which related to Nyasaland's 
economically and politically subordinate position in Southern Africa. Analysis 
of the static and dynamic nature of independent Malawi's urban system shows 
it to be very simplistic. It is emphasized that the growth of the truly 
'urban' population in most of the small centres in the urban hierarchy has 
been slow, and that institutional hindrances and government perceptions of 
the urban process may dissipate the impact of policies designed to promote 
their development. 
The major aspect of urban policy since 1964 has been the development 
of Lilongwe, which the government emphasized had two objectives: to create 
a new capital replacing the colonial creation of Zomba, and to develop a 
growth centre to promote greater regional equality and act as a counter- 
attraction to the commercial 'capital' of Blantyre. President Banda's 
key role in the: instigation of this project is empahasized, and it is 
suggested that the second objective was rhetorically promoted as a 
justificatory expedient. The results of original research on urban policy 
implementation and private sector investment in Blantyre and Lilongwe 
support the contention that government commitment to Lilongwe as a growth 
centre is weak, and also draws attention to problems inherent in applying 
such strategies in small, underdeveloped economies such as Malawi's. 
Lilongwe's economic development has not been in theoretical accordance 
with that of a growth centre. Nevertheless although it is proposed that a 
new capital programme 2er se cannot be used as a surrogate for a regional 
development policy, major infrastructural developments in Lilongwe have 
allowed it to provide a degree of economic competition to Blantyre. These 
are argued to be mainly associated with government commitment to its 
development as the capital city rather than its weakly developed growth 
centre role. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
introduction: Some Theoretical Tssues and Outline. 
1.1 Introduction 
The forces that are shaping the future of Third World countries (1) 
are many and disparate and urbanization represents one of the most active 
forces for change. The exact economic, ý social and political changes 
wrought by rapid urbanization or particular urban structures are-matters 
for some. disagreementýý, amongst urban, researchers but rarely- is- its 
significance as an important factor in development questioned. The Third 
World is, and has been especially since the Second World War, experiencing 
rapid urban growth, and for part of this time the growth rates have not 
only been high but increasing. Only in the 1970s was there some 
indication that growth rates were levelling off, although at a very high 
level. 
This phenomenon of a gradual levelling off of-urban growth rates is 
true of., Africa also, where in the'recent past, population growth rates for 
some. individual cities -reached extremely high, levels. - Whilst urban data 
for many Tropical African countries are scarce and also sometimes'of 
dubious accuracy the following examples give some indication of the order 
of magnitude of growth experienced by some of the, larger -cities. ' It has 
been estimated that, between 1960 and 1970 metropolitan Lagos grew at an 
average annual rate of, 11.5%, Nairobi at 9.6%, Kinshasa at 11.8% (Fair and 
Davies, ' 1976), -Kampala at 9.2% and'Dar es Salaam at 9% (Davis, 1972). - In 
the more urbanized African countries, - though. the-absolute growth of the 
urban population is still very high, - as cities get -larger their annual 
growth rates inevitably slow: for* instance in Zambia where 36% of the 
population was urbanized by 1975, Lusaka's officially- reported average 
annual growth rate was 13.4% from 1963-69, whilst from 1969-74, it was 8.5% 
(Zambia, Central Statistical Office, 1974). 11-I- 
In Malawi, which is the focus of this study; reasonably comprehensive 
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data on urban growth are only available for the post-independence, period. 
The first census held in 1966 showed Malawi's level of urbanization to be 
one of the lowest in Africa-, at around 5%. Over the next 11 years up 
until theý next, census in 1977, official -statistics suggested that 
Lilongwe, -which became the country's new capital city during that period', 
experienced a fantastically high annual average growth rate of about 16%. 
Blantyre however, which was. (and still remains) Malawi's largest urban 
centre, had a lower growth rate of 6.4%, and thus its rate of expansion, 
although 'very rapid, did not quite rise-to the levels that had been 
experienced in'some of the -other -African cities cited above. ' It is 
considered that since-Blantyre was-by far the largest city in Malawi at 
independence (its . population 'of approximately 100,000 represented about 
one half of the total' urban population),,, but was also relative to many 
other 'primate' African cities still fairly small, it may have been 
expected that-its growth rate in- the early years of independence would 
have been- rather higher, -if -Malawi had been experiencing the same 
phenomenon in its urbanization* process which occurred elsewhere on the 
continent. Whilst Lilongwe's growth must have affected Blantyrels, 
Lilongwe's growth must be viewed within the context of its very -low 
initial-base population of about 20,000 in 1966 (reaching-about 100,000 by 
1977). In fact a variety of factors have meant that Lilongwe's official 
growth rate in the intercensal! period was an overestimate, and-it is 
estimated in this study that a, (still very high) growth rate of around 
12-13% per year is more accurate (see Chapter 6). -Furthermore Malawi's 
census data also recorded a very high. total urban growth'rate of over 8% 
per year from 1966-77, with several small centres growing at well over 10% 
per year, suggesting that overall Malawi was, experiencing 'one of the 
highest rates of urbanization in Africa. Uncritical acceptance of these 
figures led some Malawian analysts to emphasize the problem that Malawi 
was facing during the, 1970s and into the -1980s -in the 'sphere of 
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urbanization (e. g. ', Mlia, 1978; Town and Country- Planning Department, 
1979), However these official data for small centres presented a 
misleading picture of urbanization at the lower end-of the urban system 
because theýeffects'of very-significant, boundary changes 'were not taken 
into account (see Chapter 4). Overall therefore the process of 
urbanization had not been as widespread nor quite as rapid as it seemed, 
although Lilongwe's growth, was, outstanding. Given the low initial'base 
population in urban centresi-both nationally and for individual centres 
(including Blantyre), the potential for Malawi to have experienced urban 
growth rates after -independence- comparable to those in other African 
countries during the 1950s and, 1960s was'very highi- but it is arguable 
that this situation was not fully, realized. It-is possible therefore that 
Malawi 'may be-experiencing 'accelerating rates of urbanization during the 
1980s, -therefore lagging, temporally behind other African-countries where 
growth rates have now levelled'off. III 
Africa today1remains the world's least urbanized region, yet its 
urbanization rate is the-world's highest. It averaged-over-5% in the 
1970s, and is projected to, remain above that level for, the remainder of 
the1980s. Atýthese levels the continent's urban population will increase 
from around 140. million'in 1980 to 360 million by. 2000, which -would 
represent an urbanization level -of around 40% (Ramachandra, 1986, P-3). 
This combination of the'lowest'levels-and the, highest -growth, rates of 
urbanization make Africa of particular interest in that the urban--scene is 
not yet Itset1t, and-thus the effect of the urban process can be studied in 
action from an early stage. This-view is summed up by OtConnorls-(1983i 
p. 16) opinion that "Tropical Africa provides, almost unparalleled 
opportunities for the outside observer _ýto see laities., in the making'. 
" 
Malawi is especially interesting from this respect 'if it is -correct to 
view its stage of urbanization' as- 'incipient'. 'It 'also shares the 
tradition of many other Africanýcountries (particularly in the East-'and 
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South) of a basically rural pattern of settlement on which a colonial 
power imposed a low level of urban settlement represented by a particular 
type of urban system suited to colonial priorities, and then a much 
swifter rate of urbanization after World War Two and particularly after 
independence during which it has become apparent that different urban 
policies and priorities need to emerge. Thus the experience of other 
African countries will often be applicable to Malawi, and a study of its 
own urban processes and' progress may help to form a better understanding 
of the the phenomenon of urbanization in Africa as a whole, although it 
must be remembered that the diversity of urban characteristics displayed 
dictates that international comparisons must be carefully conducted., 
Whilst the study of 'cities in the making' may be of academic 
interest, the justification for the study of an emerging urban system may 
lie more in the consideration of the impact of that system on the social, 
economic and political structures of a country as a whole. In this thesis 
the general characteristics of Malawi's urban system as it has developed 
from the end of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the past 
two decades since independence, are described and analysed. Certain 
aspects of the relationship between that urban system, and general 
developmental issues in Malawi today, and during the colonial period are 
also considered (2). Government urban policies are also critically 
reviewed. The major aspect of government urban policy since independence 
has been the creation of a new capital city at Lilongwe in the Central 
Region, replacing the colonial capital 
I 
of Zomba in the Southern Region. 
Critical analysis of the development of Lilongwe forms a major part 
of this thesis including not only examination of processes of 
decision-making and planning, finance for the new capital, and its 
internal growth and development, but also its national role. Several 
countries in Africa have transferred their capital since independence. 
There are variations in the motives for this policy, and in the internal 
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characteristics of the new capitals developed (e. g. see Potts, 1985a, b 
attached herewith), but some governments have included a definite economic 
role for their new capitals in terms of regional development planning. 
This is true of Lilongwe but there are a number of important questions 
about this policy which are addressed in this thesis, which are also 
relevant to new capital policies in other countries, and to some extent 
to the implementation of growth centre policies generally in Africa. 
These include the question of whether the intended growth centre role of 
Lilongwe was ever-more than'a merely justificatory 'political expedient in 
terms of the original decision-making and motivation for the new capital 
project, and therefore in relation to this point whether'government 
policies have really addressed the issue of facilitating a -growth centre 
role for Lilongwe. In the context, of these-discussions some wider issues 
also emerge. One'of'these is whether the designation'of new capitals "as 
growth centres in the particular contekt of a poor, underdeveloped economy 
with little industrial potential actually has' much-validity, and also, 
viewing the question to some extent from a reverse position, whether new 
capitals do, in fact have the potential to instigate a certain economic- 
restructuring of the urban system, even if this is not according to the 
tenets of growth centre theory. 
In order to provide a context and background for the present'study, 
certain theoretical issues relating to the role of urbanization in 
development, and of 'growth centres in regional-planning 'need to be 
reviewed, and these are considered in the next section. 
1., 2 Theoretical Issues 
1.2.1 Development Planning and Regional Development Theor 
There has been a certain degree of shift in development planning-in 
the Third World over the past thirty years or so, from a national, sectoral 
approach centering on increasing 'the country's Gross National Product, 
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towards a more spatially aware approach where the' importance of planning 
for regional equality is recognized. In the former it'was hoped that high 
levels and growth rates of GNP would bring about the sorts of improvement 
in living standards and economic viability implied in the word 
"development"; however, by the end of'the first Development'Decade of'the 
1960s it began 'to be realized that this unilineal view of development, 
which often borrowed heavily from First World economic theory, ' was 
inappropriate for the developing countries. Despite some successes in 
generating high GNP growth rates-often with the help of-international'aid- 
the empirical evidence was"that'the poor remained, on the whole, no better 
off and "take-off" as'p6stulated by Rostow (1956) . had not been reached. 
Part of the problem lay in the: ýword "development" - -not'enoujh thoug fiýr had 
been given to what "exactly the 'word-actually did; 'imply'and pI lanning 11 for 
some nebulous abstract' was unforeseen consequences. 
Attempts to' define what "development" meant and who it' was meant to 
benefit (e. g' '' Haq, 1976; Donaldson, '1973; Myrdal, 1972; Seoers', 1971'; 
Brookfield, 1973; Smith, 1973) were i complementary to increased'interest in 
regional planning I as"a'develoomental'tool in the 'Third World" (3)'(e. g. 
Gilbert, 1974', '1976; Friedmann, 1966; 'Friedmann and Weaver, 1979; El 
Shakhs and Obuhdo, 1974; StO'ýr and Taylor, 1981; ' Rondinelli"and'Cheema, 
1983), since one of the main criteria" for adopting this': 'approach is 
that "a spatial approach to planning decisions I might'Offer a more''reliable 
route'to equitable and balanced development" (Gilbert, 1§74, 'p. '294)'. 
It is because the problems that characterize the Third W6rld'have an 
explicit spatial component that regional planning has so mých'to offer. 
Development does not occur evenly in space "and the recognition of this 
fact and the school of economic theory I that I has developed from it is the 
cornerstone of regional development planning. The growth of theory 
relating to the spatial occurrence of-develOpMent and its tendency 
to 
manifest itself inequitably in socio-economic space has been succintly 
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described by Brookfield (1975) and to repeat it here, would be wasteful 
duplication. Suffice it to say that the contributions of such writers as 
Perroux, through Myrdal and Hirschmann, culminating in-. John Friedmann's 
general theory of polarized development. have established,, pome of the 
causal mechanisms that lead to spatial imbalances, and form a necessary 
framework for regional planning policies to work within. However although 
a theoretical base is-necessary, it-is not yet sufficient and 11we-are as 
yet a very, longway from any true general theory" (Brookfield, 1975, 
p. 123).. In part Ahis, accounts for the problem. facing regional planners 
today - although very often they are all seeking to attain the same goals, 
without a complete-and integrated body of theory about, the exact-role of 
factors,.,, likeý urbanization, migration, industrialization,, entrepeneurial 
decisions, and authority-dependency relationships in generating imbalanced 
development,, it is difficult for them to know exactly-which elements of 
the, system,, to manipulate,, when and how, in, order to achieve their aims. 
- The, rple of-urbanization is a case in point. That urbanization is an 
important feature in the Third World has already been established and its 
role in the causation of regional imbalances is. implicit,, in much of, the 
theory, but the precise mechanisms at work are not, explicit. Consequently 
although it is widely felt that the urban process, the speed of 
urbanization and the type of urban system a,, country exhibits have 
important implications for that country's development both nationally and 
regionally, exactly what these implications are in a planning context is a 
matter of some disagreement and discussion to which many writers-have 
contributed - (e. g. Gilbert and- Gugler, 1982; Soja and-Weaver, 
1976; 
Southall, 1979). This obviously leaves urban planners with major problems 
and, in the context of this study-of-Malawian urbanization, it is- worth 
quoting the view of a Malawian -academic, Mlia (1974, p. 
81), whose-work 
has embraced the twin themes of urbanization and regional planning in that 
country: 
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"granted that the process of urbanization can be both a liability 
and an asset in terms of national development, there is a vacuum as 
far as policies-for guiding urbanization are concerned. There 
exists a torrent of interesting ideas on the subject, yet a 
direction or, much less an agreement, is yet-to emerge. " 
1.2.2 The Role of Urbanization in Regional and Natigoal Dgvelopmen 
It is felt by many students of urbanization that-urbanization is a 
necessary concomitant of development, especially inasmuch as. it- is seen 
by them to be correlated with industrialization. Up to the 1950s this 
role was, hardly questioned. Statements such as "it would appear that 
significant industrialization is not possible without some accompanying 
urbanization" and "economic development without industrialization is 
unthinkablett (Higgins, 1967, P-134 and p. 123) sum up this general attitude 
- obviously during the "growth" decade, of the 1960s this sort of analysis 
was likely to ýbe prevalent. Others also feel that urbanization is 
generally an asset, but do not tend to hold this view unconditionally, and 
various other factors like location of urban investment within the urban 
hierarchy are considered. For instance Mabogunje (e. g., 1965; 1968; 1978) 
has argued that urbanization is likely to promote economic development by 
the mechanisms of forward and backward, linkages of certain propulsive 
industries only if government investment is guided by the, criterion of 
concentrating in 'growth polest which have good development potential. 
Other pro-urban analyses have stemmed from considerations of the urban 
role in social development, in terms of its ability to generate, adopt and 
diffuse innovations (Friedmann, 1968; Horowitz, 1967). 
Hoselitz' (1955) analysis of 'generative' and 'parasitic' cities was 
an early attempt to draw attention to the fact that urbanization did not 
constitute and unmixed blessing in terms of regional development (4). 
Although his initial assumption is that urbanization is a necessary 
precondition for economic development, drawing on Redfield and Singer's 
(1954) model of orthogenetic and heterogenetic cities, he proposed that 
certain types of cities, particularly those characteristic of the Third 
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World, are likely to be economically parasitic on their surrounding 
regions. His analysis is more complex than a simple 
orthogenetic/parasitic, heterogenetic/generative model, Since cities can 
exhibit a combination of features from Redfield and Singer's city types, 
and it is their interaction which determines the city's regional impact. 
For instance he suggestedthat many Third World cities are economically and 
culturally dominant in their national context, but subordinate to world 
metropoles)and this combination tends to produce a city which is parasitic. 
Parasitism may also stem from incongruities between a city's economic 
features which are modern (e. g. specific, universalistic) and its 
cultural/political life which may be particularistic and diffuse. His 
analysis is essentially spatial as the terms refer to the city's effect on 
the region within which it is located and is dynamic in 
that it allows for change over time as certain features change or become 
predominant. 
Hoselitz' ideas have been examined in some detail because it is felt 
that they constitute a useful starting point for examining other views on 
urbanization which may acknowledge its potential fo ,r stimulating 
"development" (variously defined), but at the same time also may feel that 
certain factors are preventing urban processes from fulfilling their' 
potential. These include considerations of rapid urban growth rates, 
skewed hierarchical development or urban investment bias vis a vis rural 
investment, or the nature of the authority/dependency relationships 
between core and periphery. 
One of the main characteristics of Third World urbanization which 
caused this more critical attitude towards its role in development - is that 
much of the urban growth being experienced is not in direct response to 
the stimulus of industrialization as was the case in the developed 
countries. This tends to undermine the assumptions concerning 
urbanization proposed by unilineal developmentalists of the correlation 
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a large proportion of the urban population lives in one metropolitan 
centre" (Gilbert,, 1974, p. 92). 
Implicit in these ideas is the feeling that there is some optimal 
form of urban system for each country related to its stage of development, 
and often that the pattern of urban development at present exhibited in 
less developed countries does not correspond to this optimum. The reasons 
for this non-correspondence are often traced to the legacy of an imposed 
colonial settlement pattern,, and to the influence of, dependency 
relationships which link the less developed countries into a network of 
international capitalism. 
1.2.3 Urban Systems and Their Relation to DeveloDment 
Theories relating to city size and the inter-urban 
disposition of' urban activities and populations owe much to the concepts 
introduced 
'by 
Christaller's theory of central placs. This is not the 
place to describe the, theory. in detail (see Christaller, 1966) which 
posits that in an ideal spatio-economic framework of competitive 
equilibrium centres will emerge providing, functions1for discrete areas in 
an interlocking lattice which, forms a spatial hexagonal system. The 
hierarchical nature of these settlements has attracted much attention from 
those studying urbanization as being an. element imperfectly exhibited by 
many Third World urban systems. 
Some of the main concepts that have been used in the study of Third 
World urbanization: rank-size distribution, primacy and, obviously, the 
need for settlement hierarchies -can be related to.. Christaller's 
theoretical study. These concepts and their recommendations, for, improving 
the potential of urban systems to generate "development" are often 
complementary, although paradoxically their policy implication may be 
discordant (e. g. the policy of deconcentrating urban growth to counteract 
primacy versus the policy of "decentralized concentration" (Rodwin, 1970) 
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of the growth centre approach). It is not intended to consider" here 
theoretical and policy issues related to the rank-size rule 'and primacy 
partly because they have been covered extensively elsewhere (e. j. Zipf, ' 
1949; Berry and Garrison, 1958; Berry, 1964j 1973; Linsky, 1965; El 
Shakhs, 1972; Gilbert, 1974,1972; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). 
these concepts are not considered critical to this study "of I urbanization 
in Malawi, nor have Malawian policy makers tended to evaluate urban policy 
needs there in relation to them, although acknowledgement of Blantyreis 
'primacy' at independence is contained in policy statements. ' As O'Connor 
(1983, p. 46) has pointed out, even within the context of increasing 
primacy in Tropical Africa: 
"since this [primacyl'is a phenomenon'shared with most countries in 
Latin America, many in South-East Asia and the Middle 
, 
East, and 
several in Europe, it should not be regarded as an aberration 
needing specific explanation. Probably the rank-size rule is best 
forgotten. " 
However the literature relating to the spatial expression of 
urbanization and its hierarchical nature is specifically relevant to this 
thesis, since such considerations are crucial to the examination of 
Lilongwe's development as a"growth centre, 'and also to Malawian policies 
towards the smalier"settlements in its urban system. 
1.2.4 Urban Planning Strategies for Regional D6vel6Dment 
It is possible to identify two strands of planning recommendations 
emanating from reservations about the spatial form' urbanization has taken 
in the Third World. ' The first is repr6sented*by the bo'dy, of literature, on 
'growth centres' representing the' ' policy ' -of '-'concentrated 
decentralization"; - the second is related to this approach but . is more 
concerned, with the'erdation of an hierarchical urban structure, and "is 
associated with the analysis' of service -ceýtres and the-promotion of 
smaller urban centres. " 
1.2.4.1 'Growth Centres' 
In 1955 Perroux identified the'concept of growth poles: areas in 
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economic space which have particularly high potential for generating high 
growth rates. , 
This potential was derived from an initial innovation and 
the existence of, certain types, of industries which have high, propulsive 
properties because of their forward and backward linkages. Since this 
concept was. first introduced it has been used extensively in, economic 
analyses. apd the, definition of the term has become increasingly nebulous 
(see Moseley, 1973; Gilbert, 1975). The types of towns which, have, been 
proposed as performing the function of a growth pole/growth centre (the 
two terms,, having become almost interchangeable) are very variable, from 
settlements over, 15,000 to ones, with populations of 50,000-500,000 (Carol, 
1955; Misra, 1972 cited in Moseley, op cit), and including cenýrqs whose 
characteristics adhere to a more strict interpretation oflPerroux's term 
with the presence. of particularly economically favourable industries being 
necessary. (Hermansen, 1972)., 
-Some 
feel that this has rendered the concept 
almost worthless to a regional-development, planner (Moseley, op cit), but 
nevertheless it is often,, recommended as''a policy that balances a skewed 
urban system if this is seen as undesirable. It is also a basic 
assumption of, the, growt4, centre approach. that,, the new or stimulated, centre 
will be a positive economic element, creating, pew growth and adding to the 
gross national product, often exploiting econmic opportunities previously 
ignored when the primate city constituted the 
'country's 
only 'core' area. 
John Friedmann oas particularly a5sociated with this approach as an 
antidote to, the exigencies of the core-periphery process. His analysis 
and description of the processes which tend to cause the p9larization, of a 
country's economic space into a growing core and stagnant or declining 
periphery, relating this process to the stage of development'and the urban 
system, draws heavily on the disequilibrium theories of_Myrdal (1957)--and 
Hirschmann (1958) and has been applied empirically to the case of 
Venezuela (Friedmann, 1966)., 
_In 
the Venqzuelan case Friedmann was 
involved, in. the setting up, of a growth, _., centre 
in the region of Guayana 
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which utilized unexploited resources and which it was hoped would provide 
self-sustaining ec"onomic gro*wth, benefit the region by increasing incomes 
ans stimulating new avenues of production by the industrial linkages 
effect, and assuage regional sentiments by offsetting the Caracas region. 
Opinions vary as to the success such policies have hadin'iulfilling'all 
these'hopes, particularlyIn the field of stimulating''the surrounding 
rural areas (Gilbert, 1974; Appalraju and Safier, 1976). Many however 
favour this'approach because they see it as providing the answer to the 
opposing goals'of -regional pla I nni I ng efficiency and'equity. They feel it 
combines the need to'concentrate limited investment resource's in order to 
achieve the increases'in national income necessary to improve standards of 
living, with the acknowledged need to make some effort to balance regional 
development so that alternative economic potential is not overlooked by 
the tendency to polarize, and political and social'oonsideration are not 
ignored -(e. g. see Mabogunje, 1978; Mlia, 1975b3Pioro, 1972). Particularly 
from th-e, 1970s on, 'these sorts of considerations have made growth centres 
a recognized element in Third World national development plans when 
regional equity-is r'ecoghized 'as a' d. esirable goal (e. g. Tanzanian 
2nd Five' Year Dev , el opment Plan, 1969-74; Iran '5th Development Plan, - 
1974-78; Malawi Stat. ement 'of 
'Development -, Polic I ies, 197 11 140; 1. Ken , ya 2nd 
Development Plan 1970-74 and 3rd Development Plan '1974-78; also see 
Appalraju and Safier', 1976'). ' Mabogunje 196-5, jf for exa , mple, cri I tic I ized 
Nigeria's Six Year National Development Plan of 1962-68 for not 
recognizing the importance of growth centres and for spreading their 
investment of social overhead capital too widely over the country's'urban' 
centres, instead of directing investment allocation by identifying the 
centres which woulý''utilize investment most efficiently to generate 
economic growtli. 
However although there are many aspects of the growth centre approach 
to recommend it to 'the regional and urban planner, there are also reasons 
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to have reservations about it. For instance, if ýit_ 
is accepted that 
there are problems associated with concentrated growth and large 
cities, to counteract them with more concentrated growth in other large 
urban areas may accentuate the problem if the presumed growth centre 
spread effects do not work. The setting up of a new centre may also be 
extremely costly (this has been one of the major reservations given by 
detractors of Malawi's new capital), and if this expense is met by 
transferring resources-from other centres or sectors of the economy, or by 
massive borrowing likely to cause severe debt repayment problems in the 
future, it may be that the overall benefits of the new centre are 
negligible or even negative. The question of spread effects is absolutely 
crucial - Perroux's initial concept assumed economic spread in terms of 
backward and forward, linkages, and urban centres are often, seen as being 
centres of social and political change. If the mechanisms of spread are 
integrated into growth-centres, it might be felt that the more growth 
centres the merrier. Geographers have identified urban areas as-important 
factors in the spread of modernization (Soja, 1968; Riddell, 1970; Rodwin, 
1970) although this must be set against Mcgee's (1971, P-31) view that "in 
the context of Third World countries, itý, seems. that, a theoretical 
framework which regards the city as the prime catalyst of, change must be 
discarded". However if the city's role as a 'modernizer' is accepted, 
this still leaves aside the problem of, what sorts of innovations are being 
spread forlas Adams (1970) pointed out,. many aspects of modernization are 
very undesirable. 
Even should the less -desirable aspects, of 
'modernization' be 
controlled, (e. g. prostitution, cultural breakdown), and the mechanisms, 
theoretically,,, and empirically described (Hagerstrand, 1972; Pedersen, 
1970), are acknowledged, are the characteristics of Third World 
urbanization such that beneficial forces for change are likely to be 
generated within them without some basic changes in the structural causes 
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of their undesirable characteristics? In a country oriented towards 
export production for an alien metropole, and in a position of political 
and economic dependence vis a vis the world metropolis (Frank, 1966), the 
centrifugal forces attributed to'urban areas by dependency inalysts may 
outweigh the centripetal forces attributed to them by some economists. To 
some extent the strict definition of a growth centrels'properties Should 
prevent this but as discussed, in 'practice, the growth centre concept has 
become much more diffuse. In fact empirical evidence, exists that 
questions the operation of beneficial spread effects outwards from growth 
centres in,. to their respective 'regions. Gilbert's (1975) study of 
development indicators in the vicinity of Medellin in the department of 
Antioquia in Colombia found that the low levels of development in the 
surrounding rural areas reflected 'the failure of the "trickle-down' 
process and were rather "a consequence of the nature of their-relationship 
with the'growth ceintrel" Ubid, P-331). He concludes therefore that 
"social services and infrastructural improvements do not diffuse from 
growth centres beyond a certain limited area .... and 'regions' beyond the 
immediate' vicinity of the growth centres receive little in the way of 
positive benefits". Gilbert's study is"considered of-particular relevance 
to Lilongwe's potential as a growth centre and'further reference is made 
to it in Chapter Five. The implications of the study for less developed 
countries are that if a growth centre strategy is adopted'in the expressed 
hope that it will induce rural and regional development, it is unlikely to 
be successful unless existing rural-urban relationships'are modified, 
since it is'these which, in part, caused many of'the conditions the growth 
centres are meant to change. This point is reiterated by Mabogunje 
(1977, p. 16) who stated: 
"a growth centre is not regarded as bringing about development 
simply because it achieved'growth in itself but only to'extent that 
it induced it in thesurrounding rural area.... Only to the extent 
that .... new and appropriate rural structures are created as a 
necessary complement to industrial investments in urban centres, or 
old wineskins are replaced by new ones, can urban-rural 
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relationships in less developed countries come to en'gender the kind 
of cumulative development process with whichadvanced countries 
have become familiar. " 
1.2.4.2 Service Centres and Urban Hierarchies 
From the viewpoint of redressng the ''basic imbalances between the 
rural and urban areas, and between different regions-, - some-feel that'the 
growth centre approach has less to offer than promoting the development of 
a network of urban centres, arranged in a hierarchical sequence (although 
the two are not' necessarily mutually excluýive). The miin spa . tial'impac't 
of a growth centre is limited to, the'region in which it is'located, and 
few Third World countries can afford to develop a regional network of such 
centres. 
The 'type of hierarchical pattern of urban settlement identified by 
Christaller is felt by 'some "to--repr'esent the'most'efficient system for 
distributing the central functions of urban areas. -'Elem6nts"of an urban 
hierarchy have been identified'in'Third World'sýttlbmeht patterns" (e. j. ' 
Abiodun, 1968j-Grove 'and' Huszar, 1964; -Funnell, 1976), but it isy'widbly 
felt that this characteristic is not sufficiently developed in Third World 
urban'systew. 'The advantages of a hierarchical system aý6'presented as 
being both, economic and social as evident from the fOlloi4ing statement: 
"The advantages of a rational distribution'of service centreýcannot 
easily be measured in terms of monetary costs; but there is no 
doubt that considerable financial savings are possible .... A"proper distribution of service centres can create a_new sense of social 
and political unity in the country's ývarious regions, preventing 
the drift of the most energetic and ambitious people to the big 
cities, and making maximum use of resources. The' establishment 
of a new centre or the upgrading of an old one can provide a 
powerful stimulus to the general development of an area ... This is 
especially true if basic economic activities,, particularly 
ýmanufacturing industry, are located in the same places as central 
services. " (Grove and Huszar, op cit, pp. 10-11) 
The reservations, discussed above, about the mechanisms and nature of 
spread effects are obviously applicable to this approach too, and although 
an hierarchical settlement pattern is said to aid diffusion (Pedersen, 
1970), an empirical study of diffusion mechanisms in India came to much 
the same conclusions about the nature of hierarchical and neighbourhood 
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diffusion as Gilbert did for growth centre spread in Colombia (Blaikie, 
1976). However the distribution and provision of services. is often 
stressed asýan important element of a hierarchical network of settlements, 
more than in the growth- centre approach, and even if the area affected by 
a settlement is very limited, a whole system of settlements will. have more 
impact than one growth centre. In terms of counteracting 
over-concentration in one or a few large cities, the generation- of, an 
urban -hierarchy implies both decentralization and deconcentration as 
opposed to the decentralized concentration needed for growth centres. 
Johnson (1970) felt that- the creation of an extensive hierarchical, urban 
network was vital for. the, developmental prospects of the Third World, and 
that accceps to, fairly small-Imarket towns for all the population would 
prevent the-emergenceýof backward-sloping rural. supply curves by providing 
demand-Ifor increased productioný as well,. as a-supply outlet for rural 
demand, In, hisýanalysis he rejects-as a 'myth' the possibility of a major 
development-impetus arising from the wisdom supposedly embodied.. 
-in 
rural 
villages, -and, also rejects the strategy of concentrating industry in a few 
centres, despite possible monetary economies, that might. be achieved. 
Although, the, -, ýsettlement pattern identified-by Christaller has been 
likened to the. rank-size, rule (Berry and Garrison, 1958), those who feel 
that the existence of a system of different sized urban settlements is 
likely to-improve. development-potqntial- in, the Third World do. not 
necessarily subscribe ýto the supposed advantages of-Ithat rule. Spengler 
(1967) said that it should be avoided. -In fact since, it. is-, likely to 
involve the, existence of some very large-cities. He suggested that., Iýhe 
optimum, size for cities in Africa was about 100,000 but that some 
sort of urban hierarchy with an upper tier of a, system of cities of this 
size should be-encouraged. 
Others have also identified, particular levels-of the urban hierarchy 
which -they feel--,,, deserve, particular consideration. Forýinstance Taylor 
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(1974) singled out small urban centres of 800-5,000, people as being 
especially ablev in his opinion, to implement developmental aims, in the 
Kenyan context - possibly more so than "the deliberate, artifical-creation 
of a 4-fold urban hierarchy" (ibid, p. 157), as proposed in Kenyan-urban 
policy. With special reference to Africa, Funnell, (1976) directed his 
attention to the role of small service centres ranging from 2,000 to 
20,000 people. He admitted that it was not really appropriate to term 
some of the settlements 'urban', but nor did he feel that they are merely 
hamlets or villages. His analysis of the, relationships between these 
centres and the rural population in terms of their -roles as-providers-of 
social services, suppliers of goods and services, and centres for 
agricultural production and generators of growth impulses involves a 
con-sicleration of 
-both 
the benefits as identified by writers such as 
Johnson, and the costs as identified by Frank and others. He. conclýded 
that the centres provide important social, commercial and administrative 
functions but for only a limited-proportion of the rural population, and 
that the problem of identifying an efficient spatial pattern of service 
facilities, and-using service centres-to disseminate new, -ideas had not yet 
been solved I although the application of network analysis could be very 
useful for helping to channel services and innovations through the-most 
beneficial locations. 
More recently some researchers have reached more, negative conclusions 
about the role of small urban centres in development,. in Africa (e. g. 
Southall et al, 1979). The implications of these, views are considered in 
greater detail in Chapter 4, in the context. of. a discussion of Malawi's 
policies towards its small centres.., 
The problem of population thresholds, necessary,, for the,., emergence 
of particular services has been identified in theory and was one of the 
guiding principles behind attempts to group dispersed rural populations 
into more concentrated settlements in Tanzania., There it was felt that 
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rural development was a most important goal and that improvements in the 
rural population's- standards of living could not be achieved without 
providng access to basic services, which. could not be done unless rural 
people were grouped into some sort of network of rural villages, hence the 
operation of the villagization programme. Although these villages are not 
urban, their creation is indicative of the interest in manipulating 
settlement patterns to,. achieve developmental goals, and the generation of 
various hierarchical patterns suited to different types of functional 
regions,, with-the village as an integral component, has been proposed in 
the Tanzanian context. In this analysis areas-with the highest industrial 
potential would require a more complex and developed hierarchical 
settlement patttern to create optimal conditions for socio-economic 
progress than areas of low agricultural potential, for example (Pioro, 
1972). The idea of adapting, settlement hierarchies to suit particular 
local conditions has much to recommend it, and policy recommendations of 
"filling -the gaps" to resemble more closely the characteristics -of a 
Christaller-type, system,., as advocated-by Grove and Huszar (op cit) for 
Ghana,, have been criticized for making "unwarranted assumptions" about, the 
appropriateness of, existing hierarchiesýfor, fulfilling their supposed role 
(Funnell, -op cit). Obviously the conditions found in most African 
countries are vastly different from those displayed in the developed 
countries which served as a basis for Christaller's model, and 
modifications are therefore necessary if it is-to be-used as a regional 
planning tool. The definition of areas that qualify as urban by virtue of 
their provision of some sorts of urban functions is likely to need 
adapting to local conditions; often this is set at a threshold far below 
those used in developed countries. In Sierra Leone, for example, this has 
been set as low as 1,000 and 2 or more central place functions(Harvey, 
1966, cited in Mitchell, 1972) although Mitchell revised this to 2,000 and 
5-8 central place functions for a more strict 'urban' definition. 
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Several empirical studies of the existing settlement-patterns in 
African countries have been conducted, which often utilize'central place 
functions to identify hierarchical levels (e. g. Abiodun, '1*968, - 1'971; 
Davies, 1967; Mitchell, op cit). ' A more sophisticated'attempý to'analyie 
the Tanzanian urban system through principal'components analysis concluded 
thai functional specialization was almost negligible, and that no 
integrated hierarchical system of townsexisted '(Hirst, '1973). "'The 'poor 
integration of the urban * system 'was exhibited by an analysis of 
urban-urban phone calls which showed' that the empirical pattern did not 
conform with the 'ideal' pattern of centres having primary links with the 
nearest next level centre. A similar analysis of' the 'Malawian urban 
system is conducted in this'study, -'and the'results lead io very'similar 
conclusions (see Chapter 4). _: Liter' Hirst '(1975)' used complex telephone 
transaction'analYsis to study East African urban'hierarchies and . indicated 
that national inter-urban'' linkages were 'relatively weak, and' that 
development planners could use this technique to'identify weaknesses in 
urban hierarchies which would help to combat regional inequality. 
Network analysis'of transport'route6 has-b6en used in Sierra Leone to 
identify *hierarchical levels of transport- 'nodes" ýhi6h 'were 'then 
clustered to form functional development regions., It was-felt that the 
nested regional landscape has many advantages for development planning: 
"Because the nodes are ordered hierarchically, it may be feasible 
to structure development through higher order nodes to-lower order 
nodes centres .... This approach to regional planning will, in the 
main, cause the development of medium-sized towns that are 
presently absent from the urban hierarchy of 'many developing 
countries. " (Harvey, 1972, p. 236). 
By analysing the resources available in each node and region and comparing 
them with the expected number for the population, it was felt that 
problems which might hinder the transmission of growth impulses down 
through the nested regions and from nodes to periphery could be identified 
and removed. Harvey concluded that disparities between regions and 
especially between primary and secondary nodes were striking and if this 
39 
was not rectified the nodes could become what Friedmann termed "major 
points of strangulation within the fabric of, their development". 
Empirical studies using interaction analysis for identifying spatial 
settlement structures-in Kenya and Nigeria have, also been performed,. and 
have emphasized the importance of this approach for guiding the allocation 
of development funds to create 
urban systems which will play a positive role in regional development 
(Mckim, 1978; Ajoku Nwala, 1972). The oversimplicity or underdevelopment 
of African. urban network integration has also been emphasized by Mcnulty 
(1972). 
It is apparent that African urban systems suffer from major 
imbalances in terms of their functional characteristics and -inter-urban 
linkages, which many feel are preventing the urban network from embodying 
and directing the processes ofwelfare distribution, innovation diffusionyý 
migration, investment and political, decision-making- in a, be, neficial way 
for the achievement of regional development and, greater equality. - 
1.2.5 The Colonial Influence on the Urban System, 
The presence of maladaptive forms of urbanization can be traced back, 
in part, -. -to 
the urban foundations which evolved during the colonial 
period. Historical analyses of the pattern of urbanization in most 
African countries demonstrate the influence colonial priorities had on the 
type of system that emerged (e. g. Mckim, 1978; Menulty, 1976; Soja and 
Weaver, 1976; Mlia, 1975a, b). These priorities were basically trade and, 
administration and the consequent urban settlements tended to be located 
in accordance with the need to channel resources out of the country, and 
therefore to be on direct transport links to the coast, and to administer 
the colonized area. Health and racial segregation were also factors, and 
often settlements would be deliberately located so as to avoid existing 
African settlements. Another factor was the location -of missionary 
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settlements which were less influenced by these forces and tended towards 
separate sites (Soja and Weaver, 1976). In- West Africa 'an indigenous 
urban 'tradition already existed, but even here underlying similarities in 
the urban system stem from the colonial'process, which McNulty (op cit) 
has identified as characterized mainly by coastal orientation, peripheral 
location, simplistic structures and polarization. In East Africa, where 
such a tradition was much less-evident, the imprint of the colonial 
spatial structure was even -more important in influencing the urban system 
which was inherited at independence. * Since it has been recognized that 
the spatial and structural characteristics of an urban system can affect a 
countryls'-developmental prospects, it, has. been felt, that a system 
organized to facilitate the objectives of a colonial power is unlikely to 
fulfil-the needs, of an independent country, -and will probably hinder'them. 
Primacy, the lack of development of medium-sized towns-, alignment of urban 
settlements with simplistic externally oriented transport routes, and 
concentration of infrastructural services have all been identified as 
products of colonialism. ý'For the case of East Africa, though the argument 
is applicable to' much of the Third World, Soja and Weaver (op cit, p. 249) 
have written: 
"whether the drainage [of resources] was large or small is not as 
important as the fact that the social and spatial structures which 
evolved were designed to distribute scarce resources in such a way 
as to promote an exploitative emphasis in economic relations, to 
facilitate control and domination by a non-indigenous colonial 
elite, and to solidify a condition of dependency within the 
international market system .... This process of underdevelopment 
brought with it many beneficial side effects, such as improveOL 
health ancl nutrition, modern educational facilities, better farming 
techniques, and easier transport and communications. But the 
distribution of these benefits -served primarily the interest of 
British and other colonial powers rather than indigenously 
expressed demand and local development potential .... Whatever the 
benefits of underdevelopment might have been, it has engrained a 
framework'of social and spatial relations and an associated pattern 
of urbanization which is inherently antithetical to an autonomously 
controlled and, socially just process of development. " 
Therefore 'a transformation of such patterns by 'direct governmental 
intervention is necessary: but urban growth since independence has been 
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felt to be an elaboration of the colonial structures rather than a 
transformation (Menulty, op cit). The forces set in motion 'by the 
colonial process are difficult to counteract and evolved spatial 
structures -tend to crystallize - 'so that the pI attern tends to'maintain 
itself. 
The problem of transforming Third World urban systems must be tackled 
by regional and national development- planners but ' the task is diffiCult. 
The political will to bring it about may be lacking 'if' decision-making 
power rests mainly with elites who benefit'-from the continuance of the 
status quo. Also with the lack of agreement on the exact role of 
urbanization and how best to manipulate the system to achieve policy 
objectives, planners have to choose between the alternatives with no 
guarantee that desiýed results will occur', and the limited resources-that 
many Third ! World'countries'ean allbeate'to regional and urban plannin'g 
means that their planning alternatives are anyway restricted. These 
factors relating to colonial urban structures''are especially relevant to 
the present' study of Malawi, where a sp I ecific attempt I has been made to 
restructure colonial patterns by developing a' new capital"city. ' 
The final sections of this chapter present a' brief -outline of Malawi 
and the structure of this study. 
1.3 Outline of Malawi 
This thesis on Malawian urbanization and ''the'-'new I capital city of 
Lilongwe necessarily contains within the following chap'ters discussion of 
many aspects of Malawi's geography, and 'in particular 'the spatial 
expression of economic development and urbanization. ' Certain aspects of 
the nature of politics in 'Malawi, especially the key I role of President 
Banda, are also covered. It is therefore not intended to cover these 
issues here, but only to supply a very brief contextual description of 
points that do not naturally emerge in later discussion. 
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Malawi is a landlocked African country south of the equator between 
latitudes 9*451 and 17016, south,. and longitudes 330and 36*east, about 560 
miles long, varying in width from 50-100 miles and covering an area of 
45,747 square miles. It is bordered to the north and north-east by 
Tanzania, to the east, south and south-west by Mozambique, and to the west 
by Zambia (see Map 2.4 in Chapter 2). Its geographical location allows 
it to be discussed within the context of Eastern Africa and/or Central 
Africa, but it is here considered to be essentially part of the Southern 
African regional sub-system because of the orientation of its transport 
routes, and historical ties. 
An outstanding feature of Malawi is its lake which extends roughly 
two-thirds of theýcountryls length-from the north along its eastern side. 
It is Africa's third ýlargest lake, and 'lies, about 1500 feet above 
sea-level,, occupying the greaterportion of the southern extensionýof the 
East. African rift valley which cuts through Malawi from north to south. 
It is both an, important -transport route and source of proteinýfor the 
country! s peoples, - as -well as being an important potential tourist 
attraction because of its beauty and relative. freedom-from bilharzia. 
To the west of the-lake the country's plateaux -rise to a general 
height of 3,000-4,000-feetý(see Map 2.2 in Chapter 2). Rising, above these 
are-even higher plateaux, like those of Viphya,. Dedza, and Nyika, -which in 
places reach 5,000-8,000 feet. In the south are the Shire highlands, 
which-attained great economic, importance during the-colonial period which 
is still maintained to a large extent to this-day. These are-dominated by 
0,000 taev),, 
Zomba. Plateau, again a location of extreme physical beauty, whichýrises 
above the old colonial capitalýof Zomba. - Further -south -is 
Central Africa's highest peak, Mulanje Mountain (10,000 feet). 
The climate is essentially tropical continental, although maritime 
air sometimes induces a light drizzle in the dry season, which is known as 
the chiperoni (blankets) in the, Shire highlands. -Obviouslyývariations, in 
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altitude exert local influences on temperatures - maximum temperatures of 
over 100OF may thus be experienced in the Lower Shire valley, although 
generally mean maximum temperatures do not rise above 850F even during the 
hottest months of October and November. The rainy season usually occurs 
between November and April. Annual rainfall averages between 2511 and 120" 
across the country according to altitude and aspect. For example the 
Lower Shire valley receives particularly low and unreliable rainfall due 
to rain-shadow effects. 
'Malawi has certain advantages in terms of its general agricultural 
potential in comparison many other African countries. It is usually 
considered that all parts of the country have sufficient rain for'dry-land 
farming. The range of ecological conditions allow bothý, tropical" and 
sub-tropical crops to be 'grown, such as maize, groundnuts, ý'tobaccorýteal 
cotton, and sugar. Although the'soils" are typical ýof the tropicsioften 
being deficient in certain nutrients, particularly nitrogen, 'fertilizers 
are now widely applied, and in combination with-the rainfall regime Malawi 
is usually considered to be a relatively agriculturally stable and 
fertile part of Tropical Africa. This view is supported by the historical 
concentration of" African peoples'there and its, 'success since independence 
in usually maintaining self-sufficiency in staple-food production., It is 
recognized that other factors' contributed to'-both these points, but it is 
considered that the natural resource base definitely played'a part. 
The country is divided into three main administrative regions: the 
Northern, Central and Southern Regions with the'-respective regional 
capitals of Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Blantyre. The population of about 6.5 
million people is unevenly distributed partly reflecting physical factors', 
and partly the spatial impact of economic developments during the colonial 
period and the years since independence in 1964., The Southern Region is 
most deý nsely populated-with over* 220 people per square mile in 1977, 
compared to 154 in'the Central Region'-and 62 in the Northern. About 90% 
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of the population remain rural, with the vast majority of people occupied 
mainly in agriculture, although this ranges from those employed on estates 
to those engaged in some combination of subsistence agriculture and 
production of food and cash crops for the market. However there is a 
great degree of mobility between these sectors. The emphasis of Malawi's 
development strategies is on the agricultural sector. There is a range 
of agricultural development projects in specific areas, directed to 
smallholder production, which have been initiated since independence (e. g. 
the Kasungu Flue-Cured Tobacco Project, the Lilongwe ýLand Development 
Programme, the Lakeshore Rural Development Project), mostly supported by 
external aid, and more recently-a broader National Rural Development 
Programme was designed to extend coverageýto the-many peasants not covered 
by these. However ) much -emphasis and . -local, financial resources, and 
political commitment have also, been given to the privately owned, estate 
sector, which has grown rapidly since independence, with. a massive 
expansion in the number of-Malawian-owned estates., 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. -The, next two-. chapters 
provide the historical geogrpahy of urbanization in Malawi, - before 
independence in Chapter 2, and after independence in Chapter 3, -which 
gives the factual background -for analytical discussion. A-brief 
background to the colonial choice of Zomba, as capital city is-included, as 
this is, crucial to an, understanding of the laterýfocus', on-Lilongwe as-the 
new capital. This, descriptive -material,,, forms, the base in both chapters 
for exploration of other issues. -The very low level of; urbanization in 
Nyasaland (even when compareduikýother African colonies) Isremphasized in 
Chapter 2, with specific comparisons, drawn-, with Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. From this point the rest of the chapter focusses on factors 
considered to have been influential in holding down the propess-of 
urbanization. These include Nyasaland's geographical location (i. e. its 
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land lOckednes s) , general poverty, and lack of bconomic development ýduýing 
colonial times ''as well as a number - of 'forces which'' en6ouraged the 
decentralization of 'urban- functions at the lower end of' the urban 
hierarchy". . 'The latter factor was common'to Eastern and Central African 
colonial urbanization-; but-two further major elements are "bmphasized: 
Nyasaland's' heavy' involvement in the' Southern African migrant laboýr 
system (a factor which'was partly both cause and effect Of its Colonial 
neglect and underdevelopment)', -dnd the-deepening of Nyasaland's poltical 
and economic dependence by the -'existence-'of'-the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland from 1953-63. ---'One of the aims of this'chapterýis theýef6re 
to explain why Nyasaland's urban development was so limited, and to show 
how important external relationships and forces can be in determining the 
degree of-urbanization'experienced within a country. 
The ý' description of the urban system as it developed" after 
independence; -in-':, ýChapterr' 3, includes" a'major'discu6sion of'a pýoblem 
mentioned'earlier- which relates to the official data, base on-the urban 
popýlation. ' The aim of this discuSsion, is to-'show that most of the'small 
urban centres which make up the majority of'Malawils' urban'system'have in 
fact not experienced"the, rates of 'urban'growth suggested by official 
figures, 'because' of the effect of very significant-'boundary changes. 
Various other-factors, ' including" the 'very' restricted nature, -df the 1966 
census boundaries, and the possible'out-migration of some pedple fr6m"the 
newly designated, '. 'urban'' areas, ' combined 'with*, ' a lack of suitable 
alternative data, make-it impossible to come to anyý-firm-conclusioýi'about 
the real rate of growth of these smaller centres. However a very 
approximate estimate has been made'by a Germari'corisultancy-tea: m ýhos6'ýiork 
is drawn upon in'the latter part of the 'chapter. The other two major' 
themes of this chapter are a description and analysis of both the statiC" 
and dynamic attributes' of the, urban system, ' and a'cr I iti: que of'ur6an 
policies in 'Malawi (excltiding the new capital programme which' is 
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considered in detail in later chapters). The. methodology for analysing 
the urban system includes the use of central place values for the. smaller 
centres (the 'gap' -between 
them and Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba being so 
large that it would overshadow any differentials identified between the 
smaller centres), The dynamics of the urban system are analysed through 
the medium of telephone data, and., despite some data problems, this section 
presents a clear picture of-an, extremely simplistic urban hierarchy. The 
results of the analysis of Malawi's urban hierarchy helps to provide a 
prescriptive input into the final part of Chapter 3, -in 
relation. to 
government policies which are directed at manipulating, and developing the 
lower end of the urban hierarchy. 
Chapters 5,6. and 7, f9cus entirely on the development and growth of 
Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital city. Chapter 5 concentrates, on the 
motivation and decision-making processes which led to the initiation of 
the new capital programme and the choice of Lilongwe to serve aý. the new 
administrative focus. As for other. new, capitals, a variety of 
motivations and processes of decision-making appear, on the surface, to 
have influenced this issue. An important, aspect of this chapter therefore 
is to attempt to disentangle, these points, with the intention of. showing 
how paramount political, and personal, -,, motivations, were,, hinging on the 
unique personality and power of Malawi's president., This in turn helps to 
focus attention on a major theme of this study: the stated growth centre 
role of Lilongwe and the implications of the real mo. tivations for the true 
importance and commitment of the government to this., aspect of the new 
capital programme. 
Financial and planning aspects of the new capital are considered in 
Chapter, 6. The role and influence of South Africa in both these issues is 
shown, and again Banda's role is emphasized. _Also. 
the nature and 
capability of the major authority involved in Lilongwe's development, the 
Capital City Development Corporation, is analysed., The impact of Lilongwe 
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and its associated infrastructural developments on national development 
expenditure is emphasized. This chapter provides the background for 
Chapter 7 which describes the physical development of-Lilongwe since the 
capital city programme began, and shows how the nature of the source of 
finance and planning can affect a city's internal spatial development in 
this case particularly in terms of the zoning and shortage of low income 
housing, and deficiencies in transport. 
Chapter 8 turns specifically to the question, already raised in 
Chapter 5, 
_ 
of Lilongwe's growth centre role. Two hypotheses are examined 
which are essentially that Lilongwe's development has not contained the 
features expected of a growth centre,. and secondly that the. government has 
not shown a true commitment to promoting this aspect of the new-capital's 
role. The methodology-for examining these, issues an examination of 
appropriate published data which allows comparison between Blantyre and 
Lilongwe in a number of economic spheres, since Blantyre is the commercial 
capital to which Lilongwe was essentially meant to provide a 
counterattraction. Secondly the results of research conducted by the 
author in 1980 and 1982 are presented. In 1980 a postal questionnaire was 
sent to a sample of business concerns in Lilongwe which aimed to 
establish the nature of the city's economy and its relations with its 
hinterland. In 1982 a series of relatively unstructured interviews with 
managers of new industrial concerns in both Blantyre and Lilongwe were 
conducted, focussing in particular on the implementation of stated 
goverment policies on promoting Lilongwe's growth centre role, and 
managerial perceptions of the industrial potential and performance of both 
cities. The aim is to show how far the government has 
initiated/maintained a policy commitment to Lilongwe as a growth 
centre, and how far Lilongwe has succeeded, because or despite of 
the government, to develop internal economic characteristics and external 
links with its regional hinterland and the national economy, which might 
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be expected of a growth centre. 
Major conclusions and an evaluation of Lilongwe's development in 
relation to other new capitals in Africa are presented in the final 
chapter. Certain common themes as well as contrasts in these programmes 
are thus identified. The continued low level of urbanizaion in Malawi and 
its potential for future accelerated growth is emphasized. The fact that 
Lilongwe has achieved a degree of economic success, and has provided a 
modest alternative national urban focus to Blantyre, is also discussed. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, this is shown to be due in many ways to 
infrastructural and other economic developments which accompanied its 
designation as a new capital (though not its capital status per se), 
which may not have accompanied its development as a growth centre alone, 
rather than government efforts to promote its growth centre role, as 
opposed to its national administrative role. 
S 
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Notes for Chapter One 
1. Throughout this work the term "the Third World"-''is -used as a 
descriptive term to mean those countries in the world where poverty 
and inequality are major factors and whose development is to some 
extent dependent on the activities and policies of the industrialized 
nations. It does not necessarily imply that it is accepted that the 
world consists of separate entities which are not interdependent and 
do not comprise a whole. 
2. Before independence in 1964 Malawi was known as Nyasaland. Throughout 
this thesis the country is referred to by the name appropriate to the 
time period being considered. 
3. This is not to suggest that regional planning was a relativel ,y new 
concept universally. Gilbert (1976) describes howIn many developed 
countries it was an early 'planning' component and som'etimes e. merged 
(e. g. in Great Britain) before national'planning. 
4. Others had much earlier established that urbanization'had'unde'sirable 
economic and social results, reflected in the generation of class 
conflicts and the inequalities between town -and countryside (for 
instance see Chapters 1-4 in Abu-Lughod (ed) (1977)). 
i 
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CHAPTER TWO 
-Urbanization 
in Nyasaland, -before IndeDendence. 'ý 
2.1 Settlement Patterns, before 1859-and Early British Settlement 
- Prior to the arrival of Livingstone and the"beginning of British 
interest in the territory'that was to become Nyasaland, there' was no 
settlement which' could be -called- 'urban', although, by the nineteenth 
century the population density was relatively high and there existed a 
network of both local, and main trade routes, 'the latter covering hundreds 
of miles for trade between the coast-and the interior. The, impact of 
the Arab, slave -trade, involved the growth of certain settlements which 
acted as-centres for the movement of, slaves to the coast - for instance 
Nkhota-kota from which, there were, operating two, Arab dhows across the lake 
when Livingstone visited it, in 1859. , According-to Malawianýguide-books, 
this was the largest indigenous African-settlement-in Central'Africa at 
the-time. Another Arab base was -at,, Karongaýat, the North, end of the lake 
(Macmillan, '1972) and iný the 1880s ýthis-also the northern 
headquarters of the African Lakes Company;, -, ý -- I 
British interest in the area began with'Livingstone's expedition to 
the Zambezi, -Shire and Nyasa region rin- 1859. This, led to''the 
establishment, of missions and the. beginning of European commercial 
activity in Nyasaland. The Church of Scotland'Mission set up in 1876 at 
Blantyre, a site chosen --by Henry, Henderson, who 11in. turning aside praise 
for having found such a suitable spot for'the mission, -often talked of it 
as being a matter of chance" (Ross, - 1973, p-159). - This decision-was to 
have far-reaching consequences for the eventual pattern, -of-urbanization in 
Nyasaland. Blantyre's advantages, were that it was rcomparatively 
accessible to the -lower Shire and the outside. worldi to the'Shire 
highlands and to the upper Shire and the lake 11 (Cole-King,, 1972)., -- 
In 1878 the African, -Lakes Company started to establish a train., of 
trading stations, in ýthe 'country. Planters- concentrated in the-Shire 
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highlands especially round Blantyrej Zomba and Mulanje, (Baker; 1971). The 
main European trade-and passenger route from the Shire highlands to the 
sea was overland to'the river ports of either Chiromo on the confluence of 
the rivers -Ruo 'and Shire, -or -Chikwawa (also knowný: 'as Chibisals in 
contemporary records) or Katungals, 10-miles-below the Murchison cataracts 
(Pachai, -1973; 1978), and thence down the Shire'to the Zambezi. - 
2.2 Colonial settlement patterns 
Part -of Southern Nyasaland was declared a protectorate'in 1889, and 
in 1891 the - whole of the 'Nyasaland 'districts' became a British 
protectorate under the administration of Henry Johnston as Commissioner 
and Consul-General. Captain Foot, Britain's Consul and Slave Trade 
Commissioner to the'area in 1883, had used Blantyre as his headquarters. 
However, in 1886 Foot's successor, Hawes, decided to make Zomba, 43 miles 
north of Blantyre, the headquarters for Nyasaland's administration. Yet 
Blantyre, with its cool climate ýand nearness to the commercial tea - and 
tobacco estates at Mulanje and' Thyolo and theý export: route ý'via the Shire 
to the Indian Ocean, remained the focus 'of European", settlement and 
commerce: the core of the, urban system had already emerged. 
The colonial juggling which ended- with -Nyasaland as. 'a British 
protectorate created a country of, unusualýshape, being-530 miles long-and 
never more than 100 miles wide with-the lake taking up'roughly a quarter 
of its total area. Strategic rivalry'with the Portuguese to the'east over 
access to the Shire and the lake partly determined Nyasaland's-borders. 
It was therefore a result of European politics and geographical reality 
that the Southern region and the Shire highlands in particular, received 
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the most attention from the colonial power, and that it was here that 
Malawi's largest town was established. In comparison with other African 
colonies the location of the -main European settlements and agricultural 
estates-in the highlands is unremarkable, the Kenyan "White Highlands" 
being an obvious parallel. It is also not surprising that commercial 
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interest remained concentrated in this area throughout, the colonial 
period. Both economic theory in 'the form of Hirschmann's polarization 
effects and Myrdalls cumulative causation, and the very geography of 
Malawi whereby the Central and Northern regions were relatively 'remote 
from the original area of British contact and had no direct access to the 
sea for exports except via the Shire, would lead one to expect s6ch'a 
concentration in the early stages of development. 
Blantyre remains to this day Malawi's largest urban centre, and its 
commercial dominance is still in evidence, despite never being the 
country's capital city. Zomba, with its beautiful location at the foot of 
the Zomba Plateau was the Protectorate's capital throughout the colonial 
period. Much speculation about the choice of Zomba as 
Nyasaland's capital, and there seems little doubt that the decision was 
somewhat arbitrary. 
When Captain Hawes chose Zomba as his headquarters in 1886 one reason 
given was that it was near to the great slave route running from the south 
end of Lake Nyasa to the Portuguese coast South of Ibo. However there 
were at least two other such routes further 'north, and it has been 
proposed that the sheer beauty of the location was another factor at work. 
Personal animosities may have been influential as'well, as illustrated'by 
a commentary by R. S. Hynde in the Nyasaland Times, 10th August 1923: 
"The average person thinks that there must be' some"deepseated 
reason why the Government was located at Zomba and not near 
Blantyre. This unfortunately is not the case. The history of the 
move is instructive. Consul Hawes, before the British Government 
took Nyasaland under its protection, located his Consulate at. Zomba 
for personal reasons. He and Mr. John Buchanan did not hit it off 
with the Europeans settled in and around Blantyre, and 'as Mr. 
Buchanan, who was the most prominent landowner, had his place in 
Zomba, the Consulate was built there. When Sir Harry Johnston came 
here and took over the country healso found difficulties with the 
Europeans and missions, and probably influenced by similar reasons 
to that of Consul Hawes, he adopted Zomba as his capital. Observe 
that there was no picking out of Zomba for strategic reasons, or 
for health reasons, or because it was nearer the line of 
communications. It was purely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. " 
(quoted in Pachai, 1971, P-36). 
Johnston himself admitted the attraction of the "superb scenery" and also 
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that the selection of Zomba was the cause of "a sense of hostility, 
emanating from Blantyre", whose residents felt that it was a more logical 
choice. Objections raised against Zomba were that it was unhealthy, on a 
cyclone belt, uneconomic because of its distance from the main commercial 
centre, and later that it was off the railway line. 
The railway argument was suspect since the first Foreign Office 
surveyor's report in 1896 proposed a route from Chiromo to Zomba and 
thence to the lake, with only a five mile branch line to Blantyre, and 
this caused considerable outrage amongst Blantyre residents. When the 
Shire Highlands Railway Company contracted to build the railway the route 
was Chiromo to Blantyre, but it is impossible to know whether the Blantyre 
faction had any influence on this choice. In the end the lowering of 
river levels on the Shire necessitated that this railway started at Port 
Herald, south of Chiromo; known as the Shire Highlands railway, it was 
completed in 190B. Undoubtedly the choice of Blantyre as the railway 
terminus had a most important impact on the future development of that 
town. The actual location of the terminus was at Limbe, 5 miles from 
Blantyre, and officially the two remained separate settlements until 1956, 
but both benefited enormously from their status as the railway head and 
most of the small industrial and commercial concerns which were 
established were located here. Their position was enhanced when the 
rai&y was extended first to the Zambezi in 1915, and later to Beira in 
1922. 
A later northern extension of the railway to the lake caused more 
controversy as an eastern route to Fort Johnston was suggested passing 
near to Zomba, as well as a more central route to Domira Bay. Eventually 
in the 1930s the central route was completed to Salima, Domira Bay having 
7, 
been flooded (Pachai, 1971; Stubbs, 1972) (see Map 2.1). Zomba's 
isolation may well have prevented it assuming anything other than an 
administrative function. 
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Much of Malawi's urban system today is a legacy of colonial 
administration, which involved the division of the country into districts 
and location of lbomas' or government stations which formed the basis of 
local government. These stations were located according to British 
administrative and economic needs, and there is no evidence that the 
indigenous settlement system and concentrations of population were taken 
into account. 
Only a few of the settlements originally established in the 1890s 
have an urban function today as over the years many original bomas were 
closed and new ones established in other locations. However those that 
did grow or were located at already established settlements in the 1890s 
(e. g. Blantyre, Karonga, Kota-Kota) now form a major part of the urban 
system. The location of those government settlements established from 
1891-96 is shown in Map 2.2, which also indicates those which still retain 
an urban role today. 
Gradually the British consolidated their administrative network and 
more government stations were opened in the central and northern interior. 
By the 1920s a settlement pattern was emerging which bore a resemblance to 
that of today (see Map 2-3). Five townships had been gazetted by this 
time: Blantyre, Limbe, Zomba, Fort Johnston and Port Herald, and these 
performed the most sophisticated central place functions in Nyasaland 
during the early twentieth century. 
Most of the rest of Nyasaland's centres performed little other than 
an administrative function in the early twentieth century, to which was 
gradually added the role of retail centres. Further transport 
development added some new centres to this system. Up until 1922 the 
terminus of the Central African Railway from Port Herald was Chindio in 
Portuguese East Africa, which was then connected via the Zambezi to Chinde 
on the coast, which acted as Nyasaland's sea port. However the railway 
connecting Chindio to the port of Beira was completed in 1922 (see Map 
56 
57 
58 
2.4), and Chinde, which had been administered by the Nyasaland 
government, gradually diminished in importance (Murray, 1922; Central 
African Archives, 1951). The completion of the northern extension of 
the railway to Salima by 1935 meant that new centres to serve the railway 
appeared, such ýts Balaka and Sharpevale. Als o in this year the Zambezi 
bridge providing a rail link across the river between the Zambezi railway 
to Beira and the Central African Railway was completed. Previously a 
ferry had linked the two and the improved access must have increased the 
commercial and agricultural advantages enjoyed by those towns and areas on 
or near the line of rail. 
Nyasaland's main setttlements as recognized by the 1938 Colonial 
Report are shown in Map 2.5. Comparison with the 1922 settlement system 
shows that the new centres established by 1938 came under two categories: 
new administrative stations such as Neno in the Central Shire district, 
and, a string of small centres which had grown up along the railway. 
Although the northwards extension of the railway had lessened Blantyre and 
Limbe's advantage as the railway head, they had enjoyed that position for 
27 years and obviously their attractiveness as a location for investment 
was already established. 
Noýsignificant changes in'the'pattern of settlements occurred during 
and after the war, although the availability of more funds after 1945 
(mainly due to the passing of the Colonial, DeV61opment and Welfare Act) 
did allow for some improvements in the provision of urban services 
throughout the system. This period also saw considerable, growth-,, of,.. -the 
African urban population in Blantyre/Limbe, Zomba and Lilongwe, although 
census coverage ofýurban populations. (partioularly African urban dwellers) 
was poor in Nyasaland. The iýLst 'census (1961), before independence for 
example, did not enumerate Africans at all. 
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2.2.1 Nyasaland's Urban System at Independence 
The early evolution of Nyasaland's urban system reflected almost 
wholly processes operating during the colonial period only. Pre-colonial 
settlement patterns and economic forces had very little impact. Thus by 
independence the main features of the Nyasaland system were: 
1) An administrative capital, Zomba, whichunlike most other African 
countries had not achieved a primate position in the urban hierarchy. The 
nature of Zombals'location, and its economic'inferiority to Blantyre was a 
controversial matter throughout the colonial period. The capital was in 
fact nearly transferred to'Blantyre after a cyclone hit Zomba in 1946 
(Nyasaland, 1947b), but financial constraints and the then current issue 
of Federation meant the issue was pushed aside. 
2) A commercial'capital at Blantyre/Limbe which was the country's primate 
city and had most of its industry and commerce. In comparison to other 
African countries' primate cities at independence however, Blantyre/Lim'be 
was still fairly small. They had 6riginated as separate settlements but 
were finally amalgamated as Blantyre in 1956. The population of 
Blantyre/Limbe then was about 40,500 (Nyasaland, '1956); the later 1961 
census recorded 8,500 non-Africans for the township but did not enumerate 
the African population (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1961). 
3) A system of adminstratiVe stations which had gradually emerged over 
the years of colonial administration. - Not all places chosen ' as 
administrative stations during the colonial period kept their status, as 
many lost their administrative function (which usually meant that the 
settlement closed altogether), whilst new ones were opened. Those that 
remained by independence made up nearly all the remaining 'urban' places 
in the system. These were located entirely according to the 
administrative principles of the government with no regard for previous 
settlement patterns. Only - at Kota-Kota (later Nkhota-kota) was there'an 
administrative station which coincided with an indigenous town, which in 
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this case had previously been a. centre for the slave trade. Lilongwe was 
the most developed of these centres, the rest being mainly involved in 
administration and some trading. In some cases missionary activities were 
also located at these station; a few missions pre-dated the location of 
the station itself, as for instance at Blantyre, Kasungu and Domasi. 
4) A very limited number- of transport and trading centres. Asians and 
Africans had established thousands of retail outlets all over the country 
by this time, but very few centres had gained enough status to be 
recognized as trading centres. Asians tended to, concentrate in the 
administrative stations. However a few centres emerged along the lake 
steamer route and the railway which were important enough to be mentioned 
in some contemporary reports as small centres, and also sometimes to 
attract some investment in , public services e. g. Monkey Bay, Chipoka, 
Balaka, Luchenza, Ntakataka, Mbawa., 
5) A small number of missionary stations which unlike the majority of 
those established in Nyasaland had attracted a fairly large concentration 
of population. These stations had 'establi-sh6d relatively high order 
educational and health facilities and all belonged to the Universities 
Mission to Central Africa e. g. Livingstonia, Ekwendeni, Loudon. 
The main factors affecting the location of' these' settlements were 
similar to those operating in other colonies. One factor- was the 
administrative needs of the colonial power. In the early stages the slave 
trade routes and areas of local rebellion affected the location of 
administrative stations which were often military establishments. ýWhen 
these stations had achieved their purpose many of the remoter ones were 
closed; those which remained became part of the administrative network 
which gradually developed to cover most areas of the territory. Factors 
affecting the location of other centres were the route of the railway and 
the lake steamer service; and in the case of the missionary stations, a 
relatively healthy environment and a suitably receptive population, as 
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well as a desire to compete with and preferably pre-empt the impact of 
other brands of Christianity, let alone other faiths (Murray, 1932). 
Overall the impact of the process of urbanization in Nyasaland was 
small, and the urban system inherited at independence was both very 
limited and unbalanced. The following statement from Fetter (1982, P-93) 
actually refers to the urban system of 1945, but it very concisely picks 
out a number of salient factors about Nyasaland's colonial experience 
which the following sections will develop: 
"The most remarkable quality of the colony's urbanization is the 
absence of it. In 1945 only Blantyre with its satellite town of 
Limbe constituted a city of over 10,000. To be more precise there 
were two other towns containing over 10,000 Malawians, but they 
were outside the colony - Johannesburg and Salisburyl The absence 
of colonial cities was undoubtedly a result of Nyasaland's 
poverty. " 
2.3 Why was Nyasaland's Urban Development so Limited ? 
2.3.1 Comparison of Nyasaland's urban development with that of other 
African colonial territories 
Before attempting to identify which historical processes in Nyasaland 
could be seen as hindrances to its urban development, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that Nyasaland's urban system really was less developed than 
those in other countries which had had 
_a 
fairly similar colonial 
background. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda are obvious candidates for 
comparison, more,, so in some ways than the, two Rhodesias despite'their 
greater geographical proximity, as certain important characteristics of 
these territories set them apart from Nyasaland: their mineral wealth with 
its strong influence on urban development, the relatively very large white 
settler population in Southern Rhodesia, and the unusual political status 
enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing colony. The East African 
territories on the other hand all had agriculturally based economies with 
no major mining areas, and although Tanganyika's early colonial settlement 
pattern evolved under German rule, the major, colonial influence, as in 
Nyasaland, was British. Also there are some parallels to be drawn between 
white settlement in Kenya's 'White Highlands' and white settlement in the 
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Shire highlands in Nyasaland. In both cases the group holding most of the 
political and economic power in the territory, and with the greatest 
ability to influence decisions made in Whitehall, concentrated in one 
area. This made that area a natural location for the country's largest 
city where normally both political and economic decision-making power were 
centred; and where European demand stimulated the development of 
relatively high economic, infrastructural and urban functions. In 
Nyasaland's case this pattern was modified inasmuch as most 
administrative decisions were made in Zomba and not Blantyre, although 
this was still situated in the Shire highlands. Tanganyika did not have a 
concentrated white farming population in the same way, although Dar es 
Salaam's dominance was even more marked than that of Nairobi and Blantyre. 
Uganda is an even closer parallel to Nyasaland, the country's economy 
being primarily based on two export crops, coffee and cotton, as 
Nyasaland's was based on tea and tobacco. Also here the administrative 
capital, Entebbe, was geographically separate from the commercial capital 
and largest urban centre, Kampala. In addition, like Nyasaland, Uganda is 
landlocked and therefore necessarily had very strong links with Kenya as 
its export trade went via that country to Mombasa. Although Nyasaland was 
equally dependent on its export outlets via Mozambique, it did not develop 
a similar type of relationship with this Portuguese territory, but it did 
become very dependent on Southern Rhodesia during the colonial period. 
Uganda however retained a greater degree of independence in its 
relationships with Kenya than did Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia. If an 
East African Federation had been formed similar to that of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, perhaps Uganda's urban sytem and growth would 
have been affected in the same way that it is here proposed Nyasaland's 
was. 
Table 2.1 illustrates how, in comparison to Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda, the development of medium-sized towns in Nyasaland during the 
65 
TABLE 2.1 
Towns over 5,011: a Comparison between Nyasaland 
and Late Colonial Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda 
NYASALAND 
1956 
MALAWI 
1966 
UGANDA 
1959 
KENYA 
1962 
TANGANYIKA 
1957 
Town Popn. Town Popn. Town Popn. Town Popn. Town Popn. 
Blantyre/Liabe 41,498 B/Liabe 119,461 Kampala 46,735 Nairobi 266,794 Dar es Salaam 128,742 
Zomba 91331 Zomba 19,666 Jinja 29,741 Mombasa 179,575 Tanga 38,153 
Lilongwe 19,425 Mbale 13,569 Nakuru 38,218 Mwanza 19,877 
Mzuzu 91498 Entebbe 18,941 Kisumu 23,536 Tabora 15,361 
Kabale 11,919 Eldoret 19,615 Morogora 14,517 
Fort Portal 9,317 Thika 13,952 Moshi 13,726 
Sorati 6,645 Hanyuki 11,448 Dodosa 13,435 
Tororo 61365 Kitale 9,327 Uiiji 12,811 
Nyeri 7,857 Mtwara 11,459 
Kericho 7,692 Lindi 11,315 
6ilgil 6,452 Arusha 11,138 
Lamu 5, B28 Iringa 9,587 
Malindi 5,918 Mbep 61932 
Athi R. 5,516 
Isiolo 5,445 
F. Hall 51399 
Thomson's 
Falls 5,316 
Embu 5,213 
Note: 1. This officially recorded figure for Sources: Nyasaland, Census 1956 
Kampala refers to the municipal area only, Malawi, Census 1966 
and a more realistic figure (including all Uganda, Ministry of Ecanoeic Affairs, 1962 
the urban area of Kampala and Mengo) would Kenya, Population Census 1962 
be about 111,161-121,180 at this time Tanganyika Statistics Division, 1968 
(O'Connor, personal communication). 
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colonial period was almost non-existent. According to the 1956 census 
Nyasaland only had two towns with populations over 5000. Although no 
other figures are availableýfor the years'b4fore independence in 1964, by 
that time Lilongwe should also be"added to''"this 'category' , since it was 
approaching '5000 in 1956., H6wever-even I by - 1966 when'the nex It- ce nsus waas 
held, Malawi (as Nyasaland -had" - 'been re'named)'still'fi'ad only four towns 
over'this size. It is impossible to obtain town population estimates for 
the same base year fo'r all-the countries, - as none I were made 'in 'the 
inter-censal years and the censuses were made in different years. However 
it is 'evident that 'the other territorie6, 'despite'the simila: riiies-in 
their' hist orical background, economic base and 'population size to 
Nyasaland, had developed some sort of network of intermediate'urban places 
by.. the '' end'of the colonial peri6d. ''-Kehya had 15 centres with'pop'ulations 
of over'5 600 apart'fr6m'Nairobi and Mombasa, and Tanganyika had . 11 13 . in 
aI dditlon to Dar es Salaam. In Uganda besides Kampala and Entebbe 
(which'hadý'a ý6pula'tion comparable to Zomba in I Malawi at thi's timeY 6 
other' small'-'towns of' over 5000 'people 'also `6xis'ted, including the 
'industrial' town of Jinja. 
-A number of factors can be I identified which help to explain the lack 
of such centres in Nyasaland's urban system. For instance both" Kenya and 
Tanganyika had 'seen the development of' ports along-"th4ir' eastern 
coastlines' both prior 'to and during the' colonial peric')d, 'whilst"'the 
stimulus which Nyasaland's export trade could give toý_'_ such -urban 
development -occurred ' in Portuguese East Africa ''t 10. some e, xt ent. 
Pre colonial ports such as Mombasa, Lamu and Mali: ndi-in Kenya, or Bagamoyo 
and Lindi in Tanganyika, had no counterpaýt in"Nyasaland. Colonial port 
development involved a major expansion of those ports most suited to 
colonial needs, particularly Dar es Salaam, Tang .a and Mombasa, whilst 
others suffered a decline. The latter' however are' still number6d"among 
the -inýermediate-centres which' th6*sie territorie's had developed by 
67 
independence. Also the impact of; early Arab and-Swahili trading routes 
stimulated some urbandevelopment, for instance, at. Tabora,, and Ujiji (Soja 
and Weaver, 1916, p. 236); although some, sort of parallel can perhaps be 
drawn . with 
Nyasaland's settlement of Kota-Kota, which, although still 
relatively small at independence, had initially developed because of the 
Arab slave trade and managed to-retain some of its importance during the 
colonial period. 
Both Kenya and Tanganyika had a much larger,, -land area than 
Nyasaland, and all., three. -ýast African-territories had larger populations. 
This may have encouraged the development of a greater number of urban 
centres to, administer and, serve adequately , the larger, areas and 
populations.,,.,, On the oýher ýand, this does not explain why, the, towns 
developed were Jarger, than those developed in Nyasaland. Also Uganda is 
a- roughly similar size and. yet,, deyeloped more urban centres -, than 
Nyasaland.., 
Nyasaland waslo, ne of. the poorest of the British Africanýpossessions, 
which hindered all aspectslof, lmodernizationlýincluding the, deveTopment, of 
urban-,, infrastructure, and , 
therefore the growth, -of. industrial, and 
commercial functions. -Its rqcurrent,, revenue,. in -1958/5_9 ýwasýonly, 15-3 
million, the majority of which came from-the African.. ý,, poll tax, its -, 6% 
share of federal, income tax, And., the, 20% territorial surcharge on income 
tax collected in Nyasaland., The ýlat, ter, two, items relate to, Nyasaland's 
partnership in-the Federationýof Rhodesia-, and Nyasaland -from 195,3, when 
allýincome tax, export and import duties became,,, federal revenue., -From, the 
start ýof the Federation Nyasaland ýhad ., a, deficit on, - 
its, recurrent 
expenditurei: account and "it had practically, no scope for increasing., its 
revenues by its,. policies"-, (Federation of,, Rhodesia and Nyasaland,, 1959). 
Prior to Federation most-of Nyasala! ndl. s-public,. development expenditure was 
financed from recurrent revenue and U. K. -, government grants,,, and investment 
was generally small, averaging about , per-, year, from 1948-52. 
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During the federal years investment in the public sector increased and the 
greater proportion was financed by loans. However money available for 
development projects in Nyasaland was still limited, averaging for 
example, about E3 million annually from 1953-59, of which the Nyasaland 
government's share averaged just under E2 million per year from 1954-59. 
However Tanzania was in a comparable economic position: in 1956 its per 
capita gross domestic product was estimated at E15.8, compared to E17 for 
Nyasaland, when Kenya, and Uganda's per capita net domestic product were 
C25.9 and E20.9 respectively (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959, 
P. 51). 
, Several historical studies ýof urbanization in various African 
countries have been completed, which both describe and attempt to analyze 
the major processes involved (e. g. for Africa, as a whole: Hanna and Hanna, 
1971; Hance, 1970; for Kenya: Morgan, 1969; Obuhdo,, 1974; -for Tanzania: 
Slater, 1975; for Nigeria, Mabogunje,, 1968 ; for West Africa: McNulty-, 
1976; for East Africa: Soja and Weaver, 1976; and a number of papers in 
Obuhdo and El- Shakhs, 1979). To some extent-both the nature of, the 
processes identified, as well as their relative importance are similar in 
all the studies despite differences in the analytical frameworks-adopted. 
The pre-colonial settlement pattern is feltý, throughout Africa to have had 
an influence on present urban patterns, but in most cases, it isýagreed 
that these structures have largely been destroyed, or- superceded by the 
creation of the colonial settlement network. For instance-McNulty says 
that the colonidl phase of urbanization in West Africa Ilwas characterized 
by a growing economic dependence. on Europe and the creation of a system of 
cities to serve colonial ends. Those towns, even important indigenous 
centres such, as Oyo in-Nigeria, which did-not fit into the-colonial 
spatial scheme suffered serious 'economic and political declinellý(McNulty, 
op cit, p. 217)(1). Slater (1975, p., 153) makes a similar point in his 
study of Tanzanials, spatial structure -which he analyzed within the 
framework of dependency theory: 
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"commercial agriculture had existed in Tanzania before the 'German 
invasion, especially along the coast, where crops like rice, sugar 
and copra were produced for export to Zanzibar and other parts of 
the Indian Ocean market, both by Arab-owned slave plantations and 
by Swahili-speaking peasants. One of the results of German 
penetration was to destroy this complicated coastal economy and to 
ruin many small ports .... In 1907 a German governor remarked with 
much relevance that: 
one finds only one place that has progressed under German 
control, viz. Dar es Salaam ...... Comparatively large places 
like Pangani, Sangani and Bagamoyo have retrogressed ...... A 
whole list of medium-sized places ... have practically lost all importance. Such places are Mkwaja, Winde, Mbwenio Mbwamaji, 
Kisiju, Kiumangao, Nyamsate, Msindaji, and others ..... 11 
There is no doubt that the colonial power in Nyasaland also neglected to 
consider the existing spatial structures when imposing its own settlement 
network. However there is no evidence that an indigenous system of 
central places was in existence, as in the above examples. There were 
established trading routes, operating for both local and long distance 
trade, but there is no mention in historical studies of the existence of 
any sort of network of periodic markets, as existed in West Africa, and to 
a lesser extent in East Africa. The most detailed study of Malawian 
settlement patterns describes the evolution of various types of rural 
village networks which resulted from the interaction of factors like 
migration flows, invasions and the emergence (usually temporary) of strong 
local chiefdoms (Pike and Rimmington, 1965: Chapter 8). However 'the 
overwhelmingly rural and subsistence nature of the early Nyasa economy 
leads to the conclusion that, "true urbanization was unknown in Malawi 
before the entry of Europeans, and Asians into-'the country .... Urban 
development is entirely a result of the''growth of administration, 
commerce, and industry during the period of British protection" (ibid: 
p. 167). Kota-Kota and Karonga differed from'the usual indigenous pattern 
because of the influence of the Arab slave trade on them. Karonga was 
only a fortress and depot really, and apart from Kota-Kota no permanent, 
nucleated, multi-functional centres existed and even here agriculture 
remained the most important means of livelihood (ibid). Although other 
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large nucleated villages often had larger populations than colonial 
administrative centres, and were foci for the operation of local authority 
as exercised by their chiefs, they could not be classified as 'urban'. 
One such was Mponda at the exit of the Shire from the lake, which was the 
centre of a strong Yao chiefdom with a population of over 1,000 before 
Johnston's arrival (ibid, p. 167). I 
Some writers have in fact generalized that the whole of East Africa 
had no indigenous urban tradition in the-interior. For instance, Morgan 
says that before the colonial penetration of Kenya, there were no interior 
settlements in Kenya which could be classified as towns, as there was no 
economic base to build them on (Morgan, op cit; also see Obuhdo, 1974). 
Others have shown this to be an oversimplification (e. g. -see MckiM, 1978, 
Chapter 2), although undoubtedly the major characteristic of East African 
settlement patterns in the interior was its dispersed nature. 'Soja and 
Weaver describe two main types of pre-colonial urbanization in East 
Africa: the Arab and Swahili trade route towns like Tabora, Mpwapwa and 
Ujiji; and the "significant settlement concentrations" of the royal 
capitals of large, centralized states like Buganda and Ankole (Soja and 
Weaver, op cit: 236). There are certainly no parallels to be drawn for 
Nyasaland with the latter type of centre, and as it had no coast it had no 
opportunity to develop the ports which constituted the major pre-colonial 
urbanization experienced by Tanganyika and Kenya. 
Processes identified in various studies of Africa's colonial urban 
experience can nearly all be seen to have operated in Nyasaland also. " One 
very important exception is that the location of ports is usually seen'to 
be a very important factor in the re-orientation of a colony's spatial 
economy. Nyasaland's land-looked position meant that one major influence 
which encouraged the formatiori of relatively large urban'places ih'other 
territories was lacking in Nyasaland. In the early colonial years the 
river ports acted to some extent in the same way as the major sba: ports did 
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in other, colonies. Soja and Weaver (1976, p. 237) state: 
"The major seaports of East. Africa, emerged as the basing points 
for colonial penetration and as the centers for the export of 
commercial products from the, interior. 11 
Ports, like Port Herald and Chikwawa can be seen as having been-involved in 
both these processes but both were- really only staging points for 
functions that were really performed in Chinde, Quelimane, and later Beira 
in Portuguese East Africa. 
_Even, 
this intermediary function Was lost, as 
river levels dropped and the railway was built. Thus part of Nyasaland's 
'urbanization' process was occurring on the coast of Portuguese East 
Africa. 
The other, key urban focus of the newly imposed spatial system in 
most colonial territories was the administrative capital whose location, 
along with those of the . ports, 
directly reflected the. central,, strategic 
and exploitative objectives of. the colonial 
_pqwers.,,,. 
In West Africa the 
two foci (port and administrative capital) often qoýncided,, thus combining 
two of the major. characteristics identified. -by, 
MeNulty as being. typical, of 
West African colonial city systems: coastal orientation,, and, peripheral 
location. This is seen to be a reflection of the colonial power's need to 
organize efficiently the export-orientated and metrppole-dependent 
economic system which had been imposed. Thus the most important,, urban 
places were the major linkage points between the railways which-channelled 
exports from the interior and the shipping routes which linked the colony 
back to the metropole (McNulty, 1974). In British,, colonies,,. in Eastern, and 
Southern Africa it is not so easy to generalize; -. although, the objectives 
were the same, the location and nature of resources were more, varied, and 
several colonies were landlocked: _ i. e., Nyasaland,, -Uganda, 
Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia. The influence of the coast. was therefore far 
less persuasive. - 
Even Kenya's capital was in the interior thus providing 
the country with two-,, urban foci: the port of, Mombasa, and., the 
administrative capital of Nairobi. Theinfluences of the. railway route to 
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Uganda and of'white settlement in the "White Highlands"*were'both'factors 
in Nairobi's location; no such influences were operative in 
British-controll: ed', ' West Africa as there were 'noýBritish`possessions 
inland from the coastal colonies, nor was there' white settlement on a 
similar scald. Both the, ihfluences of a trade route-and'white settlement 
could be argued to have" affected the growth of Blantyre-as Nyasaland's 
main town; although the railway post-dated Blantyre's early growth, -it did 
have relatively good access to the Shire, by which early links with the' 
metropole were maintained. -Location on the Shire 
Jk 
was''prevented 
by'an oppressive climate. -" 
Apart' from the urbaný centres acting as river ports and the 
administrative"and commercial capitals-$ Nyasaland's only other 'urban" 
settlements'creatdd during -the colonial period''were those which emerged 
at" theadmihistrative, stations, and' the smallý`trading' centres''which 
emerged on the railway. -- Also 'there, " we_ýd `the"miS6i on sites providing, 
education'-and health services. - This patt-6rn and the 'processes inv6lved 
are almost identical to those identified'for the East African territories 
by Soja and Weaver. They recognize the' administration"as being: 
, "probably'the most -powerful generator of town growth" in East 
Africa. Strategic and health factors tended to dominate the 
location)of administrative centres, the first leading to accessible 
points near the centre of major ethnic groups, the second to areas 
of high ground and good drainage, most'commonly some 'distance away 
from both local African markets and the Asian dukas (shops) of the 
trading'centres" (Soja and Weaver, 1976, p. 239). 
This statement could be applied quite accurately to Nyasaland, except that 
here the 'strategic' interests'seemed to have'been'lesi concerned'with'the 
location of local dentres of power, and more with*ending the slave trade 
and establishing-British authority in areas'of local rebellion. ' The'lake' 
was also'important for the siting of early'ý'administrativeýstations: its 
configuration, running two-thirds of the way down one side of a very 
narrow country)meant that: it formed a most-'convenient transport-route in 
Northern and Central Nyasaland. The position of the'lakes of East Africa 
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meant they were not nearly so important' for internal-transport'. Stations 
like' Karonga, Chinteche,, Nkhata Bay, Nkhota-Kota arid'Fort Johnston- all 
reflected'Nyasaland's early dependence on the lake-as a de'ntral-pdrt of 
Nyasaland's communications network. The establishment ofý later stations 
in the''twentieth century such as Lilongwe, Neno, Ka: sungu and Mztizu 
represented more an attempt to fill in gaps in the administrative network,. 
Their exact location within the area chosen was a matter of convenience' to 
sI ome'extent. Lilongwe for instance was'requested by'a lddal'chief. Neno 
reolided the' lesi-cehtrýally , situated boma Matobe as the head . q6arte'rs of 
the Central Shire'district. Kasungu, was situated "at' an established 
missionary centre and'Miuzu'at 'an abandoned" tung' station. 
Trading dentres' are als6ý re'cognized by Soja and Weaver'as forming 
another majorýlayer of centres. The 'railwaysare'seen as being the most 
decisive'facto ,r influencing'their location'as'in Nyasal , and. ''The"groWth"of 
nucleated-, trading 'settlements at pre-existing marketing points did not 
seem to'occur' there however as it 'did, occasi: onally in'Ea6t Africa (ibid)'; 
Sometimes Asian traders would however establish shops'at periodic market 
sites. -These latter'must have been important nodes for the African rural 
population as-'they had always been, 'and' their 'impact 6n'day-to-day life 
may -have been greater than the* more remote influence of-the ýmore 
artificially created lbomas' -"'yet they were very smill-and receive'little 
comment in contemporary records. ' 
The separation -of "missionark sites from other town-building 
functions in Nyasaland was repeated throughout East Africa. The numbers 
of mission stations And schools was always fairly flu , id'as'new one Is opened 
and others closed, but for 1932 a ý'L, rough' eitimation''dan be made' from 
information contained in' the Handbook of Nyasaland. At this time there 
were approximately 55-60 ma'jor'stations-of'whichlabout one third coincided 
with administrative stations; ''most of-the-rest were completely dissoeiat6d 
from ýother nucleited"lurban" 'settlements. 'In addition 'about `3600 
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out-schools were operated by the missions, apart from those actually at 
the stations, and the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) also 
had 229 'out-stations' not included in the above mission station estimates 
(Murray, 1932). This dispersal of potential town-building functions is 
one factor that helps explain the limited degree- of urbanization 
experienced by East Africa and, Nyasaland. If administrative, trading and 
missionary service functions had located together, the population 
attracted to permanent -urban 
settlement1would Probably have been larger 
than, the combined populaeons of the dispersed settlements since there 
would_have been'the additonal attraction of the convenience of having all 
the functions combined in one location. The likelihood of a settlement 
being,,, reclognized as a town for,,, the purpose of",, enumerating , 
"urban' 
populations, would,, also have been enhanced, changing the picture of urban 
statistics in these countries. However the result of the processes of the 
colonial period,, in Nyasaland as outlined above. was,,, as in East Africa: _ 
"a_ pattern, of small, polynucleated towns, consisting, of a few 
thousand people spread out around several nodal centres, and a 
rural, landscape dotted with isolated services, a school here, a 
market center there, and administrative stations elsewhere" (Soia 
and Weaver, op cit, p. 239), ,"ýI 
For Soja and Weaver this -helps 
to explain 
'why 
by, independence only 
Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Mombasa had. populations over 40,000, 
and nearly every town -over 
20,000 was an administrative, station 
established before 1910, reflecting the major importance of colonial 
administrative needs as a town-building force. 
The theory appears to_be applicable to Nyasaland, yet urban 
development was limited here to an even greater degree. Presumably 
therefore other factors were at work. 
The degree of polarization displayed by Nyasaland's urban, system by 
independence, centring on Blantyre, is again typical'of colonial urban 
systems. In West Africa this has been seen. to be one of the major 
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characteristics of the urban legacy of colonialism (McNulty, op cit), and 
the pattern is similarly repeated in East Africa (Soja and Weaver, op cit; 
Slater, op cit). However. specialized secondary centres grew in all three 
East African territories: Mombasa in Kenyai Jinja in Uganda, and Tanga in 
Tanganyika. Nothing like this occurred in Nyasaland; 'and although 
McNulty feels that in West Africa, below the level of the primate cities, 
"urban centres, if indeed they can, be so classified, 'are practically 
devoid of employment opportunities, services and other urban facilities" 
(McNulty, op cit, p. 272), this was'truer for Nyasaland than for several 
of the countries that he was considering. 
Hanna and Hanna (1971) attach much importance to colonial'industrial 
and mining requirements'for the creation of colonial towns, 
administration, education and "entertainment as secondary, factors. 'This 
view is also taken by Magubane (1979, p. 44) who says: "the trajectory of 
urban development in Africa was based'on extractive-'eapitalism-, -which 
created urban complexes exemplified in, -"the -Katanga region of tfie'Congo, ý 
the Copperbelt of Zambia; and the Witwatersrand of the'Transvaal-in South 
Africa. " This may have some truth for selected countries (like South 
Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia), but it is more usually 
felt that industrialization was neglected by the colonial powers, and that 
the colonies' urban development and economies suffered'as a result. "' There 
appears to be a positive correlation 'between industrialization and 
urbanization, and industrial development" in 
Nyasaland'was negligible: even more so than the very limited progress-made 
in this sector in colonial Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. 
Thus whilst processes involved in the evolution of Nyasaland's urban 
system up until 1964 are often "comparable to'those'-felt to be typical for 
colonial African urbanization as a whole, in, many cases those' forces 
identified as limiting factors on urbanization were more strongly present 
in that country (e. g. general lack* of 'capital; 'disparate location of 
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urban functions). 'In-addition, many of the elements identified as'likely 
to encourage urban growth were absent or only present in a very weak form 
(e. g. access to 'the sea; existence of mineral resources; indigenous 
pre-colonial forms" of urbanization or a centralized state). Inasmuch as 
many of the' processes discussed above did also operate,, in Nyasaland, a 
similar urban system to those which evolved in these'other territories may 
be expected. However as'already'demonstrated, Nyasaland's, urban system 
was even less developed 'than those which evolved in' other British 
possessions in East Africa, 'andýalso some important processes were at work 
in Nyasaland which 'cannot-be- seen in these other studies. After'1953 
Nyasaland's links'to Southern Rhodesia were stronger than those between, 
for intance, Uganda and Kenya; 'also Nyasaland was part of a -migratory 
lcibour system operating in"Southern'-Africa' which drained it of an 
appreciable proportion of its male labour force'. The ways in which these 
factors influenced Nyasaland's urban system are discussed next, as they 
appear to 'be the-major 'processes which"differentiate the evolution of 
Nyasaland's pre-independence urban s ystem from the process in other 
similar African territories. 
2.3.2 Nyasaland I s-PrimýLte City: Salisbury, or 'Blantyre? (2) 
There 'is much evidence to show that Nyasaland's urban system did 
become merely part of the federal urban hierarchy during the'-y6ars 
1953-63. It is also arguable that, throughout the entire period in which 
it was a protectorate, its urban system was so strongly linked to Southern 
Rhodesia and particularly to Salisbury that-to regard it as an autonomous 
system with'Blantyre as'its core is invalid. - The model of the world's 
urban system proposed 'by Frank (1966) incorporates this concept: less 
developed countries having a core region including the country's-' main 
metropolis to which the rest of the country is peripheral, and the cor6 
region in turn being linked to, and -subordinate to the-metropoli of the 
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developed world. In Nyasaland's case however the model can be ýextended 
for here existed an urban system which, if'superficially viewed within the' 
territorial unit, aI ppeared to follow the familiar patterý of one large 
primate city which stood at the apex of a system of much smaller urban 
centres with a paucity of intermediate towns; however-wh6n the links 
between Blantyre and Salisbury are examined it appears that the true 
'core' of Nyasaland's' system was Salisbury. 'Salisbury was then linked 
strongly to the developed world via London, and ultimately it--was here 
that key decisions affecting much of the political, economic and social 
development of the two possessions would be made. Thus Blantyre was not 
simply a secondary satellite relative to the world system, but was a 
tertiary outpost 'through which centralbontrollwasýchannelled. In this 
sense it was almost comparable to, for instance, Tanga or Moshi- in 
Tanzania, Kisumu or Mombasa in Kenya, ' or Kumasi in Ghana. This analysis 
seems to go some way to explaining the extreme 'underdevelopment, of 
Nyasaland's urban system at the time of Independence. 
Even prior to Federation Salisbury 'performed many functions'with 
respect to Nyasaland which placed it at the head-of many of the country's 
spheres of activity, although central administrative power was located in 
Zomba with the Protectorate's Governor and was thence linked to- London. 
Through Zomba the ultimate authority of central decision-makers in the 
United Kingdom was channelled as were those policies'and decisionswhich 
Nyasaland's legislative body was able to make. Central, decisiOns relating 
to major issues were made by the Colonial Office in London; for instance, 
the crucial issue of the route of the first section of Nyasaland's railway 
had to be referred to the Foreign Office in 1896 by Sir Harry*Johnston, as 
was the question of the removal of the capital when this arose. (Pachai, 
1971). In the political sphere therefore Nyasaland'at this stage was no 
different from other British colonies and Protectorates, with'the'capital 
acting as the immediate 'core' for the territory. However Zomba remained 
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very small when compared to, for instance, Nairobi or Dar es Salaam, which 
were both not only their countries' administrative centres, but also their 
main commercial and service centres. In Nyasaland the highest order 
commercial and service functions were found in Blantyre. Both Nairobi and 
Dar acted as the foci through which links to and from the rest of the 
world and particularly London were channelled, yet in many instances 
Nyasaland's external linkages had to go through Salisbury. 
For instance, almost all external communication links (except for 
road and railway transport) for Nyasaland operated through Salisbury 
during most of the colonial period. Obviously when the seqL, route was the 
only external transport link, Southern Rhodesia had no -part to play 
in 
passenger and trade traffic. Air transport changed this pattern with 
regard to passenger traffic in particular. Salisbury also came to play an 
increasingly important role in the general sphere. of communications over 
the years. The earliest form of communication Was postal, and the network 
of postal agencies operating from administrative stations, wixs linked by 
various means to Zomba or Blantyre. At first the postal links-between 
Nyasaland and the rest of the world operat6d by river transport via I Chinde 
on the Portuguese East African coast. ' As' eaýly"as 1909-id a direct 
exchange of mails between Chinde and Blantyre, was begun (British Central 
African Protectorate, 1911). However when- airmail was introduc I ed al -1 
Nyasaland's airmail had to go to Salisbury, by train before IbI eing forwarded 
by air to its destination (Nyasaland, 1931). The ai , rmail ''link 'betweeý 
Blantyre and Salisbury was inaugurated in' 1934 (Nyasaland, 1934Y. 
Early telegraph linkages were to Tanzania, ý`souih fromBlintyre to Chindio 
on the River Zambezi via a line owned by the Central African Railways, 'and' 
from Chiromo on the River Shire to Chinde on-the coast'via a Portuguese 
line. However as telecommunications impýoved-'Salisbury became Nyasaland's 
main centre for this service also. A radiotelephone link between-Z6mba 
and Salisbury was established in 1950 (Nyasaland, 1950), and when a 
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telephone link between Nyasaland and London became possible in 1953 this 
also was routed through Salisbury (Nyasaland, 1953). 
Chileka aerodrome at Blantyre was not even begun until 1932 and the 
air link to London and most other external destinations was then via 
Salisbury. A direct link between Nyasaland and London operated for only 
one year, in 1949, when B. O. A. C. flying boats from London landed at Cape 
Maclear on the Southern lake-shore (Nyasaland, 1949). The basis of 
Nyasaland's early air services was the Central African Airways Corporation 
(CAAC) established in 1946, and most international flights originated in 
Salisbury. Prior to this Nyasaland had gradually developed an internal 
air service linking many of its main administrative centres but the only 
regular external links were to Salisbury and Fort Jameson in Northern 
Rhodesia. The air route maps for 1946 and 1960 illustrate how Salisbury 
rather than Blantyre was the main link between local and international air 
traffic (Maps 2.6 and 2-7). For a while Nairobi was also. an important 
centre as it offered a connection to London via a South'African flight, 
and the CAAC flight from Salisbury to Nairobi actually went via Blantyre 
(Nyasaland, 1946). By 1948 a daily air service from 
Lntyre 
to Salisbury 
was operating, strengthening the links between the two (Nyasaland, 1948) 
and by 1952 the CAAC had added some new routes. These included a twice 
weekly service from Blantyre to Dar es Salaam and then Nairobi, and links 
from Salisbury to Livingstone, Bulawayo and Lourenco Marques, as well as 
those to Beira and Johannesburg. Connections to Europe, India and 
Australia could be made from East African destinations. Thus Salisbury 
was acting as Nyasaland's major link to Southern and Central Africa. - It 
also regained its position in terms of the crucial air link to London as 
by 1960 the flight via Blantyre to Nairobi was lost and the only direct 
link Nyasaland had to a destination beyond the Federation was to Dar es 
Salaam - all other external links operated via Salisbury (Federation ot 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960&, P. 31). 
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Salisbury also stood at the apex of another vital aspect of 
Nyasaland's urban functions: that 'of European secondary education. This 
was available in most other"colonies providing another central place 
function for many towns, especially the capital although the schools were 
not necessarily urban based. However, to save money Britain decided that 
it was not necessary to provide such a' service in Nyasaland and all 
European secondary pupils' had to go to Southern Rhodesia and usually 
Salisbury, for this purpose. In 1935 a conference for Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was held to create a common educational 
policy for all three territories with the result that Southern Rhodesia 
was regarded as the main centre for European education (Nyasaland, 1935). 
This meant that the people who might well have eventually become important 
in Nyasaland's economic, social and' Political life were educated in 
Salisbury and kI new it fairly well and 4ere'maybe likely to I vie Iw it as I It I he 
metropolel to which Blantyre was a pale comparison It is arguable that 
this would be 'to the detriment of Blantyre's and Nyasaland's urban 
development as those who ' became private investors or public 
decision-makers would have -a psychological tendency to look to Southern 
Rhodesia and Salisbury for 'profit-making opportunities and/or political 
guidance. 
Thus the links between the two cou'AAes were' already strongly 
established' before 1953'and 'the consolidation of the - Nyasaland/Sout I hern 
Rhodesia link through Federation, ' and in almost ýevery' case the picture 
was one, in which Nyasaland/Blantyre stood in a subordinate position to the 
central services provided by Southern Rhodesia/Salisbury. The advent of 
Federation obviously strengthened this situation because now central 
administrative authority over much of Nyasaland's 'e'conomy a- nd p ublic 
expenditure'was vested in Salisbury . as the'Federal capital. 
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2.3.3 The effect of Federation on Nyasaland's urban system 
In 1953 Nyasaland became part of the Federation of Rhodesia, and 
Nyasaland, alopg, with Southern and, Northern Rhodesia. Exactly how this 
affected, 
-Nyasaland's 
evolving urban system is difficult to analyse. 
Opinions on whether the Federal period was beneficial, to economic and 
social development as a, whole in Nyasaland are conflicting:, some felt, the 
amalgamation was most undesirable (for instance, see Clutton? rProck, 1959) 
and represented,, a betrayal of Nyasaland's Protectorate status, by the 
British Government,.. whilst others stressed the economic benefits to be 
gained. by a small,, poor. and, densely populated, country from association 
with the more diverse and labour-hungry economies of the two Rhodesias. 
This latter argument is most forcibly argued by all publications issuing 
from Southern Rhodesia, before 1953, and from the Federation as,. a,., whole 
after,, -1953,, which 
dealt,, with this question (e. g. Federation of, Rhodesia 
and. Nyasaland, 19600). Most relatively objective authors admitted that 
there was no simple answer to the., question, 
'as, 
there, were bothadvantages 
and disadvantages for, Nyasaland, some more easily. measured than others, 
and,. it could only be-sppoulated as to how, Nyasaland would'have fared. if it 
had not become part of the Federation. One very valid fear was that 
Federation represented an attempt by relatively powerful Southern Rhodesia 
to create a territory which could later, receive, Dominionstatus,, thereby 
allowing the introduction of racist, policies, as in-Sputh Africa,, under. an 
autonomous white Government. Events in Rhodesia after Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia had received their independence certainly proved this 
fear to be well-founded,, and the -break up of the 
Federation in_1963 was 
indispensable to their, national integrity- 
However, socio-politic4l. considerations. aside, the weight of-opinion 
is generally that Nypaland, probably,, benefited to some degree from the 
Federation, in purely, economicýterms. This did, not- necessarily, mean, of 
course, that the economic benefits were of a nature that enhanced -the 
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long-term,, development of urban-based activities in Nyasaýland, which is the 
real issue in question-here. - Nevertheless, the 'Jack Report', a federal 
economic survey of Nyasaland in 1958/59, for Instance, pointed out that 
association with the other two more credit-worthy territories meant- that 
commercial loans for capital expenditure in Nyasaland were more easily 
obtained. This view was generally shared by those analysing the effects 
of Federation for Nyasaland, although Hazlewood and Henderson (1960) 
felt the case was overstated. Prior to Federation Nyasaland had only 
raised one loan for general development (on the London market), but by 
1959 it had raised another on the New York market'and had received shares 
of three Federal loans raised on the London market, plus four issues of 
Federal local stock. Obviously this allowed for considerable development 
expenditure which almost definitely could not have been funded by 
alternative means, such as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, "had 
Nyasaland remained outside the Federation. Repayment of loans obviously 
represented a burden for Nyasaland which -before Federation. had hadýonly 
very modest support from Britain, and had achieved a small'surplus in the 
years immediately before Federation (Creighton, 1960), but suffered, an 
increasing shortfall in its recurrent account throughout the Federal 
period. 
Nyasaland lost control of its principal sources of revenue to the 
Federal Government, as import, excise and export duties and income tax 
became Federal responsibilities -and accrued to Federal revenues. This 
left Nyasaland with control over the proceeds of the African poll-tax, 
licence sales and motor-spirit tax only. The major source of revenue-for 
the Nyasaland Government became the 6% share of income from Federal taxes, 
supplemented by a 20% territorial surcharge on basic income tax collected 
within Nyasaland. Most authors (e. g. Creighton, 1960; Federation-of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959; Franklin, 1963; Hazlewood and Henderson, 
1960) agree that the total revenues thus available to Nyasaland exceeded 
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those it would have received if it had not joined' the Federation as it 
benefitted from the copper boom in Northern Rhodesia, although its loss of 
control over its sources of revenue was felt to be "less 
satisfactory" (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, op cit) from the 
view-point of budget planning. Uncertainty over yearly territorial income 
cannot have helped long-term development planning and in- 1958/59' for 
instance a fall in copper prices caused a 22% fall in Nyasaland's share of 
Federal income tax (which had previously increased year by year) from 
E2.46 million in 1957/58 to E1.95 million. 
Recurrent Government-revenue is a fairly useful index of a country's 
prosperity, and the degree to -which Nyasaland's recurrent 'revenues 
benefit_ed was significant but not spectacular. Of course it is possible 
that some of the growth would have* occurred without Federation although 
this is 'speculation. General development' in Nyasaland up-to 1952, ' 
although slow, ' had allowed'the Government's rev'enues'to'growý and I -from 
1950-52 they increased from E2,950,000 to E3,378,000 (an average annual- 
growth rate of 4.6%). In 1958/59 E5,332POO was ýreceived"implying-an 
average annual growth rate from 1952 of 7.9% (Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland,, "'1959). 
The most cautious analyses of the economic benefits of-Federation'to' 
Nyasaland (Hazlewood and'Henderson, 1960; 'Voodruff"and Thompson, 1954Y; 
discounted many of the general benefits presumed to operate, such as the 
stimulus to industry of a wider, unifieýd market'and 'free labour movement', ' 
pointing out that to a large extent these conditions had operated prior to' 
Federation. Nyasaland, in fact', because-it'was part of the Congo Basin' 
Treaty, ' couldý not previously 'operate discriminatory tarriffs although 
its own exports to the other two territories' were -treated at the most 
preferential tarriff rates applied -to the United KingdoMand Colonies. ' 
When the 'discriminatory tarrifft-of ! the' Federation"were applied to 
Nyasaland in 195 in the opinion of Hazlewood and Henderson . the changes 
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were not beneficial and prices for some basic commodities like hoes, 
shirts and enamelware rose as increased ta.., riffs were imposed on goods 
from cheap sources like India and Hong Kong. Also protectionist policies 
covering a customs union are often not beneficial to the whole area 
especially "where the economic growth stimulated by the taýyiff is highly 
localized geographically" (Hazlewood and Henderson, 1960, P. 76), and the 
opening of Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesian industry in particular probably 
meant that "industrial development within Nyasaland will be made more 
difficult" (ibid, p-76). This argument will be further discussed later, 
as the development of industry has major repercussions on urban 
development. The most direct benefits therefore were felt to be the 
increase in current revenues available to Nyasaland, and possibly a 
higher level of public capital expenditure and the safeguard of Federal 
citizenship preventing Southern Rhodesia's post -1958 foreign labour 
restrictions affecting the large migrant labour force from Nyasaland. - 
For an analysis of the impact of Federation on Nyasaland's urban 
system it is important to establish how Nyasaland's prospects for overall 
development expenditure were affected. As can be seen, on balance, these 
were improved, and inasmuch as the urban centres of, the Protectorate 
benefitted from this expenditure (e. g., in the ýexpansion of -building 
programmes, and provision of various amenities and facilities) the, impact 
was beneficial. 
Another indirect consequence of Federation that could have had-an 
impact on urban development did not occur. The spectre of -the 
establishment of 'apartheid' type policies within the-Federalterritories 
which would have severely affected the growth and urban morphology -of, 
Nyasaland's towns was not realized. Racial segregation was a component of 
Nyasaland's urban residential patterns but this was largely due to 
economic factors rather than a, deliberate policy measure. 
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2.3.3.1 Direct Effects of Federation 
It is impossible to be clear about how much' of Nyasaland's 
development within urban areas from 1953-63 was a result 'of theFederal 
links and how much would have occurred anyway. This is made even more 
difficult because different sources voice differing opinions about how 
various sectors of Nyasaland's economy were affected by Federation, ' and 
none address themselves specifically to urban development. However the 
location of industrial and commercial development and the siting of the 
Federal capital are two factors affecting the" urban system which'received 
some attention in. contemporary literature. 
a) Industry and commerce 
Most contemporary analysts viewed Nyasaland's industrial prospects 
in a negative light. ' They either felt ithit development was very 
restricted and the potential for 'expansion verYý limited, 'or that 
federation with the more attractive investment areas of Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia would mean that new industries would locate there to`aný 
even greater extent than '' if Nyasaland' was' a s, eparate 'unit. ' 
Industrialization in Nyasaland suffered'from the disadvantage 'of lack of 
power sources and although these were being expanded, particularly in 
Blantyre, the Jack Report pointed out that "assured 'and abundant power in 
the larger centres of th6'rest of thelederation as a result of, the Kariba 
scheme might I divert to I the Rhodesias some of'tý'e i'n"dustria 11 expansion 
which might have otherwise occurred in Nyasalahd"'(Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, 1959, p. 17). To add insult* to'injury'the'Kariba'project 
absorbed a massive proportion of 'Feaeral'devel6pment funds''to"'w'hich 
Nyasaland was a contributor. In the 1959-63 Fe'deral"deveiopment plan the- 
Kariba project accounted -'for an' average annual ''expenditure of E6.3 
million, or 34% of total development expenditure (Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, Ministry of Economic*Affairs, , '1962). Had special efforts 
been made to prevent Nyasaland 'falling even further behind in the power 
stakes, and therefore 'in ' its ''ability to attract-' urban-based 
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power-dependent investment, its financial loss on the Kariba project from 
which it benefited not at all would have been less important. After all 
it did receive more funds on the whole from the Federation than it put in 
because of the redistribution of the Northern Rhodesian -copper revenues. 
However as no such efforts were made, in this case Nyasaland appears to 
have lost out all round. 
Transportation between Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a 
hindrance to some extent to the former's relatively advanced industries 
having complete access to Nyasaland's market. The planned 
Salisburyl-Blantyre all-weather road via Tete in Mozambique was never 
completed during the federal years. Had it been, it would have made 
Nyasaland even more vulnerable to penetration by outside, producers and 
correspondingly harmed its own industrial development (Hazlewood and 
Henderson, 1960). 
In absolute terms the growth of manufacturing output occurred 
overwhelmingly in Southern Rhodesia during the federal. years. Between 
1955/56 and 1957/58 net output of manufacturing industry, expanded by_f: 12.8 
million there, compared to E2.1 million in Northern Rhodesia and, only CO. 9 
million jn Nyasaland. However Nyýsalandls share of total Federal 
industrial production remained virtually, constant during that period at 
2%, whilst Southern Rhodesia's share increased from 40% to 47%. It could 
be argued therefore that Nyasaland neither gained nor lost in terms of 
industrial investment and its corollary of urban population, and 
functional, growth. Onthe other hand it is also true that countries with 
a very small industrial base often experience industrial growth rates 
which exceed that of more industrialized territories, during the early 
stage of development. Therefore Nyasaland's share of Federal industrial 
output should perhaps have increased, even if only by one or. two per cent, 
simply because there were so many gaps to be filled. That this did not 
occur may have been because industries -chose -. 
to locate elsewhere in the 
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Federation due to the more favourable infrastructural and commercial 
facilities to be found there. 
Nyasaland's population was almost equal to that of Southern 
Rhodesia's in 1956 (2.61 million compared to 2.91 million). Northern 
Rhodesia's was smaller at 2.2 million so there was little disadvantage for 
prospective industrialists in terms of Nyasaland's labour force and labour 
costs we're lowest here, although the very low average incomes of the 
African population there would- have depressed its comparative market 
potential. Southern Rhodesia's European population was also 25 times that 
of Nyasaland's so manufactures geared to a European market would 
obv16uslý be'attracted there. 
One way'of estimating the impact of the Federation 'on'Nyasaland's 
industrial development is to''analyse F investors' guides and Federal 
industýial policy, to see whether Nyasaland received equal treatment'in 
relation to its'resources 'and industrial needs. There was no attempt made 
by the Federal government's Ministry 'of Commerce and Industry'to guide 
industrial- development into particular areas, and therefore"private 
decision-making was the major factor involved in industrial location. The 
1962-65 'Federal development plan stated that "generally, the provision of 
capital for' industry* is a function of the private sector aided by the 
various policy measures of the Government, incuding -the provision of 
services, aimed at the creation of a favourable climate for industrial 
expansion"' (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland', -1962, 'P-31)_- Inasmuch 
as the Kariba dam development was a government policy measure which 
provided a -more attractive climate -for industrialization in the two 
Rhodesias compared to'Nyasaland(thereforeN 
industry was damaged by government policy- 
Each territory had its, own industrial 
territorial government. However the 
Corporation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, finai 
Nyasaland's ability to attract 
finance body spofi-sored by the 
federal Industrial Promotion 
aced by the Central Bank, i4as a 
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purely commercial concern and thus 'unlikely to 'show 'preference to 
Nyasaland as an area which had the greatest' need' for- industrial 
development. 
Investment- guides for the Federation 'also may not have I helped 
Nyasaland, as it was bound to be seen in an unfavourabl4' light when 
compared to the other, more economically developed terrritoribs. Sepa I rate , 
guides for' Nyasaland alone would have prevented 'it Suffering by 
comparison. The Federation' produced its own investor's guide in 1960, and 
both the text and the maps which'de'scribed the geographi , 6al-location of 
infrastuctural facilities served 'tO' accentuate the relative 
underdevelopment of Nyasaland in those respects. From a purely perceptual 
viewpoint federal maps in general made Nyasaland 'look' remote''and 
peripheral to the main economy, which an emphasis on popula'tion'numbers 
might have helped to diminish. The section on markets- emphasized the 
importance of Southern Rhodesia because of its large European population. 
European consumption expenditure in the Federation was estimated to be 
double that of the African population. The three'main market areas listed 
therefore were Salisbury, Bulawayo and the Copperbelt, and it was'pointed 
out that African incomes also tended to be higher in these areas. The 
only potential market mentioned for Nyasaland was Blantyre/Limbe. 
The guide also listed the headquarters of commercial enterprises by 
location, and again Nyasaland was noticeable oniy'by its'absence. Al 11 five 
U. K. banks operating in the Federation had their lo&ai'H. Qs in Salisbury, 
as did the other three' banking groups including the Merchant Bank of 
Central Africa and the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. ' The' latier did not 
even have a branch in Nyasaland until one opened in Blantyre in-1962, a 
year before the Federation ended (Federation of Rhodeýiaand"Nyasaland, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1963). Eleven finance and trust companies 
also had their H. Qs in Salisbury and only one'was based in Nyasaland (in 
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Limbe). None of the Federation's fifteen discount houses,. were based in 
Nyasaland either, and eight of them had their headquarters in. Salisbury, 
as did the three federally based producers' and employers' organisations 
(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960a). The location of commercial 
services and governmental offices is known to be a factor influencing the 
location of commercial and industrial development, and, -potential 
industrial investors would obviously have, been attracted to Salisbury, by 
these factors. Nyasaland's towns on the other hand were, at ýa- complete 
disadvantage in these terms. 
Other surveys and guides presented much the same picture. A 
Barclays Bank survey of the Federation devoted more space --and 
information to Southern Rhodesia than to either of, the other two 
territories. At the time there were 77 Barclays Bank branches, in Southern 
Rhodesia (20 in Salisbury alone), 25 in Northern Rhodesia, ý and only 5 in 
Nyasaland (Barclays Bank, DCO, 1961). Southern, Rhodesia, and Salisbury 
were again pre-eminent in a U. S. A. Department, of,, Commerce -guide to 
investment in the Federation. An appendix listing the, Federationis,. towns 
gave only Blantyre/Limbe for Nyasaland, with a brief, - mention of, 
Zomba 
(U. S. A. Dep4rtment. of Commercel 1956). Another American sponsored report 
on the Federation's economy stated that "Nyasaland is of little economic 
consequence at present" and virtually dismissed it from further discussion 
(Enke, 1959). 
This sort. of information may have,, been quite important for 
investment from external sources. where the decision-maker. s-had little or 
no prior knowledge of, the three territories. Additional information, could 
have come from the Federal Information, Department,., which yet again had its 
headquarters in Salisbury. Private decision-makers are not guided purely 
by strict analysis of the factors which affect the return to capital; 
however k to the extent that they, are, these factors may be ones on which 
they are imperfectly informed,, especially if their sources of information 
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are notý 
, 
fully)objective. In the examples discussed above, Nyasaland's 
treatment is to some extent subjective because detail is lost for the, sake 
of the generalization made necessary by the size of the, unit to be 
surveyed. Every characteristic is presented in relation to the whole 
Federation and therfore usually as a relative lack of that factor, rather 
than a mere report of its presence. This probably unintentional and 
unavoidable slant given to Nyasaland through its relationships with the, other more 
resource-rich federal territories cannot have helped its 'investment 
image I. 
Investors' decisions are also distorted, from a purely profit-making 
view, by their perceptions of other, perhaps social advantages of a 
particular location. This has been termed "psychic income" by Richardson 
(1969). They may-'also overestimate the agglomeration economies to be 
gained by location in the main metropolis and/or capital . -because, its 
obvious size-and stage of, commercial and administrative development 
relative to smaller centres -distracts their attention-from unrealized 
potential'in other locations. This is one of 'the factors-recognized by 
Friedmann (1966) as *, hindering the process of 'trickle-down, or 'spread 
effects' in an urban hierarchy. 
b) Choice of Salisbury as Federal Capital 
That Salisbury became th6-Federal-., capital was 'almost inevitable-, 
although the decision was not- made -without-some- controversy. -- 1he 
arguments against Salisbury' at the'time'were'mainly. politioal.,, -, First, 
siting the capital in one of the other 'territories would , have-ýbeen'a 
strategic move that would have*illustratEd. a spirit of federal partnership 
rather than the domination which both Nyasaland and Northern'Rhodesia 
feared. Second, Salisbury was racist, and-this obviously 'caused an 
enormous amount of ill-feeling, especially- for those -Africans "from 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who had 'to visit, the federal capitalýonly 
to find many amenities were denied to them. A Select 'Committee'on the 
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question, appointed in 1954, prepared a report which, nevertheless, led to 
the choice of Salisbury as the federal capital. This report had covered 
alternative sites in the other territories with what was felt to be 
suspicious speed, especially since Sir Roy Welensky (the Federal Prime 
Minister) had stated in 1952 that none of the three territorial capitals 
would become the federal capital., Certainly there was evidence that the 
result had been a foregone conclusion, demonstrating the power wielded by 
the Southern. Rhodesians- in the supposedly democratic process of federal 
decision-making (Franklin,, 1963). 
The economic issues. relating to the siting of the capital at the 
Federation's most populous and economically developed city, appear- to have 
received less recognition at the time. Salisbury had not, only, the 
economic advantages of having the Federation's most 
advanced infrastructural and industrial base, but also, as the seat of the 
federal government, was now an even more obvious choice for the 
headquarters of enterprises operating in all three territories and for, new 
industrial, commercial and trading establishments. If the federal capital 
had been sited at any other town, particularly one outside Southern 
Rhodesia, it is probable thatl a more equal spread of urban-based 
development would have been achieved. If Nyasaland had been chosen to 
house the federal capital, 
, 
for instance at Blantyre (this not being a 
territorial capital), the gains to that particular town would have been 
obvious, and it is-arguable that the whole territory would have benefited. 
Not only would direct-gains have occurred due to, necessary -investment, 
in 
the new capital, but the territory as a whole would, probably have received 
more official attention merely because those in authority would have been 
more familiar with it by virtue of their residence there, and also because 
they would have been more accessible to the views and opinions of the 
inhabitants of Nyasaland. Had Northern Rhodesia housed the federal 
capital the detraction from Salisbury's position may have prevented the, 
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degree of concentration-of urban investment there which occurred, although 
whether this competition would have aided Nyasaland's urban centres is 
impossible to tell. However it would have lessened the extent to which 
Nyasaland was operating as a satellite of Salisbury with all that this 
entailed for the status of Blantyre and Zomba. 
The general- theme of these arguments about Salisbury were in, fact 
recognized as the federal period progressed, as is illustrated by this 
statement taken from. the Monckton Commission which was set up to review 
the Federation's constitution: 
"The siting of the Federal capital in Salisbury has undoubtedly 
caused dissatisfaction and suspicion in the Northern Territories. 
We were told this by both Africans and Europeans. The latter 
maintain that the capital should have been placed in one or other 
of the less developed Northern Territories, thus stimulating 
development there, and that its location in Salisbury has led to a 
greater concentration of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia 
than is equitable. The African objections are partly 
psychological, because it is felt that the Yederal Government by 
being in Salisbury comes too much under the influence of the 
Southern Rhodesian Government, and partly due to the racial 
discrimination which still exists in Salisbury .... There is therefore a strong case for moving the Federal capital from 
Southern Rhodesia altogether. " (Report of the Advisory Commission, 
1960, p. 90) 
The financial cost of relocation however was felt to outweigh the benefits 
to be gained, although it was also felt that if Salisbury did not improve 
its attitudes to racial discrimination, a move might eventually become 
unavoidable. However the'general findings of the Commission had "passed 
the death sentence on the Federation" (Pike, 1968, p. 157). In 1961 
Nyasaland held a general'election for representatives 6n'its territorial 
Legislative Council and in 1962 adopted a new constitution providing for a 
two-stage move towards full internal self-government. The Federation 
finally came to an end on December'31st, 'i963- 
2.3.4 Migration and Urbanization in Nyasaland 
Labour was one of Nyasaland's main exports in the'colonial period I and 
the effects of this on social and economic life in Nyasaland were all- 
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pervasive. Much authoritative empirical and theoretical work has been 
done on the causes and effects of the migrant labour system in Southern 
Africa and it is not intended here to tackle these topics in detail (e. g. 
see Palmer and Parsons, 1977; Schapera, 1947; Boeder, 1973; Murray, 1981). 
The perspective here is to emphasize that the degree to which Nyasaland 
was involved was another factor which would have depressed urban 
development there because at any one time a significant proportion of the 
male labour force was away, and by deduction therefore a number of 
potential urban dwellers were absent. 
Table 2.2 gives estimates of the number of male Nyasas working abroad 
between the years 1927-62. This and the following table (2-3) show that 
both the absolute numbers and the proportion of the male labour force 
absent from Nyasaland increased over this period. Women also migrated but 
their numbers were relatively insignificant. Despite some reservations 
about the accuracy of the figures (see Appendix 2.1) it is possible that 
up until about 1930 the proportion who went abroad was relatively small 
and thereafter a rapid upward trend emerged, with between 20-30% of adult 
males away up until the end of the war (which in itself proved a drain on 
Nyasaland's male labour force), and after the war over a third being 
absent. The numbers applying for identity certificates to go abroad 
(Table 2.4) also increased over the years; in the ten years up until 1962 
the average number applying was about 70,000 per year (Nyasaland, 1962). 
The numbers varied slightly from year to year according to conditions in 
the destination countries. 
The reason for this enormous movement was the attraction of much 
higher wages in the main territories to which the migrants moved. Lack of 
any employment opportunities in certain areas of Nyasaland also played a 
part, but the wage differential was certainly the most important factor. 
The emigration was in fact viewed with much misgiving by certain sectors 
of the white population in Nyasaland as sometimes it became difficult to 
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TABLE 2.3 
Estimated Nyasa Male Labour Force and Percentaqe-Absent 1930-56 
1930 1937 1938 045 1948 1 1952 1953 ý 1954 1955 1956 
Estimated labmr 
force (male) 30D, 000 443,000 424,000 513,000 na 413,000 423, bOD 435,000 435,000 43D, 625 
Nrcentage 
ibsent >10% 201 M1 241 M 36% 3EM 371 371 
Notes. - 1. no data ayailable for 1931-36,1939-44, 
1946-47,1949-51 
2. see kpndix 2.1 for explanation of 
variations in defining 'mle labour force'. 
Scurce: data irce Nyasaland, Rq)crts icr the 
years 1930-62 
TABLE 2.4 
Annual ISSUe of Identity Certificates to Migrant Workers 1946-61 
Country of 
Destination 
Average 
1946-58 
Average 
1951-55 1956 1957 1958 1959 1968 1961 
Southern Rhodesia 22,853 41,662 51,768 49,248 44,863 41,252 36,424 28,947 
Northern Rhodesia 1,369 41145 5,630 6,671 3,961 5,155 7,440 8,537 
South Africa 91925 
f 
18,189 15,516 18,115 19,615 22,822 28,656 34,485 
Other Territories 395 619 391 382 586 865 1,022 663 
TOTAL 33,852 55,545 72,384 ý 74,346 68,945 68,924 73,551 72,552 
Source: data fro* Nyasaland, Reports for the years 1946-62 
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recruit sufficient workers to fulfil their needs. This is first mentioned 
in the 1947 Colonial Report when a labour shortage, particularly in the 
south where the majority of the European plantations were, is discussed in 
relation to the problem of migrant workers. Also local African chiefs and 
the white missionaries often complained about the system because of its 
disruptive effects on family life and the exercise of traditional local 
authority. However the unequal distribution of cash-earning 
opportunities, whether in self-employment or as an employee, did mean that 
in the Central and Southern Regions men were less likely to be actively 
forced to migrate in order to pay their taxes. In the Northern Region 
however the almost complete lack of wage-earning opportunities combined 
with a lack of infrastructure which prevented the development of African 
cash crop agriculture (as it developed in the Central Region) meant that 
in 1945 22% of the entire male population was abroad (excluding those on 
military service). The corresponding percentages for the Central and 
Southern Regions were 11% and 5% (Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1952). The 
conditions under which the migration occurred varied according to the 
destination, but nearly all of it was circular, most men returning within 
three years, if only for a holiday (Nyasaland, 1947). 
By far the largest'proportion of the migrants went to Southern 
Rhodesia, yet another important link between the two countries. The 
average wages paid here'were considerably higher than the average wages 
operating in Nyasaland, as illustrat . ed in Table 2.5. For 
convenience average wages in Northern Rhodesia are also given for 
comparison. In 1959, when the largest number of male Nyasas is estimated 
to have been in Southern Rhodesia (see Table 2.2), probably about one 
quarter of Nyasaland's male labour force was at work there. Federation 
does not appear to have affected the numbers attracted to work there: the 
upward trend registered before 1953 simply continued. A certain 
proportion of those who went to Southern Rhodesia went under contract but 
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TABLE 2.5 
Average African-Wages in the Federation 
PER ANNUM 
TERRITORY 1954 1960 1961 1962 
Southern Rhodesia 63 91 99 101 
Northern Rhodesia 77 133 142 146 
Nyasaland 36 57 60 65 
source: adapted from Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, 1963, p. 18. 
Note: wages in Northern-Rhodesia are skewed by the very high wages 
on the mines, where in 1959 the lowest paid surface worker earned 
ilg/12/6 for a 30 day ticket (Fedtration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
195B/59, p. 77). Wages for other jobs were generally higher in 
Southern Rhodesia: the urban minimum weekly wage here was 32/- 
compared to a minimum daily wage of 2/ld to 2/6d in townships 
in 
Nyasaland (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963). 
TABLE 2.6 
WENELA Recruitment in Nyasaland 1947-62, 
YEAR 1947 1948 !. 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Quota 
no. recruited 
12,750 
9,800 
10,000 
1 
9,540 
10,000 
8,022 
8,000 
7,889 
8,000 71000 10,000 109000 
7,828 6,501 6,974 9,844 
YEAR 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Quota 
no. 
- 
recruited 
12,600 
12,600 
14,000 
14,000 
16,000 
16,000 
18,000 
18,000 
20,000 (1) -- 
20,000: 25,960 31,830 20,645 
Source: data from Nyasaland, Reports for 1947-62 
1. Quota abolished in this year (see Appendix 2.2). 
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the majority simply left Nyasaland and found a job' there when' they 
arrived. As Southern Rhodesia was overwhelmingly dominant as a 
destination for migrants it must have been most influential in determining 
the effect that the iqigratory system had on the country of origin; both 
in terms of the absenteeism itself and in terms of the impact returning 
migrants had on their country of birth. 
The factors affecting migraton to Northern Rhodesia were very similar 
to those in Southern Rhodesia. Again the proximity of the two territories 
meant that the link was established early and Federation appears to have 
had little effect. Most migrant workers to Northern Rhodesia went to work 
on the Copper Belt. 
There were several important differences in the system of migration 
to South Africa however. First, all the workers who went there were 
contract workers: 'all African Nyasas were prohibited immigrants unless 
recruited for the gold mines (Nyasaland, 1954). The Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WENELA) was the only body' allowed to conduct 'this 
recruitment. The numbers involved from 1947-62 are shown'in Table, 2.6. 
Wages again were high on the Rand compared'to those offered in Nyasaland', 
and the Union attracted the greatest number of 'migrants after Southern 
I., tar-e 
Rhodesia although never seriously rivallingýits position. South Africa's 
proportion of Nyasaland's total migrant labour force fell over the 
years under'consideration (see Appehdix'2.2, for a more detailed'discussion 
of the levels of'Nyasa migrant labour during the'colonial period, and of 
the conditons under which it occurred). 
Migration to other territories besides these three was negligible. 
It is'the impact of these major links, particularly the Southern Rhodesian 
flow, to which any possible effects on Nyas. aland's urban development'must 
be attributed. Obviously the situation described above, with such a large 
proportion of the African adult male population absent, had devastating 
effects on most spheres of life in Nyasaland: political, economic`and 
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social. The concern of the missionaries mostly reflected-the social 
problems experienced in the villages which sometimes lost one half of 
their men in this way., However)it is also true that it is often the 
youngest, fittest, best educated and most aware members, of a society who 
migrate: they are the ones most likely to respond to, and seek out, 
opportunities to earn higher, (or any) wages, and want to experience new 
things. It is this group who, in countries where migration abroad does 
not form a major part of everyday life, would have migrated within the 
country to urban places. Thus it is not just the scale of Nyasaland's, 
migration helped to limit its urban development, but also the probability 
that it selected the very elements who might have contributed to the 
internal urban population. Nyasas were often regarded as being 
particularly skilled workers in the countries to which they migrated, 
which was probably partly, a legacy of the importance and success, of 
missionary education in,. the country. Had this labour remained in 
Nyasaland and its potential, 1% recognized, it might have attracted 
the, 
industrial and c9mmercial, investment which, needed such labour, and which, 
would have been mainly, urban-based. Even had no such employment 
opportunities,. been forthcoming in the towns, some of the absentees would, 
probably have gone tp. the towns anyway and maybe set up small enterprises 
of a formal or informal nature. - 
The argument is not without flaws however. The-system of. migration 
undoubtedly allowed many individuals to remit considerable amounts of 
money. In 1952 it was estimated that approximately E85,000 was remitted, 
excluding amounts in excess of the sums obligatory. under the., various 
inter-territorial agreements, and money brought back, personally by 
returning migrants. E539,000 was cashed in postal and money. orders in 
local Post Offices in the same year. The 1952, Colonial Report (Nyasaland, 
1952) felt this could well be representative of the additional monits 
which migrants were bringing or sending to the country. It is estimated 
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that Nyasaland benefited by EO. 75 million in total in 1953 and 1954, and 
by C1.75 million in 1959 (Nyasaland, 1954,1959). Undoubtedly-this 
allowed for a higher standard of living in Nyasaland than would otherwise 
have been possible (Wilson, 1976). Money saved by the time of a migrant's 
return could perhaps have been an incentive to start up small enterprises 
rather than return to farming, and some of these might have been in the 
towns. The money generated by the migrant labour system could therefore 
be seen as a possible generator of urbanization in Nyasaland. On the 
other hand there is no evidence in contemporary records that returning 
migrants did use their money in this way, nor indeed of how they used it 
at all, although the basic needs of their dependents was one major 
outgoing from, money remitted during their absence. 
Also all the migrants experienced new ways of life, which may have 
made them dissatisfied with rural village life when they returned and 
encouraged further migration to Nyasaland's towns. This would be 
particularly likely for those who had experienced urban life in other 
countries. There is no data on how many of Nyasaland's African urban 
workforce had previously been migrant-, labourers, but should such 
dissatisfaction have occurred, theýhigher wage rates and possibly, more 
cosmopolitan. atmosphere in foreign towns may have meant that many, migrants 
went abroad again. 
Taking the overall ýpicture however. there, does, seem to be some merit 
in the argument that Nyasaland's involvement in the Southern African 
migratory labour system meant that some of the urbanization which might 
have occurred within her boundaries in the absence of this involvement, in 
fact occurred in, for, instance, Salisbury and Bulawayo, on the Rand 
in South Africa, and in the Copperbelt towns of Northern Rhodesia. It 
seems a fair proposition that the loss of that section of a population 
which in most countries is the most innovative and non-traditional,, both 
being characteristics often associated with,, urban centres, is likely to 
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have some retarding effect on those aspec, 
where those characteristics are most 
might be proposed that the urban centres 
Lesotho, have been underdeveloped as 
systems which link them strongly to other 
of the migrant labour system. 
bs of a country's development 
influential. In the same way it 
of Southern Mozambique, or of 
they too have been enmeshed in 
countries through the operation 
2.4 Conclusion 
At the time of independence Nyasaland had an urban system which was 
characterized not only by features which reflected particular aspects of 
its pre-colonial and colonial experience (e. g. the 
administrative/commercial capital split), but also by a general lack of 
development on all urban indices. The urban population was small, both 
absolutely and as a proportion of the total population, the number of 
centres was very limited, and urban functions and infrastructural 
development were negligible outside Blantyre, Zomba and possibly Lilongwe. 
This chapter has argued that since Nyasaland's urban development was in 
many ways similar to that experienced in some other British colonies, and 
yet was even more limited in extent by independence, some other factors 
unique to Nyasaland must be considered to explain the discrepancy. The 
factors identified here as likely to have had a retarding effect on 
Nyasaland's urban development are its close ties to neighbouring countries 
to the south. Aspects of Nyasaland's relationship with Southern 
Rhodesia, and particularly with Salisbury, appear to have operated as 
limitations on general urban development, especially in functional terms. 
The specific ties of dependency which resulted from the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland served to strengthen the satellite status of 
Nyasaland's urban centres vi. r. a vi-s Salisbury, which was already in 
operation in many spheres of economic and social activity. Also the drain 
on Nyasaland's population from migrant labour going to South Africa and 
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the two Rhodesias can be seen as a system in which part of Nyasaland's 
potential urban development was displaced and occurred outside the 
country. 
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Notes for Chapter 2 
1. Whilst this analysis is applicable in many cases in West Africa, it 
should also be recognized that in Nigeria many pre-colonial urban 
centres (e. g. Ibadan, Kano) remain very important in today's urban 
system, as they were throughout the colonial period. 
2. The concept of primacy is used here not only in its simplest form 
whereby it denotes that the largest city has more than twice the 
population of the second largest but also in a broader sense. Thus a 
city's primacy within any urban system is also reflected in its 
capacity to formulate most of the central decisions which affect the 
rest of the urban system and in its dominant share of all urban 
infrastructure, industrial and commercial development, and wage 
employment. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Urban Development in Malawi after Independence 
Nyasaland gained her independence in 1964, one year after the 
Federation had been abolished. In 1966 the first full population census 
was taken in the country, which had been renamed Malawi. For the first 
time it was possible to gauge the degree of urbanization, and to analyse 
the relative size of the centres in the urban system. The level of 
urbanization was extremely low at this time: just over 200,000 people were 
living in urban centres, which was a mere Wof the population of 4 
million. Most of1the urban population was concentrated in a few centres: 
Blantyre itself accounted for 54% of urban dwellers and it was one of only 
4 towns (Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu) with populations of over 
5,000. ' These 4 accounted for over three-quarters (78%) of Malawi's entire 
urban population as recorded in the census. 
The only other full census was taken in 1977 and recorded an urban 
population' of' about 471,000, '8.4, % of the -ýnational population of 
5.3 million. This implied an extrdmelý rapid increase'in urban in 
and S the intervening1lyeaýs 'at a rate- of 8% per year 'uggested that 
Malawi was one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries on the continent, 
although the level of urbanization was still 'low. Blantyre still 
accounted for almost a half (46.5%) of the total, and the four main 
centres maintained their overall importance with 76% of the urban 
population living in them. 
3.1 'Rapid Urban Gr6wth_in' Malawi: True or False?, 
3.1'. 1' The definition of 'urban' centres 
One problem associated with international'comparison'Of urbanization 
levels and growth rates is the lack of consistency in the definition'of 
which centres are defined as 'urban'. As 'alluded to above, Malawian 
official figures include many centres which would not be included in'-urban 
statistics in most other countries (i. e. centres with populations under 
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5,000). This makes direct comparisons of Malawian urbanization with the 
process of urbanization as exp'eriended elsewhere difficult. In fact the 
majority of the places designated as 'urban' in the 1966 census had 
populations of under 1,000'and most*of the-rest were under 2,000. Even by 
1977 two-thirds of the officially designated urban centres had populations 
of less than 5,000. 
In addition to' these problems, the way in which census officials 
selected centres as being urban rather than rural settlements is not very 
well defined, and the criteria changed between the two census dates. Thus 
whilst 51 places were assigned urban status in 1966, a somewhat tighter 
set of criteria led to only 32 being so defined in 1977. In 1966 urban 
areas were defined as'ail townships (1) and district centres as well as 
those centres "having installations such as a Police Post', a Works Camp or 
a Post Office, in addition' to trading stores and market1t (Malawi 
Statistical Yearbook, 1977, ' P-7). Although this would go some, way to 
exclude essentially rural settlements (many villages have much larger 
populations than the smaller urban centres) it is clearly' not a strict 
definition, and would easily allow settlements with populations almost 
entirely engaged in agricultural occupations to be included as 'urban". 
If a population minimum is not used to select'urban centres, a functional 
approach can be a more'Us6ful tool'especially in the context of countries 
like Malawi. 
To some extent the 1977 census also used functional characteristics 
to select urban centres but, the definition was narrower and excluded many 
very small settlements (Town and Country Planning Department, personal 
communication, January 1983)., The 32 centres fell into three categories: 
gazetted cities and towns, all district administrative "centres not 
included in the first category, and four other small centres. The first 
category, ' essentially 'covers those settlements which have' acquired 
sufficient status to be locally administered by a Town Council, rather 
108 
than their District Council. The second category covers the remaining 
majority of district administrative headquarters. The four towns in the 
last category were also designated urban in 1966 and all have sub-district 
centre status (ibid). Several other sub-district centres also exist but 
were not included,, many of them much larger than Phalombe with a 
population of only 1207. However Phalombe is a well established 
sub-district centre with a resident Assistant District Commissioner and 
empirical observation combined with the evidence of official studies 
(TCPD, 1979; TCPD, 1980a) supports the assumption that these four centres 
were selected on the basis of their other urban functions besides the 
merely administrative. 
Any analysis of Malawi's urban system must try to account for any 
definitional inaccuracies. A consultancy firm involved in the preparation 
of a project to develop' Malawi's district centres still stated in 1980 
that "There is no clear definition of "urban population 11 in Malawi. To 
consider a town as such is rather a matter of custom 11 (TCPD, 1980b, Annex 
3, P-3). However it is considered here that... an analysis of Malawi's urban 
system should take as a basis only the 32 centres-selected in the 1977 
census which are shown in Map 3.1. Generally these centres are the main 
service centres for their area and contain a wider range and higher level 
of facilities than other local settlements. Settlements which might 
appear to be unimportant acording to their population size may in fact 
perform very important functions in less developed countries such as 
Malawi, where the majority of the population is engaged in agricultural 
occupations which are the mainstay of the economy. A16o policies directly 
affecting urban development tend to concentrate on these centres and the 
scarce comparative urban statistics which exist pertain to them. 
3.1.2 Urban Growth Rates 1966-77: the Problem of Boundary Changes 
"Malawi is essentially an agricultural country with less than 10% 
of its population employed and residing in urban areas oý any 
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description. But the situation is not static. A number of urban 
areas are growing rapidly at rates in excess of 6% 
with .... Lilongwe, the new capital, __[registering] 
a growth rate 
of .... 16%. " (Mlia, 1978, p. 
8 emphasis added). 
The initial impression gained from a straight comparison between the 
populations enumerated in Malawi's urban centres in 1966 and 1977 (see 
Table 3-1) would tend to support the opinion expressed in this statement, 
and implies that Malawi has failed in its intention of preventing 
disruptive rural emigration (Economic Planning Division, 1971). 
A stricter analysis of the situation however not only calls into 
question the rapidity of urbanization in Malawi, but also raises the issue 
of whether rural-urban migration is, in fact, making a significant 
contribution to growth rates in the majority of the designated urban 
centres. These apparent contradictions arise mainly because of extensive 
boundary changes. These have significantly affected the area within which 
people are enumerated as 'urban' for nearly every centre. The massive 
boundary changes which accompanied Lilongwe's development as the new 
national capital are one aspect of this problem (2). The average annual 
growth rate of around 16% quoted in the above statement thus gives a false 
impression of Lilongwe's true growth and, inter alia, means that the 8.4% 
national urban growth rate was an overestimate (3). This distortion is 
amplified by the fact that in 1966 the 'urban' population of all but the 
four largest urban centres was only considered to be that population which 
resided within the boundaries of the so-called lbomal area, a very 
restricted area centred on the old colonial administrative offices. 
Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and MzuzuIs boundaries covered much'ý more 
extensive areas which were 'designated and occasionally-expanded, "under the 
auspices of the Local Government (Urban Areas) Act. Although other 
townships were gazetted in March 1966 they had not had their boundaries 
defined in time for the census (Malawi Notices, GN 48,1966). Even Salima 
which had new boundaries gazetted in July 1966 (a month before the census) 
(Malawi Notices, GN 162,1966) was enumerated in accordance with its 
III 
TABLE 3.1 
Urban Centres in Malawi: 1966 and 1977 
Urban Centre Population Population Rank in AA0 Urban Popn. 
1977 1966 1966 Area Density 
Census Census (kial) 
_/km 1966 1977 1977 
Blantyre 219,011 109,461 1 6.4 202 220 996 
Lilongwe 98,718 19,425 3 15.8 23 218 453 
Zomba 24,234 19,666 2 2.0 21 21 1,154 
Mzuzu 16,108 8,490 4 6.0 23 23 700 
Karonga 12,051 11128 21 24.0 - 26 464 
Nkhota-kata 10,316 1,117 23 22.4 - 10 1,032 
Kasungu 6,488 1,62B 10 13.4 - 36 ISO 
Nsanie 6,400 1,373 15 15.0 - 16 400 
Balaka 5,632 1 647 ý 9 11.8 - 10 363 
Dedza 5,578 1318 6 8.3 - is 310 
Mzimba 5,396 4,156 5 2.4 - 10 540 
Ngabu 4,848 614 26 20.7 - 34 143 
Salima 4,712 2,307 7 6.7 - 5 942 
Monkey Bay 4,048 1,18B 20 11.8 - 10 405 
Rumphi 4,003 1,916 a 6.9 - 21 191 
Thyolo 3,856 1,394 14 9.7 - 5 676 
Liwonde 3t738 - - - - 34 Ito 
Luchenza 3,381 827 29 13.7 - 13 297 
Mponela 3,359 11310 16 8.9 - 8 420 
Monkey Bay 3,207 12300 17 8.6 - 10 371 
Ntcheu 3,115 17118 22- 9.8 - 16 195 
Chitipa 31110 1,429 0 7.3 - a 389 
Chikwawa 3,036 902 24 11.7 - 10 304 
Mulanie 31001 1,225 is 8.5 - 13 231 
Mangochi 2,792 1,467 12 6.0 - 10 279 
Mwanza 21354 692 25 11.8 - 5 471 
Dowa 11962 1,552 11 2.2 - 13 151 
Mchinji 1,957 831 28 8.1 - 10 196 
Ntchisi 1,654 1,218 19 2. B - 5 331 
Phalambe 11207 203 31 17.6 - 3 402 
Machinga 697 203 30 5.1 2 a 87 
Chiradzulu 689 609 - 1.1 
1 
- 3 
I 
230 
Total Urban 470,658 192,913 8.4 1 
i 
1 ---I 
Sources: Malawi Population Census 1977 
Malawi Population Census 1966 
Notes: 1. AAGRs taken froo 1977 census, Table 1, or own calculations. 
2. Area covered by boma boundaries in 1966 not available, except 
for Machinga. 
not applicable 
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'bomal population only (Malawi, N. S. O., 1968, Table 2). 
By 1977 the population of urban centres was enumerated in two 
different ways acording to their status. The gazetted towns of Salima, 
Dedza, Mangochi, Balaka, Liwonde and Ngabu were now treated like the major 
centres had been in 1966, and their populations were enumerated within 
their gazetted boundaries (excluding Town Planning Areas). The remainder 
of the designated urban centres were assigned the population residing 
within their entire Town Planning Areas (4). In both cases the area 
designated as urban was larger than that used in 1966., 
Boundary changes, per se, need not lead to the, overestimation of 
urban growth rates. As the urban population grows it is likely to spread 
out beyond the original town area and new borders must be defined which 
include it. However the nature of the boundary changes described above 
has led to a significant distortion of the meaning of 'urbanization' at 
the lower end of the urban hierarchy. Before this assertion can be 
analyzed the term 'urbanization' must be defined. 
Urbanization can be perceived as a spatial and/or behavioural 
process. The definition of wheth er an environment and its population 
should be classified as 'urban' can be problematical. Factors such as 
minimum population thresholds, minimum levels of population density, and 
the area of the urban labour market are often used in developed countries 
(Simmons and Bourne, 1978). These are variables which can be measured 
spatially to determine which areas are urban. However none of them 
address the question of a functional difference betwen urban and rural 
areas. This often involves the considerationof occupational structures as 
well as the provision of certain types of services. It is often asserted 
that an urban population should be primarily engaged in non-agricultural 
activities in order to distinguish it from the rural population of large, 
densely settled centres where agriculture remains the primary activity. 
This implies that there is a qualitative difference between the mode of 
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existence of urban and rural dwellers. This criterion of employment 
stjucture is a useful tool because it does begin to tackle- the 
behavioural aspects of urbanization. However it should not perhaps be 
used in isolation since agricultural employment and 'urban' categorization 
are not always mutually exclusive as illustrated An the following 
statement: 
"the most traditionally urban of all African peoples were the 
Yoruba.... Nigeria's last reliable population census, that of 1952, 
found that fully 47% of the population in the Yoruba region lived 
in settlements of 5000 or more people. However, it is significant 
that most of the inhabitants of these towns earned their livelihood 
on farms to which they commuted for several days at a time. These 
were clearly pre-industrial as well as pre-colonial towns. " 
(Sandbrook, 1982, P-39) 
The classification of these Yoruba settlements as urban does not rest 
merely on their size. They also exhibit societal and institutional 
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characteristics which differentiate them from rural communities 
(Mabogunje, 1962; LLoyd, 1973). 
In most cases urban centres are characterized by a combination of 
these various factors. Thus Friedmann (1973) has defined urbanization as 
two inter-related processes: the geographical concentration of population 
and non-agricultural activities in urban environments, and the geographic 
diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organizations and institutions. The 
urban environment must therefore be dictated by not only the density and 
concentration of settlements but also by the usual modes of production and 
interaction assumed by the resident population. The corollary of this 
premise is that the urban population is that which is specifically and 
directly involved in the urban milieu: in general this would mean that the 
population's occupational structure would usually exclude widespread 
agricultural activities, and that the people's behaviour was governed to 
some extent by the influence of urban values and institutions. In fact 
there is disagreement over whether urbanization can be characterized by 
the adoption of a new orientation to life which involves a move from 
traditional to modern cultural values (Sandbrook, 1982, p. 184). However 
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the perception of oneself as urban need not imply the denial or loss of 
traditional values (which in themselves need not be equated with rural 
values). Instead it could involve a high degree of dependence on 
urban-based facilities for everyday needs (e. g. food, cooking utensils) or 
a certain level of interaction with urban services (e. g. schools, 
hospitals). In addition a switch to involvement with urban institutions 
such as voting for Town Councillors, or dealing with licencing officers 
could lead to a more 'urban' perception than dealing with village headmen 
(who are still influential administrative authorities in Malawi). 
When such a definition of the urban population is applied to the 
Malawian situation, it becomes clear that the growth rates registered for 
many urban centres have little to do with a true increase in 
the 
population that is genuinely urban. The redefinition of the small 
centres' boundaries to include Town Planning Areas (TPAs) was not designed 
to include only new areas of the urban environment which had spread from 
the original nucleus. The assignment of TPAs by the TCPD was a logical 
step in urban planning to provide areas within which the long-term growth 
and development of centres could be organized. The new boundaries define 
the potential urban space and include 'undeveloped' or lunurbanized' areas 
and their residents. 
The case of Karonga on the Northern lake-shore is illustrative. The 
'raw' average annual population growth rate of the population is an 
astonishing 24% per year. Yet a significant proportion of the new 
population are not people who have decisively altered their lifestyle to 
become part of the urban population whether by immigration or absorption. 
Many are village residents who have been included in the urban population 
of 1977 by a cartographical procedure. Thus an official study 
recommending measures for Karongals development states: 
"the settlement pattern for the planning area is essentially 
rural... In 1981 the TPA is estimated to house-12,350 inhabitants of 
which approximately one third live in Karonga Town, whereas the 
remaining two-thirds are scattered in villages or live in an urban 
115 
settlement cluster around Karonga Airport and Bwiba. 11 
(TCPD, 1981, ps. 2,3) 
Although a rural settlement structure and residence in villages is 
not incompatible with urbanization inasmuch as outlying villages on urban 
boundaries can be absorbed into an urban environment by a gradual (and 
virtually organic) process, it is indisputable that a significant 
proportion of Malawi's official 'urban' growth is false. Much of the 1977 
'urban' population remained rural in its characteristics and lifestyle and 
could not be part of the true urban population. 
One method by which boundary changes can be taken into account is to 
estimate the population living within the 1977 boundaries at the time of 
the 1966 census. Published statistics are insufficiently detailed for 
such an analysis, and unpublished data proved to be inaccessible to the 
individual researcher. However the TCPD did have data for two towns 
which exhibited extreme growth rates (TCPD, personal communication, 
January, 1982). The growth rates thus calculated are indicative of the 
massive distortions produced by boundary changes (see Table 3.2). 
However this system produces its own distortions as it suggests that 
Karongals growth was well below the rate of natural increase. The 
explanation partly lies in the fact that there has been out-migration of 
the 'village population' of the TPA due to flooding of agricultural land 
(TCPD, 1981). The TCPD also feels that the conversion of fertile 
agricultural land to urban land use also drove 'peasant' families out of 
the TPA: thus for some people absorption into an urban environment was 
rejected. In some ways this could be seen as an increased Iruralization' 
of part of the TPA population. The definition by the TCPD of a proportion 
of Karongals population as either 'village' or 'peasant' Ubid, Annex 1, 
p. 6, and Table A1-3) shows that there is a tacit acceptance that large 
numbers of the so-called urban population within the TPA are essentially 
rural. The numbers of 'peasants' in 1977 is given as 8900: 74% of the 
TPA's population. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Adjusted Averaqe Annual Growth Rates 1966-77 
far two small urban centres 
Town 1966 1966 Pop. 1977 Adjusted AAGR 'Raw' 
Census adjusted Census 1966-77 AAGR 
Pop. to 1977 POP., 
Boundaries 
JIF 
Nkhota- 1117 6425 10316 4.4% 24% 
kota 
Karonga 1128 11240 12051 0.63% 22.4% 
Source: TCPDj personal communication, 
January 1982. 
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If this proportion was assumed to be applicable to the situation in 
the 28 other small urban centres, calculations shows that there was no 
'urban' growth at all in these centres. In fact a decrease in 'urban' 
population would be registered, from 35,871 in 1966 to, 29,272 in 1977., 
This is an untenable conclusion: unfortunately the picture is much more 
complex and other detailed analyses, such as that for Karonga, were 
unavailable. Yet it is possible to draw some inferential conclusion, from 
available information. 
For -instance Karongals 'urban' population (i. e. the non-village 
population) is estimated as 3151 in 1977 (ibid) giving a 9.8% AAGR in the 
intercensal period: a viable but still very rapid rate of increase. Yet 
there has been no attempt to define the 'urban' population acccording to 
the type- of-methodology outlined earlier; it is merely the population 
living in the specifically lurban', environment., However about . -6,250 
inhabitants of the TPA were dependent on "urban job-typeýopportunitiesll in 
the town that year (ibid, Annex,. 1, p. 6) (5). Clearly-residence in the 
village environment has not prevented some -, people obtaining urban 
employment, as roughly half the number employed -and those dependent upon 
them must be living outside the strictly urban area. Consequently -the 
definition of the village -population as 'peasant' must be inaccurate to 
some degree as up to a third of them are part of the urban labour-market. 
No employment statistics for small urban--areas were gathered in. the past, 
but it seems a fair assumption that a similar. situation pertained in 1966, 
and that-some proportion of, the urban ýpopplation (defined.,,, by the-urban 
labour market) -were resident. outside the delineated, lbomal area at-that 
time. It is possible that some so-called ', peasants' should also., have been 
perceived as 'urban' then, as well as in 1977, by the, imposition of a 
broader definitioný which includes some consideration, of the level. and 
nature of interaction with the urban milieu., This: can be assumed to be. a 
minority as it is clearly significant that -over 1000 peasants chose to 
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leave the TPA suggesting that maintenance of agricultural production was 
their major priority, thus excluding them from classification as 'urban'. 
This was due to the loss of only 140 has. of agricultural land whereas the 
TPA covers a total of 2600 has. ' Thus a loss of only 5% of the TPA was 
sufficient to 'displace roughly 10%'of the village population (6). By 
analogy it'appears that generally the village population of Karonga is not 
committed to urban life despite proximity to the urban environment and it 
is therefore assumed that only those forming part of the urban labour 
market should be regarded as part of the urban ýopulation. - 
The conclusion of this analysis is that whilst the 1966 'census 
significantly underestimated Karongals true urban population, the 1977 
census overestimated it. Controlling for boundary changes is not 
particularly helpful in Karongals case, because of urban-rural'migration in 
the'inter-censal period' and the very -large area covered by the TPA. 
Adjusting Nkhotaý-kotals growth rate by this method* may be more 
satisfactory because the boundary extensi'dfi was more' limited and the'TPA 
only covers 1000 has. Also Nkhota-kota is an ýextensive, 'indigenous 
settlement and its'TPA was the most densely settlid'in the'country after 
Blantyre and Zomba. Therefore its TPA mayýwell have'covered an area where 
few"truly 'rural' people resided'even'in 1966. 
For Karonga the urban labour market appears to offer the most useful 
method for interpreting'urban growth there, 'yet lack of data makes exact 
analysis of past trends impossible. However a complete study of Karongals 
urban job oppportunities found 2060 jobs in 1981, a 4.2% AAGR since 1977 
(TCPD, 1981, 'Annex 1). This 'rate is regarded-as' low and expected to 
increase to 5-6% "as a result of urban development promotion, because the 
latter will certainly result in ''acc6lerated expansion of future 
employment" (ibid, p. 9). ' As Karo'nga""received no special promotion up 
until 1981 when the report wad prepared, it seems safe to assume that the 
4.2% growth rate in employment' opportunities was a 'reasonable 
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approximation to the real situation in Karonga from 1966-77. Assuming a 
roughly similar level of dependents per worker over the-period (7) the 
employment growth rate becomes a surrogate for the urban population growth 
rate, and this leads to the conclusion that Karonga's urban growth between 
1966-77 occurred at a rate of roughly 4-5%. 
Despite the imperfections of such a method which rests on the 
acceptance of several unverifiable assumptions, there are reasons to 
believe-that it does present, a fair picture of the real process of 
urbanization in this case. -If the, general points made in respect of this 
centre's growth are accepted, particularly in relation to the 
underestimation in 1966 and overestimation in 1977 of the urban 
population, some further inferences can be drawn for other small centres. 
For instance it can be deduced from available-figures that the expansion 
of the urban labour market, has been rather slow in the smaller urban 
centres. - Detailed statistics by occupation are available for two urban 
categories only: Blantyre and 1ilongwe combined, and all other urban 
centres. ''An overall picture for-small'urban centres can'therefore be 
gained from the latter category. -Of , all occupations enumerated, 17,739 
people (37%) people, were agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry 
workers, -. fishermen and hunters (Malawi, -NSO, 1980b, Vol. 11, Table 
4-3). If these people and their dependents (calculated on the basis of 
average activity rates for this urban-category) are excluded from the 
enumerated urban population, the number of 'urban' workers, unemployed and 
their dependents is 96,237. Assuming that- the narrowly delineated 1966 
urban ýareas would have included few people involved in- non-urban jobs, 
this analysis. implies an inter-censal, AAGR of'only 3.7% per year in the 
urban labour market. (excluding, Blantyre and Lilongwe). The 1977 
census data give a-natural increase-rate-for all urban. centres of-3.5%. 
If this can be used as an indication of the-situation in the category of 
urban centres being considered, it'appears that the'increase in urban'Job 
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opportunities from 1966-77 would have done little more than absorb the 
natural increase in the urban labour suppply. Whilst the data base is 
admittedly imperfect, this evidence definitely shows that the huge 
in-migration rate implied by the AAGR of 11% for small urban centres 
recorded in the 1977 census must be misleading. 
Further evidence of a significant 'rural' component in the smaller 
urban centres is available. Economic activity statistics classifying 
people as employers, employees, self-employed, family business workers or 
Imlimil (peasant farmers) are given in the 1977 census. These are 
disaggregated by district for rural and urban areas; hence occupational 
data is available for individual towns when there is only one urban centre 
in a district, or for a group of towns where there are more than one 
(Table 3-3). Whilst the large urban centres had only a small minority of 
mlimi, in many centres they made up an even larger proportion of the 
economically active population than in Karonga. However this is not a 
perfect indicator of the rural element in the population. First., 
particularly in the smaller, more densely settled centres, it is possible 
that a-broad definitionwould regard some mlimi as part of the urban 
population because their degree of accessibility to the urban environment 
allowed a sufficiently high level of interaction with urban services and 
institutions to produce a greater degree of urban commitment than was the 
case in Karonga. Secondly, in some cases the number of agricultural 
workerswill actually be higher than the recorded mlimi, as those working 
for large estates or for small farmers are registered only-as employess 
and many of these would be essentially rural (8). Therefore more useful 
conclusions can be drawn if this evidence is combined with an analysis of 
the size of TPAs and their population density. 
Those urban centres which have been designated fairly limited TPAs in 
1977 might be expected to present a truer picture of urban growth rates in 
Malawi. This is because a restricted TPA is less likely to cover large 
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TABLE 3.3 
'Mliini* (peasant farmers) as a proportion of the economically 
active population in Malawi's urban centres. by district, 1977 
District Urban Centres Total Economically 
Active 
'Mlimi' Mlimi as X 
ec. active 
Chitipa Chitipa B12 329 41 
Karonga Karonga 3373 l4eG 44 
Nkhata Bay Nkhata, Bay 1204 237 17 
Ruiephi Rumphi 1295 479 37 
Mzimba Mzimba, Mzuzu 5335 579 11 
Kasungu Kasungu - 1938 345 Is 
Nkhotakota Nkhotakota, 2133 1005 47 
Ntchisi Ntchisi 611 229 37 
Dowa Dowa, Mponela, 1711 685 40 
Salima Salima 1941 425 22 
Lilongwe Lilongwe 30769 1599 5 
Mchinji Mchinji 790 367 46 
Dedza Dedza 2030 899 44 
Ntcheu Ntcheu 1235 675 55 
Mangachi Mangochi, Monkey Bay 2026 428 21 
Machinga Machinga, Liwonde, 
Balaka 3734 1334 36 
Zomba Zomba 6379 822 13 
Chiradzulu Chiradzulu 278 107 38 
Blantyre Blantyre 76146 Sill 7 
Mwanza Mwanza 1030 423 41 
Thyolo Thyalo, Luchenza 2392 365 15 
2. 
Mulanie Mulanie, Phalambe 1359 354 26: L. 
Chikwawa Chikwawa, Ngabu 3313 1606 48 
Nsanje Nsanie 2941 2099 72 
Source: Malawi Population Census 1977, 
Vol. II, Table 4.2 
1. This figure will overestimate 'urban' employment rates. A proportion 
of those designated 'employees' are probably primarily engaged in fishing 
as Nkhata Bay is an important fisheries centre. It also had an extremely 
high unemployment rate of 33% of economically active (no other centres 
approached this rate; but Nkhata Bay had the highest out-migration rate to 
other countries of all districts from 1966-77 and is experiencing relative 
stagnation). 
2. Excludes agricultural workers in tea and tobacco estates. 
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areas of cultivated land and therefore include a corresponding scattered 
rural population, with relatively limited access to the urban Centre. 
Thus the recorded 1977 population is probably a fair approximation of the 
true urban population then. It is significant that it is generally these 
centres whichý registered the lowest 'raw' growth rates (see Table 3-1). 
Some are actually recorded as stagnating; Chiradzulu, for example, with an 
area of only 300 'has. experienced an AAGR of only 1.1%, significantly 
lower than its district growth rate (2%) or even natural increase. This 
is due to Blantyre's proximity as there is considerable migration to, this 
city from its surrounding areas. Mzimba, Dowa and Ntchisi with average or 
small TPAs also suffered from net emigration. Mzimba, ranked as Malawi's 
fifth' urban, centre in 1966, was' thus unable to provide sufficient 
attraction to encourage in-migration. Although it suffers 'from 
competition with the regional capital, of Mzuzu, it still remains its 
district's capital. '?, II 
Consideration of 'urban density statistics for both population'and 
dwel: ling-units (Malawi-) National Statistical Office-, 1980a, --1980b) 
finds that most of the smaller TPAs (3-10 km2') have 
higherAensities than the largest, new TPAs. On the other hand, ''many are 
still, relatively 'low in' comparison -with the urban environments 'of 
Blantyre, Zomba, ýýand' Nkhdta-kota-(Table-3-3) and therefore must still 
include some rural areas. Taking this factor into account along with the 
original underestimation of the urban, population in 1966, means that there 
should be a, particularly sharp downward revision of'urban'growth rates for 
Machinga, - Mponela,. Mwanza, Chitipa,, --Chikwawa, Mangochi-and Monkey Bay. It 
appears that Thyolo and Salima have, sufficiently high population densities 
to make, this, rural,, factor relatively unimportant; a slightly lower growth' 
rate for Thyolo on ac'count. of the -'original-'underestimation' would still 
make it a fairly rapidly growing centre'. Balaka is another such, case. 
Empirical observation adds 'further evidence as both Balakaýand especially 
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Salima present much more of an impression of an urban environment than 
most other small centres. Phalombe's position is somewhat spurious as it 
began from such a low base. The recorded growth rate is definitely too 
high and even this small TPA must include some rural people, yet the 
centre has received a boost from certain government policies and is 
probably growing quite rapidly. 
By comparison the remaining small centres which cover larger TPAs 
(13-36 km2) display such low densities that the rural element of their 
1977 populations must be extremely important. The exception is 
Nkhota-kota which is a unique case and a 4-5% AAGH is probably an 
acceptable approximation, as previously discussed. Ntcheu and Luchenza 
have densities not much different from their surrounding rural traditonal 
authorities, and although the others are higher the_ overall impression 
must be that the distortion in every case is at least as extreme as was 
proven , 
for Karonga which registered the highest 'raw' AAGR of all, but in 
fact has the highest populationdensity amongst the range of larger TPAs 
(excluding Nkhota-kota) and is situated in a district with one of the 
lowest rural population densities in Malawi. This being the case, it 
seems feasible to suggest that as Karongals true urban growth rate is 
considered to be about 5% maximum, the maximum AAGR for the other urban 
centres with large. TPAs and low population densities was slightly lower 
(9). 
For the larger centres with the exception of Lilongwe, urban growth 
rates recorded by the 1977 census are less problematic. None of them have 
a large mlimi component in the recorded labour force, and neither Zomba 
nor Mzuzu had their boundaries extended in the inter-censal period. 
Blantyre's boundary expansion was due to the inclusion of a major new 
urban housing area, South Lunzu. Therefore theofficial. rates of . 
growth 
for Blantyre, Zomba and Mzuzu appear to be acceptable estimates, and 
although Lilongwe's growth rate is an overestimate , 
(see Chapter 
. 
7)_ its 
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true growth was nevertheless very high. 
3.1.3 The Implications of Adjusted Urban Growth Rates 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that urbanization in 
Malawi is still at a very early stage: as a social or spatial phenomenon 
it is only occurring at any significant level in a very few centres. 
These include Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu but it seems that hardly any of 
the smaller urban centres are growing "rapidly at rates in excess of 6%11 
as stated by Mlia (op cit). Salimals growth may be about this level, and 
Balaka's slightly higher, and some evidence exists to suggest that 
Luchenza should also be regarded as a relatively thriving centre, largely 
on account of its trading and informal sector activities (10). Kasungu 
probably also experienced a higher than average increase in its true urban 
population. This again partly impressionistic view is supported by the 
fact that the massive development of tobacco estates in Kasungu district 
is likely to have contributed to the demand for urban services. This has 
led to relatively large numbers of application for leases of commercial 
plots there (TCPD, 1981, p. 52). 
The overall picture though is one in which, at the lower end'of the 
urban scale, people are adapting an urban life-style at a fairly slow 
rate. This is not necessarily perceived in 'all government circles, but 
has been accepted by those involved in a project to develop Malawi's 
smaller urban centres. They assumed an AAGR of 4.5% in the intercensal 
period for all centres excluding Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu. 
This approximation was made after detailed study of trends in four 
centres: Mzuzu, Luchenza, Ntcheu and Kasungu, from which it was concluded 
that the small urban centres did not appear to be growing very fast (TCPD, 
1980b). By adjusting Lilongwe's growth rate in accordance with a 
redefinition of its population in 1966, this study produced an overall 
national urban growth rate of 5.8% (see Table 3.4). 
As a merely numerical observation, the fact that the majority of 
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TABLE 3.4 
Adjusted Urban Growth Rates 1966-77 
1966 
Census 
data 
19b6 
Adjusted 
data' 
1977 
Census 
data 
Adjusted 
AAGR% 
Small Urban Centres 33,13iý 71,600 112,587 4.5 
Blantyre 109,461 109,461 219,011 6.4 
Zomba 19,666 19,666 24,234 2.0 
Nzuzu 
2 81490 8,490 16,108 6.0 Lilongwe 19,425 45,3130 102,924 7.7 
Total Major Urban 
Centres 157,042 182,997 362,277 6.4 
Total Urban Popn. 190,178 254,597 474,864 5.8 
Source: adapted from Table 3-2, TCPD, 1981 
Population of 1966 adjusted in accordance with larger township areas 
in 1977: for small urban centres this is a 'guesstimate' by the TCPD 
produced by a backward projection from the 1977 population using a 
4.5% annual growth rate. 
2. Lilongwe's adjusted 1966 population is based on the population living 
within the 1977 Town Planning Area. The 1977 population is therefore 
slightly larger than in Table 3.1 as the TPA extends beyond the 
gazetted boundaries. 
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Malawi's 'new urban population since independence is to be found in the 
major centres is relatively unsurprising, considering their share of the 
total urban population. However as a qualitative observation it has wide 
implications. Firstly the spatial impact of the experience of urban life 
is very unequal and not improving. Secondly the smaller centres are 
failing to counteract the attraction of the larger centres for rural-urban 
migrants. Thirdly, government perception of the targets for policies 
dealing with urbanization is likely to be distorted by 'the false 
impression given by apparent urban growth rates. This latter point holds 
true despite the fact that the TCPD is" aware of the problem. Without a 
clear picture of the true urban population, and of which centres have 
really been expanding rapidly it is difficult to plan for future urban 
development. ' This needs to-6stablish which factors are contributing to 
urban growth. Whilst it is quite obvious that Blantyre and Lilongwe exert 
the'major attraction for migrants due to their size and the concentration 
of urban- job opportunities there, it is difficult 'to 'see 'ýihich 
characteristics encourage in-migration at the lower end of the urban scale 
when past trends for individual centres cannot be ascertained. The 
assumption of a 4.5% growth rate for all smaller urban centres cannot aid 
in the selection of the most thriving centres for future development 
plans. It must be significant that, of those whichare here considered to 
have''grown-'faster than this, three out of four are railway ce'ntres-. ' 
Balaka, Luchenza and Salima. The first two are not even district 
capitals. This suggests that the administrative'"and service 'functions 
which have been the main cause of urbanization at the lower end of the 
urban system are insufficient to generate much urban growth under a 
laissez-faire approach to urban development, whilst these cenires with a 
more direct economic 'role have greater potential. 
. The' Malawian government avers that an over-ýconcentration of 
migration to Blantyre and Lilongwe is undesirable. The'a: nswer to this is 
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felt to be the diversion of migration to the smaller urban centres, yet it 
is clear thatýa certain amount of confusion has been produced by a 
combination, of- conflicting information on the attraction already exerted 
by these centres, and the official distaste for urbanization as a general 
phenomenon. For instance one policy recommendation takes the line that 
"since the urban population growth is already quite- high, any policy in 
the urban context should avoid to make towns too attractive (sic) ..... it 
should not be- possible to raise one's standard of living markedly by 
simply moving from a rural to an urban area. This would be undoubtedly 
the -case if access to most, of the urban amenities ...... were substantially 
subsidized" '-, (TCPD, 1980a,, p. 21p emphasis in original). This accords 
with the "keeping-the-town-clean" attitude so -characteristic of 
Malawian 
urban policies. Yet simultaneously the TCPD avers that "nothing ýis won 
with a "keeping-the-town-clean". policy", (ibid, p. 20) whilst. an earlier 
planning document stated that: 
"[by the year 20001 an additional 670,000 will need to --be 
accommodated in the smaller urban centres. This represents a 
five-fold increase in the, numbers living in such centres. It is 
essential that these centres are developed properly, not only to 
accommodate the anticipated flood of.. rural migrants into such 
towns, but also to act as counter-magnets for Lilongwe and 
Blantyre, and thereby help to avoid the plethora of urban problems 
so apparent in large cities in other developing countries" (TCPD, 
1979, p-1). 
This recommendation was based on the assumption that smaller urban centres 
already exert considerable attraction and would grow at an AAGR of 7.7% 
. (using census data with an adjustment for Lilongwe's boundary expansion) 
to the year- 2000. This growth rate is equivalent to the national urban 
AAGR for 1966-77 (11). 
The contradictions in these recommendations are evident. Yet both 
indicate policy directives which, might lead to continued stagnation in the 
smaller urban centres. On the one hand it is suggested that care should 
be taken not to make the small centres too attractive to migrants which 
implies that special policies to increase their attractiveness relative to 
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Blantyre and Lilongwe would be avoided. On the other hand it is assumed 
that these centres already present a 'positive climate for rural-ýurban 
migration so that rapid growth is inevitable, 'which implies that their 
development'need only be guided, rather than fostered. Despite the 
recognition of the ambivalence of recorded urban growth rates, the TCPD 
presents not only conflicting analyses to the government, but 'also leaves 
the way open for furthe'r"gov'ernrient neglect of the smaller centres. 
It, is apparent that the proportion of the'urban'poPulation'ih'the 
four largest towns has increased in the inter-censal period. Blantyre and 
tilongw6ls pnoporti6h combined grew even 1. accordi ng to I official statistics 
from'66.8% to 67.5%; a downward I revision of the 'urban' populati6n'of 
smalleiý centres would make the proportion in these two centres in 1977 
even higher. If the government wishes to reverse this trend, specific 
policies must' be devised to 'generate a more attractive environment in 
OL I other urban centres in order to divert some rural-urbn migration to them. 
4 
First though the government must perceive the trend, -and even the adjusted 
figures of the TCPD, shown in Table 3.4, would result in a''fall in the' 
large town proportion, as the 1977 census figures for the small centres 
are regarded as wholly''urban. 
A demographic survey prepared I for' Malawi by the World Bank in 1982 
would do nothing to help this impresssion, if used by Malawian planners as 
an authoritative analysis of the country's population trends. The survey 
made great efforts to overcome the many imperfections and inaccuracies in 
the data base, and is in many ways the most satisfactory source of 
information on the parameters affecting changes in the population, 
particularly in terms 'of fertility and mortality. However the urban 
po. pulation trends were analysed on the base's of "census' fi&res, only, 
adjusted only for Lilongwe. Using an urban I growth r- ate of 7.6% pe'r yI ear 
(12) the report states that this is' "far' above any conceivable rate of 
natural increase, and obviously produced largely by migration'from the 
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countryside- into towns. The implied -minimum number -of ýintercensal 
migrants, assuming a maximum [urban] natural increase rate of 4% is 
156,000; conversely a minimum rate of 2.5% would imply 204,000 intercensal 
migrants. The. average annual number of, [net] rural-urban migrants would 
be in the range of,, 14-18,00011 (Hill, ý1982, p. 16). 
The report goes on --to- say that if the anomalous figures for Zomba 
and Lilongwe are excluded, an overall national urban growth rate of 8.3% 
is produced.. It-is therefore assumed that this meant that all other urban 
centres grew, at a very, fast rate, and the report concludes that, this is a 
sign that rural-urban migration is spreading throughout the urban system. 
This conclusion could only- serve to support the impression that the 
smaller centres-are thriving. 
3.2 Components of Urban Growth in, Malawi, 
Urban ýpopulation increase can occur through three processes: natural 
increase, net in-migration from rural areas (or from other urban centres 
although this does not increase the overall urban population), and 
population reclassification due to boundary expansion. The latter aspect 
has already been discussed. Assessment of the relative contribution of 
the three factors is important for urban planning, but it is apparent that 
this is a difficult task"in Malawi because of lack of data and the problem 
of separating migrants from the re-classifiedýrural population. 
3.2.1 Natural Increase 
Fertility and mortality data-are available for the urban population 
as a whole, and to some extent for Blantyre and 1ilongwe- separately. 
Crude urban birth and death rates have been calculated from the 1977 
census as 45.9 and 10.6 per thousand-respectively- (the corresponding 
national rates-were 48.3 and 25). These,, give an urban natural increase 
rate of about 3.5%. Although the census data are not altogether reliable, 
this rate appears quite credible and falls, within the range for---urban 
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natural increase assumed by the World Bank demographic survey, (Hill, op 
cit). 
3.2.2 In-Migration 
One cannot necessarily assume that the above rate of urban natural 
increase is uniform across the urban system. However on the assumption 
that it will indicate the average rate for the smaller centres as-a group, 
when it is related to the adjusted total growth rate (allowing, for 
boundary expansion)-for-that category it implies that in-migration only 
accounts for about one-fifth of their growth. Whilst there is some doubt 
about the accuracy of the data it does indicate that the great majority of 
urban growth (excluding reclassification) is due to natural increase in 
most urban centres. This is unusual for developing countries where the 
proportion of in-migration is often over 50% at the early stage of 
urbanization, and now appears to be about half of total urban growth in 
many African countries (O'Connor, 1983). 
Whilst in-migration to the small centres has been relatively-low, it 
must have been much higher in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Zomba, on the 
other hand, clearly experienced net out-migration due to the change in its 
status. Lilongwe's boundary changes necessitate a careful analysis (see 
Chapter 7), but this factor is unimportant in the cases of Mzuzu and 
Blantyre (see Section 3.1.2). Using the"overail urban national increase 
rate for Mzuzu this suggests that in-migration acounted -for about 
two-fifths of its growth. 
For Blantyre it is possible to ýbe more specific aboutits natural 
increase rate as relevant data are available. Demographic variables by 
district tend to disaggregate Blantyre and Lilongwe 'urban', and urban 
data for the Southern Region can be used as a surrogate for Blantyre-which 
makes up over three-quarters of the regional urban population. Blantyre's 
crude birth rate and death rate for the year 1976-77 were 45 and-11.1 per 
thousand respectively, giving a natural increase rate of 3.5% (the same-as 
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the'urban'average). The birth rate was cross-checked with'reported urban 
fertility rates for the Southern Region and is regarded as satisfactory 
(see Appendix 3-1). With an overall AAGR of 6.4% from 1966-77 (13) it is 
55% of 
calculated, that net in-migration accounted for A 
Blantyre's growth in the 
intercensal period. '' Thus Blantyre's growth has been reliant on 
in-migration to a much greater degree than the smaller urban centres. 
The conclusion from' this analysis is that rural-urban migration is 
not spread evenly through the urban system, 'but is heavily concentrated at 
the upper end of the urban hierarchy, particularly in Blantyre and 
Lilongwe., 
3.2.3 Land Shortages in Malawi and the Future of Rural-Urban Migration 
The pattern displayed by Malawi is one in which the process of 
urbanization is still at a very early stage. TLs implies that the rate 
of rural-urban migration will increase markedly in the future, if Malawi 
follows the trend in other countries. There is a further reason to expect 
this phenomenon in Malawi as a crisis has recently been reached in the 
availability of cultivable land. 
Malawi has always been the most densely populated country in Southern 
Africa and with such a low level of urbanization, - the availability of 
cultivable land is one of the most crucial aspects of its economic 
survival. The country is usually self-sufficient in food, and has managed 
to accommodate its expanding population by the expansion, of- farming on to 
new land. However this process has now reached its limits 'because there 
is virtually no land left. A national physical plan prepared in 1982 
estimated that cultivable land in the Central and Southern Regions was 
already' fully utilize4-j_-and that-the, l'and frontier would very soon be 
reached in the least, densely-populated Northern Region 
(TCPD, personal 
communication, 19B2) (14). There is no evidence that the' adoption' of 
improved farming practices amongst smallholders 'has in' any way been a 
significant contributor to increased fd6dýproduction, 
_ even in specific 
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areas covered by special agricultural projects such as the Lilongwe Land 
Development Programme (TCPD, 1980b; Kydd, 1985). In these circumstances it 
is likely that there will be a rapid increase in rural-urban migration in 
the near future as people are inevitably pushed off the land. One of the 
aims of the aforementioned plan is to estimate the likely numbers of 
rural-urban migrants this process will produce. 
The significance of the relatively low level of rural-urban migration 
experienced up to the 1980s is recognized by Malawian town planners: 
"it is most important to state that two thirds of the urban 
population growth is due to natural growth and only one third to 
migration.... If migration patterns follow the general trends 
observed in other countries, the rural-urban population transfer 
might well increase in the near future" (TCPD, 1980a, Annex 3, 
ps. 5,6). 
In relation to the need to adopt "more "efficient" techniques in 
agriculture, planners also made the following point: 
"policy based upon this principal feature would undoubtedly 
bring forth accelerated rural-urban migration since the 
modernization of farming practices will lead to a substitution of 
labour. In search of an economic basis for their livelihood, the 
labour surplus created in the rural areas would be pushed into 
urban areas. A "land efficiency" policy should therefore be 
designed to avoid as far as possible the deterioration of rural 
employment opportunities" (ibid, Annex 3, p. 24). 
The usual distaste for rural-urban migration is evident in this 
statement, yet it is clear that the authors are prepared for a rapid surge 
in urban growth. Had the census figures actually given a true picture of 
past trends, this would ýhave meant that Malawi was about to experience a 
process that would be virtually without parallel, with a national,. urban 
growth rate of well over 10% per year. - -, I'll 
3.2.4 Components of Migration to Urban Centres 
The Malawian population is extremely mobile but much of the internal 
migration is rural-rural in nature, largely in response to constraints on 
land availability. For example the districts of Kasungu and Mchinji 
experienced very high rates of in-migration in the inter-censal period 
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accounting for 29% and 26% respectively of their total growth, mainly due 
to the demand for labour on the tobacco estates developed in these 
districts (TCPD, 1981; Christiansen, 1984). Increasing pressure on land 
in the Southern Region has altered the pattern of overall internal 
migration in Malawi. Previously'it gained the most by net in-migration, 
but now this position is taken by the Central Region as shown in Table 
3.5. 
The 1977 census and'the 1970-72 national sample census provide some 
data on internal migration for 1976-77 and 1971-72. The newer census only 
breaks down this data by district, or for rural and urban categories by 
region. The earlier sample census provides sufficiently disaggregated 
data to allow comparative analysis of all internal migration events by 
category (i. e. rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural, urban-urban). It 
also discounted migration that would last less than three months, and 
therefore excludes short-term visits, which the 1977 data does not. 
However the data from the sample census A; ý-anot altogether reliable and 
should only be viewed as an indication of the true situation. 
Table 3.6 shows the estimated number of migrants by category for 
1971-72 and 1976-77. It indicates that intra-rural' migration is by far 
the most important type of migration, but that about one-fifth of total 
internal migration in 1971-72 was rural-urban. The gross number of 
rural-urban migrants in both years was extremely high (about one-third of 
the total 1977 urban population from 1976-77). However return urban-rural 
migration was also very high. Many of these migration events must also 
relate to what are essentially visits, although as stated short-term 
visits should be excluded from the 1971-72 data. 
The 1977 figures appear to imply that there was a large fall in 
return migration from urban areas relative to the situation in 1971-72, 
although the gross figures are still large. However the 1977 census 
greatly underestimated the degree of urban-rural migration. For example 
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TABLE 3.5 
Internal Migration Balance by Region, 1965-66 and 1976-77 
Internal Migrants 
qain d 
Internal Migrants 
lost 
Net Internal 
miqrants 
Region 1966 1977 1966 -1977 1966 1977 
Northern 33,625 28,701 54,130 73,475 -20,865 -44,744 
Central 149,627 152,004 139,961 85,049 +9,666 +66,955 
, Southern , 270,890 - 
1 98,583 1 299,691 1 120,764 +11,199 -22,181, 
Source: Hill (1982) (based an Malawian census 
r figures for 1966 and 1977) 
TABLE 3.6 
Categories of total internal miqration in Malawi: 
1971-72 and 1976-77 
Category of 1971-72 1976-77 
migration n o. % no. 
Rural-Rural 432,000 52 n. a. 
Rural-Urban 159,000 19 162,916 
Urban-Rural 144,000 17 98,799 
Urban-Urban 93,000 11 n. a. 
Net R-U migration 15,000 64,117 
Total internal 
migration 
1 
828,000 - 99 n. 
F 
Source: Malawi population Change Survey, 
1974, Table 23. 
Malawi Population Census, 1977, 
Table 51. 
1. Rounded to nearest thousand. 
2. Less than IOOX due to rounding. 
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only about 24,000 out-migrants were recorded from Blantyre, whilst 168,000 
residents reported in 1977 that they had been living there a year before. 
Taking into''account natural increase this implies gross in-migration of 
45,000 people, and that Blantyre's growth in that year' due- to net 
in-migration alone-was, over 10%. ' This is regarded as inconceivable as it 
suggests an overall growth rate of more than twice the average'over the 
past five' years (see Appendix 3-1) for 1976-77. The recorded urban 
population of 382', 000'in 1976 is also incorrect since it implies a 23% 
growth in the total'' urban population for that year. This 
under-enumeration of out-migration from urban areas is probaby due to 
many* people not recording themselves as -previous urban residents in 
1976 because they were short-term', migrants or visitors-ý'who. had either 
forgotten, or did not perceiveIt as relevant-, that they had been, in urban 
areas a year'ago. The 1977 census figures on the other-, hand would include 
this-itinerant population. Taking these factors into account the evidence 
can only be interpreted as indicating a very high level of circular 
migration between rural and urban areas throughout the intercensal period. 
The only data on duration ofmigration, comes from the 1970-72 sample 
census, but it does indicate that short-term migration occurs at a 
significant level. 
- 
About 15%_ (almost 38,000) of migrants to urban areas 
were estimated to go for, 
'a 
period of three to., six months, and 25% for 
three to twelve months . 
(even shorter-term visitors were of course 
excluded). 
The 1972 data also suggest that circulation within. the. urban syst. em 
was operating at a high level. This. evidence is. somewhat. ppzzling because 
although it is suggestive. of'step-7wise migration thi. s, would be. expected to 
be reflected in more growth at the lower end of the urban hierarchy than 
has occurred. 
One other, comppnent of migration is returning migrant workers from 
abroad. The overall national growth rate of 2.9% was affected by this 
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factor as ther6' has been a fall - in the number of new migrants, 
particularly after the 1974 air crash at Francistown when new recruitment' 
to South" A: frica was halted for some years. In the early 1970s it appears 
that migration to urban areas by returning Malawian migrant workers was 
counterbalanced by-Malawian emigration abroad, and was a small proportion 
(about 2% or 3000i 6f"total in-migration to urban areas (NSO, 1973). It 
was also a 'small proportion of all returning migrants (about 5%). 
In-migration to"urban'areas from abroad was at a similarly 'low level of 
about 3500 (including foreigners). This evidence that returning migrants 
have not 'made a major contribution to urbanization in Malawi is further 
supported by the work of Christiansen and Kydd (1983). They contend that 
the 330,000 (net) in-migrants tO' Malawi in the intercensal period were 
nearly all absorbed into the rural'sector (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 
for a more detailed analysis with'reference to the context of urban policy 
making). 
3.3 Conclusion 
Urbanization is still at a very early stage in Malawi. However the 
alteration of urban boundaries has meant that large numbers of essentially 
rural people have been re-classified as urban and this, combined with 
rural-urban migration, has led to an increase in the apparent urbanization 
level from 4.8% in 1966 to 8.5% in 1977. 
Elimination of the 'boundary factor' indicates that net rural-urban 
migration has been at a low level to small urban centres, with some 
exceptions, although it is a very significant factor influencing growth in 
the major towns, except Zomba. The latter has suffered net out-migration 
due to the relocation of the capital to Lilongwe, which in turn has 
experienced a very high intercensal growth rate. The relative stagnation 
of most of the smaller centres in terms of the increase in their truly 
urban population suggests that these centres need to receive special 
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development efforts if they are to fulfil the roles of efficient service 
centres to Malawi's mainly rural population, and as, alternative 
destinations for rural-urban migrants. However it appears that'attitudes 
towards the development, of these centres is ambivalent, which may be 
to 
partly due. the false, impression of their growth given by census figures. 
Gross rural-urban migration in Malawi is high, but the most prevalent 
form of, migration still appears to be circular, on a both short and 
long-term basis, as indicated by very high levels of return urban-rural 
migration. 
The evidence implies that the process of rapid urbanization 
experienced in so many African countries has only just started in Malawi. 
There are also reasons to believe that a rapid increase in rural-urban 
migration is inevitable in the near future. Continued neglect of the 
small urban centres will ensure that the direction of this migration will 
remain concentrated at,.,, the top of the urban system, which, 
lis 
likely. to 
lead to problems unacceptable to the present Malawian government, such. as 
squatting and widespread informal employment. 
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Notes for Chapter 3 
1. Blantyre, Lilongwe,, Zomba, 'Mzuzu, Salima, Balaka, Dedza and Mangochi. 
kow- b"Al 
2. Interpreting the effect of' Lilongweli new, boundaries in order 
A 
to 
estimate its intercensal growth rate is a complex problem, 
and will'be examined in^greater detail later. I1 11 
This figure is taken from Table 3.1 and has been calculated on 'the 
basis of the recorded 1966 and 1977 populations of the 32 centres 
designated as urban in the latter census only. 
TPAs are, those areas for which the TCPD has prepared outline zoning 
plans) (Malawi, NSO, 1978). 
The TCPD calculates this according to census statistics on activity 
status in the'Karonga TPA"given in Volume 2 of the census. These show 
1749 people registered'as employer, employee, family business worker 
or'self-employed, and 1488 as mlimi (self-employed farmers). On the 
basis of a 28% employment - rate and the assumption that this implies 
2. _57 dependents per worker, (ratio 72: 28) the number of 6,250 de p endent 
on urban jobs was' produced. This presumes' that there were no 
employees in agriculture. - This may be a reasonable assumption in the 
Karonga'area'where large'estate'pro . ductiori'ddes not figure. 
6. This process is likely to continue as at least 76 has. were ear-marked 
for various new urban facilities and a similar amount"was likelý to be 
designated for'primdry schools in the TPA (TCPD,, 1981, -A: nnex 2, 'ý'. -18)'. ' 
The TCPD estimated that the peasant population, would fall' to 5,300'by 
2001 due to "losses of agricultural land being converted into building 
land" (ibid, Annex 1, ' p. 16). 
7. Backward projection yields a total, of about -1100 jobs corresponding to 
an- urban 'population of, 3971 in 1966. This implies that about 
two-thirds- of the urban' population' lived 'outs . ide the 1966 lbomal 
boundaries and adds weight to- the -view that the 1966 -census 
underestimated urban populations. 
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A further 2500 An specifically rural occupations (i. e. agriculture, 
hunting, fishing and forestry) were enumerated for all urban centres 
excluding Blantyre and Lilongwe (Malawi) N. S. O., 1980b, 
Vol. 11, Table 4.3). 
This applies even to Nsanje and Ngabu which appeared to grow at 
extreme rates. Nsanjels growth was very distorted by boundary 
changes (TCPD, personal communication, January 1983), and Ngabu has 
been assigned a TPA which is even larger than Zomba's gazetted 
boundaries in 1977. 
10. This opinion is supported by a study by the TCPD which states that 
"it seems as if the "informal" sector activities around the trading 
centre and market are considerably more developed than at comparable 
small towns in the Central and Northern Regions" but the writer 
admits that "this is merely a conjecture based on a passing 
observation" (TCPD, 1981, p. 54). 
In this report the TCPD assumed that this growth rate of 7.7% was a 
suitable surrogate for the small urban centres in Malawi. 
12. There is a small discrepancy here with the TCPD figure, due presumably 
to the use of Lilongwe's gazetted population in 1977, rather than 
that in the TPA. 
13. This rate of increase is assumed to have been fairly constant over 
that period as data from the 1970-72 national sample census, and the 
1972 Blantyre sample census give an AAGR of 6.5% from 1966-72 (see 
Appendix 4.1). 
14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources estimated in 1977 
that the overall cultivated area would exceed the suitable arable 
land available in 1983 by 380,000 acres. In the Southern and Central 
Regions unsuitable land would increasingly come under cultivation and 
the total cultivated by 1983 was projected to be 117% and 110% of the 
available arable land respectively (Malawi, National Rural 
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Development Programme, 1978). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Urban HierarchX: Patterns, Policies and Problems 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of an urban hierarchy relates to the functional 
organization of urban centres which make up an urban system. Different 
hierarchies can be delineated for different functions or characteristics: 
for example provision of goods and services, or of administrative or 
transport functions. Thus a purely administrative or transport hierarchy 
can be described, or a combination of functions and characteristics can be 
used to produce a more complex functional hierarchy. A well 
differentiated hierarchy will have a number of different levels and is 
usually pyramidal in form, with many lower order centres at the base and 
decreasing numbers of increasingly higher order centres in the levels 
above. The top category may include only one centre. 
The nature of the urban hierarchy is influential in determining the 
spatial impact of social, economic and political development within a 
country. Since the regional spread of development is a crucial aspect of 
the development process, anything which affects this diffusion is 
important. Analysis of an urban hierarchy may lead to the identification 
of factors which hinder develoPmentl and suggest remedial policies. The 
development of this theory relating to the relationship between an urban 
hierarchical structure and the level of accessibility to urban goods and 
services is based on the early works of Christaller (1966) and 1; 6sch 
(1954), and has since been elaborated by many economists and geographers 
(e. g. see Berry and Pred, 1965). 
Several studies of African urbanization have stressed the importance 
of the urban hierarchy as one of the structures through which development 
can be channelled. For example this has been identified in Sierra Leone by 
Riddell (1970), in Kenya by Soja (1968) and in Tanzania by Gould (1970). 
In the la,, L- study it is stated that: 
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"underlying the very modernization process ..... are the dynamics of 
that most spatial of , systems - 
the central place structure; a 
system of nodes of various sizes, at differing diRtannAR, linked 
with, varying intensities,, influencing areas contiguous. and between. 
structuring, focusing and serving their hinterlands, and acting as 
emergent pole ýg, thepqurjou dion a ý, &Tgujýtion. " ? Gooulattigý8io;. em as s 
?na 
The conclusion of suchý studies is that 'development' does not spread 
evenly from its place of origin because the capacity to adopt new 
innovations is unequally distributed. Although distance is always an 
important factor,, urbdn, places, have a higher potential to adopt many new 
innovations and this potential'increases with 'size' or level in'the urban 
hierarchy (Friedmann, 1973). Since modernization or innovations tend to 
be generated or adopted at the top of the urban hierarchy, (ibid) these 
are diffused in stages down through each level of the hierarchy, with each 
centre operating as the origin of an innovation for its own local urban 
sub-system. 'It is suggested that this process operates-most efficienny 
in a balanced urban' hierarchy. , This implies-that the ratio and spatial 
distribution of higher to lowerýorder centres at-each levelýshould allow-a 
high, level'of, interaction and accessibility between them and that-if the 
gap between hierarchical levels is too large (i. e. the system-is minimally 
differentiated) this will impede the process of diffusion. 
Innovation or modernization may not necessarily be synonymous with 
development of course,, and therefore a balanced urban hierarchy may assist 
the spread of changes which' are decidedly negative in their -impact'. 
Examples'are V. D., or cultural: breakdown due to the erosionýof traditional, 
values 'without, their replacement- by appropriate new structures CAdams, 
1970, ýP-36). The assumption that- small towns in Africa'-are less 
exploitative than large-towns has, also been challenged (see the special 
issue of Africa, 1979, vol. 49, no-3), which introduces the problem that 
special efforts, to-develop the lower end of, the urban hierarchy might also 
serve-to facilitate-the-channelling of surplus value from the rural areas. 
It should be noted however that the small centres considered here tend to 
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be much smaller than, those covered in these studies. 
- The creation -, of -a ýbalanced urban-hierarchy is only one method of 
spreading development, as, it assumes thatýinnovations are generated''from. 
aboveý, The creation-of development impulses at-the specific level of the 
urban hierarchy that is expected to benefit most-from a- particular change 
should, by-pass the process. Since the, -, lower levels of the hierarchy tend 
to be'those which serve theýmajority of the population in many developing 
countries, it,. is also, frequently asserted -that certain types-of 
development should be concentrated, there. ýNot only does this allow for a 
more immediate impact, on the population, but it also avoids, the problem of 
the diffusion process being weakened by the imperfect structure of the 
urban hierarchy, which is also a common phenomenon in developing countries 
(Johnson,. 1970; Funnell, -1970,1976; Taylor, 1972). 
- -The -firstýýhalf 'ofýthis, chapter analyses the nature of the, urban 
hierarchy in ýMalawij-drawing attention to problems that, exist* with 
reference to the theoretical points above. Government policies affecting 
the general context within which urbanization is occurring, and-specific 
urban,, policies directed at the smaller centres are considered, in -the 
second half. 
4.2 The Urban Hierarchy in Malawi 
, The, analysis of Malawi's present urban hierarchy takes two 
approaches. , The first method uses information on-central place functions 
in all, the urban. centres below the level, of Blantyre,,, Lilongwe, andýZomba 
to discover, the degree of differentiation in functional importance between 
centres. These three are excluded because not only is it absolutely clear 
that they are at the top of the hierarchy, but also because in order to 
differentiate between the smaller centres very low order functions have to 
be included in the analysis (e. g. groceries), and enumeration of such 
functions in the major towns would have been difficult and of little 
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value. The aim of this analysis is to see whether a multi-level hierarchy 
is developing below the level of the largest towns, -in which there- are 
clearly demarcated differences. in the. -, level-of goods and services, offered 
at each level. Such analyses ýhave- been. done for several countries in 
Africa (e. g. Grove and Huszar, 1964; MeWim, 1978; 1biodun, -1968, - 1971; 
Harvey, 1966; Obuhdo, 1970. For a critique and analysis of this method 
see Davies (1966))., It has been hypothesized that if the spatial 
expression of the system -forms a set of nested hierarchies with regional 
centres serving-a network of- smaller sub-regional centres, each of which 
in turn is easily accessible to a set of lower order central places and so 
on, this is the most effective way of offering, goods and services to, the 
population in terms of accessibility. 
The second approach analyses the nature-of interactions between urban 
centres in-Malawi.. A balanced, multi-level hierarchy not only ensures the 
most -equitable spread of access to similar, urban functions, but also 
allows effective transmission of, information flows through the'-system 
(Berry, 1972; -Hagerstrand, 1972). Analysis of the nature, of flowsýcan-be 
used to, draw conclusions about the! form of-the urban hierarchy (Mckim, 
1978; -Funnell, 1976). McWim has: -emphasized the-value of interaction 
analysis as a, method of understanding, structures and processes inherent-in 
spatial, organization, feeling that it, "canyield valuable insights which 
cannot be gained-from the analysis ., of static areal attributes- or 
functional inventories of central places" (Mc)(im, 1978, P-113). Friedmann 
also 'argues that one of the salient features of a nation's. -settlement 
system, is, that: 1, ý. 1- 1ý 
lleachýsubsystem-stands at the node of a communications network that 
originates, absorbs, and transmits impulses of change to the other 
subsystems" (Friedmann, 1973, p. 72). 
In addition he states that: 
, 11a, change in the relative position of one of 
the subsystems in the 
hierarchy of dependency relations signifies a change in the 
structure of the system as-a whole", (ibid, P-72). 
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One change that has occurred in the Malawian urban system is the 
relocation of the capital to Lilongwe. It is hoped that analysis of the 
pattern of interaction between urban centres will show whether the 
Lilongwe sub-system has altered its relative position, and thus allow 
conclusions to be drawn about the significance of the relocation for other 
parts of the urban-systemý 
4.2.1 The distribution of Central Place Functions 
In order to assess the degree of differentiation in the smaller urban 
centres they were assigned points according to the range and order of 
central place functions they performed. These functions were split into 
three categories: the urban economy, administration and welfare 
(essentially public services), and their coordinating role in the 
provision of services for agriculture, forestry and fishing (see Appendix 
4.1 for a more detailed explanation). 
Information on these aspects of urban functions in Malawi was 
collected from a variety of sources. A central place survey conducted by 
the TCPD in 1979 provided the main body of data. This was uý-dated and 
new data was provided by the National and Commercial Banks, ADMARC, the 
government department telephone and telex directory of 1980, and an 
official series of maps illustrating development projects for 
1981/82-83/84. Further data and a cross-check on the original TCPD survey 
'4"_. "_ 
was produced by empirical research in a number of centres in July-August 
1980 (1). 
The final values attained by each centre are illustrated in Figure 
4.1 (see Appendix 4.1 for an explanation of the methodology). This shows 
that there is a certain level of differentiation between the centres which 
could form the basis of an incipient hierarchy, and three tiers 'are 
tentatively defined. However the absolute difference in functional 
importance between each tier is not very great. The centres assigned to 
the higher category are Mzuzu, Salima, Karonga, Kasungu, Dedza, Mangochi 
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and Mzimba. These do not entirely correspond to the most populous 
centres, but there is a good correlation between those in the lowest tier 
and the smallest centres by population. 
The spatial distribution of centres according to their hierarchical 
level identified in Figure 4.1 is shown in Map 4.1. The coverage of the 
Northern and Central Region is very sparse but reasonably well distributed 
for first and second order, centres., In the Southern Region there is a 
great lack of intermediate centres between the level of Blantyre and Zomba 
and the second tier of lower order centres. The majority of lower order 
second and third tier centres are found here but the implication is that 
access to urban services in this most populated and densely settled region 
is relatively poor, except for those with access.. to Blantyre or Zomba. 
This runs counter to the more generally accepted view that the Southern 
Region is the most developed in Malawi. Instead it appears that the 
'core' region is spatially'limited to parts of the Shire Highlands around 
Blantyre and Zomba (2). 
Although this general spatial description yields some information 
which might direct urban development policy, there is no clear 
relationship between hierarchical rank and economic strength. This 
becomes clear when the 'urban economy' factor is disaggregated from the 
other central place functions. The ranking on this variable alone (Figure 
4.2) differs significantly from that in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.3 plots the 
rank of each centre for all functions, and for urban economy functions 
alone. It is clear that the relative strength of the urban economy in 
several centres bears little relationship to the overall strength of their 
central place functions. All those centres which fall far below their 
overall rank on this variable are district capitals, but all those which 
attain a much higher rank are not. 
This analysis has thus singled out a significant factor in Malawi's 
urban system: that the location of some district centres in accordance 
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with colonial administrative purposes has been disadvantageous to their 
economic development. On the other hand, economic development has been 
stronger in the few centres which were located primarily according to 
economic, rather than administrative factors. For instance the 
development of Balaka, Luchenza and Liwonde was stimulated by the railway. 
The latter has only emerged as an urban centre since Independence, due to 
the completion in 1970 of the 
rail connection to the Mozambique border and Nayuci and thence to the port 
of Nacala. Monkey Bay also owes its development to transport as it is a 
major port and repair centre for lake shipping; it is also a centre for 
tourism and fishing. Ngabuls central position in the Shire Valley on the 
main road connecting the district centres of Chikwawa and Nsanje has led 
to its development as a major service centre, and its selection as the 
headquarters of the, Shire Valley Agricultural Development Project and ýof 
one of the National Rural Development Programme's Agricultural Development 
Divisions. 
,- The, apparent-, strength of many administrative centres stems from 
government, policy. Many higherý order welfare and, administrative 
facilities such as secondary schools, Aistrict hospitals, magistrate 
courts, and district veterinary and agricultural offices are, located in 
them because they are established. targets,,, rather than because of any 
specific- locational advantage. In- some cases these -two factors- are 
combined in a district centre. This appears to be true particularly in 
the upper tier of this section of the urban hierarchy where there is a 
close correlation between overall functional rank and urban economy rank 
(see Figure 4-3). However there are large discrepancies elsewhere, 
particularly in the cases of Rumphi, Mwanza, Chikwawa and Dowa. The 
district administrative and welfare functions, of the latter two, for 
example, -, might well have been more effectively located 
Un. terms of 
convenient access for the rural population) at the non-district centres, of 
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Ngabu and Mponela. 
There is thus a degree of confusion, at the lower end of the Malawian 
urban hierarchy which suggests that it may not be an entirely effective 
structure for the efficient distribution of goods and services. Mlia 
(1978) has argued that the problem stems from colonial and missionary 
policies: 
! 'At, present 'one can think of many facilities that appear to be 
poorly located. This is particularly true of installations 
inherited from the colonial period. Consider, for instance, the 
location of Kasupe [Machingal and Dowa district headquarters or a 
number of mission secondary schools or hospitals. How well located 
are they in relation to the population they are supposed to serve? 
Imagine theýimpact these installations would have made on the rural 
environment if our colonial masters had not been pre-occupied with 
the idea of'settling in cool and scenically -beautifully places. 
The interests of the people to be served should come first. " 
(Mlia; 1978, p. 11) 
This ' lays, the ' 'blame entirely on policies formulated prior to 
independence, 'but does not explain why the situation has been-perpetuated 
since. Criticism should also be levelled at present -policy makers who 
have-'used -the inherited colonial centres as a-convenient and, established 
structure to which urban, projects'are directed. 
This ýanalysis has indicated -that, whilst there is a degree- of 
differentiation-in the. overall functional- strength of Malawi's smaller 
urban centres, the situation is-not clear-cut. ' However-this method only I 
describes' the distribution of 'static areal attributes' (Mcl4im, op 7cit) 
and tells us nothing of the operation of the dynamics of Ahe urban system 
(e. g. innovation and information flows). ý .-1. - 
4.3 Analysis of communicationflows between urban centreS .--, ý -1 '1 
, Origin-destination data for flows in the urban system can yield a 
picture of the system's dynamics, and further conclusions can be drawn 
about the nature, of the urban hierarchy. The most suitable data for 
Malawi were the annual schedules of telephoneý call 'distribution which 
included all the urban centres under study., Schedules, for- 1979 and 1982 
1 1ý3 
were obtained from the Postmaster General in Blantyre. Altýernative flow 
X data (e. g-postal flows) were unavailable. Telephone call data ýAs been 
used for similar analyses-'bf urban systems by ýGould '(1970)-'and Hirst 
(1973, -1975) for Tanzania, Le'inbach (1973) for Malaysia, and Soja for 
Eastern Africa (Soja, ýn. d. )*. " 
The schedules gave the destination of all calls made on 'manual 
exchanges for a sample' period. All centres'had manual exchanges in 1979 
giving-a complete matrix'of manual'calls'betWeen each pair of, centres. By 
1982 a, number of, -smaller urban centres had automatic exchanges only, 
so for these centres the schedule only shows calls' which originated from 
other -, manual, -exchanges. A major problem in using such data is- the 
exclusion of any, calls made between automatic exchanges. The analyses 
referred to above largely ignored this problem. However where a pýir of 
centres both'have-'automatic: 'bxchariges, as well as manual'exchanges, it is 
not''possible to-draw valid conclusions about the strength and direction of 
their interaction 'based on manual exchange 'data only. This problem 
relates mainly to the nature of flows between Blahtyre, '-Lilongwe, -Zomba 
and- 'Mzuzu. ' However the methods of' analysis mainly, rely-* on ' the 
proportional distribution of calls rather'than- their' absolute magnitude. 
For nearly all centres it is considered that' the relative, strength' of 
recorded (manuil)'''interaction with, '' for '6xample', Blantyre'Compared to 
Lilongwe', is'a satisfactory'surrogate of the' relative "strength' of all 
interactions (manual plus automatic)'with'those centres. In'addition-the 
majority, 'of centres ! ýin both' years 'had only manual"exchanges, -and'vihere 
thdre-was a choice between manual and automatic exchanges (as'wis the case 
for all other centres in 1979) many potential automatic calls go through 
manual-'bxchanges 'due to technical difficulties or lack of information. 
4ý3.1 The Matrices of Telephone Calls 
Initial inspection of the originý-destination data for urban centres 
immediately -indicated the relative weakness of' inter-urban'linkages. 
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There were few cases -of significant numbers of calls between any pair of 
towns (dyads). In both 1979 and 1982 nearly every urban centre sent and 
received its largest single number of calls to its regional-capital 
(Blantyre, Lilongwe or Mzuzu). In Tanzania Hirst (1975) found that Dar es 
Salaam alone was overwhelmingly dominant and in Malawi it appears that 
such primacy has not developed. However as Hirst concluded for Tanzania,, 
the matrices do suggest that the urban hierarchy is underdeveloped. A 
more developed hierarchy would be expected to yield a more complex pattern 
of dominance, with intermediate towns interacting with their smaller 
regional sub-centres more than the latter did with the regional capital. 
In Malawi therefore it appears that the urban centres below the level of 
the regional capitals are insufficiently differentiated to encourage 
hierarchical associations, - despite the evidence indicating a certain 
degree of functional differentiation. This hypothesis is borne out by 
further analysis of the data. 
4.3.2 Nodal Flow Analysis 
KS 
Nodal flow analysis provides one method of ordering and grouping cent 
by the strength of1flows operating between each pair of points, where each centre 
is regarded as a point. As described by Nystuen and Dacey (1962), a nodal 
flow from a centre only exists if its dominant or larg6st'a6sociation is 
with a 'larger' centre. In an analysis of telephone call flows, size is 
determined by the magnitude of all 
-in-coming calls received 
by each 
centre. Therefore there may be discrete', stru6tures of subordination 
within any urban system, as more than one centre 'may prove to be 
indýpendent (i. e. does not have its strongest association with a larger 
centre). ' 
Analysis*of the 1979 Malawian telephone- data covering all, manual 
exchanges (including, non-urban centres) by this method shows clearly the 
dominance of the regional, -, capitals 
(Map 4.2). However four Central 
Region centres, including the urban centre of. Ntcheu, were most strongly 
ipa 
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associated with the southern system rather than with Lilongwe. The 1982 
data showed a very similar pattern (Map 4-3). It should be emphasized 
that the exclusion of automatic calls makes it impossible to draw any 
conclusions about the nodal flows of, the four largest towns, and therefore 
to assign a hierarchy of dominance between the three regional sub-systems 
identified. None of the regional capitals had a nodal flow according to 
the manual data (except Lilongwe in 1982), as shown on the maps, but this 
should not be interpreted as meaning'that the sub-systems are discrete. 
If it had been possible to analyse the sum of automatic and manual calls 
between these centres it is probable that some pattern of interaction 
would have been found. 
The hierarchical associations identified by this technique are shown 
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The 1979 pattern is extremely simplistic and 
points to the dearth of centres performing intermediate functions. The 
six intermediate links identified are all weak; three centres are dominant 
to one other centre only, and even Zomba is only dominant to three. The 
1982 pattern is even more simplistic as only two intermediate links were 
identified. Nodal flows for eight centres (3) could not be defined as no 
manual calls were made as discussed above. The nodal flow-, from Champhila 
to Blantyre may indicate the strength -of Blantyre's influence over 
Mzuzu1s. 
If this analysis is compared to McIdmIs (1978) work on the Kenyan 
urban hierarchy, it is clear that the Malawian pattern is simplistic even 
in African terms. The Kenyan data indicated a five level hierarchy in 
1969, with Nairobi at the apex, and a number of centres, subordinate to 
most intermediate dominant centres. District. centres in Kenya tended to 
dominate their local centres, but this is exceptional in Malawi'. However 
Mcl(im found that few district centres had nodal flows- to 'their own 
provincial headquarters, and concluded that this indicated that the 
boundaries utilized for planning out across, functional areas which was 
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likely to be disadvantageous. A positive conclusion from the Malawian 
data is that administrative boundaries appear to be closely correlated 
with functional regions. The possible exception is the district of 
Ntcheu, and the railway centres of Chipoka and Mtakataka, which are in the 
Central Region but appear to be functionally related to the Southern 
Region. 
4.3.3 Transaction flow analysis 
Transaction flow analysis is a more sophisticated analytical method 
than nodal flow analysis, allowing all important interactions to be 
identified. It also accounts for direct and indirect associations, but 
cannot identify the largest nodes nor hierarchical associations. It has 
been used to analyse the degree of political integration in East Africa 
(Soja, n. d. ), and of the pattern of urban dominance in Kenya (Mcitim, 
1974). 
Transaction flow analysis essentially transforms the original 
telephone matrix so that salient flows can be identified. These are 
interactions of greater than expected strength, given the magnitude of 
total interactions with the whole system of both the, origin and 
destination. The expected interaction is related to the proportion of all 
interactions received at each point, ignoring the effect 
-of 
distance. 
Appendix 4.2 explains the assumptions and methodology of this technique in 
greater detail. 
The strength of the association between each pair of centres is 
termed the relative acceptance. Centres are mutually salient when the 
relative acceptance values in both directions are more than twice the 
expected value. The computed values from the 1979 data for the Malawian 
urban system are shown in Map 4.4. 
The Northern system is the most strongly integrated, all centres 
having mutually salient flows with Mzuzu at least four times the expected 
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value. Lilongwe's influence over its own regional sub-system is again 
identified, as it is mutually salient with every Central Region urban 
centre, except Kasungu. The southern part of the country contains two 
unconnected systems: one is clearly centred on Blantyre and involves 
mainly those centres to the south and west of Blantyre. The other 
southern sub-system has no clear focus, but its pattern supports the 
earlier suggestion that the administrative boundary between the Central 
and Southern Regions appears to cut across a functional system which here 
includes the centres of Dedza, Ntcheu, Balaka, Liwonde, Machinga, Zomba 
and the southern lake towns of Mangochi and Monkey Bay. 
The pattern of mutually salient flows in 1982 (Map 4.5) is very 
similar, although as some centres registered no manual exchange calls 
mutual salience could not be assigned between several centres. Maps 4.6 
and 4.7 show non-mutual salient links (transactions between dyads which 
operated in one direction only). one important point that does emerge is 
that Blantyre's influence does extend throughout the Southern Region, 
although its interaction is sometimes indirect. The Central-Southern 
sub-system is shown to be even more cohesive, as a number of, one-way links 
exist, whilst Kasungu appears as another focus in the Central Region. One 
sub-system identified in both years is located in the tea estate area 
south-east of Blantyre, and includes Luchenza, Thyolo, Mulanje and 
Phalombe. The lack of integration between this sub-system and the nearby 
centres in the Shire Valley (i. e. Chikwawa,,, Ngabu and Nsanje) illustrates 
the effect of the natural barrier of the Shire escarpment. 
4.3.4 Regression Analysis of Telephone Calls 
The two techniques already used have indicated that the mass of urban 
centres, measured in terms of their total interaction', has a large effect 
on the degree of interaction between centres. Blantyre, Lilongwe and 
Mzuzu are clear foci in the communication network. However the patterns 
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identified suggest that below these centres 'mass' differentials do not 
11 
have much influence, and that the urban hierarchy is basically two-tier. 
No account of distance has been taken in these analyses, although it is 
expected that in less developed countries with poor transport the friction 
of distance is likely to be an important influence on inter-urban 
interactions. 
A regression analysis of the data of the basic gravity model type 
helps to clarify the relative influence of mass and distance in 
determining the degree of interaction between centres. When such a 
regression was computed for the matrix of telephone calls between urban 
centres in Malawi in 1979 (4) it was found that 47.2% of the variance was 
accounted for by mass and. distance, variables together, the form of the 
equation being: 
log(calls) = 1.78 + 0.0047(origin mass) + 0.0063(destination mass) 
r 2. = 0.472 
-0.6009(log distance) 
As expected therefore a significant proportion of Malawi's communication 
pattern can be predicted by distance and mass variables. 
The r2 value is similar to that calculated for telephone call 
matrices in Tanzania and Malaysia7which were 0.506 and 0.51 respectively 
(Hirst, '1975; Leinba6h`, 1973). ' Disag'regation 6f'the di , st4nce'variable in 9 
these studies found that it accounted for most of the variation in the 
call pattern. From this it was deduced that the urban hierarchies of both 
countries' were little' developed, because the step-wise', 'interactions 
between urban centres of different sizes-expected of a'developed-hierarchy 
were not operating. -In the Malawian case, regressing the indepe I ndent 
variable (number of calls) on mass and distance variables separately 
showed tha't distance was a very weak explanatory variable, accounting for 
only 7.7% of the variance. The two mass variables together, on the other 
hand, explained 37.1% of- the variance (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6). 
However further, analysis'of the data by a succession of regression models 
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TABLE 4.1 
Reqression Results: All Inter-Urban Interactions 
I Coefficients for each Independent Variable* 
Dependent Variable Intercept Origin Destination log. ra# 
Mass Mass distance 
., 
log. calls 1.78 0.0047 0.0063 -0.6009 0.472 
1.9217. - - -0.5293 0.077 
0.4887 0.0045 0.0061 - 0.371 
0.624' - 0.0056 0.228 
0.672 0.0038 - 0.101 
t values of each coefficient tested and found significant at 0.0005 
confidence interval. 
#f value of r' tested and found significant at 0.0001 confidence 
interval. 
TABLE 4.2 
Regression results: interactions excluding dyads containing- 
Blantyre. Lilonqwe and Zomba 
Coefficients for Each Independent Variable* 
Dependent Variable Intercept Origin Destination log. distance r%# 
mass Mass 
log. calls 2.0166 0.0356 0.0511 -0.9191 0.405 
2.0511 - - -1.1933 0.236 
0.2183 0.01se 0.0322 - 0.06 
0.3762 0.0194 - 0.014 
0.3109 - 0.0326 0.047 
t values of all coefficients tested and found significant at 0.0005 
confidence interval7 except those separately marked 
#I value of r2tested and found significant at 0.0001 confidence 
interval 
I. significant at 0.005 confidence interval 
%, significant at 0.025 confidence interval 
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found that the basic model was distorted by the very high number of 
interactions with Blantyre and Lilongwe, and to a lesser extent Zomba. 
These three together accounted for 40% of all incoming and outgoing calls 
in the urban network. When all dyads containing these three were excluded 
from the regressions, the results were almost the reverse of the overall 
model (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4-7). Distance alone now explained 23% of 
the variance compared to only 6% for the mass variables together. The 
latter were therefore virtually negligible in determining the pattern-of 
communication flows within most of the urban system. 
Analysis of the pattern of high standardized residuals from this 
model served to confirm the strength of the regional factor identified in 
previous analyses. For example almost all interactions between towns in 
the Northern Region and Mzuzu were, much higher than- predicted by mass and 
distancp variables taken-together or alone. 
The results of these regression analyses, support the conclusion that 
the urban system below the level of the major towns does not form- a 
coherent hierarchy. The fact that distance exerts a strong negative 
influence on the degree of interaction between the smaller centres has 
negative implications in terms of innovation diffusion, as it is likely 
that other information channels are-similarly incoherent. Yet the smaller 
centres are forced to overcome the friction of distance to interact with 
major centres due to the lack of intermediate centres to act as 
'middle-men'. 
It is clear that urban interactions in Malawi are operating within 
two very different modes, and that the major discontinuity occurs at the 
highest level of the urban system. The use of a binary coded variable in 
place of the original mass variables can help to elucidate this (Hirst, op 
cit). Therefore three further regressions were computed in which the mass 
variables were replaced by scores of one for every dyad containing 
Blantyre, Lilongwe or Zomba. The results showed that the discontinuity 
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occurred when either Blantyre or Lilongwe were involved in interactions, 
but Zomba did not have sufficient influence to yield a significant result. 
Combining the dummy variable so that both Blantyre and Lilongwe scored 1 
and other centres 0 in one regression, increased the overall variance 
accounted for to 50%. In the Tanzanian case analysed by Hirst (op cit, 
p. 283) he concluded that the improvement in the regression model yielded 
by use of a binary variable (for Dar es Salaam dyads) had "captured the 
essential feature of Tanzania's urban structure more effectively and more 
efficiently than the original mass variables". The Malawian results 
suggest that the "essential feature" of its urban system is an 
hierarchical step between two major cities, and the rest of the urban 
network. It also supports the earlier conclusion that Zomba's loss of 
status- has removed the essential characteristic which made it 
significantly different from other Malawian towns. 
When the Blantyre and Lilongwe models were compared it was found, that 
26.8% of variance was accounted for in the former (i. e. when only its 
mass was weighted), and only 14.7% in the latter. The equations were: 
1) Blantyre dyads weighted: - - log(calls) = 1.8092 + 0.8555(mass) - 0.5307(logd) r 0.268 
2) Lilongwe dyads weighted: - 
log(calls) = 1.9501 + 0., 3535(mass) - 0.5647(logd) r 2.0.147 
All the coefficients are very similar except for that of mass. From this 
it is deduced that Blantyre's mass is a more influential factor in 
determining the pattern of Malawi's phone-calls than Lilongwels. 
Hirst and Leinbach's studies also found that the capital cities in 
Tanzania and Malaysia generated their calls with little regard for the 
friction of distance. A town at the top of an urban hierarchy might be 
expected to channel information flows through secondary centres which are 
spread more evenly across national space, and therefore mass rather than 
distance of destination should be an important influence. The Malaysian 
results showed that Kuala Lumpur had a low coefficient for distance but a 
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high one for mass of destination. The data for Blantyre and Lilongwe 
showed an even more extreme pattern, using two separate models for each 
centre based on out-going and in-coming calls respectively. Neither the 
distance nor the mass of other centres were found to be significant in 
explaining the pattern of calls from or to Blantyre. However distance 
did account for 20.1% of variance in the number of calls sent by Lilongwe, 
and 19.5% of calls sent to it, whilst mass was also insignificant (see 
Table 4-3). 
These results again point to the lack of secondary centres through 
which the two main cities could channel their information flows. Blantyre 
had also overcome the distance factor in its pattern of calls, presumably 
because it was virtually the only source of so many goods and services and 
all centres must interact with it to some degree regardless of their size 
and proximity. Lilongwe's interactions are limited by distance however, 
which suggest that its administrative power is weaker in the further 
reaches of Malawi. 
Having discussed the nature of Malawi's urban hierarchy, the issue of 
government policies affecting urbanization will now be considered. 
4.4 Post-Independence Government Policy and the Urban System 
Goverment policies which affect urbanization operate at two levels. 
In Malawi there are specific urban policies such as those related to the 
development of particular urban centres (e. g. Lilongwe), levels of the 
urban hierarchy (e. g. district centres), and the location of industrial 
estates and housing schemes. At another level there are a range of 
policies which affect the context within which urbanization occurs. 
Policies affecting rural development can influence the rate of rural-urban 
migration for example. Therefore an analysis of urban policies in Malawi 
cannot be made without an adequate evaluation of the national policy 
context within which they are made and this is considered below. The last 
172 
TABLE 4.3 
InfluenCe of mass and distance variables 
on interactions with BlantVre and Lilongwe 
Variation accounted for by independent variables W') 
Regression model Blantyre dyads Lilongwe dyads 
Incoming calls on: 
1) Mass and distance insig. 0.208 
2) Mass only insig. insig. 
3) Distance only insig. 0.201 
outgoing calls on: 
1) Mass and distance insig. 0.309* 
2) Mass only insig. insig. 
3) Distance only insig. 0.195* 
Note: * significant at . 01 confidence interval; other r' significant 
at . 001 level. 
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part of the chapter evaluates direct urban policies affecting the smaller 
centres. 
4.4.1 The Context of Urban Policy Making in Malawi 
The Malawian goverment's development approach concentrates heavily 
on the agricultural sector. There, -is clear evidence in its official 
stance that large-scale rural-urban migration is seen in, a very negative 
light. Although most African governments display concern about the, speed 
of urbanization in their countries, which sometimes leads to the adoption 
of extreme measures such as bulldozing squatter settlements or "retour a 
la terrell strategies (none of which appear to be very effective), the 
Malawian government takes a particularly rigorous stance on this issue. 
Rural-urban migration which would lead to an imbalance between job-seekers 
and employment is strongly condemned. - There appears to be little regard 
for the absorptive capacity of, the urban informal sector, nor of the 
concept that in areas where the, rural marginal productivity of labour is 
very low (e. g. in the Southern Region where land is. greatly over-utilized 
and population density very high) the indiv idual migrant's productivity 
and income in urban centres may exceed his/her- rural potential, even if 
their employment is 'marginal'. 
Beyond these economic considerations however there appear to be two 
other strands to the, official anti-urban stance. One is a political 
unease about the emergence of an unsatisfied, but possibly politicized, 
urban p-ovo-. proletariat. The evidence for this is impressionistic rather 
than direct, 
- 
but it is an attitude often attributed to African 
governments, and in Malawi residential zoning in Lilongwe may well reflect 
such political considerations (see Chapter 6). The second strand reflects 
a certain puritanism evident in Malawian official attitudes to a range of 
social issues. In this context urbanization often appears to be viewed as 
a corrupting influence. The reverse side of this coin is the clearly 
expressed official view that the role of Malawians is to remain as rural 
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peasants and "work hard in the fields". Not only does this exhortation 
commonly form headlines in the daily newspaper, along with calls to "grow 
more maize", but a similar theme often dominates parliamentary debate, 
particularly in the speeches of the President (who holds the portfolio for 
agriculture). The President frequently details his perception of the 
progress of maize growing in districts that he visits, and emphasizes that 
the sale of maize is regarded as a, far more appropriate method of raising 
cash than any alternative employment. The issue of food self-sufficiency 
amounts to a national obsession at official levels, and it is pursued with 
such vigour that it cannot fail to affect national awareness, or 
individual politicians' perceptions of what is expected of their 
constituents. It is worth quoting at length from one presidential spe ech 
to illustrate the extraordinary emphasis given to this issue: 
t'Freedom to me must mean food for the people .... but if we are to 
have this, then it means hard work on the part of qverybody in this 
country .... We have no gold mines .... Our mine is the soil. 
Therefore everyone must work. If one cannot work, as I cannot at' 
Chemwari (5), then you must spend money to employ someone to do 
the work for you, as I am doing.... At least we feed ourselves.... We 
are the only country in Africa, as I am speaking, at least this 
part of Africa.... that is not asking either the USA or the Dominion 
of Canada for maize and other kind of foodstuffs. To me it is 
shameful, Africa.... is very rich agriculturally.... I am glad my 
people are working hard. They have listened to my appeal to them 
to work hard in the fields. They are working hard in the fields. 
As a result there is no shortage of food here .... even those 
districts of the country which knew nothing about agriculture 
before, now .... produce all kinds of crops, not 
forgetting maize. 
For example I am happy to see that the people in Chitipa, even 
Karonga itself, Nkhata Bay, even Mzimba, let alone Nkhotakota, do 
produce maize.... I am happy. Because these places never knew 
anything about maize before .... now everyone of these districts 
announces bags of maize produced. I was amazed to hear some-of the 
numbers of bags produced even by Nkhata Bay, N; Chotakota and 
Kanyende's areas .... grow maize for money. 
Instead of going to South Africa, Rhodesia and other places like 
that, plant maize for money, you will make much more money at 
home .... if you grow maize and sell 
that maize to ADMARC, rather 
than if you would if you went to South Africa of Zimbabwe or 
Zambia. Because if you went there the most you get is t5 a 
month .... But if you grow maize, oh 
K500 even K1,000. Therefore it 
is better to stay at home, engage yourself in agriculture. 
I am glad people had listened up North .... even such places as 
Kasungu, Lilongwe, Dowa, where they have always had maize, they are 
growing much more of it now.... not only for food .... they are 
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growing it for money, to sell to ADMARC, to sell to Press Produce. 
I have given orders both to ADMARC and Press Produce that they 
have to buy any maize offered by my people in the villages, whether 
they make profit on that maize or not .... any surplus maize .... must 
not be thrown away or allowed to get rotten .... That is why I 
ordered the building of those silos [in Lilongwe]" (Hansard, 
December 18,1981). 
National prestige and financial self-interest (Press Produce is part 
of Press Holdings which is essentially a private presidential enterprise) 
are both evident in this statement. Whilst political pressure of this 
kind, carried through to village level by local Malawi Congress Party 
officials, must have an effect on the national psyche and discourage 
people from leaving the land, the rhetoric is also backed by one of the 
most rigorous wage policies in Africa. 
Restraints on urban minimum wages are seen by the government as one 
way of discouraging rural-urban migration. From 1969-77 real wages for 
unskilled urban employess fell by 30% (Ghai and Hadwan, 1983, p. 90). Real 
incomes also fell for rural peasants and estate workers in the 1960s and 
1970s (ibid; Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Christiansen and Kydd, 1983). 
This has led to criticism (ibid) of agencies like the World Bank which 
have cited Malawi as an African 'success' story (e. g. see Acharya, 1978; 
1981a; 1981b). Kydd and Christiansen (1982, P-350) have stated that "any 
'success' that Malawi has enjoyed has been seriously harmed by declining 
real living standards for the majority of the population". 
However in the context of rural-urban migration, the gap between 
rural and urban incomes is a crucial factor, even when they are both 
falling, as well as the number and location of wage-earning opportunities. 
The data in Table 4.4 show that in Malawi the rural-urban income gap is 
not very wide and has diminished since Independence. Estate workers in 
fact obtained comparable incomes to those on minimum urban wages in 
1968, and the 1969-77 fall in real terms of average minimum rural wages 
was only a third of that suffered by urban minimum wages. Also by 1977 
average income in the smallholder sector was higher than the urban minimum 
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TABLE 4.4 
Indices of income levels 
in rural and urban areas in Malawi 
1969 1977 % 
change 
Average smallholder production (K p. a. ) 117.9 176.0 
Subsistence 90.6 130.0 
Cash 27.3 46.0 
Average agricutural wages (K p. a. ) 97.8 152.4 56 
Minimum rural wages 82.8 90.0 9 
Fall in real terms minm. rural wage -9 
Av. estate worker's income (all sources)* 140.0 (1968) n. a. -17 
Minimum urban wages (Blantyre) (K p. a) 137.0 144.0 5 
Low income cost-of-living index (1970=100) 91.3 170.7 
Fall in real terms minx. urban wage -30 
includes free housing, other income in 
kind and cash from self-employment 
Source: data from Ghai and 
Radwan, 1983. 
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wage, although the majority of this income derived from subsistence 
production rather, than cash. Whilst the smallholder sector undoubtedly 
suffered during 
'the 
1960s and-1970s because its viability was eroded by 
ADMARC taxation through crop-pricing policies and the diversion of 
agricultural development resources to the, estate sector (Kydd and 
Christiansen,, 1982; Christiansen and Kydd, 1983; Ghai and Radwan, 1983), 
in the 1980s there have been significant price rises for both staple food 
crops and cash crops for this sector. These were largely a result of 
pressure exerted by the World Bank which made two Structural Adjustment 
Loans to Malawi (SAL) in 1981 and 1983: one of the conditions was that 
crop 
, 
prices (particularly cash crops) should be raised. From, 1980-82 
peasant producer prices increased by 113% for maize, 25% for cotton, 12% 
for tobacco and 6% for groundnuts. Further increases in 1983 raised maize 
prices, by 4.5% and export crop prices in the range 29-50% (Kydd, 1985). 
The SALs also led to deregulation of many price controls on goods 
which would have also hit the urban poor in the 1980s Ubid). Whilst 
minimum urban wages are only a guide to the real income levels of the 
urban employed, it is argued that in Malawi they do give a real indication 
of the wage levels in many of the jobs available to the average unskilled 
rural-urban migrant (e. g. in construction, manufacturing and the service 
sector). As Ghai and Radwan (1983, p. 95) point out, government policy is 
to maintain the present level of minimum wages, and seeks to "control 
rural-urban migration through reducing income differences between peasants 
and wage earners .... the weak trade union structure .... and the small number 
and effective organization of employers.... further facilitated the 
implementation of. this policy". 
Another factor which has arguably affected 'the , 
rate of rural-urban 
migration in Malawi, and which is again the indirect result of government 
policy, has been the massive increase in wage employment in, the 
agricultural sector. Domestic wage employment increased by 7.2% per year 
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from 1964-78 (9% per year from 1968-78), representing one of the fastest 
employment growth rates recorded anywhere in the world in that period, and 
58% of the increase was in agriculture (Ghai and Radwan, 1983, P-76). 
Estate employment growth alone accounted for a large proportion of this, 
growing by 11.5% per year from 1964-72 and 9.6% per year from 1973-78. By 
1977 the estates accounted for about 130,000 employees, equal to the the 
total domestic wage employment in 1966 (ibid) and by 1980 50.8% of all 
paid employees in the country were in the agricultural sector as a whole 
(compared to 10.9% in manufacturing) (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982, p-364). 
This expansion of the estate sector has been encouraged by the 
government through a variety of measures: political, bureaucratic and 
business elites have been strongly* encouraged to lease large and 
medium-sized estates primarily for tobacco (this policy is indicated in 
Banda's quoted speech); much of the avalable unused cultivable land has 
been appropriated to this sector (sometimes leading to the eviction of 
peasants) whilst land rents have been kept minimal (6); agricultural wage 
rates have been kept low; and the real return to peasant labour restricted 
by ADMARC pricing policies (at least until the 1980s) encouraging 
peasants to work for low wage rates on the estates. Public and private 
resources have also been diverted on a massive scale. ADMARCIs investment 
and loans to the estate tobacco sector were 50.9% of their total 
investment and loans in 1978 (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982, P-368i; and 
ADMARCIs and other Malawian interests' financial control of Malawi's two 
commercial banks was used to push the banks into major loan commitments to 
the estate sector. In 1980 53% of commercial bank advances went to 
agriculture (compared to 13% from 1965-72) "at the direction of the 
government, with scant regard to standard lending criteria" (ibid, 
pp-368-369) (7). 
Estate employment expansion coincided with a massive return migration 
of economically active Malawians who had been abroad, primarily in 
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Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, caused by changing policies for 
foreign libour in these host countries; ' a temporary ban on recruitment to 
the South'African mines after 1974 'by 'President Banda, since when the 
flows have been at 'a much lower level; and possibly the President's 
rhetoric against international migration. The latter is tentatively 
suggested as a possible'factor in the return migration by Christiansen and 
Kydd (1983, P-322) for example. Indeed it is clearly possible that 
Banda's position on'this is not only affected by consideration of national 
prestigý related to a desire not to'appear dependent "on external sources 
of employment to maintain the population, but also by a desire to' have a 
large*surplus supply of labour'in . the"country to depress agricultural wage 
rates. 'Christiansen and Kyda (op`cit)-eýstimate that' from '1966-77 Malawi 
experienced a net in-migration of 330,000 economically active people from 
abroad, of'which 175,000 were men (8). In their opinion the vast majority 
have been successfully absorbed in the agýicultural sector-(ibid, -P-. 325). 
They estimate that about one fifth became wage employees 'on estates, 
another fifth work as smallholders and 'ýart-tiMe on estates', and most-of 
the rest returned''to subsistence' and 'cash-crop farming. '-They also 
estimate that there has been a fall in male full-year employment in 
peasant agriculture, due to more "involvement' in part-time estate 
employment. If their estimates are correct this suggests that despite 
the fact that the decrease in remittances must have caused'severe problems 
in the peasant sector (in 1968/69 'the poorest 43% of smallholder 
households derived 65% of their cash income from remittances (Ghai and 
Radwan, 1983)), and that returnees from urban centres abroad might have 
been expected to have a high propensity to migrate to urban areas in 
Malawi, they must have opted to remain in the rural areas. This again 
supports the contention that the alternative of urban employment 
(particularly for fhe unskilled) in Malawi has not been a major draw, 
presumably because the income differential_is low and also because estate 
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work was available for many. 
Further evidence is supplied by Christiansen (1984) in a study of 
internal migration patterns. He emphasized that rural-rural migration is 
far more common than rural-urban migration and that the districts with 
the largest net in-migration are centres of estate development (9). He 
concludes that "interestingly the typical pattern of rural-urban migration 
does not seem to have characterized migration in Malawi. The majority of 
net migration is rural-rural" (ibid, p. 147). 
General policies and attitudes towards development and the 
agricultural sector have therefore created a framework which is 
considered to have strongly influenced urbanization-sirice independence, 
particularly those factors which affect rdral--urban migration. 
4.4.2 Direct Urban Policy 
Up until the 1980s Malawi lacked any coherent policies relating to 
the pattern of urban settlements. The Statement of Development Policied 
1971-80 which has formed the basis of much of Malawi's development 
programme since independence contains only one specific section relating 
to urban strategy which is reproduced in its entirety below: 
"Until recently Malawi has suffered froniý' the "primate city 
syndrome" with one moderately large urban centre (Blantyre) nearly 
ten times as big as the next largest town. This-trend is now being 
reversed with the siting of the New Capital City at Lilongwe in the 
Central Region and with the creation of new urban growth points 
such as Liwonde. The new industrial location policy, which 
requires all new 11footloosell industries to be sited in Lilongwe, is 
also helping to bring about a more even distribution of urban 
population. This will have beneficial effects on rural areas, in 
that it will provide them with easier access to urban facilities. 
With a large number of small urban centres spread around the 
country, the contrast between urban and rural living conditions 
will become less pronounced. However, it will still be necessary 
to avoid making town life too attractive if disruptive rural 
emigration is to be avoided. " (Malawi, Statement of Development 
Policies, 1971-80, p. 121) 
The references to Lilongwe's impact on future urban and industrial 
development are, to some extent, questionable (see Chapter 5). 
Furthermore since Liwonde was the only small centre which received any 
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special attention during the planning period, the presumed, impact of 
industrial decentralization policies on rural areas was not forthcoming. 
The major element 
lof 
Malawi's urbanization policy has undoubtedly 
been the relocation of the capital. This has been presented as a means of 
achieving. an improved regional balance in urban growth, by providingan 
alternative to. Blantyre. Analysis of this aspect of urban policy, in 
Malawi is one of the major aims of this study. It forms the basis of the 
following chapters and will not be considered in detail here. 
Despite the lack of a coordinated national urban policy, a number of 
recommendations have been made over the years directly concerning the 
development of the urban system. At the beginning of the 1970s 
recommendations were made. - 
for both Lilongwe and Blantyre which were 
intended, to generate a more balanced urbanpattern within their local 
regions., For Lilongwe the policies were formulated, by the. Physical 
Planning Division, and those for Blantyre, came from the Blantyre Planning 
Team of the Town Planning Department (TPD). In both cases the planners 
recommended the development of a local network of "satellite towns" and. an 
integrated settlement., hierarchy which would stabilize,. local regional 
development, relieve pressure on the land,,. and improve service. provision 
for the regional populations, as well as providing alternative 
destinations for rural-urban migrants (Physical Planning Division, 
_1971; 
TPD, Blantyre Planning Team, 1973). 
The Blantyre plan, as well as other official statements during the 
1970s drew attention to the importance of. the policy of,, diverting 
industrial development to other growth centres. However as indicated, the 
implementation of such a policy has been limited to, the case of Liwonde, 
apart from the new capital. An, industrial estate was builtlat Liwonde in 
1974 by the Malawi Development Corporation, (MDC).,. Inasmuch as this. is the 
only fully-equipped industrial estate, outside Blantyre and Lilongwe., 
Liwonde has a potentially significant role in, regional development. 
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However despite its advantageous location on the Nacala rail link its 
development has been very disappointing. In 1977 two industries were 
established to produce brushes and plastic shoes, but the only other 
development was a canning factory established by the MDC which has since 
closed down. This case illustrates the difficulties of encouraging the 
spatial spread of. significant industrial development in a country which 
has a very weak economic base for, urban-based industry. 
The policies. recommended, for Blantyreand Lilongwe and their local 
regions might have had a sigificant impact- on the development of the 
smaller centres surrounding them, but they were never implemented. One 
problem which hinders urban policy formulation and implementation. in 
Malawi. appears to be the expectations and. attitudes of key decision-makers 
(which often means the President). For example the goverment response to 
the Blantyre Planning Team's Interim Report was negative.., Although the 
original terms of reference did not include halting Blantyre's growth, one 
of, the criticisms was that the recommendations would not produce the 
'required' aim of stopping Blantyre's growth altogether by the. eary 1980s 
(Blantyre Planning Team,, op cit)., Another problem was. that until 1977 the 
main authority involved-in settlement planning,, the TCPD, was only a unit 
of, the Ministry of Works and Supplies and had very, little power. Its 
transfer to the Office of... the President and Cabinet enabled,, it to play a 
more active role in national development planning thereafter.., Financial 
factors have also prevented ., policy 
implementation:, the fact that-the 
Blantyre plan's, estimated cost., equalled the. initial. estimates , for 
relocating the capital also counted, against it., ýDevelopment. funds in 
Malawi are limited, and most, projects. are- almost, entirely, funded, by aid. 
projects can only be implemented if donors can be found, and the 
development of the urban sector generally has, a low priority. The capital 
relocation has taken priority., over, other urban projects for - any 
development funds which might be allocated for this sector. 
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4.4.2.1 The District Centres Devel_opment Programme 
The formulation of a District Centres Development Programme (DCDP) 
in the 1980s has improved the chances of policies being implemented which 
will lead to the development of a more integrated and functionally complex 
urban hierarchy. It is a separat6 and identifiable target 'for urban 
'development funds and provides a" donvenient target for aid donors. It is 
essentially aimed at developihg the 'urban' system 'below' the-level- of 
Blantyre and Lilongwe and wad initiated by the"TCPD. A Gerýan'do . nsultancy 
firin, GITEC Consult GMBH, wa s hired to prepare' a feasibility study for the 
programme'and t: &' produce I detailed recommendations for the development OT 
particular centres. 
The basic proposals, published in 1980', " ' 'relate 'to t: wo' main 
recommendations'. One was that -decentralized urban d6velopM6ht- is 
absolutely crucial to Malavii"s overall economib'development. It"is'stated 
that rapid urban growth is inevitable, and that the secondary sector will 
have to be'developed to provide an'economic base for'the urban-population-. 
The consultants produced various forecasts of the 'urban, population-'by 
2000, and'- of- the 'marginal' 'urban population, ' acdording, to"different 
'assumptions about demographic variables and'economic growtli, "Oarticularl ,Y 
in the'agricultural sector. The 'marginal' uýbah population is defined as 
that without an economic base-for their livelihood, or as the 'squatter' 
population. For example one likely scenarid pibduced'an urban population 
of about 2.2-millioh"by*' 2000, ' equivalent to an, 'urbanization level o, f 
around 20%, and a projected marginal population of 830,000. 'More 
optimistic" assumptions about -growth in the agriculturil sector'however 
gave much lower estimates of the urban and marginal population. '-On-the 
grounds that -Malawils 'circumstanced dictate that industrial develOpm , 4nt 
must be promoted through agricultural -, development, 'the consultants felt 
that the focus of economic policy should remain on the agriculture sector, 
but' emphasized that since 'decentralized urban development is a 
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complementary policy for obtaining accelerated growth in that sector it is 
very important for Malawian development. 
The second recommendation basically relates to the role of spatial 
linkages within the urban system. It is assumed that decentralization 
will not generate the positive rural-urban relationships necessary for the 
development of both rural and urban sectors if there are not strong 
spatial linkages between the units of the urban system. Furthermore it is 
emphasized that such linkages can only be effective in'llan articulated 
spatial- system.... [where] towns of different sizes -and -at different 
hierarchical levels have to perform specific functions as nodes for 
linkage diffusion" (TCPD, 1980a, p. 22). In other words the district 
centres programme is aimed at manipulating the present urban system to 
produce a clearly identifiable urban hierarchy. As has been seen, at 
present hierarchical development in the Malawian urban system is 
negligible. ' 
The form of the urban hierarchy proposed by this programme comprises 
six levels: national centres, regional centres, sub-regional centres, main 
market centres, rural centres, and villages (see Table 4.5). 36 centres 
were ranked according to a number of variables to indicate not only their 
existing functional roles (10), but also their potential for development, 
and their existing linkages ' with riirkl Surrounding" (see'Appendix 
4.4). These centres included-nearly all-the official urban places (except 
Lilongwe, Blantyre and Mzuzu which were already assigned as national or 
regional centres) plus nine other centres included because of their 
location or economic functions. From these indicators 9 sub-regional 
centres were selected to receive priority treatment for development to a 
relatively high functional level, since this intermediate level is the 
most identifiable gap in Malawi's urban hierarchy. The final ranking of 
the 36 centres is shown in Table 4.6, which also indicates their planned 
functional role, and the priority they should receive. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Recommended Urban Hierarchy and Projected Growth Rates to 2000 
Urban Population : 2000 
7% total AAGR 5.5% total AAGR 
no. of 
Type of Centre centres Population AAGRX Population AAGR% 
1. National centre: 2 
Blantyre 700,000 5.0 500,000 3.6 
Lilongwe 600,000 8.0 500,000 7.0 
2. Regional centre: 
Mzuzu 1 135,000 B. 3 100,000 6.7 
3. Sub-regional 
centres 9 230,000 7.5 190,000 6.0 
4. Main market 
centre 30-35 350,000 5.4 250,000 3.6 
5. Rural centres 200-250 200,000 - 70,000 - 
6. Villages - - - 
Source: TCPD/GITEC, 1980b, Table 5-6 
including centres not qualified as urban 
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Table 4.6: Final Ranking of Centres for DCDP 
Name of, Reglonb2 'Naln Functlcqm Other IN=ctlons to be 
Rank Centre Locl-tlon of Centre 
Performed by Centre 
i-r %c%- nnTnnV-P%- 
cwp&ratIve ve2opment Avantages Potential 
zdIcator I of Binter-j 
land 
ndex I Rank I nd;. % 
ri. 
., 
Ft: uzu North R%iinnal Centro All lower level sorvice n. a. 
for Northern functions and Industri- 
Region al Centre for Northern 
Region 
(2) Ansunqu Con t ra 1 Sub-rcqional All lower Ivvel service 121 
Centre functions and District 
Administration 
(3) ra 1 ima Central Stib-regional. All lower levelservice 130 
Centre functions and District 
Administration 
(4) nangula South Sub-regional All lower levelservice 113 
Centre functions 
(5) 
I 
Mchinji. Central Sub-regional All lower level service' Is 
Centre functions and District 
i 
(r- )I KaronUgl 
Zomba 
(6) Liwonde 
(9) Luchanza 
Administration I 
11, ýrth Euh-rpglonal All lovr-r level service 122 
Centre functions and vistrict. 
Administration 
South Cultural Centre Main Harket Centre and 165 
all In-.: cr level ser- 
vice functions and 
District Ad: ministra- 
tien 
South lryýu5trial : "Vi- Sub-regional. Centre 122 
ccntre and all lower level 
service functions and 
District AIninistra- 
tion 
F, )ut h Iniustrial. main Market Centre and 117 
C(.. ntre all lower level ser- 
vice functions 
SECOND PPIORITY MITRES 
c) Dwangwa 
7) Central Sub-regional 
Nkf"ý;,, _r'.. rjta) Cc. ntre 
(11) vangochi South Sub-regional 
Centre 
(12) Eu*. )-.,, ni 11orth Sub-regional 
(or Centre 
THIN) PRMIlly Cr I. 17prs 
(13) Ralaka South Main market 
Centre 
(14) 11khata Day North flain Market 
Centre 
(15) IlkhotaYota 
(or Dwang- 
wa) 
fiq - lizinha 
(17) munphl 
central Main Mar), t-t 
I 
Centre 
North Main Market I 
Centre 
North Main Market I 
Centro 
All lower level scr- 
vice functions 
All lower level ser- 
vice functions and 
District Admini-stra- 
tion 
All 1cwer level ver- 
vice functions 
All lmwer level ser- 
vice functions 
All lower level ser- 
vice functions and 
DistrIct. Administra- 
tIon 
All lower lvt-I ser- 
vice functions and 
District Adninistra- 
tIon 
All lower level ser- 
vice functions and 
District Administra- 
tion 
All lower lovel ser- 
virp functions anti 
r)istrJct Ad-ninintra- 
tion 
100 
4 179 
2 120 6 
10 100 n. a. 
87 e 
83 p 
1 
5 
9 
103 14 
(112)l (1 1)ý 
94 21 
78 
124 
122 
112 
110 
109 
31 109 
3 49 
5 77 
11 73 
eo - 11 
49 16 
67 14 
12 109 
13 83 
7 
Ir 
12 
13 
7 
91 
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Table 4.6 (cont 1d) 
ii 
.. If'o r Name of Regional 'Main Functiop Other Functions to be rimp ateive Developmen 
Centre Location of Centre Performed by Centre ., 
C va=g s Potential 
Rank 
rIndicator 
of Hinter- 
11 
j; nA 
ýI 
till) 
(19; 
(2u) 
2) 
i23) 
24) 
(25) 
%26) 
(27) 
'28) 
301 
tIu 10 suUth flain Narket 
Celftro 
I- 
Ngabu South Main Market I 
Cciltre 
ucoza CCntral -n3"*-nuykct 
I 
collue 
Ntchou CenLral 
I Nsallic 
Npancla 
Tn-. -olo 
Chilumlýa 
monkey Pa*. * 
Danwara 
Mw a r. Z. 3 
South 
centri: l 
so"Itil 
North 
scuth 
SouLh 
South 
Ciiikwa-. a 
Lir an c; w. - 
Chitipa 
Flain Market 
colit I I. 
Ilaiii Ilarket 
Centre 
Ilaill Ilarl. et 
COJILre 
Main Market 
Contre 
Main Ilarket 
Contre 
Main Narket 
Centre 
Main I-larket 
Contro 
Main flarkot 
Centre 
South Main I-lar; -., t 
contro 
,, )UL: l I Main Ilar?. ct. 
Cvntre 
Nort I Nain Matkot 
Centre 
South Min 14arket 
Centre 
Central Vain flarket 
ConLral flarhot 
J'35. htclli si 
(36) Mu I an j 0. - 
137) 1 Cisirad- 
Zulu 
I 
Central Main Market 
Centre 
suUth 1-1: 4. m Market 
Ccntr(-, 
suuth Main Market 
Cuntre 
l 
index 1 '1111, Index 
_! 
f1kj Rzank 
I 
All lowor level ser- 102 1 '136 A4 
vick. fullctlulls and 
Ilk: 
-. '; I 1 1-0 . 14ull-Ccntre 
All luw. -a Ivvel uvr- 102 151 IN, 4 
viev fullctivils 
All :. -r- 17; 24 2-1 
Vice fL... C1j"I" 
: )horlol 
tion 
All lower It-vol ses- 98 17 4SO 20 
vI Ct. I ullet i oll: '. and I 
Difal let 
t1 lin 
All lower levol ser- 9L; 17 'j 1 24 
vice ! Unctions and 
Distriel. AtIministri- 
1 
tion 
All 2C'VOI SLr- 95 201 46 1 19 
Vice fu: ICL1c: '.:; I 
. I 
All lc. wcr level scr- 94 21 1 11), 3 
vice functlo-'s and 
Dis=riet AuiiinisLra- 
tion 
All lc,,. *cr lc. vLl ser- 91 23 831 9 
vice -. uncticns 
All Ic". -. 'O: Ic, *. *el sur- 89 24 f 67 14 
Vice Junctiun. 5 
All lc-. %; -: r iuvel ser- [It. # e4 0 14 
vice functions 
All lowvi It.. 01 Ser- b'.. 14 321 21 
-. Ilc.:, ft; ljc%: r. -. S a:: d 
D_-r. Lr. ct 
I. a C. I. 
1. *, * Jc. *; ý., cr s--, r- b9 27 13C 4 
vice fj: -ctjL-. S I-IJ 
; %Il ; L.. -er 2q. -. e2 !; L: r- 133 i -. I DO lz . 42 
j 
vice L... C' -L:. s 81, 28 46 17 
VICV L: tle*,. l- 11.!; 
Dinirict Ad. ani.,; tra- 
All Ic-. i--r lcr. cl sL-r- 81 30 1 fjo n. a. 
Výce '-unctitris 
All Ic-,.,.: -r ser- 77 32 12C G 
vic.. ý f unctions 
/, I-- I- ... -r ser- 75 3J 4C, 19 
*., i v. .I . l: 'V t; f... 5 . 1%d 1jJ: jtj i,.: t ;. ýLniniuLra- 
ticin 
All If-wer levc 1 ser- 74 34 31 22 
ViCe fU! ICL! on:; and 
DiStrICL J. d. -,. inistra- 
tion 
All lower level SOY- 74 34 4e 17 
vice functions 3: jlj 
Vlstr., (: t 
tion 
/ill lownr lcvcl ser- 63 36 51 is 
vice funCLirns and 
J)istrict A&miinistra- 
tion 
- -I __j 
1. See Table 4, f in Appendix 4 
2. See Table 4e in Appendix 4 
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A number of points can be made about the feasibility and suitability 
of these recommendations. The projected. growth rates of the various 
levels of the hierarchy (Table 4-5) are based on the assumption either of 
a laissez-faire approach to population growth, or of government efforts to 
improve. rural living standards and, push jamily_ planning. The 5.5% urban 
growth rate associated with the latter policies is stated to lead to a 
'viable' urban population by 2000 of 1.6 million. However considering the 
evidence of increasing pressure on land resources over the next 20 years, 
these policies would not necessarily be effective in decreasing urban 
growth rates to, this extent. The postulated. lower growth rate for 
Blantyre is. also unlikely since it is based on a number of assumptions 
about government policies relating to Lilongwe's status versus Blantyre's 
which are not being implemented. For instance the report suggests that 
the "present policy of discouraging further growth in Blantyre (mainly the 
restriction of land use for industrial purposes) will undoubtedly assist 
to divert growth to other centres" (TCPD, 1980b, Section 5.4). Yet a new 
industrial, estate has recently been opened in, Blantyre (see Chapter 8). 
There is also a degree of non-compatibility between the DCDP and two 
rural development programmes which have ramifications for settlement 
development: the National Rural Development Programme_(NRDP), and, the 
Rural Growth Centres,. Project (RGPP). Although, there is meant to be 
co-ordination among them, it is possible to identify conflicts in the 
choice of centres that the different programmes focus on, leading in some 
cases to wasteful diffusion of actual and planned investment in a number 
of centres, rather than the concentration which would allow intermediate 
centres to develop (see Appendix 4.5)., 
In terms of implementing the programme a number of problems were also 
identified by the consultants. The most significant was the way in which 
most small centres are administered. Urban development in. centres without 
Town Councils is the r. esponsibility, primarily of the District Council 
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(60 . Evidence suggests 
that such administration opýerate's' to the 
detriment of urban centres, and this in some ways helps to explain the 
underdevelopment of most of Malawi's urban system. 
DC finances are structured in such a way that there is an actual 
disincentive to promote development in urban centres. DCs have access to 
limited funds which come from their share of the district's minimum tax 
levied per adult male (50-75% of which is taken up by collection costs 
because of widespread evasion), licence fees, market and resthouse fees, 
council service fees, interest on investments, and government grants 
(which are very low). Their annual budgets come under the control of the 
Ministry of Local Government and "it appears that it is the'main concern 
of this-Ministry that the local authorities balance their books; little 
attention is given to the question of what impact the budget might have 
for development" (TCPD, 1980a, p. 60). Because of this, although the DCs 
have very wide socio-economic responsibilities,, they prefer to concentrate 
on projects likely to yield high and immediate returns like resthouses, 
taverns and beerhalls. Thus physical infrastructure such as roads and 
water supplies, essential' for fostering urban-rural links' and the 
development of trade and commerce, is neglected as they have long 
gestation periods before they yield returns. In addition, although Town 
Councils fare rather better as urban administrative authorities, DCs are 
particularly reluctant to spend their scarce funds on urban centres if 
this might lead to them being elevated to Township status, -because 
capital assets and important revenue sources are then lost to the Town 
Council (TCPD, op cit). Therefore the motivations of Present 
decision-makers may hinder implementation of many of the recommended 
infrastructural improvements of the DCDP. 
This evidence also suggests that the rural areas are in fact 
parasitic'' on smaller urban areas, thus partially causing the 
underdevelopment of Malawi's' urban system and the lack of 
attraction of 
.1 
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small centres for migrants, as indicated in the following statement: 
"As already observed'in the pilot centres of Ntcheu and Luchenza, 
Karonga District Council makes virtually no effort to improve the 
living conditions in Karonga, but rather takes the approach to 
plough back the considerable revenues generated by the town into 
rural areas" (TCPD, 1981, Annex 4, p. 1). 
_The consultants recommended 
that Township status should be conferred 
on certain centres to enhance their development prospects. This requires 
parliamentary, legislation and _-at present urban, centres can only 
be 
elevated to Townships if-they. are self-sufficient in raising revenues to 
cover recurrent expenditure. -, The centr. es are therefore in. a 'Catch 22, 
position: they cannot develop andjulfil their expected DCDP roles unless 
they are run by, Town Councils, but. they., cannot become Townships until they- 
develop. Implementation of the, DCDP. is further hindered by the fact that 
the TCPD only has direct planning control'in Townships; elsewhere the only 
control operates through a leasing system which is channelled from the 
local headman, to the District Commissioner and, up to the Land Evaluation 
Department which makes the final decision (TCPD, personal communication, 
1982). 
The inability to acquire leasehold or freehold land by, Town or 
District Councils to develop and sub-lease is another disincentive to 
urban development, as this might encourage them. to provide serviced plots 
for subsequent rental to locall entrepreneurs. The possibility of 
transferring leasehold land to local urban authorities,, without subsidy, 
was allowed by the Land Commissioner but this would not be nearly as 
effective as, giving councils subsidized, freehold land for development 
(TCPD, 1980b). Furthermore Town Councils cannot levy rates on government 
property which only yields a nominal grant, and tends to use up an 
unwarranted amount of central land for administrative functions. It is 
estimated that Town Council income would increase by- 30-35% if this 
practice was abolished (ibid), thereby enhancing development prospects for 
some small centres, but the current government is unlikely to. give this 
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matter a high priority. 
A further problem faced by the DCDP is the scattered nature of urban 
settlements which in part relates to the inherited colonial pattern. Yet 
the problem has been perpetuated by the current administration which 
disregards the advantages of nucleating urban developments for a variety 
of reasons. Some that might be suggested are lack of financial incentives 
for government properties to limit their use of urban land, and a general 
suspicion of low-income residential areas and the 'bright-lights' effect 
on certain institutions (11). For example the detached location of an 
ADMARC centre in Mzuzu "does not, seem to be consistent with urban planning 
objectives" . 
(TCPD, 1980a, p. 50), and a vast new Traditional-Housing Estate 
for Kasungu was built beyond the original housing zone forcing people to 
walk "exceedingly long distances" (ib, id, p. 52). The TCPD feels these 
factors tend to dissipate the potential of urban centres to' develop 
internally, as well as affecting their service function for the rural 
population. 
The final hurdle for the DCDP is finance. The 1980 plan estimated 
that about K8.6 million would be-'required to implement the'first phase 
which covered the sub-regional centres', Mzuzu, Zomba, and Ntcheu as a 
test-case main market centre. Actual implementation of the proposals'has 
been very slow and by 1982 the German aid which had been forthcoming was 
insufficient even to cover these centres. The donors' assessment led to 
Ntcheu being dropped and most of 'the 'available money was earmarked for 
Mzuzu, and emergency flood works in Karonga (TCPD', 'personal communication, 
'19B2). 
4.5 Conclusion 
An analysis of the role of Malawi's smaller urban centres by their 
central place strength and their role in the communications network showed 
that there is a lack of urban hierarchical development in the country. 
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Their functional roles are essentially simplistic and do not provide a 
strong base 
'for. 
the provision of services to the rural population, and the 
form of the urban system does not promote the diffusion and spread of 
innovations and information flows. The evidence suggests that an 
administrative base for urban development in Malawi has -not led to 
complementary economic development, and that the ex-colonial district 
headquarters have distorted the allocation of urban development investment 
away from centres with greater potential. 
Urban policies in Malawi have been piecemeal for most of, the period 
since Independence and their main. aim has been to control, rather than 
foster urban development. In combination with a number of institutional 
problems identified with respect to urban development, it can be concluded 
that a major cause of. the underdevelopment of Malawi's urban system has 
been the nature of government administration which has prevented small 
centres, under District Councils, benefitting from the real and potential 
funds they generate. 
A number of recent government projects, particularly the District 
Centres Development Programme but also the Rural Growth Centres Project 
and the National Rural Development Programme, provide a framework within 
which the development of small centres can be accelerated, and manipulated., 1619CL% 
to promote positive rural-urban relationships andaccommodate the 
expected rapid increase in the urban population. However the financial 
status of Malawi is a barrier to the implementation of these policies. 
Blantyre and Lilongwe are clearly the most important centres in 
Malawi's urban system and it is intended to analyse these two centres in 
detail in the following chapters, with particular reference to Lilongwe's 
new status and its role in relation to that of Blantyre. 
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Notes for Chapter Four 
1. The centres surveyed were Mzimba, Rumphi, Karonga, Nkhota-kota, 
Ntchisi, Dowa, Salima, Ngabu, Chiradzulu, Machinga and Liwonde. 
2. A thorough analysis of Malawi's space economy in terms of Friedmann's 
(1973) concept of core and periphery can be found in Mlia (1975, 
Chapter 3). The core region defined in his analysis is relatively 
restricted within the Southern Region. 
Kasungu, Balaka, Mulanje, Thyolo, Luchenza, Mangochi, Salima and Dedza. 
4. Although all the regresssion models computed for the 1979 data were 
repeated with the 1982 data the results were essentially very similar 
and they are therefore not detailed here. Also the introduction of 
automatic exchanges in several smaller centres meant that no calls 
were recorded from them, and the logarithmic transformations of the 
regression (see Appendix 4-3) meant that they were ignored in the 
models, and the results are regarded as generally less representative 
of the whole urban system. 
Chemwari is one of the President's tobacco estates. 
This practice has been criticized in a government report on land 
tenure in Malawi which stated: "It is evident .... that the current 
level of agricultural rents is significantly lower than the true worth 
of the land. Profits from tobacco and maize grown on an estate basis 
are in hundreds of kwacha per acrea and current rentals in tambalas 
per acre. Letting good agricultural land on this basis not only 
deprives Government of a reasonable rental income, but it can also 
lead to this most valuable commodity being treated with less respect 
than it deserves (Government of Malawi, OPC, Land Department 
(Valuation), 1978, P-11). Economic factors therefore have been 
neglected in order to foster elite political support. 
This practice, combined with poor management on the estates, was one 
of the many economic problems tackled by the World Bank in the context 
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of its SALs (Kydd, 1985). 
8. In 1966 226,000 migrants were working outside the country. in 1972 
487,000 of the de Jure population (including dependents) were abroad, 
of which most were in Rhodesia and 124,000 in South Africa. By 1977 
this had fallen to 275,000: about 5% of the de jure population 
(Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, P-313). 
9. He even suggests that Blantyre experienced net out-migration from 1976 
to 1977 on the basis of census data, although as this pertains to 
Blantyre district as a whole, and as suggested in Chapter 4 this 
rural-urban data probably includes many people who were temporary 
visitors rather than residents or employees, this is probably a 
misinterpretation. 
10. The TCPDIs 1979 functional data for smaller urban centres, which 
formed part of the data base for the analysis ofýt4e urban hierarchy, 
earlier in this chapter was also used by the DCDP. 
11. This factor is said to have affected the location of a new girls' 
school for Phalombe which was sited some distance outside the main 
settlement. The decision was finally made by, the President against 
the TCPDIs recommendations, the suggestion being that contact with 
'urban life' was undesirable (TCPD, personal communication, 1982)., 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Origins of the New Capital Project. 
An Analysis of Decision-Makin 
Less than, a year after Malawi gained independence, on January 22 
1965, the new President, Dr. Banda, announced in Parliament that it 
had been decided to move the capital from Zomba to Lilongwe. Although 
Zomba's status had been subject to criticism throughout the colonial 
period, the choice of Lilongwe was a departure from the usual conclusion 
reached: that Blantyre should assume the role of national capital. - In 
terms of the original analyses of Zomba's disadvantages, as discussed in 
Chapter 21 Blantyre was the obvious choice to replace it; indeed the 
earlier arguments often concentrated on those factors-which specifically 
highlighted Blantyre's attributes in relation to Zomba's. It had been 
emphasized that Zomba was not on the railway and that the location of 
several government. departments-in. Blantyre necessitated much wasteful 
commuting between the two centres, that more efficient co-operation 
between the administration and the private -, commercial and -industrial 
sector could be obtained if the government was established, in Blantyre due 
to its pre-eminent role, in these sectors, and that, government officials 
would benefit from better facilities for recreation, shopping and social 
life (see Pachai, 1971; Potts, "1985b). 
, However these considerations did not really address the issue of -a 
new capital's national role-in-terms of its spatial impact on the economy, 
or its role as a symbol of national pride. Capital cities as centres of 
national administration, and urban symbols of power and nationalism, have 
a special status within an urban network and their location has a strong 
influence on their -potential to fulfil these roles effectively. In 
addition ' in most countries the -capital is also the most important 
economic centre and this has ramifications for the spatial distribution of 
economic power. - The relocaýion of a capital therefore presents an 
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opportunity to choose a site which will be most conducive to the 
realiZation of 'the political' and economic objectives of national 
decision-makers. The motivations of a colonial administration differ from 
those in power in a newly independent country, and one outcome of this has 
been the development in Africa of 'colonial' capitals which suited the 
needs of the colonial power but 'which are 'in many ways inappropriately 
located-in terms of the'needs of both the -indigenous population' and an 
elected goverment which needs to'consolidate its support (Potts, 1985b). 
In' consideration of 'such factors there are several points which 
weighed againstý the choice 'of Blantyre in 1965. It was strongly 
associated 'with the colonial regime and' was still the focus for the 
expatriate population and was therefore' unlikely to provide the Malawian 
people with a symbol which could be identified with their independent 
status. In some ways its relative modernity made it . more symbolic I than 
Zomba of the colonialism from which Malawi had only just emerged through 
political, and somtimes violent, 'struggle. There was also an increasing 
awareness that both political and economic problems were associated with 
spatial-imbalances in development, and relocation to' Blantyre would have 
perpetuated the existing marked inequalities in the regional spread of 
development. In addition, since Blantyre had, always been the favoured 
choice of the colonial administration to replace'Zomba, it is perhaps not 
surprising that it was rejected in favour of an alternative /which 
although still a colonial creation, would show that the new government did 
not intend its policies to be dictated'-by past decisions. 
Against these factors however can be ranged a series of arguments 
which counted heavily in Blantyre's favour, even for a newlý'independent 
administration. They generally relate to a short-run financial 
cost-benefit analysis of relocation. Thus although supportive of 
Lilongwe's selection from the regional planning perspective, Mlia, (1975b, 
P-396) points out: "It can be categorically stated .... that the opportunity 
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cost would have been lower if the capital was moved to Blantyre than- to 
Lilongwe". Blantyre represented a large proportion of Malawits fixed 
capital and this has been an important factor militating against the 
relocation of inconveniently located capitals. It was Malawi's primate 
city at independence, six times larger than Zomba or Lilongwe in 
population terms, and its share of relatively modern'urban infrastructure 
Was even more disproportionate. It was the most important communications 
centre , in the country, especially in terms of international 
communications. It was also the main centre for the manufacture and 
importation of building and construction materials; and since five out of 
fourteen government ministries, thirteen ministerial departments and 
nearly all diplomatic missions were already located there it was clear 
that the expansion necessary to accommodate the new capital could have 
been achieved relatively cheaply and conveniently. - The , cost of 
establishing the capital at Lilongwe had to be much-greater, -especially 
since that also involved an extension of the railway and the construction 
of a new international airport. 
-- Decentralization policies are nearly always subject to criticism 
about the short-term financial costs incurred which could have. - been 
avoided by further concentration. Such criticism tends to-overlook the 
issue of social and political costs and benefits, and also the long-term 
economic benefits that such policies may achieve. However itýcannot be 
denied. tht Malawi's economic circumstances at, independence were an extreme 
disincentive to embarking on a very expensive programme such ap-the move 
to Lilongwe. Monetary GNP in 1965 totalled only K74-7 million (c. 
E37.35m) (NSO, 1978), whilsý total government expenditure in the same year 
was K9.46 million (c. E4.73 million) (Malawi-Government, 1970). Up until 
1973 the government could not even meet its recurrent expenditure, and had 
to receive British budgetary aid totalling nearly K50 million (NSO, op 
cit). Even in comparison to other less developed countries Malawi was 
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poor, and theAfore'criticisms levelled at, the new capital city programme 
on the basis- of -its-cost, ' or the fact'that it had ignored the cheapest 
option, were in many ways justified. - 
In this light-the decision to move, to Lilongwe indicates that the 
motivation behind the project must have be'en very strong. 'An analysis of 
the, -"Various locaf factors which influenced this decision &an therefore' 
help to"identify' their 'relative contributi6ný to the process of 
decision-4aking. ' These factors fall into three categories: the inadequacy 
of Zomba's-position, regional planning issues, and political motivations. 
5.1'-'Zomba: 'the'Problems of the 'Colonial', Capital 
Zomba's status as the national capital was undoubtedly anomalous in 
many, ways. Its location did notýfit in with the pattern established for 
most' other, African-colonial, capitals:, it,., was'not associated, with, the 
development'of trade and the-'growth of'agriculturalýexportsf-nor was it-'an 
important transport focus. 
However the choice of. Zomba in''1886- occurred when the pattern of 
economic development was still, fluid. ',:, iThe'motivations behind its choice 
have previously been discussed'-in"Chapter 2', and it is 'evident that in 
addition to its'proximity to the major slave trading route, major factors 
involved in its'selection were the personal'idiosyndrac'ies of--the :, 'early 
Commissioners representing the colonial government. -At the''time'it is 
perhaps unsurprising that such factors should-predominate; however as'the 
colonial economic pattern became established and it became "evident that 
Zomba was not centrally-'located in'relati6nto transport and estate 
development, it might have been expected "that', the capital would have been 
moved. In Kenya and Zambia for instance, the consolidation of economic 
and transport patterns led to the relocation of the administrative 
headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi in 1907 (McAm, 1978), and in 
Zambia's case from Livingstone to Lusaka in 1935 
(Kay, 1967). 
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Although similar considerations led 0% 
to serious debate about the 
possibility, of, relocating Nyasaland's capital on four occasions, a variety 
of factors, including disagreements aboutýfutureýtransport development and 
"the delays.... financial limitations and apathy of the Colonial Office" 
(Pachai, 1971, p. 45) resulted in Zomba retaining its status throughout the 
colonial period. ý At independence the, old argumentsýagainst Zomba remained 
as pertinent as ever, -and new issues were ýnow -added. -A'brief-summary,. of 
these arguments helps to clarify the -, situation-,, inherited by the, new 
government. , Zomba- suffered from a number ofphysical.. drawbacks: its 
position, at thefoot of-, a,, plateau made, expansion-difficult and, the hilly 
terrain led to scattered housing and expensive road construction. It,, was 
also ýon a -cyclone belt and-in-: a--malaria -area. ý- The division -of 
administrative , functions, with-, Blantyre was; clearly -1anomalous-and 
inefficient, and the lack of-a railway connection was another. drawback, 
which had undoubtedly contributed -to the general lack of secondary sector 
development. ý In comparison to Blantyre,, Zomba remained -an ýeconomic 
backwater,, and-the uncertainty surrounding its status may have contributed 
to the, lack of-, --maintenance or modernization, of its administrative 
infrastructure. 
-.. 
Consequently the national-, buildings were in need -. of 
considerableý, redevelopment and expansioný if.,. Zomba were to remain, the 
capital, which somewhat lessened the -: opportunity cost of., relocation. In 
addition it, has been suggested, that-the antiquated nature-of the buildings 
and their poor layout would do little to promote a sense of. national-pride 
(Mlia, 1975b). -The issue of centrality also-, mi-litated againsts Zomba at 
independence, since this,, factor now, -becameýan-important consideration as a 
elected government can ill afford to appear remote to the population-. 
In comparison to other countries -which have emphasized the 
importance of, centrality. as a factor behind their capital relocation 
programmes- M5 
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,, Malawi's circumstances were less severe. Zomba's location in 
the Southern Region did make it relatively inaccessible to, the population 
of the Northern and Central Regions, yet 50% of the population lived in 
the Southern Region, and Zomba was. located-in the most densely settled 
area of the country. However the particular -configuration-of Malawils 
boundaries made the location of a capital city at either lend' of the long 
strip of national-territory partioularly, inappropriate,, and was likely to 
cause suspicion that the areas furthestý from the- capital would be 
neglected. The, easiest way to alleviate this problem in Malawi was 
obviously to locate the capital in the Central Region. This would have kodt- 
the effect of making-national policy-makers appear more accessible to the 
whole population, even if in reality it did not-alter the direction of 
development. A shift -in the administration's location will not 
necessarily result in improved representation of thedevelopment needs of 
particular areas and is therefore no guarantee that future policies will 
endeavour to spread 'development' more fairly. It is to be expected that 
the immediate area surrounding a new capital would-benefit since national 
policy makers would be-involved by virtue of continued contact, but 
heightened perception of problems elsewhere may: not result simply. because 
they, areý less far away than previously. ý Whilst physical distance is, a 
hindrance to the perception ofýdevelopment needs in,. rerqqte areas,, -a 
national executive which is isolated by its attitudes is also'a hindrance. 
Thus an emphasis on the advantages, of, a central, administrative, location 
can be merely a political palliative which manipulates the, electorate's 
perception of the government's objectives. -to gain support, although in 
reality the objectives have not necessarily changed. 
Almost immediately after the announcement in Parliament, a, team of 
consultants, Brian Colquhoun and Partners, was appointed to prepare a 
report on, the proposed move. Among the points they were required to 
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analyse was the cost of maintaining and extending the government 
buildings in Zomba and Blantyre over a period of 10 years, in comparison 
to the cost of new buildings in Lilongwe. The firm's estimates were E3.6 
million and E13.5 million respectively. The Ministry of Works later 
revised the Lilongwe costs downwards to E11.8 million, but they were still 
much higher than the alternative. In October 1965 a further survey was 
commissioned from H. Hindle, the Regional Public Administration Advisor of 
the Economic Commission for Africa. The "Hindle Report" was received in 
December 1965 and contained a further downward revision of the cost of 
buildings in the new capital to E11.2 million (Pachai, 1971). These 
initial calculations therefore suggested that the cost of maintaining the 
status quo would be about one-third of that of building a new capital, but 
paradoxically were seen as a further Justification of the move as 
indicated in the following statement: 
"If Zomba were to remain the seat of Government, many of the 
existing structures' would require'to be replaced .... Thus, much of 
the cost of building the New Capital would have been incurred by 
the need to provide additional or replacement facilities in either 
Blantyre or Zomba. " (Economic, Planning Division, e.. 1971) , 
The emphasis on this point must be judged as either naive or as a 
deliberate attempt to make the 'project 
appear in a favourable financial 
light. Anyway, the cost of the goverment buildings per se- would only 
be a proportion of the total cost af a new capital: such a development 
would also imply major expenditure on urban infrastructure, residential 
buidings for the population influx which would -accompany"the 
administrative move, an expansion of education, health and recreational 
facilities, and the provision of improved transport facilities which, in 
the case of Lilongwe, implied the massive cost of a railway link and 
airport. 
Another point made about Zomba was that many of the existing, 
structurally sound government buildings could be used 
to house a 
University, thus further lightening the financial burden. Reference to 
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this advantage'- was ' made in'October 1965 when President Banda presented a 
further statement'to Parliament on the capital relocation project, after 
receiving the 'Colquhoun' Report (Malawi Government, 1965). This factor 
then became a usual element of later reports on the project (e. g. Economic 
Planning Division, op cit; Richards, 1974; CCDC, 1978). However'virtually 
all the administrative, academic and residential buildings of the 
University' are new structures on 'a site some distance from the town 
centre. Hence maximum use of the old buildings was not made. , 
Although there were a number of justifications for moving the capital 
from Zomba; it is apparent that the goverment's analysis of the problem 
presented an unrealistically favourable picture of the financial cost of 
the exercise. The implication is that the government was deliberately 
selecting factors which supported'theýdecision: to, move. 
5.2 Regional Planning Issues 
"Lilongwe is in the most central place of the country for political 
and administrative purposes. An important overall objective in 
shifting the capital from Zomba to Lilongwe is however, that this 
will provide a new growth with [sic] augmenting not only 
agricultural activity in the Central and Northern regions, but-also 
industry and commerce. The development of the New Capital will 
involve annual expenditure of K5 million over the current decade 
but this will not be at the expense of investments in other 
deserving prolects. To the contrary, the development of the New 
Capital and the surrounding agricultural projects are planned to be 
mutually reinforcing as part of an integrated programme 
accelerating development in the Central Region and also aiding in a 
fuller exploitation of the region's potential. The Northern 
Region is expected to benefit enorm2uslv from the spread effects 
of the new capital city development, with major economic activity 
generated in the centre of the country. " (Economic Planning 
Division, 0971, ps. 3-4, emphasis added) 
That' Lilongwe's 'development was explicitly related, in'official 
circles, 'to Malawi's regional planning needs is evident 'from 'the above 
statement. This view of Lilongwe's role is reinforced by references in 
both official and unofficial literature to Lilongwe'as a-'growth point' 
(e. g. NSO, 1978, p. 10; Richardý, 1974, p5l; Mlia, 1978, p. 9). The capital 
city programme was therefore directly linked to the concept of 'growth 
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centres' as envisaged and promoted by Friedmann (1966), and this implies 
that the new capital's development would be specifically planned to 
encourage the emergence of features which would enable it to fulfil this 
role. Theoretically such planned development would involve the 
establishment of 'propulsive' industries, various incentives to 
counterbalance the attraction of the 'core' area, and an urban economy 
characterized by the existence of many backward and forward linkages with 
the surrounding regional economy. It is clear that the association of the 
new capital project with the issue of regional equity would give it a 
greater appeal as it added a further justification for the move, and could 
be used to counter criticism that Lilongwe would only be a prestige symbol 
which Malawi could ill afford. 
The mere assertion that Lilongwe would act as a 'growth centrel 
however would have little effect on its actual role unless specific action 
was taken to guide its development, although the rhetorical promotion of 
this aspect may well have improved its image. In addition, it is clear 
that the validity of the 'growth centrel concept is questionable, and the 
approach has attracted much criticism (see Chapter 1). However it can be 
shown that the spatial distribution of economic development in Malawi did 
provide a very real justification for the choice of Lilongwe as a suitable 
site for locating a 'growth centrel, given that at the time of its 
inception the concept was more generally accepted as a valuable tool for 
regional development. 
5.2.1 Spatial Imbalances in Malawi's Development in 1964 
At independence Malawi inherited an economy characterized by its 
dependence on agricultural exports, and a severe imbalance in the spatial 
spread of modern economic activities. These aspects of the Malawian 
economy have been emphasized in much of the literature on Malawi 
(e. g. 
Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Kaluwa, 1982). In terms of export crop 
production, industrial and commercial establishments, and the provision of 
204 
transport and "'communication' infrastructure, the Southern Region's share 
was overwhelmingly dominant. The degree of concentration was'far greater 
than the South's 50% share of the population would warrant. 
The development of the Southern Region was clearly associated with 
the historical pattern of European settlement. This was concentrated in 
the Shire highlands where the great majority. of tea and tobacco estates 
and factories were found. In response to this concentration 
4 
Blantyre/Limbe developed to become the country's main service centre and 
soon emerged as the commercial capital. Both European and African 
monetary demand was concentrated in this area as the estates were the main 
employers of African labour, and the process of cumulative causation 
ensured that a large share of urban-based African demand was located 
in Blantyre. Modern industrial activity in Malawi was confined to two 
major categories: processing of agricultural produce for the export market 
and 'demand-based' light industries which relied on local demand for a 
range of relatively simple products. The Shire highlands monopolized both 
industrial categories, as well as dominating the monetary agricultural 
sector and accommodating the national capital at Zomba. 
The polarization of economic development in the Shire highlands has 
been identified by Mlia (1975a), using a principal components analysis of 
forty-one indices describing the socio-economic. characteristics of 
Malawi's 23 districts. The clustering of indices on a variety of factors 
highlighted the contrast between the nature of development in the Shire 
highlands(and particularly Blantyrej, and the rest of the country. Most of 
the data related to the late 1960s and consequently the pattern described 
is relevant to the pattern of development which faced decision-makers when 
the capital relocation programme was conceived. Mlia (op cit, p. 112, 
p-115) concluded from his analysis that: 
"the available evidence generally suggests that Blantyre stands at 
-the apex of Malawi's primary core region. While the actual extent 
of the core region cannot be defined precisely, it can be conceived 
as roughly coinciding with the Shire highlands .... comprising 
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Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulu, and large portions of Blantyre (2) and 
Zomba districts .... The rest of the country outside the. -. 
Shire 
highlands can conveniently be considered as being one big 
periphery. " 
The Blantyre Planning Team also emphasized the skewed nature of 
industrial and employment patterns in favour of the commercial capital. 
They estimated that in 1972 59% of manufacturing jobs were accounted for 
by Blantyre, when its population was only 3.7% of the national total 
(Blantyre Planning Team, 1972, cited in Mlia, op cit). Furthermore it was 
estimated that Blantyre also accounted for 66% of Malawils. monetary GDP 
(but see Appendix 5.1). 
In terms of spatial economic structure it was therefore possible to 
divide Malawi into a core and periphery at the time of independence. Map 
5.1 illustrates the areal extent of the core, taking into account not only 
Mlials factorial analysis but also the distribution of tea and tobacco 
estates and the location of Blantyre and Zomba. This clearly shows that 
the spatial impact of the core was very limited. Most of the Southern 
Region is excluded and could in fact be regarded as equally undeveloped as 
the Northern and Central regions. Smallholder incomes in the Southern 
Region were no higher than elsewhere, for example, and the rate of labour 
migration to other countries was almost as high as in most other districts 
(Mlia, op cit). Clearly the Shire highlands were not the focal point of 
development for the African population, and Mlia (ibid) has described the 
core as an "alien arable enclave" like the "White Highlands" of Kenya. 
The limited areal impact of the existing core implies that the nature 
of the economy and of rural-urban linkages was unlikely to allow another 
urban-industrial complex, in Lilongwe, to produce automatically the very 
far-reaching effects on the Central and Northern regions that policy 
statements suggested. However it is clear that from a regional planning 
perspective, the siting of the new capital away from the Southern Region 
was logical, if a growth centre policy was to be pursued. Had Blantyre 
become the new capital on financial grounds this would merely have served 
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to perpetuate and enhance the existing spatial imbalances. Indeed, 
according to the second parliamentary statement on the establishment of a 
new capital Blantyre had-in fact been considered as a possible site, but 
it was rejected because "any further emphasis in the south could-only lead 
to a lop-sided and,, inequitable development to the detriment of the Central 
and Northern regions" (Malawi Government, 1965, P-3). There appears to be 
no evidence that any other site really was considered apart from Lilongwe 
however. 
5.2.2 Lilongwe: a Regional Planning Perspective 
Lilongwe-was virtually the same size- as Zomba by 1966, and thus 
jointly, second to ýBlantyre. Inasmuch as its existing infrastructure 
lessened the total-cost of the project therefore, it was the least 
expensive site for the new capital development, once Blantyre was 
eliminated on regional planing grounds. Although the Northern Region had 
a strong claim to a growth centre, it was Malawi's least developed region 
economically, and the obvious choice of Mzuzu would have been much more 
expensive and would not have satisfied the criterion-of centrality. In 
anyýcase, both the Northern and Central regions -were almost equally 
disadvantaged when compared to the Southern Region, in terms of secondary 
and tertiary sector development (3 1ýp and consequently the location of-a new 
capital in either served to improve the spatial distribution of these 
sectors. 
Another factor in Lilongwe's favour was that it is located. in an area 
which is characterized by a relatively thriving smallholder economy. The 
Central Region has fairly fertile soils, and the average size -, of 
smallholding is larger than in the other, two regions: in 1968/69 this was 
estimated to be 4.7 acres, compared to 3.5 acres and 3.2 acres in the 
Northern and Southern regions respectively (Malawi,, 1978). , During 
the 
colonial period the area round Lilongwe had become the centre. olf, African 
tobacco production. This development had begun shortly after the First 
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World War and was encouraged by the colonial governement, which 
established a Native Tobacco Board. In 1930 the Imperial Tobacco Company 
set up a factory in Lilongwe, but the establishment of an auction floor 
was thwarted by pressure from buyers at the original floor in Limbe. This 
suggests that the vested interests of the European population had a 
detrimental effect on Lilongwe's development, since natural economic 
forces were already in action to enhance its economic status. The spatial 
imbalances inherited at independence could therefore be seen as not only 
the result of the. usual process of cumulative causation, but also of 
deliberate efforts to prevent the realization of economic potential in 
other areii-M. In this light -it may be fair'to c'onlcude that Lilongwe 
fulfilled a further aspect of growth centre theory as, to some extentl its 
hinterland'could be termed a "resource frontier' (Friedmann, 1973 p. 2 1 76) 
The neglect of potentially productive opportunities in the periphery,. due 
to the core's immediate impact on investors' perceptions, is one element 
of Myrdalls lbackwashl effects, which tend to prevent the 'trickle-down' 
of development from economically advanced areas. The underdevelopment 
of the Lilongwe area may therefore have continued if the government had 
not taken direct action to enable its potential to be exploited. 
Estimates of farm cash income and income from ADMARC purchases for 
1968-69 (Table 5.1) illustrate the Central Region's non-estate 
agricultural strength. By comparison the Southern Region's African rural 
population was clearly at a disadvantage, particularly in terms of farm 
cash income. In fact the only Southern Region district which had 
comparable incomes on either index to the Central Region was Chikwawa, 
whilst the lowest incomes were found in the four districts which comprised 
the economic core. 
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence about how exactly the 
spread effects of a growth centre are suposed to stimulate its surrounding 
region, a study by Gilbert (1975) on Antioquia in Colombia showed 
that 
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TABLE 5.1 
Estimated Incomes from Non-Estate Agriculture bv Reqiorý 1968-69 
I Farm Cas h Income Income from AD MARC Purchases 
REGION Total W000 Per capita M Total W000) Per capita W 
frural popn. ) (rural papn. ) 
NORTHERN 1,289 2. B 491 1.1 
CENTRAL 4,550 3.0 3,750 2.7 
SOUTHERN 2,267 1.5 3,0-18 2.0 
Source: adapted from Mlia, 1975a, Table I 
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growth centres may have little impact on surrounding agricultural areas 
unless there are simultaneous effects to improve agricultural and social 
conditions. Although some of the area surrounding Antioquia was part of 
Colombia's coffee belt and characterized by greater equality of land 
tenure and incomes than usual in Colombia, and was considered to offer a 
favourable environment for economic growth, it was found that the positive 
inpact of the centre fell away very sharply with distance and was very 
limited beyond a radius of about 50 kms. Gilbert points out however that 
the more remote areas wevstill influenced by Antioquia, although in a 
negative sense. Much of these areas was used for cattle ranching, and the 
profits tended to be invested and consumed in Antioquia due to the 
concentrated banking system and the entrenched system of absentee 
landlordism. 
The nature of the agricultural economy in the region of Lilongwe in 
the mid 1960s did offer some advantages in terms of the above type of 
analysis. Given that it was based on smallholder production generating a 
relatively high level of income, and that this was distributed fairly 
equally amongst the population, it is clear that the potential to respond 
to any stimulus offered may have been fairly high. The backwash problem 
relating to private investment of rural profits in the growth centre was 
less likely to occur, since the landholders lived on the land. Also both 
agricultural and social development were receving specific attention in 
the region, as there were a number of major agricultural development 
projects located there. One was the Lilongwe Land Development Project 
(LLDP) itself, while the Kasungu Flue-Cured Tobacco Schemestarted in 
1968, and the Lakeshore Rural Development Project were also within the 
Central Region (see Map 5.2). A growth centre needs to take advantage of 
opportunities generated by its hinterland as well as vice versa, because 
if it can build its economy partly on the demands of its surrounding 
region, its economic development should be self-generating to some extent. 
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Map 5.2 
MALAWI: ECONOMIC CORE, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CAPITALS 
AND MAIN TRANSPORT NETWORK 
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This also ensures the promotion of rural-urban linkages which are 
emphasized by growth centre theory. If, the existing agricultural economy 
is so severely underdeveloped that producers are unable to take full 
advantage of any spread effects which do emanate from a growth centre, the 
impact of the centre on agricultural development is 'going to be severely 
- 
howtvew- 
reduced. - fheoretically the above projects would enhance the 
ability 'of Lilongwe's hinterland to respond to stimuli, if Lilongwe's 
development was guided to ensure that appropriate linkages were 
generated. The LLDP and' Kasungu Scheme are both integrated development 
projects aimed at increasing'rural welfare and infrastructure, as well as 
agricultural production and incomes. Inasmuch as these could be 
succesdful'in altering rurai-urban re , lationships in the Central Region 
by enabling the rural areas to generate effective -demand for 
urban-based produce and services (e'. g. agricultural machinery, ' cýo'p 
processing, cheap consumer goods), the' climate for linkages-'betwee'n 
Lilongwe and its hinterland to be of a reciprocal, rather than one-sided, 
nature was positive. 
The improved regional transport infrastructure which accompaniýd 
Lilongwe's development could also bI enefit the rural areas and allow 
effective access to the services of the new core'. However it could also 
be argued that'improved accessibility . enhances I the action of backwash 
effects (ý. g. by easing the process of rurai-urban migration which may 
select'the most educated and dynamic elements of the rural population). 
There were therefore a number of factors in 1965 which justified the 
choice of Lilongwe, if regional planning objectives were to be met. Yet 
it is interesting to note that there appears to have been'ho attempt to 
consider other centres which may have offered a similar potential; it is 
arguable for instance that Salima in particular might have met a number of 
criteria. Although it was much smaller than Lilongwe, the cost of the new 
construction would have been lower as it'was the railway terminus, and 
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materials from'Blantyre and abroad could have been transported' rel atively, 
cheaply. Salima is also very near'the lake, and therefore' the capital 
C 
would have been more acessible to all the lakeside centres, and, a number A 
of agricultural projects along the lake shore. In fact Salima! s transport 
links to both, the Northern and Southern regions,, were better than 
Lilongwe's, and its. position was, equally central (5). The railway link is 
clearly a crucial point,, considering the emphasis on the disadvantages 
Zomba suffered from being off the railway,, - and this represented a clear 
advantage over Lilongwe. Furthermore the 1968/69 incomes per head from 
ADMARC purchases in Salima district were the highest in Malawi, after 
Chikwawa (Mlia, 1975a),. 
I. 7 
It can never be stated yith certainty how much regional planning 
considerations contributed to the process of-decision-making leading to 
the choice of Lilongwe as the new capital. The. lack-of evidence that 
alternative sites were really .. considered does tend to suggest that 
regional planning was not an important motivation. The- fact that 
Lilongwe's -selection can be related to Malawi's regional planning needs 
does not in itself makeýregional planning a primary objective, and such an 
assumption might easily be the, result of post-hoc rationalization, The 
significance of these points is clarified in the next section, which 
analyses, the evidence, for political motivations being the most important 
contributor to the decision not only, to move the capital, but also to site 
it at Lilongwe. I 
5.3 Political Motivations 
In order to understand the political motivations behind the capital 
relocation programme it is necessary to analyse the nature of the Malawian 
government, and in particular the influence of, the Life- President, Dr. 
Banda. 
Nyasaland's bid for independence was inextricably linked with the 
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tremendous antipathy of the African population to the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (see Chapter 2). Dr. Banda had been a vocal critic 
of the establishment of the Federation on Nyasaland's behalf despite the 
fact that he had been out of the country for over 20 years, and was 
resident in Britain at the time. His arrival in Nyasaland in 1958 to 
assume the leadership of the struggle was greeted with popular acclaim, 
the 'younger and more radical nationalists feeling'that his status as I an 
eider statesman would add I weigh -t to their claims for both the end ofthe 
Federation and eventual independence. However it was to become clear that 
Banda's ideas about the future of the country, and his own role, did not 
match the ideology-of many of his younger associates'. 
In 1959 Banda was imprisoned by the colonial government in Gwelo in 
Southern Rhodesia. It was here that he claims to have formulated the idea 
that Lilongwe should become the new capital of the country, once 
independence was gained. Kadzamira (1977t p. 66) writing about ýhe 
development planning process in Malawi points out that Banda is "the 
architect of Malawi's development". He emphasizes the key role played by 
the President in all post-independence policy formulation and 
implementation, including tI he major development -projects which provided 
the basis of the Malawi Congress Partyls" economic policies, which he 
states were formulated by Banda alone during his imprisonment Ubid, p. 68p 
69,73,81; Kadzamira, 1976, p. 279) (6). ' Banda's roleýis also highlighted 
by the 'following quotation from a Capiýal City Development Corporation 
publication: 
Dr Banda, as might be- expected, did not waste his time in Gwelo 
prison in self-pity but rather exercised his mind in formulating 
guidelines for the development of Malawi when it should become 
independent. One of these guidelines pointed very 
definitely to Lilongwe .... 
(Richards, 1974, p-13) 
It can be categorically stated therefore first, that the initial impetus 
for the capital relocation programme came from the President, second, 
that the choice of Lilongwe was made before the idea was presented for 
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the consideration of other members of the, national executive, and third, 
that this location was the personal choice of Banda. Indeed the 
national commission to look into the-question of relocating the capital 
was only established after the initial parliamentary, proclamation on the 
subject. 
There is no doubt that Banda's motives for this choice were the true 
ones behind the 'initiation of the project, although one can only speculate 
as to what these were. The preceding analysis has shown that there were a 
number of factors -which- generated a climate from which a capital 
relocation programme might naturally emerge. Undoubtedly the President's 
initialýdecision was partially a result of these general circumstances, as 
no personal decision is made in a vacuum. - However a number of factors 
suggest that -beyond-this, the President's individual influence according 
to his personal wishes was equally, if not more, important. - , 
Given that he was the source-of the decision to move the capital, and 
the choice of Lilongwe, there is no evidence that the eventual 
parliamentary statement was the result of an intermediate process of group 
analysis. Whilst this is not to suggest that'there was no discussion at 
all, political events in Malawi at the time emphasized that the President 
was not open to criticism of his ideas, nor, once he had set his sights on 
a particular project, to influence from any source. This determination 
extended even to those to whom he owed his status, as they had created-the 
background for Nyasaland's independence, and had supported his sudden rise 
to power. Thus it was the younger ministers (7), whose socialist 
aspirations were utterly opposed by Banda's conservative and capitalist 
alignment, who were the first to suffer from the series of purges of the 
national executive initiated by Banda during his rule, which led them to 
leave the country in 1964 (Chiume, 1975). 
The parameters of this study preclude a detailed analysis of-the 
evidence demonstrating the extraordinary power wielded by Dr. Banda within 
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Malawi, and the methods of control which allow it. This is well 
documented elsewhere (e. g. see Williams, 1978; Hodder-Williams, 1979; 
Weisfelder, 1980; Worrall, 1974). Suffice it to say that it is undeniable 
that the locus of true decision-making power lies with the President, and 
thatl many, major decisions are made by him alone. Thus it is widely 
recognized that "Malawi has a distinctly personalist regime dominated by 
the whims and idiosyncracies of its President" (Weisfelder, 1980, p. 16)- 
-. 'Banda 
was therfore in a position to implement policies which 
reflected his personal motivations, and a number. of factors can be 
suggested which might, have been influential. To some extent his motives 
would parallel those of any- new government, inasmuch as he also had need 
of popular support and an effective location for his administration. 
However it is also clear that he, was prepared to ignore-these. factors if 
they should be. personally inconvenient, as there was-considerable popular 
support for the individuals he ousted at, -an early stage. Thus not too 
much weight can, be given to possible consideration involving the need to 
legitimize the government by choosing a more central location-for the 
capital to allay,., regional Jealousies. Yet- there were political 
considerations which may have encouraged a northwards shift in 
administration. 
. Despite the fact that the Northern Region. was sometimes referred 
to 
as the 'dead North',, it enjoyed the highest. standards of educational 
achievement. The reasons for this are complex: in general this pattern 
resulted from factors influencing the distribution of missionary, educatiop 
and the nature of colonial grants to schools. (8). The, consequence of 
this was that the articulation of the North's development needs was 
particularly significant due to the greaterýproportion of educated people 
amongst the local population. This factor had little impact on the 
colonial administration, but it did produce a situation whereby, at 
independence, the share of 'proximate policy makers' (9) originating from 
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the north was disproportionately large. In 1966 12% of the national 
population was resident in the Northern Region, but 25-30% of cabinet 
ministers and parliamentary secretaries came from there, whilst less than 
30% came from the 'Southern Region. These facts illustrate a general 
situation in which the Southern Region, and the Shire highlands, were no 
longer able to exert a dominant influence on policy decisions. Mlials 
analysis of these factors concludes that this was a significant element 
influencing the direction of policies in independent Malawi, which has 
resulted in specific efforts to improve the spatial distribution of 
development projects, because "the authority-dependency relationships are 
presently in favour of the periphery" '(Mlia, 1975a, p. 210). 
As stated above, the actual nature of Malawian politics suggests that 
these factors were probably less important than Mlia, for instance, 
assumes. Nevertheless the circumstances did mitigate against choosing 
Blantyre on financial grounds, and therefore pro bably were perceived as 
one reason why a move away from the south could be justified. 
Another, and more personal, motivewhich may have influenced the 
President's choice was the issue of regional and ethnic loyalty. Connell 
(1972) alludes to the fact that Banda's birthplace was near Kasungu in the 
Central Region, and that this area, including Lilongwe, is the core 
territory of his ethnic group the Achewa. The implication is clearly that 
the choice was influenced by either personal'emotional ties, or a desire 
to ensure the continued political loyalty of his most important 
supporters. By comparison with many other African countries conflict 
among Malawi's ethnic groups has not been a major political problem. One 
reason may be that the colonial administration did not favour any 
particular group as a specific policy (10), and the distribution of 
ethnic groups (see Map 5-3) did not leave any of the strongest groups in 
control of the core. The Angoni and Ayao, had been the militarily 
strongest groups at the time colonial rule was imposed, for instance, 
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whilst the Achewa have always been numerically dominant (accounting for 
28% of the total population in 1945) (11). The Alomwe are the second 
largest group and are dominant in most of the core, but they mainly 
entered the territory from Mozambique during the colonial period, and have 
never wielded any special influence or power (Mlia, 1975a). 
Banda's choice of Lilongwe clearly favours the Achewa, in contrast to 
other African countries embarking oný similar projects, which have 
attempted to choose neutral sites for their new capitals (e. g. Nigeria, 
Botswana) (Potts, 1985b). Another example of presidential favouritism for 
this region is"the location of KamuzU- Academy, an extraordinary secondary 
school which is modelled on elitist British public schools. - This-school 
was built on the President's direct orders, and is located near Kasungu, 
close to a tree under which he states he learnt to read. The. official 
line is that it was built with the President's own money, However Banda 
has a 99%. share-holding in Press Holdings, which he says he holds on 
behalf of the nation. Press, with-its subsidiaries, has been estimated to 
account for almost 30% of Malawi's economic activity (New Statesman, 
1980). It is therefore arguable that the school was built with the 
nation's money, without consultation. In, addition, there is evidence that 
many enterprises, institutions and individuals, were"requested' to make 
private donations for the project,, and -around that-, time, ADMARC made an 
unsecured loan to Press of K26 million (Financial Times, ý1981). 1ý -ý 
The final. and, perhaps most important-individual-motivation, that can- 
be suggested is. that the new ýcapital is -a, source of. personal 
gratification. This,. is more a'symptom of the Presidentlsýpersonality than 
a- specifically political factor; however the nature of political 
interaction in Malawi -is strongly affected by the fact that. Banda expects 
to receive overt displays of loyalty-and gratitude for all- his'actions,, 
and is highly susceptible to flattery. Physicalsymbols of his-prestige-- 
abound, and there is no doubt that the new capital plays a similar role. 
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The President associated himself directly with its establishment, rather 
than allowing it to be seen as a national decision, and his key role in 
master-minding both the initial decision to move, and the actual 
construction of much of the new part of the city is emphasized. The 
following quotations from the CCDC's publicity illustrate this point very 
clearly: 
It ... one of the Life President's most cherished ambitions was 
fulfilled by the formal recognition of Lilongwe as the "National 
Capital City of Malawi". " 
"... the Life President directed that the Secretary for Works and 
Supplies should become additionally the Chairman of the CCDC. The 
advantages of single control. by direct access to His Excellency 
who was also Minister of Works and Supplies, soon became apparent. " 
... direct access to His Excellency the Life President was vitally 
important... [who was] always prepared to accept ultimate 
responsibility. " 
"It (the new capital] is an expansion of the identity of the people 
of Malawi. May it always serve as a proud reminder that the first 
great Malawian leader and the father of -the nation 
had the 
strength of will and self-discipline to set out on a journey on their behalf "from vision to reality". 11 
(Richards, 1974, ps. 11,24,29-30,62, emphasis added) 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is considered that political factors, and in 
particular the personal desires of the Malawian President, were the 
primary motivations for the new capital project and its location at 
Lilongwe. Zomba's drawbacks, and regional planning issues helped to 
justify the move, but although it can be rationalized as being in the 
interests of a democratic, nationalistic Malawian government, this does 
not necessarily mean that the decision was the result of a democratic, 
parliamentary process. There is considerable evidence that it was not the 
result of group decison-making, and that the original cost analysis was 
deliberately misleading in order to allay criticism. Banda's almost 
unique power within his own country makes viable the conclusion that 
Lilongwe began as a personal prestige symbol at a politically advantageous 
location, rather than as a rational element of an attempt to restructure 
Malawi's space economy more equitably. 
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Notes for'ChaRýe_rFijv-e 
1. For instance in Tanzania and Nigeria, * the coastal locations of the 
colonial capitals made them 'inacessible to the majority of the 
population (for a more detailed discussion of this point, see Potts 
1985b),. ')- 
2. At this time Blantyre 'district was very extensive and stretched to the 
Mozambique border on the western side of the River Shire, an area 
unaffected by' the relatively -high levels of economic development 
experienced in ýthe area surr'ounding Blantyre itself. The later 
division of the district, into', 'two, Blantyre and Mwanza, 'has removed 
this ambiguity. ' 
The' main exception to" this 'general- situation relates to social 
development 'and- education in particular. Educational'achievement in 
the Northern Region was higher than elsewhere; this point is discussed 
further in the following section on political motivations. 
It is significant that this process was also disadvantageous to the 
African communities of the Southern Region. For instance the 
government deliberately avoided encouraging smallholder production in 
the Shire highlands, because the estate owners opposed it on the 
grounds that this would disrupt their labour supply, which they always 
complained was insufficient. Thus there was no African cotton 
production 'in Zomba and Blantyre districts, despite the facts that 
they were suited to cotton, were 'important areas of European'cotton 
growing', and that generally the government promoted'AfricAn, dotton 
production very strongly (see Mlia, 1975 a, pp. 119-140 for a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of colonial policies on the spread of 
agricultural development. ) 
In'particular, for instance, the 'Dwangwa Sugar project is located 
north of Salima near Nkhota-kota (see Map 5.2). Sugar has assumed 
great significance in the Malawian economy in recent years, surpassing 
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tobacco as the most valuable export in 1980, a year of poor tobacco 
prices (Kydd, 1982). However this is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
and could not have influenced the capital relocation decision-at. the 
time 
-it 
was taken., 
6., Apart from the capital relocation to Lilongwe, Bandalsý so-called 
IGwelo. Plan' envisaged--a University, in Zomba, and a lakeshore road. 
In- January 1965 he. added, ýanother project, the Nacala. rail . 
1ink 
(McMaster, 1974). All these prqjects-have been implemented-, 
These, ministers, Chirwa, Chipembere, Chiume, Chisiza,. Bwanansi and 
Chokau, later developed opposition -movements in neighbouring 
countries, which have been continuously harrassed from Malawi. This 
culminated in, the assassination of Dr., Atati Mpakati-in 1983, and the 
imposition of death, sentences on Orton ano Vera, Chirwa in the same 
year-(later commuted to life sentences). 
A detailed analysis of the causes of educational patterns is given in 
Mlia (. 1975a, pp. 153-161. ) 
9. ýThis term, refers to all those with immediate legal authority to decide 
on specific- policies and immediate p4rticipants-in decision-making. 
The term is used -by Mlia (1975a; 1975b) in his analyses- of the 
influence of regional representation on Malawian policy making, and is 
attributed to LindlAm (1968). 
10. Clearly the, spatial impact-of economic -and educational development 
did affect ethnic groups differently, but there is no evidence that 
this was deliberate, although the importance of Christian missionaries 
may have disadvantaged the Muslim Yao. 
11. Later estimates of the proportional-distribution of Malawi's ethnic 
groups are categorized by language. This fails to distinguish between 
the Anyanja and, Achewa, who both speak Chichewa. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Finance and Planning for-the New Capital 
The expense of financing the transferral of capital cities has led, to 
criticism even -of countries much richer than,, Malawi. Malawi's available 
resources made it certain that the- project could- not begin to 'be 
implemented unless major external aid-was forthcoming. 
Unsurprisingly Malawi automatically turned to -Britain for funds. 
The British Overseas Development Ministry hadý: sent anteconomic, -advis, ory 
mission to Malawi in 1965 to assess aid requirements, which had prepared a 
favourable ýreport ensuring British development support. , However' the 
British and Malawian government had agreed that the focus should be on 
agriculture,, along with transport development directly linked to 
supporting this sector, secondary and tertiary education, and private 
sector industrial growth-(Morton', 1975). ' The British considered that'the 
new capital project did not fit into, these categories, and refused to aid 
it. Furthermore they indicated that the -project was undesirable, 
particularly in terms of the opportunity cost of projects foregone. There 
were clearly doubts about the contribution of Lilongwe to regional 
development and national income, and it was stated that the project would 
not contribute to the key priority of short and medium term economic 
expansion. In an unusual step Britian actually threatened to 'reconsider' 
its aid commitment if Malawi went ahead with the project (ibid) (1). 
Undeterred however, Malawi continued its search for funds and commissioned 
feasibility studies for the project. 
As previously discussed, the British consultants Brian Colquhoun and 
Partners were appointed in 1965 to examine the general wisdom of the move, 
and decided in its favour (Richards, 1974). A South African mission, 
headed by Reutenbach, the Chairman of the South African Resources and 
Planning Advisory Council, also supported the move in a report submitted 
in 1967 (Morton, 1975). According to McMaster 0974), ýthe United States, 
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West Germany and the World Bank were all approached for financial help 
without success. Finally negotiations with South Africa achieved their 
objective, and an initial loan of eight million rand ( 4.7 million) was 
agreed in 1968, which had a grant element of about 60%. 
ý The fact that Malawi was prepared to accept South African help, 
despite being a member of the OAU and an independent black-ruled state on 
the, front-line of black-white conflict in Southern Africa, requires some 
comment. Much has been written about Malawi's anomalous relationship with 
the Republic (e. g. see Leistner, 1967; McMaster, 1974; Chipembere, 1971; 
Hughes, 1973; Munger, 1969). Briefly this situation is the result of 
Banda's own idiosyncratic view of Southern African politics, and his 
personal ideology of so-called 'pragmatism' is reflected in Malawi's 
foreign policies. There are diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, for example, and substantial financial help has been received 
from South Africa, which also made a loan for the Nacala rail link. 
South Africa's infiltration into Malawi was therefore enhanced by 
Britain's selective stance on development aid at that time (Morton, op 
cit). For South Africa, the loan for Lilongwe represented an opportunity 
to fulfil a foreign policy aim of increasing the dependence of black-ruled 
Southern African states on the Republic, and also possibly to gain a very 
convenient Central African military air-base once Lilongwe's airport was 
built. 
6.1 The Lilongwe 'Master Plan' 
,. A master plan was commissioned from a firm of architects in 
Johannesburg, Imex Pty. Ltd. This was received in 1967 but according to 
Richards (op cit) certain elements proved unsuitable for the needs of a 
poor and undeveloped economy. -Although it has not been possible to 
ascertain exactly how much the original plan was then altered, it appears 
that it was over-ambitious in technical and financial terms. The major 
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points of contention were technical problems, neglect of established local 
practices, insufficient attention to the need to use local materials and 
industry, and expense. The planned transport scheme for example, had 
taken little note of local circumstances, as it envisaged mass transit 
public transport, which would have been beyond United Transport Malawi's 
(UTM) financial and material capabilities. It also assumed that vehicle 
ownership would be "as high as elsewhere in the world". and that roads 
should be provided "on the basis that nearly every family in Lilongwe will 
eventually own a motor-car" (Gerke and Viljoen, 1968). This assumption 
was clearly unrealistic, if not ridiculous. 
A revised master plan was therefore drawn up by the Ministry of Works 
and Supplies, which included the Town Planning Department (TPD). This 
plan in theory retained "what was good" and rejected "what was 
unacceptable" from the South African plan and was directed to encompass 
three major points. First Lilongwe was to be a multi-purpose city 
functioning as both the national administration and a new commercial 
industrial centre. Second, the 'old town' was to be integrated into the 
new city, and finally the plan was to include provision for Lilongwe's 
future transport role as it was now "a certainty that it would become the 
site of the new international airport and an important rail centre on the 
future rail link from the Zambian border via Salima to the existing 
railway network" (Richards, op cit, p. 24). 
The plan that resulted is shown in Maps 6.1 and 6.2. There are four 
elements in the plan which have a direct impact on the quality of life 
experienced by the city's inhabitants. These are considered below. 
6.1.1 Land-Use Zoning 
The very strict zoning between land-use types, including division of 
residential areas prevents the intermixture of functions spatially. The 
'new town' development in particular gives the impression of a virtually 
clinical degree of orderliness, and perceptually the impact is very 
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artificial. Class divisions between the city's different residents are 
physically delineated by their residential location: this can only lead to 
the perpetuation of class differences, maintain a lack of, social 
interaction between economic classes, and prevent a-social awareness of 
the circumstances of the poorer classes by, those in higher socio-economic 
categories. This situation appears unfortunate for future social 
development and seems particularly inappropriate for 'a city which is 
supposed to symbolize the national identity of the entire Malawian 
population. The cause may be attributed to the original South African 
influence on the plan, although it is clear that the Malawian government 
has chosen to continue the policy of urban residential segregation 
established under colonial rule, and it is probableýthat the pattern is a 
result of a combination of these influences. 
6.1.2 The 'Garden City' Approach 
There has been a considerable effort to make Lilongwe a 'garden 
city'. The success of this policy is undoubted: there are vast areas of 
open 'bush' intervening between built-up areas,, as well as landscaped and 
planted areas. This is partly the result of the very- extensive area 
covered by Lilongwe's boundaries. The original 'Designated Area' was 
declared on 31st Augustý, 1968 (TPD, 1978c) and covered 37,018 acres. This 
has since been considerably extended, particularly with the inclusion of 
the area up to Lumbadzi to include the new airport (see Map 6.1),, and the 
city boundaries now include an area-of 67,842 acres (TPD, 1978b). As Map 
6.1 shows the main body of zoned urban land-use covers a large part of the 
designated area, although Lumbadzi is separate. There has been no attempt 
to concentrate land-use zones within this main area consisting of what is 
termed the 'Old Town' and 'New Capital', nor has-the-plan been implemented 
in spatial phases, so as to gradually incorporate different zones and avoid 
the emergence of a disjointed spatial structure. 
The general form of the city Is linear, on a north-south axis, 
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stretching from the 'Old Town' to Lumbadzi. Thre are supposedly four 
focal areas: the old town, the new CBD, the industrial area of Kanengo, 
and the airport/Lumbadzi. These are all meant to contain a variety of 
higher-order service function such as shopping areas, post offices and 
banking facilities (TCPD, personal communication, August 1982). The 
latter two in particular had not progressed very far by 1982. Although 
the linear form of the city necessitates a number of such centres it is 
probable tht income levels do not produce sufficient demand for each to 
develop a full range of functions, which could have been more effective if 
concentrated in a more compact urban environment. As many areas had not 
been completed or even begun by 1982 (thirteen years after construction 
began), the physically unintegrated nature of the city was very apparent. 
The distribution of land-use zones is shown in Table 6.1. Over a third of 
available land is not zoned to become 'built-up', and the space set aside 
for some types of land-use (e. g. institutions, government administration) 
is vastly in excess of that necessary for the buildings themselves, which 
contributes to the scattered nature of the built areas. 
The lack of spatial integration hinders perception of the city as a 
cohesive whole, and the physical impact of the new structures, some of 
which are of considerable aesthetic value in terms of architectural style, 
is consequently hampered (see photos). The symbolic, and perceptual 
impression of most cities in which the individual attributes' are areally 
co-ordinated tends to be greater than the sum of its parts, but in 
Lilongwe it is arguable that the reverse is true. 
6.1.3 The Transport Problem 
On a less 'cultural' level, the immediate physical result of the 
city's morphology is that the population often has to cover long distances 
to get to work, or to use various urban services such as shopping centres. 
Inadequacies in public transport, discusssed in a later section, compound 
this problem for the vast majority of the population who cannot afford 
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TABLE 6.1 
Land-Use Zones in Lilonqwe 
Land-Use Acreage % of total 
Government Administration 435 0.65 
Institutions 3290 4.85 
Commercial 900 -1.18 
Industrial 7115 10.49 
Residential 25280 37.26 
Cemeteries 114 0.1 
Open Spaces/Parks 7530 11.1 
Forestry 3748 7 5.52 36.1B 
Agriculture/grazing 8240 12.1 
Conservation centre 450 0.66 
Ornamental lake 510 0.75 
Undetermined 4040 5.96 
State Residence 6290 9.27 
TOTAL 67842 
Source: Town Planning Department, 1978b, Table 2D 
4. 
A 
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private transport (even a bicycle). This- may reflect the unrealistic 
transport assumptions of the original plan, 'as the revised plan may have 
paid insufficient attention to re-zoning residential and employment-areas, 
to allow for the realities of Malawian travel. 
Many low-income housing areas are inappropriately sited, ' with 
low-income groups housed far from their work places. For example, Area 25 
was zoned to house some low-income residents of the 'Old Town' and many 
people were resettled as the new plan was implemented. Yet most of the 
main residential area of Area 25 is some dist , ýncd'- from the main, 
industrial area of Kanengo "(Area 29),, ' and miles'from the"'Old Town' 
itself. Furthermore Area 25's early development as a' site and service 
residential area occurred before Kanengo was properly established. Even 
now Kanengo still cannot offer employment to all the residents of Area 25. 
By the 1980s both the TPD and the CCDC were prepared to admit, that this 
was a major problem. Whilst this may be the result of planning mistakes 
combined with the 'garden city' approach, a possible implication is that 
there was a deliberate policy to distance the poorer 'sections of 
community from the core areas of urban infrastructure' because they are 
perceived as a""potential, source of political unrest. 'The effect on the 
population's quality of life is clearly detrimental, the most obvious 
drawback- being the high commuti: ng costs incurred, - although many simply 
walk long distances every'day. 
6.1.4 Spatial Integration 
A further consequence of general planning practices for Lilongwe is 
that, despite the directive to ihtegrate-the 'Old Town' with the' new 
developments, this has not been achieved. Some new development has 
occurred in the vicinity of old Lilongwe, but there''is a definite IgdpI 
between it and the, new CBD which is the closest existing part of the 'New 
Capital'. The intervening space of about 4 kms. is, open bush and includes 
a 'nature sanctuary which might easily have been, accommodated elsewhere on 
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the river. Again the reason is unclear, but it may be because it had 
already been determined that-the government ministries' complex would be 
located on Capital Hill, a site both aesthetically pleasing and easy to 
defend, and in order to serve this complex and associated high-income 
residences, the new CBD had to be nearby. This analysis is admittedly 
speculative, but it is a fact that Capital Hill is surrounded by a 
security fence and there is only one guarded entrance. 
The location of the new city market is also worthy of note. It was 
originally planned for a site within the new CBD. Its eventual location 
was however much less convenient: it is some 20 minutes walk from the CBD 
and considerably further from existing residential development, in the 
middle of open bush land. 
These factors further contribute to necessary travelling time, and 
again must be particularly onerous for the low-income residents. 
6.2 The Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan 
The Lilongwe master plan was basically only a zoning plan, although 
much of the city's development during the 1970s was in accordance with its 
guidelines. A more comprehensive plan, the Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan 
(LUSP), was later prepared by the Town Planning Department within Malawi, 
which superceded and updated all previous plans. The LUSP, published in 
1978, is an "Outline Scheme" under the 1948 Town and Country Planning Act, 
and is the official planning document directing the city's strategic and 
overall development. It analysed and made recommendations about the 
existing and potential structure of Lilongwe, as envisaged, by the master 
plan, with respect to "the social, economic and physical systems of an 
area, so far as they are subject to planning control or influence. The 
structure is , in effect, the planning framework for an area and includes 
such matters as the distribution of the population, the activities and 
relationships between them, the patterns of land use and, the development I 
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the activities give rise to, together with the network of communications 
and the systems of utility services', (HMSO, 1970, quoted in TCPD, 1978a, 
p. 1-6). 
The LUSP is divided into four sections. Background information is 
provided in the first, which covers the existing situation in 1978 and 
future projections of possible developments, with reference to almost 
every aspect of the city, from population growth and structure, and 
employment, to conservation and townscaping, city management and finance. 
Section Two contains the Plants aims and objectives with respect to these 
aspects, and contains recomendations on monitoring of plan implementation. 
The third section constitutes the legal statements and definitions 
involved in the plan, and describes the legal framework covering the sorts 
of buildings which may be erected in any land-use zone, as well as 
technical data on legal densities of building in different zones, the 
appearance of buildings, etc. The final section considers Lilongwe's 
regional and national setting. and., for instance, makes recommmendations 
for the creation of a sub-regional urban hierarchy to promote Lilongwelsý 
spatial impact on its hinterland. These are closely related to those 
made in the Plan for the Lilongwe Region (see Chapter 4), although the 
hierarchy suggested takes the form recommended in the District Centres 
Development Programme (TCPD, ' 1980b). 
Those involved in plan implementation were thus provided with a 
definite set of guidelines. However since this detailed plan was, not 
published until nine years after the initial construction began in 1969, 
during which time it proceeded in line with the master plan, a number of 
problems had already emerged, and the LUSPmade several criticisms about 
the city's development up to 1978. Social infrastructure had not kept 
pace with other construction for instance, and there was a shortage of 
housing, schools and clinics, as well as insufficient allocation of areas 
for firewood cultivation. Some of Lilongwe's problems may have arisen 
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because its development was pushed ahead before a detailed plan was 
available, although of course this would not have guaranteed their 
avoidance, especially as some of them derive from the original land-use 
zoning. 
6.3 The Capital City Development Corporation 
A major problem inherent in the implementation of development plans 
is that they frequently require the co-operation of a number of different 
agencies which are all involved in plan execution. This can cause 
friction and hold-ups as the administration of all the different aspects 
of the programme needS to be phased to coincide. The development of 
Lilongwe successfull y avoided this problem through the establishment of 
an autonomous statutory authority which had complete control over 
virtually every aspect of development within the designated area: the 
Capital City Development Corporation (CCDC). 
The CCDC was established by Act of Parliament in 1968 with the 
authority to act "as agent for the Government.... to administer and 
supervise the orderly construction, development and maintenance of the 
Capital City, including buildings for the Government, and for industrial , 
commercial and other purposes, the construction, maintenance, repair and 
renewal of dwelling houses, factories, stores, and other buildings, roads, 
transport facilities, water supplies, surface drains, sewage disposal 
works and services of any other description and the provision of community 
centres, theatres, libraries, halls, gardens, swimming pools, and 
amenities of every description .... either alone or in association with or 
as an agent of any person" (CCDC, 1978, pp. 4-5). 
There were other governmental agencies involved in plan execution. 
The Malawi Housing Corporation was chiefly responsible for, the provision 
of medium density and high density permanent housing, although other 
residential construction fell to the CCDC (. TPD, 1978a). The Lilongwe 
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City Council is the Local Education Authority and administers primary 
education, as well as local authority functions not administered by; the 
CCDC during its existence, and the Ministry of Education is' resp, -onsible 
for secondary and tertiary education. UTM, a, private company, ' is 
responsible for public transport. 
The establishment of the CCDC undoubtedly helped to speed the process 
of plan implementation in the early stages. It insisted that the master 
0 we Xq%. e#"5 
plan should specify- land-use which prevented friction A 
between local 
authorities and other agencies. I The President's influence in 
the CCDC also meant that it was a powerful, if, undemocratic body. - All 
members, including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman; were"Cappointed by'the 
Minister of Works and Supplies, 'a post held by, Banda. ' 'The first Chairman 
was also the Secretary of Works and Supplies; other members'-included the 
Mayor and several councillors from the Lilongwe City Council--(LCC) 
(Richards, 1974). 
The., CCDC was run on a commercial basis, acting in-a similar, way to a 
New Town Development Corporation. The initial R8, million advance from 
South Africa, on-lent by the governmenti-provided'its seed capital, but 
further funds had to be raised through its own initiatives. Some of this 
came from the government, but always in the- form-of loans, -rather than 
grants (see Appendix 6.1). The terms of the largest government loan were 
relatively soft; later-loans carried a 9.5% interest rate but*repayments 
did not commence until *the 1980s (see Section 6.4 below). 'However the 
corporation was forced to raise commercial loans as well, in order to 
fulfil its responsibilities. They found that financiers were reluctant'to 
lend to them as a statutory body, 'and'the loans raised -"'were i-often"at 
extremely onerous interest rates. Further ', funds were meant to come from 
their general activities of developing land for sale- or rent'(including 
development charges). Loan repayment was their responsibility, although 
the government- guaranteed some of the commercial advances., A major 
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consequence of these factors was that the CCDC's administration and 
priorities had to reflect their commercial orientation, and this 
inevitably meant that some of their major responsibilities, which were 
inherently 'unprofitable', were unlikely to receive due attention. A key 
example is low-income housing, of which there has always been a severe 
shortage since the capital programme began. It is clear that the CCDC was 
reluctant to provide the massive investment ne cessary to keep pace with 
the rapidly growing population, since low-cost site and service plots 
yield no profit, although the subsidy element in Lilongwe is very small 
(Pennant, 1982). Whilst finance for this; sector, is a problem in all 
less-developed countries, it is suggested-that the CCDCIS commercial 
nature made it very difficult to fulfil its obligations-in this sphere, 
given the likely prioritization of its various responsibilities. - 
The CCDC's major problem was undoubtedly financial. - Shortages of, 
funds slowed the progress of construction, and a number of projectshad to, 
be shelved during the 1970st including the new and extremely expensive 
State Residence and the transfer of the High Court and parliamentary 
buildings (Financial Times, 1981). The former is still not completed, and 
transfer of the latter two is still only at the planning stage due to 
continued lack of finance (Metcalfe, personal communication, February 
1986). 
The corporation's initial assets, apart from the South African loan, - 
included the land designated for the capital (2). The CCDC! s land 
included freehold title to about 24,000 hectares by 1980 (CCDC, 1980) but 
excluded land already held freehold by other bodies. The Malawi-Housing 
Corporation (MHC) for instance owns freehold land and will not inýfact 
develop land unless it is given to them freehold (TPD 1978b). Other 
small pockets of freehold land also existed (e. g. embassies, -major 
industrial concerns) (Richards, 1974; TPD, 1978a), and government land 
was transferred back to the government (Dept. of Lands, interview, August 
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1982). The value of both developed and undeveloped land was estimated as 
a book asset of K9,041,298 in the CCDC's 1980 accounts (CCDC, op cit). 
Thus nearly all Lilongwe's land came under the CCDC's direct control, 
with all users havi 
,ý 
to pay the corporation development, charges (except 
for occasional charities), and rent. However whilst the CCDC implemented 
the master plan, all planning applications are vetted by the Lilongwe Town 
and Country Planning Committee, a body nominated by the President, and 
part of the TPD (TPD, interview, August 1982). Thus the ultimate 
authority on planning applications is the President. 
The CCDC also received all ground, and lease, rents from land and 
property in Lilongwe district which is owned by city, residents. This is 
collected by the government and passed on to the CCDC as a grant. This 
implies a direct transfer of funds from hinterland to city, and could. -be 
viewed as detrimental to regional development (although the government 
could have used the money for projects outside the cityanyway, and this 
at least ensured it remains within the district). 
Despite these assets, the CCDC found its finances insufficient to 
carry out its responsibilities as early as 1972. It decided to set up a 
series of property companies, beginning with the -, Malawi Property 
Investment Company (MPICO), in which the CCDC had a 60% share holding. 
The objective was - to attract 
international and* local commercial 
investment, and MPICO created subsidiary companies to suit the needs of 
particular investors and, projects (CCDC, 1980 The companies were 
successful in attracting private investment capital both internally and 
externally, and, by 1980 there were 17 associated and subsidiary companies 
in the group, including four wholly owned by the CCDC (the largest being 
Airport Developments Ltd. ), with provided or assured funds of,. K30 million 
(ibid). Investors included Barclays Bank, Standard Bank, Bank of America 
and the Commonwealth Development Finance Co. Ltd. (Richards, op cit). 
There is also a strong South African influence, as Old Mutual owns. 23% of 
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MPICO (Moore, personal communication, 1984). The corporation retained 
direct control of these companies (Richards, 1974), although its, main 
direct role in some was the provision of management services (CCDC, op 
cit). However some of the companies had in fact only two shareholders, 
both from the CCDC (ibid). It is undeniable that this move allowed the 
capital project to progress through the 1970s at a rate otherwise 
unattainable, and it was even reported that "the net result has been that 
Malawi now has a virtually completed new capitaLat little direct cost to 
the government" (The Times, 1978). However to call the capital "virtually 
completed" in 1978 was certainly over-optimistic as major elements of the 
outline plan were still non-existent, and there was a major shortage of 
housing. 
This view also ignored the long-term aspects of this development, 
besides neglecting to account for the other masive infrastructural costs 
involved in building the new capital (e. g. transport, public utilities, 
low-income housing). The incentive for investment in these, companies was 
that they would yield a high return (CCDC, interview, August 1982), and 
although it is not certain whether the CCDC guaranteed a specific return, 
the companies did yield regular dividends. -However the true financial 
position of these companies did not-always allow dividends to be paid from 
company profits, and in 1982 1 was informed that dividends were being paid 
by the National Bank of Malawi. By 1979/80 it was already apparent that 
the structure and future of the group faced massive problems: heavy 
borrowings from external lenders at floating interest rates (the peak was 
21%) creating impossible debt conditions. The 1980 accounts showed that 
the subsidiaries had increased their debt to the CCDC, which had made a 
number of unsecured loans to them, by K1.2 million. MPICO eventually had 
to sell off many of its assets, to pay external lenders (Metcalfe, 
ibid). 
There are therefore a number of aspects about the funding of 
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Lilongwe's construction which suggest that substantial national funds were 
diverted to support the CCDC. The CCDC was wound up in 1984, and its 
responsibilities passed to the LCC. The debts it incurred are likely to 
remain a considerable burden on the country for the foreseeable future. 
6.4 The Cost of the New Capital 
The monetary cost of the new capital is only one element of any 
cost-benefit analysis of the project, as less tangible social and 
political effects as well as economic gains have also to be considered. 
These all have implications for the project's impact on other aspects of 
Malawi's developmnt. The relative importance of the actual expenditure on 
a project in such an analysis is largely a function of the country's 
overall financial position. Thus in many ways the cost element is mainly 
relevant in terms of the relative proportion of available funds it uses, 
rather than the absolute cost. 
It is impossible to be exact about the cost of the new capital, 
partly because of ambiguities in development expenditure accounting. The 
government has always tried to present a relatively low-cost picture in 
its various statements and planning documents, presumably to avoid 
internal and international criticism that Malawi's overall development 
would suffer significantly because of the diversion of development funds 
to the project. Thus the initial government estimate of the cost was 
E15-20 million (K30-40 million), which was soon revised to E25-30 million 
(K50-60 million) (Connell, 1972; Economic Planning Division-, 0971)'-- On 
the basis of an expenditure of K50 million in ten years, the Economic 
Planning Division estimated that Lilongwe would account for only 7% of 
gross fixed capital formation, and 13% of the government's development 
programme from 1971-80, compared to 19% and 29% respectively for 
agriculture and transport. In 1971 they confidently stated that "the 
allocation of K50 million to the New Capital will neither reduce the 
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growth performance of the Malawi economy nor lead to insupportable debt 
servicing commitments" (ibid). 
Oil price rises helped to cause massive escalation in the cost of all 
development expenditure in the last decade, and must have led to 
corresponding increases in the cost of the capital project. Thus whilst 
total development expenditure from 1971-80 was originally estimated at 
K374 million, total expenditure from 1971-79 was K475-3 million, and in 
1978/79 alone was over K120 million, well above the expected yearly 
average. Yet over the same period the official record of governmental 
development expenditure on the new capital was only,. K18-5 million, a mere 
4% of the total, and less than the original estimates. 
It is obvious that accounting procedures were very narrow in their 
definition of government expenditure on Lilongwe, since most of the 
direct cost of internal construction was borne by the CCDC. Table 6.2 
shows official estimates of expenditure on the development account from 
1964-1982/83 by selected functions. Expenditure on the 'New Capital' is 
recorded as a separate category and appears as a relatively minor expense, 
totalling K24 million over the period. Table 6.3 shows the proportion of 
total annual development expenditure on each category. It can be seen 
that the cost of the new capital, according to government accounting, 
peaked in the early construction period of the early 1970s, when it was 
about half of expenditure on agriculture. As previously noted, the 
Malawian government's attitude towards welfare services such as health and 
education is that it cannot afford to provide a full service and therefore 
concentrates on providing facilities which are believed to yield the most 
immediate economic returns (e. g. by improving health services in areas 
where specific agricultural projects have been established). By 
comparison to many other African countries the proportion of development 
expenditure on these functions is low, although educational development 
immediately after independence was significant due to the need to provide 
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very basic facilities not established in the colonial period. Officially 
recorded annual development expenditure on the new capital has been 
(Z 
comparable, and sometimes greater than. -that on either of 
these 
ON 
categories. 
However this categorization of the new capital's cost cannot be seen 
as a true representation of the real opportunity cost of the project to 
the government's development funds. The vast majority of the cost shown in 
Table 6.2 is made up of government loans to the CCDC, as shown in Table 
6.4a (3). In 1975 planned loans totalled K20 million, and by 1980 
outstanding government loans totalled K12.8 million (CCDC, 1980), 
excluding the original on-lent South African loan of which K10-5 million 
was still outstanding. The largest element of the government loan was 
made at a 'soft' interest rate of 4.5%, but the CCDC had already defaulted 
on two payments in 1980 (payment of other government loans did not 
commence until after this date, the last for which accounts are 
available). These facts imply that the opportunity costs of these loans 
was greater than expected, as alternative commercial investment would have 
yielded higher returns. Furthermore the value of the public land ceded to 
the CCDC (estimated at K9 million in 1980) does not appear to have been 
accounted for in any way. 
Of even greater significance is the fact that items entered under 
general headings such as transport and government buildings are directly 
related to the capital project. This means that the project's true cost 
is much greater than suggested by official categorization. Also although 
expenditure on the 'New Capital' is shown to have ended in 1981/82, in 
fact further costs are still being incurred during the 1980s. Tables 6.4a 
and 6.4b attempt to estimate the importance of this factor, as indicated 
by the government development accounts of 1976/77 and 1982/83 (4). These 
figures should not be regarded as definitive because of the subjective 
difficulties of identifying those elements of expenditure in other 
2A5 
TABLE 6.4a 
Planned Develoompnt in Selected Sectors in Malawi: 
Total Government Costs as Estimated-in 1975 
and ProDortion Attributable to Lilonowe 
Planned expenditure Expenditure 
(existing projects) 
I 
to 31/3/75 
Category 
1. New Capital 
of which: govt. loans 
to CCDC 
I K'000 
% of 
K'000 categ. 
100 lb, 183 100 
90 15,91-7,98 
22,336 
20,023 
12. Government Buildings 31,596 
of which: a) presidential residences 13,878 
b) other government bldgs. 17,718 
c) govt. bldgs. in 
100 14,959 100 
44 8,591 57 
3 5b 6,3b7 4ý 
categ. i 
total 
spent b 
31/3/75 
72 
79 
47 
62 
36 
Lilongwe as % of 2(b)- 8,035 45 3,903 61 49 
3. Health 10,278 100 4,308 100 42 
of which: Lilongwe 4,977 49 1,986 46 40 
4. Transport 133,481 100 37,929 100 28 
46 3,052 95 of which: Lilongwe 61,520 
Source: calculated from Malawi Government, Approved estimates 
of expenditure on development account for 1976/77 
Notes: 1. This figure includes the estimated cost of State House in Lilongwe, which 
is officially categorized as separate from other presidential residences. 
2. Over K1,000,000 was dE; ignated for an unspecified category of 'other 
gcvernment buildings'. These were probably attributable to Lilongwe and 
would increase the total poportion of planned e-penditure an govern. T. 'ent- 
bui I d4 ngs there to 70%. 
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TABLE 6.4b. 
Planned development in select2d categories: 
1982/83 Estimates of Government Expenditure and 
Praportion Attributable to Lilanqwe 
Planned expenditure 
(existing projects) 
Expenditure 
to 31/3/81 
categ. 
total 
s ent b 
X of 
p y 
31/3/75 
Category K'000 % K'000 categ. 
1. Government Buildings 124,926 100 89,983 100 72 
of which: a) presidential residences 2,059 1.7 1,627 i. 8 79 
b) other government bldgs. 122,237 98.3 88,356 98.2 72 
c) govt. bldgs. in 
Lilongwe as % of 2(b)"2' 116,883 96 83,563 95 71 
2. Transport 292,528 100 195,422 100 67 
of which: Lilongwe 106, B31 37 86,756 44 
J 
81 
Source: calculated from Malawi Government, Approved estimates 
of expenditure an development account for 1982/83 
Notes: 1. Includes Lilongwe State Residence. 
2. Includes K71.5 million planned expenditure on Malawi Army Buildings, which 
would be almost entirely due to further expenditure on the Lilongwe Army 
Barracks. 
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categories which would not otherwise have been made if the new Capital 
project had not been implemented. For instance, one can only make reasoned 
assumptions as to whether the railway from Salima to Mchinji would have 
been constructed even if Lilongwe had not been chosen, and obviously some 
road improvements in the area would have occurred. Nevertheless it 
A. 
can be stated that many infrastructural development which accompanied the 
new capital's development were made because of the capital project, and 
not in spite of it. 
A number of assumptions have been made in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b on the 
basis of the alternatives available had Lilongwe not become the capital, 
and the opportunity cost of not selecting Blantyre, or remaining in Zomba. - 
With respect to government buildings it is felt that the -cost of new 
buildings in Lilongwe can definitely be allocated as a cost-of building-a 
new capital, as considerably less expenditure would have been necessary, in 
Zomba or Blantyre. Most of the estimated and expended cost of 
presidential residences has been excluded when calculating the proportion 
of development expenditure in this category accounted for by Lilongwe, as 
the very high cost of these is regarded as an anomalous element in an 
analysis of 'development' expenditure, although it is indicative of the 
structure of decision-making power and of government priorities (the total 
planned expenditure on health in 1976/77. was less than that for 
presidential residences for example). However the, New State House at 
Lilongwe has been included as part of Lilongwe's costs. 
The allocation, of health expenditure to Lilongwe in the later -1970s 
was also a very high proportion of total plannedand completed development. 
The main element of this was the new general hospitalýin Lilongwe, with a 
very-small share- taken by a new medical auxiliary school. Although the 
latter may have been a necessary expenditure, it can be assumed that the 
hospital was definitely attributable to the decision to initiate a new 
capital. Alternatives would have been to expand the existing-hospital at 
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Blantyre, and/or to expand primary and prevenjtive health care, perhaps 
combined with the upgrading of an existing district hospital in the 
Northern or Central Regions. 
The transport sector has consistently received the largest'single 
share of Malawi's development expenditure. 'A significant proportion of 
this has gone on the new railway links to Nacala, and from Salima to 
Lilongwe and thence to Mchinji, and these are reflected in sudden rises in 
the cost of railway development in certain years (see Table 6.1). The 
present analysis has included the cost of the Salima-Lilongwe- Mchinji 
link as directly attributable to Lilongwe's development. There are a 
number of reasons why this appears to be a fair assumption. First this 
development was not included in Banda's 11Gwelo Plan" guidelines. This is 
significant since the other two major transport projects (the Nacala link 
and the lakeshore road) were included, and it seems probable that if the 
decision to construct the railway had been made independently of the 
Lilongwe project, such an expensive and important development would have 
been derived from these early guidelines. Secondly it seems improbable 
that the government could justify this railway on the grounds of improved 
transport of agricultural produce'in the Central 'Region alone; and the 
extension to the Zambian border from Lilongwe has proceeded without any 
definite plans for a link from Zambia'which might otherwise-have made the 
project independently viable. The government also stated that one purpose 
of the railway was to cater "for the increasing demands of the rapidly 
growing new capital" (Department of Information, 1978). All these factors 
imply that Lilongwe's development as the new capital was the major raison 
dletre for this railway and that it can be regarded as part, of the 
capital's cost, especially as the opportunity cost of selecting Blantyre, 
or providing a rail link to Zomba would have been much 
Although the Mchinji link had not been begun by 1977, -the year to 
which Table 6.4a refers, it can be seen that transport costs related to 
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Lilongwe are estimated to be almost half of total estimated expenditure on 
existing projects at that time. Lilongwe's share of transport costs are a 
very important element in any cost-benefit analysis as this expenditure is 
the largest proportion of estimated allocable cost of the project. The 
figures in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b are somewhat conservative estimates 
however, and do not, for instance, included the cost of new plant vehicles 
and equipment for the Balaka-Lilongwe stretch of railway (K14.5 million in 
1976/77) on the grounds that some of this expenditure was inevitable. 
Similarly no element of the cost of the improved Zomba-Lilongwe road has 
been included (K9 million in 1976/77), although it has been assumed that 
major expenditure on improved Lilongwe road links to Mchinji and Kasungu 
should be allocable to Lilongwe, as their prioritization is considered 
directly attributable to the capital's development. 
Whilst the capital project can never be costed exactly because of the 
various problems outlined above, the evidence is that significant 
proportions of planned and completed development expenditure in a variety 
of sectors have been allocated to the project, and that the relatively 
positive picture of its impact on development spending in other sectors 
indicated by official government estimates of the project is an 
insufficient basis for analysis of the true economic costs and'benefits. 
Thus in 1976/77 almost a half of the total cost of existing-projects in 
health, transport and government buildings are regarded as allocable to 
Lilongwe. In 1982/83 when the capital projects was already officially 
excluded from development accounts, nearly all the current cost of 
government buildings was for Lilongwe, plus a third of total transport 
costs, reflecting in particular the development of State House, army 
buildings and the new airport, as well as continued expenditure on 
railways. The total cost of the new airport has been estimated at K82 
million (Financial Times, 1981) (5). It is considered here that the 
airport could definitely not have been justified in the absence of the new 
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capital projecto despite the inadequacies of Blantyre's Chileka airport 
for wide-bodied jets. 
According to government accounts the estimated cost of all existing 
development projects in 1976/77 was K383 million. On the basis of the 
data in Table 7.3a the then current cost of the capital was at least K96.9 
million. Thus the new capital accounted for about a quarter of the 
government's development programme duringthe, latter half of the 
. 
1970s, and 
aproximately a third of the total of non-natural resource projects. An 
identical picture is, found if similar calculations are made with reference 
to the 1982/83 accounts: the current cost of the new capital related 
projects was K224 million representing a quarter of total current 
projects' costs of K886 million, and-a third of K672 million allocated to 
non-natural resources projects. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The development of Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital city has required 
an enormous effor,. ýt on the part of planners, construction workers and 
government agencies. The strength of purpose and single-mindedness with 
which the project has been pursued has provided, the country with one of 
its major achievements in the years since independence.,., Yet there is no 
doubt that the opportunity cost of the new capital has been very high, and 
that the achievement has only been gained by, incurring heavy external 
debts both the government and the CCDC. About 80% of Malawian 4 
development expenditure is financed by aid and the rest is borrowed 
overseas on commercial terms. Even with low interest rates on some of the, 
loans made as aid, it is estimated that about ý40% of annual revenue went 
to debt. repayments at the beginning of the 1980s. It is sometimes argued 
that if -aid for a specific project would not 
have been. forthcoming for 
alternative projects, then there is- no opportunity costs in terms of. 
development in other sectors. This may well, be true of the original South 
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African loan, for instance, but it is difficult to ascertain the pos , ition 
of other donors such as Canada which financed the railway. Nonetheless 
when a country is as aid-dependent as Malawi it can be suggested that an 
opportunity cost does exist even in these circumstances. This is because, 
apart from the considerable burden of debt repayment which diverts 
governmnent revenue from internal development, potential donors are likely 
to assess a government's ability to pay, ' and projects which' have 
sigjnificantly increased indebtedness may have the effect of discouraging 
donors from aiding other projects. 
Development accounting procedures make it'impossible to cost the 
project precisely, and the benefits 'of many of I the associated 
infrastructural investments have development implications beyond the 
immediate confines of the capital project; but the current retrenchment'in 
the Malawian economy and its future development plans- result "from a 
balance of payments problem which has been partly caused by expenditure on 
the new capital. .I 
Criticism of the project on economic grounds is clearly justified, 
especially if it is judged that the new capital has little to offer in 
terms of economic development. Thus Williams (1978, p. 293) has written: 
"The readiness of the president to devote most substantial 
quantities of very scarce resources and to incur heavy foreign 
liabilities that exacerbate the already serious balance of payments 
problem, in order to pursue the political dream of building the 
national capital among his own Chewa people, cannot easily be 
reconciled with the view that the economic development of the 
country was his major priority. " 
In some ways however Lilongwe is a symbol of Malawian development 
priorities, which as a whole can partly be critici zed as 'failing to- 
grapple with the country's most urgent needs. Ther'&fore one can speculate 
that even if the finances for the capital project had been directed to 
alternatives, these would not necessarily have had a greater impact on 
economic development. Nonetheless the relevance of expenditure on the 
capital and associated projects to the overall economic situation is 
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undeniable, and it cannot be justified as a wholly necessary expenditure. 
Had the country not incurred the debt associated with Lilongwe, the 
severity of the country's recession would have been lessened. 
The Malawian economy was in crisis by the end of the 1970s, leading 
to intervention by the, IMF in 1979. The country's external debt rose-from 
K399 million to K504 million between 1979 and 1980, with a corresponding 
increase in debt servicing from K32.9 milliontSK47 million. Malawi was 
therefore forced to revise its planned development -programme for 
1981/82-1985/86, which has been described as a "sober, -almost masochistic 
document" (Financial Times, 1981). In addition severe measures to 
rebalance the economy were introduced: budgets were-cut, -taxes increased, 
a credit squeeze was initiated, and efforts made to, limit imports by a 3% 
import levy. Parastatal bodies. like the Spearhead Group of the Malawi 
Young Pioneers and ADMARC have been overhauled due to evidence of 
inefficiency and extravagance; even -Press Holdings was subjected to 
examination. The government raised prices for basic. services. and rent, 
but continued to hold down wages (ibid). During -the 1980s these measures 
must have had a negative impact on the already low-living standards of the 
Malawian population. 
These problems have clearly been caused by a variety of factors, -of 
which perhaps the most. important is the current world recession, and debt 
repayment has become an overwhelming burden for so many less-developed 
countries that Malawi's circumstances are not unusual. Yet. the evidence 
presented above regarding the CCDC's financial experiences,:. and the 
proportion of overall expenditure related to the new capital demonstrates 
that the government's insistence that the capital-project would- not, "lead 
to insupportable debt-servicing commitments" was. incorrect, and it is 
clear that the project made a major contribution to Malawi's present 
financial situation. More specifically, the scale of the cost of the new 
capital must also have had a detrimental effect on development in other 
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sectors of, the national economy, and has diverted., funds which could have 
had a significant impact on aspects of national welfare. In particular 
one might single out the relatively low level of development in the 
education and health sectors, and small-scale peasant agriculture. 
The annual Economic Report of 1982 (Economic Planning Division, 1982) 
predicted further falls in economic growth rates and the description of 
the performance of both the public and private sectors is generally 
pessimistic. Existing debts and servicing commitments are described as 
"very burdensome", and it. is emphasized that predictions are based on 
the assumption that reserves will be maintained and that the current 
deficit will be covered by continued inflows to government. However it is 
also stated that "it is not clear that such inflows can realistically, be 
anticipated" and that if the government is forced to reduce expenditure 
further, the future economic prospects would be even worse (ibid, p. 12). 
In relation to Malawi's dependence on foreign capital, Williams (1979, P. 
327) predicted -that a situation might arise whereby "the government will 
have to choose between a sharp fall in the rate of economic growth and the 
risk of severe disaffection among some of its closest supporters'll. It-is 
possible that this analysis was proved correct when in 1983 a number of 
political events occurred in Malawi which were suggestive of an. increase 
in internal dissent amongst the national executive. This culminated in 
rumours that the President was to take a year's sabbatical (which in 
practical terms would have meant the end of his rule in Malawi), and that 
the Head of the Reserve Bank might assume power. These events may have 
been partly caused by economic problems. 
The capital project has also drawn Malawi into a close, and arguably 
unethical, relationship, with South Africa. The 'role of Lilongwe in 
establishing_. this relationship has been emphasized by Weisfelder (1980, 
P-17): 
"Malawi's grinding poverty and commercial dependence on Mozambiquan 
ports can help to account for Banda's accommodationist tactics 
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towards white Southern Africa' prior to the demise of'Portuguese 
colonialism. But only the fulfillment of Banda's development 
'priorities, particularly his personal vision of'a new capital at 
Lilongwe, provides the key to understanding his unique 
; tance within the region" (emphasis added). 
Malawi has become increasingly dependent upon'South Africa which provides 
a high' proportion of its imports (38.4% in 1978) although taking only a 
small proportion of its exports. It also holds a significant share of the 
goverment's external debt. Although no further South African loans for 
the capital per se were made after the initial R8 million, many South 
African planners and personnel were involved in the project, as South 
Africa provides technical aid in the form of skilled personnel seconded 
for two years or more (McMaster, 1974) (6). South African construction 
firms have also been involved in the actual construction of the new 
capital. The South African Roberts Construction Company won a contract 
to build four government buildings in 1972 for instance (ibid), and South 
African capital has also been involved in the CCDC's property companies. 
Such involvement is definitely detrimental to Malawi's standing within 
black-ruled Southern Africa and may, for instance, harm the country's 
prospects of sharing in any benefits that might be realized from the SADCC 
regional grouping. It also makes Malawi very vulnerable to the exigencies 
of South African foreign policy, and therefore represents a constraint on 
the country's future choice of development paths. 
It is possible that South African influences on planning processes 
have been detrimental to Lilongwe's development. However the elements 
identified as problems probably mainly reflect the priorities given to 
internal planners by the government, given that the original South African 
plan was revised. The analysis of the city's planned development in this 
chapter has shown that this has tended to neglect the needs of majority of A 
the city's population, which could not be accommodated by directives 
to 
build a spacious and visually appealing 'garden city'. Consideration of 
security also appears to have affected the accessibility of 
the low income 
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population and it is clear that this sector is the most severely affected 
by the financial constraints on the city's development. Further 
consideration of the problems of the low income population, particularly 
with respect to housing and transport, is given in the next chapter which 
deals with Lilongwe's physical development and population growth. 
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Notes for Chapter Six 
1. Morton (1975) considers whether Malawi's dependence on aid has been 
used by donors to direct government policies. Although she concludes 
that this has not generally occurred, Britain did attempt to 
influence Malawi not to embark on two projects in particular: the new 
capital and the Nacala rail link and tried to discourage other donors 
from funding it (McMaster, 1974). 
2. This land was originally designated by government order in 1968 by the 
Capital City Development Corporation Designation Order describing the 
area to be included in the Capital City of Lilongwe (Malawi, 
Government Notices of 1968, GN no. 160). This extended the boundaries 
which had been last defined in 1966 (Malawi, Government Notices of 
1966, no. 157). The boundaries have since been extended further in 
1972 and 1982. 
3. The other government costs shown in 1975 were: perimeter fencing for 
Capital Hill, special expenditure on telecommunications, street 
lighting, the new market, and a U. K. loan of K1-5 million for 
traditional housing (Malawi Government, 1970. 
4. The development accounts give the estimated total cost of all 
existing development projects at the time, including those planned for 
the near future and not yet begun, and those already completed. In 
most categories of development expenditure the share of 'Lilongwe' 
projects is small, and only those categories in which it has had a 
significant impact have been selected for analysis. Therefore the two 
sets of accounts analysed in the tables provide a guide to the 
proportion of planned and completed expenditure in certain other 
categories, allocable to Lilongwe, from about 1975-80, and 1980 on. 
5. The new airport was financed with loans from Japan, and the African 
Development Bank. 
6. For instance a South African was appointed as Malawi's Director of 
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Information for two years from 1969. South Africans have also held 
appointments as the general manager of Air Malawi, and the head of the 
Malawi Development Corporation (McMaster, op cit). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
. 
Physical Development and Population'Growth in Lilongwe(j) 
7.1 Physical Development of Lilongwe 
The physical construction of Malawi's new capital city along the 
lines of the master plan began in 1969. Preliminary work on Capital Hill, 
the site of the ministerial administrative complex, began, in 1970, by 
which time the Ministry of Works and Supplies' design and planning teams 
and part of the CCDC was housed in temporary headquarters constructed in 
'Old Lilongwe'. In 1972 this Ministry was the first to move to Capital 
Hill and by 1978 the relocation of all government ministries from Zomba 
and Blantyre was complete. The, army and police headquarters were also 
relocated successfully. 
-Kamuzu, 
Barracks, located near, to the State House 
site, was in fact one of the earliest complexes, completed, at a 
cost of K2.5 million (Malawi Government, 1976). and was opened in 1974. 
The police headquarters were estimated to have cost K1.6 million, and are 
located between the large traditional housing area west of the airport 
road, and Capital Hill (see Map 6.2). It is arguable that the 
prioritization of these police and army developments and their siting 
indicates the President's influence, and a somewhat suspicious attitude 
towards the low-income urban population. The rapid transfer of 
government administration was marked -by 
the official designation of 
Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital in 197,5. All foreign diplomatic missions 
have also relocated to Lilongwe. 
The city is now established as the focus of national administration, 
but since in 1986 Parliament remains in Zomba, and the President's main 
residence is still in Blantyre the locus of decision-making power remains 
diffuse., Some other, important 
linsititutions 
have also. yet to be 
relocated. Whilst the pace of construction in the early stages was, rapid, 
this did not continue into the later 1970s and 1980s, due to financial 
stringencies. For example during the latest planning period into the 
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1980s, planned expenditure on government buildings was severely cut back. 
Court had been 
Thus although the site -for the new High earmarked for years, at present A 
(1986) it still remains in Blantyre, as'does the Post Office Headquarters. 
Planning for the new Parliament- had not passed the design stage in 1982. 
Some development of'State House occurred during the early years, but then 
constructionýwas halted for some time; by the mid 1980s it had begun again 
despite its massive, cost'and the fact that it iS'possibleýthat Banda will 
never occupy'it, since he has not visited it for years and seems content 
to remain in Blantyre (M6tcalfe, personal communication, 1986Y. 
7.2 Commercial and Industrial Development 
Other major elements of the master plan completed by 1982 include the 
new Capital, City-, Centre, close to Capital-Hill. This provides a'fairly 
narrow-range of services, but several government and diplomatic missions 
are located here, as was the CCDC administration.,, ' Oth6rl' major 
institutions located here include the, headquarters of the' National -and 
Commercial Banks, the Building Society, ýthe Reserve Bank, and the National 
Library Service. 'The new five-star Capital Hotel is also situated nearby. 
This arearof the 'New Capital' represents the most visually appealing and 
visible element of its development, although even here the density of 
construction is low. 
The main industrial areas are Biwi Triangle' south' of' theýold town, 
Area 7 (2) also adjacent to old Lilongwe, and Areas 27,28 and 29'-'(see 
Map 6.1). Kanengo, (Areas 28 and 29) is the new heavy industrial-area for 
Lilongwe and is serviced by the railway. The land was developed by the 
CCDC for lease to industrialists who pay a development charge'as well as 
rent. - The degree and nature of private investment in these areas is 
varied, and- the private sector's contribution to Lilongwe's growth centre 
role and its attitude to location in the New Capital is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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7.2.1 Commerce and Industry in Old Lilongwe 
The physical appearance of the old town has been little affected by 
the new capital project. It retains the characteristics of a. small 
African colonial provincial town. Historically it was divided into an 
"Asian quarter" on the east bank of the river, wiiý'the Europ6an town on 
the west bank and to some extent this division is still evident. - 
The range of service functions in the old town is extensive, and it 
is naturally more popular as a -shopping area than the new Capital City 
Centre, which compares 'very, uhfavourably. Jhe cityls'bus station is in 
the old town also and the' original city market is adjacent to it; again 
the %volume of trade at the ill-sited-new market is'a tiny fraction of that 
at the thriving old market. 
A number of small industrial concerns"are foUnd within the old towh, 
apart from at the Area 7 estate. Thus in some ways" the old town is X 
essentially self-contained and any fears that it might suffer'from 
competition with the new capital appear Unfounded. ''-In fact the' reverse 
has occurred and it has benefited from an increase in demand as the 
population has grown, and several new retail outlets have opened and tfib 
old Lilongwe hotel has been extended. 
7.3 Housing 
Residential land has the largest single allocation of' sýa6e in the 
city (see 'Table 6.1 in previous chapter). This'lýnd'ý'is 'iub-divided 
according to income and defisity into high "income-low defisity, middle 
income-medium density, and low income-high density zones. The' last 
category is further sub-divided into 'permanent' and- 'traditional' 
housing. 
Perman6nt low income housing is" generally formally 'built by the 
Malawi Housing Corporation. The traditional housing areas (THAs) 
accommodate the vast majority of the low income population and operate on 
the site-and-service principle. They are sub-divided into plots, and are 
261 
supplied with water mains, estate roads, landscaping and neighbourhood 
centres (Richardst 1974). The THAs were the responsibility of the CCDC 
during its existence, and after 1984 the MHC reluctantly took them on. 
People allocated these plots build their own 'traditional' housing, and 
there is therefore some flexibility in their choice of construction 
materials and the general standard of housing according to income levels. 
The THAs thus have a wide variety of housing types, and whilst some are of 
a relatively low standard, some people have privately built high quality 
permanent structures on site-and-service plots (TPD, 1978a). However the 
houses are meant to comply with fairly strict regulations laid down by 
both the Public Health Act and the LUSP, which cover a range of variables 
including plot coverage, spacing, minimum' size of dwelling, air and 
sunlight specification and building lines. This ensures a certain degree 
of standardization in the THAs. There are also a number of regulations 
designed to prevent the sub-letting of separate dwellings on each plot. 
In theory only one principal building is allowed per plot, and all 
outbuildings are subject to detailed specifications which should ensure 
only plot-owner's employees can actually sleep there. However these 
regulations are widely disregarded. 
The basic housing type for all- income levels is detached, 
single-storey dwellings. A small number of low-rise middle income flats 
were planned and some high density maisonette-style accommodation is 
provided in the high income area east of Capital Hill. The original plans 
for the allocation of land for different housing types, and the assumed 
nature of occupancy is shown in Table 7.1. These estimates were later 
revised by the TPD to produce more accurate estimates of potential plot 
numbers, and to allow for flats and permanent high density housing in THAs 
(see Table 7.2). Nevertheless, adherence to original land use allocations 
will lead to shortages of residential land well before 2000, the period 
covered by the plan. Although the total residential allocation is 
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TABLE 7.2 
Revised Town Planning Estimates of Housing Capacity 
Acccordinq to Original Plot Density Specifications 
RESIDENTIAL Net Maxa. X Projected Year 
AREA Residential no. of Maxm. total 2000 land 
Area(acres) plots popn. popn. Popn. exhausted 
Low Density 31810 5,067 50,670 9.5 58,253 c. 1997 
Medium Density: 
a) Houses 21827 1,654 39,578 7.9 53,772 
b) Flats 107 716 5,012 1.0 4,481 
Total Medium 21934 2,370 44,590 8.9 5B, 253 1995/96 
High Density: 
a) Permanent 775 71525 45,150 
b) Permanent in 
THAs (1) 500 4, B49 29,094 
Total Permanent 1,275 12,374 74,244 14.8 67,125 After 2000 V 
c) Traditional 5,745 55,571 333,426 66.8 264,380 After 2200O 
I 
Source : as for Table 7.1, 
adapted from Table I 
Notes: I. On assumption that 8% of THA plots used for permanent low income 
housing, as recommended by TPD- 
10 
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sufficient given an estimated population of 450,000 in that year (TPD, 
1978a), there are structural deficiences in land allocation, and the TPD 
has- suggested that 'the average area-for low density houses should be 
decreased to allow the construction -of maisonettes etc., and that more 
land should be, allocated, to medium density areas or that plot size should 
be decreased to-0.4 acres (ibid). 
The physical development of the residential areas shown on Maps 6.1 
and 6.2 in Chapter 6 has been gradual. ' The old town already had some low 
density housing in Area 3, whilst Area 2 was an existing Indian housing 
area. There was also some low incomeýpermanent housing in, parts, of Area 1 
(the Falls Estate), as well as I some pre-existing traditional housing in 
the south of this area as well, as 'in parts of Areas 4-9,21,22,33,37, 
46 and 47. Most of this was at least partly outside -'old' Lilongwels, 
municipal -boundaries (Pennant, 1982) and consequently came under 
conditions of traditional tenure. 
- By-1982 extensive development'hadýtaken place of theýnew low density 
areas (10 and 43) north and east of Capital Hill. Development of medium 
and high density permanent'housing has been provided in parts of the 
appropriate zones 'by the MHC, " including some high, density permanent 
housing'in-Areaý25 (near Kanengo'and adjacent to a THA), 'and Area 18 (see 
plates)., The MHC had provided over 2000 houses in these two categories by 
1978, 'utilizing loans from the government and abroad, totalling over K3 
million (CCDC, 1978). - Most of this housing is-for, government employees, 
andý-rents are heavily 'subsidized. Massive new development of MHC housing 
also began at Lumbadzi in the 1980s' to houseýstaff associated with the 
airport. IýI 
ý Housing in these categories has more or less kept pace- with demand, 
especially when compared-with the situation in the THAs. The TPD stated 
in 1978 that "housing shortages are already, apparent in Lilongwe, this is 
felt most acutely-in the low-income groups. All site-and-service plots 
265 
are occupied or allocated, and the waiting list for plots is large, there 
being up to 9,000 applications on the register .... the main problem is the 
lack of finance available .... money borrowed externally is subject to high 
rates of interest" (TPD, 1978a, Ps. 1-37,1-38). 
Site-and-service plot provision has not begun to keep pace with 
demand and since it is estimated that between two-tli-irAs to three-quarters 
of Lilongwe's population will need to be housed in these areas (see Tables 
7.1 and 7.2) it is clear that the 'CCDC has not fulfilled its major 
residential responsiýility and thi's must be seen as one of Lilongwe's 
greatest problems. Table 7.3 shows the TPD's demand projections for low 
income housing to 2000. Over 10,000 plots were needed as early as 1977, 
at which time only 1400 had been laid out (CCDC, 1977). 
At the beginning of the new capital project the CCDC took over a 
site-and-service area in Area 4 of -told 
Lilongwe' which had been begun in 
the 1960s. Their largest new development is in Area 25, and there has 
also been expansion and new site-and-service development in Areas 4,8,21 
and 22 near the old town. The siting of new THAs has been in line with 
efforts to maintain Lilongwe's image as a modern and visually attractive 
city. They are ý, therefore some distance off the road from which they, are 
screened by trees. However despite increases in annual plot provision 
(e. g the CCDC allocated 1500 plots in 1980 with immediate plans for a 
further 1700 (CCDC, 1980)), the housing problem is increasing. It also 
appears that the TPP's projections were underestimates since although 
about 10,000 plots had been allocated by 1981, there were 10,568 
applications on the waiting list in April that year (Pennant, op cit). 
Furthermore it is very probable that the demand is even higher than these 
figures imply as, in the circumstances, it is inevitable that many people 
will not bother to register. 
The CCDC had strong anti-squatter sentiments in line with the 
government. As land in Lilongwe was almost entirely owned by the CCDC, it 
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TABLE 7.3 
Plot/Housing Demand Projection - Low Income Housinq in LilonQwe 1977-2000 
Year PLOTS TRADITIONAL PLOTS PERMANENT 
Cumulative no. Additional no. Cumulative no. Additional no. 
of plots reqd. of plots reqd. of plots reqd. of plots reqd. 
per year per year 
1977 10,121 - 2,573 - 
1990 12,749 944 3,241 240 
1985 18,386 1,041 4,675 265 
1990 24,605 1,393 6,256 355 
1995 32,927 1,864 B, 371 474 
2000 44,043 21494 11,203 634 
Source: Malawi Government, Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan, Section 1, 
Background Information, Table ID (adapted). 
Note: the additional number 
backlog of about 9000 
unknown number of low 
register. 
of plots required did not include the current 
registered applications in 1978, plus an 
income people who may not have bothered to 
i 
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was able to prevent squatting fairly successfully. Apart from the CCDC's 
control of land, specific legal provision is made in the LUSP to prevent 
the development of 'unsightly sites' (TPD, 1978c, paras 3.10-10,3.10.11). 
Squatters who are evicted are usually compensated, but such compensation 
would probably not be paid if they built illegally again within the city 
boundaries (TCPD, interview, August 1982). Consequently squatting is not 
a major problem within the city, and Richards (1974, p. 38) states that 
"density control and planned siting of the houses [has] resulted in 
suburbs vastly superior to the generally ragged housing areas that border 
so many cities in Africa" (3). 
A survey of the THAs in Lilongwe by the Centre for Social Research of 
the University of Malawi showed that the unsatisfied demand for such 
housing, combined with restrictions on illegal alternatives, has pushed 
the problem into existing THAs and resulted in severe overcrowding. The 
areas surveyed are shown in Map 7-1: (this survey was carried 
out in August and September 1980, and involved a systematic sample of 
every eleventh plot in Areas 4,8,21,22 and 21. There is therefore 
extensive sub-letting of parts of plots and many plots are 
multiple-tenanted. Table 7.4 illustrates the extent of overcrowding, 
showing the estimated housing areas per person in 1980. Many renters and 
their families are accommodated in single rooms erected in series behind 
the main dwelling as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The whole situation in 
the THAs is in flagrant defiance of the legislation already discussed, but 
the CCDC admitted that they dare not enforce the law because they could 
not provide any realistic alternative (CCDD, interview, August 1982), and 
the LCC will now be facing exactly the same problem. The CCDC estimated 
in 1982 that 40% of THA plots had sub-tenants (ibid), but the 
aforementioned survey found the problem to be much greater, and that the 
occupation of a plot by the legal plotholder's household alone was a 
rarity. 
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TABLE 7.4 
Housing Area Per Person: Lilonqwe 1967, Lilonqwe THAs 1972 and 1980(j) 
Area/person 
1967 
Lilongwe Municipality 
1972 
Areas 4,8,21 
1980 
Areas 4,8 21,22,25_ 
(square feet) Housing People Plats Plots People 
Units X % x x x 
0-19.9 5 B 2.1 2.6 2.8 
20-39.9 22 2B 14.6 9.4 12.6 
40-59.9 21 25 22.0 22.2 25.5 
60-79.9 19 19 23.7 21.6 23.0 
80-99.9 10 7 12.9 11.6 13.7 
100-119.9 6.9 10.8 8.5 
120-139.9 4.3 6.9 5.6 
140-159.9 21 11 2.6 4.9 2.7 
160-179.9 2.6 3.1 1.8 
180-199.9 1.7 0.6 0.2 
200+ 6.4 6.0 2.5 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 
Total popn(2) 4,280 16,390 2,320 5,324 66,341_ 
Source: Pennant, 1982, adapted from Table A12 
Notes: 1. *1967 area per person of housing unit, from 1967 Housing and 
Income Survey; 1972'are per person on plot of main house on 
plot from 1972 Lilongwe Social Survey THAs; 1980 area per 
person on plot of one or both houses on plot from 1980 CSR 
survey. 
2. Estimated total population of sample areas obtained by nx 
sampling factor. 
j 
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Table 7.5 shows the tenure status of household heads interviewed in 
this survey, as well as their initial status when they first lived in 
Lilongwe. The survey indicated that about 12% of THA household heads were 
resident in Lilongwe before 1966, and 23% before 1970 (when initial 
construction of the new city was beginning). It has become increasingly 
difficult to obtain a plot over the years, and as the table implies there 
has been relatively little mobility from other categories to becoming a 
plotholder, apart from those who had traditional tenure, who were given 
priority in plot allocation when resettled. Plotholders as compared with 
tenants were found to be typically. long-term residents, relatively old, 
with large families and households, and were more often economically 
inactive or self-employed than other groups. Self-employment for 
plotholders was stated to involve 'business' rather than 'subsistence, 
activities, which implies higher income levels, although this is probably 
a fairly arbitrary categorization and elements of both could probably be 
categorized as 'informal sector' employment (4). Furthermore the survey 
indicates that for many the additional rental income -makes 'subsistence' 
self-employment a viable long-term way of life, 
However plotholders made up only about one-fifth of the surveyed'THA 
residents. Nearly three-quarters of hou'sehold heads were renting, 
although the average household size of renters was only 3.7 compared to 
6.6 for plotholders (see Table 7.6). The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that either through mismanagement or corruption, only about 
half of all plots are actually resided on by plotholders who only have 
one plo . The survey estimated 
that 25-30% of all plots are owned by 
multiple plotholders who live on one plot and let others. This is most 
common in the older THAs, the Kawale area of Area 1 being particularly 
notorious and rarer in the new ones. A further 20% appear to be owned and 
rented out by people not living in the THAs who are "frequently in 
salaried positions and employer-provided housing" (Pennant, 1982, p. 9). 
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Tenure Status in Fi-st Residence in-Lilonowe by Prg-sgnt Tpntirp c; faf,, S 
Heads of Households, THAs 4. B. 21.22,25 
FI RS TRESI DE NCE 
Staying with % 
Plot- Plot- friends, Trad. Row present 
PRESENT holder renter Tenant relatives tenure Other Total HHs. 
RESIDENCE 
Plotholder 85.6 26.0 12.0 11.5 76.6 25.8 289 21.8 
Renter 2.9 54.2 1.4 4.8 4.7 4.8 46 3.4 
Tenant 9.6 18.7 B6.0 74.2 15.6 58.1 964 72.0 
Staying with 
Friends, 
Relatives 1.9 4.2 0.4 8.7 3.1 3.2 32 2.4 
Traditional 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 B. 1 9 neg. 
TOTAL X 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.6 
Total sampled 
household heads 104 24 834 252 64 62 1340 
(column totals) I --- I f -- i 
Source: Pennant, 1982 Table AIO 
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TABLE 7.6 
Percentaqe Distribution Df Household Size 
Lilonowe Urban 1967 and 1968: and LilonQwe THAs 1980 
Household 1967 1968 196B 1968 1980 1980 
Size At B* C* THA THA 
PHO) tenants 
1 14 11 2 6 3 9 
2 23 24 7 4 5 22 
3 20 26 12 10 7 22 
4 12 13 24 9 B IB 
5 10 10 I-T 0 Q 14 12 
6 7 7 12 21 15 9 
7 4 4 14 1 -T 13 4 
8 4 2 7 9 11 2 
9 1 1 2 9 B I 
10 1 1 4 9 7 1 
11 1 1 - 1 3 
12+ 0 01 1 0 5.6 0.1 
Total 7 100 100 
1 
100 loci 100 100 
Total no. # 4,2BO 1,4B7 1,049 933 3,20 12,089 
Average 
HH Size 3.7 3.5 5.3 5. e 6.6 3.7 
Source: Pennant, 1982', Table A16 
Notes: 1. Plotholder. 
Household Annual Cash Receipts Group: A 10-200, B 1200-300, 
D1300-1000. 
# Lý CC-txw)rb 08, ý0,4: ^. CA 
TABLE 7.7 
Number of Households per Occupied Plot, Lilongwe THAs 1980 
Households/Plot No. Plots X Plots households 
1 147 30 10.4 
2 9-z 19 13.2 
3 104 21.2 22.1 
4 69 14.1 19.6 
5 34 6.9 12.1 
6 is 3.7 7.7 
7 12 2.4 6.0 
8 6 1.2 3.4 
9 3 0.6 1.9 
10+ 4 0.8 3.7 
TOTAL 490 100 100--1 
Source: Pennant, 1982, Table A15 
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This explains why Table 7.6 only shows 3267 plotholders in the areas 
surveyed, although there were obviously at least double this number of 
plots in all THAs in 1980. This also-means that'there is a difference 
between plot-tenants where the plotholder is non-ý-resident', and tenants 
sharing a plot with the plotholder or main tenant. If CCDC employees were 
involved in this lucrative practice,, of course, this would have created an 
extra, disincentive for the Corporation to prioritize THA housing, since 
the greater the supply shortage, the higher the rents would be. 
About two-thirds of householders, 'allocated only one plotsub-let. 
The result of these various elements of, illegal renting and leasing in the 
THAs is that 'only 30% of plots accommodate only one household, *and only 
10% of -THA households (containing 16% of THA residents) live on a 
one-household'plot, whilst 30% of plots have more than'three households on 
them involving over 50% of all households (see Table 7-7). 
7.3-1- Spontaneous Housing in Lilongwe 
In 1982 there was only one'true squatter settlement within'the city's 
boundaries (Pennant, op cit). This is south'of the old town, invisible 
from the main road, and fairly well established and has'not been removed. 
A major task of the' CCDC was to'resettle thotisandsýof people who. had been 
living under traditional tenure in rural housing -who suddenly found 
themselves within the new capital's boundaries. Payment of compensation 
to these people was yet'another 'major drain' on "the''CCDC's' resources 
(Moore, personal communication,, 1984). 'This -is discussed in greateý 
detail later in relation to population growth rates, - but is not 
appropriate here since this housing could neither be described as 
spontaneousaor'squatter. 
There are a number-of spontaneous settlements however just outside 
the controll'ed or designated boundaries (see Map 7-1). The controlled 
area extends beyond the designated boundaries proper but is subject to 
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ministerial control, of land-use (TPD, 1978b) . These peri-urban 
settlements -emerged 'particularly from 1977 onwards, due to the lack of 
available plots within the city, and have been termed*11squatter areas" in 
the CSR surveys. Although strictly speaking they do not constitute 
squatter'settlements, since the residents have -obtained permission-from 
village headman or farmers-to settle, the situation is complicated by the 
Lilongwe Land' Development Programme (LLDP) which borders on the city 
boundaries to the west and south. This land has been converted to 
freehold and registered to the small farmers involved in the scheme. All 
but one of the external, "squatter settlements" -shown on the map fall in 
this area, and when approached by residents' representatives, the control 
of permitting settlement and'allocating land has been shared by village 
headmen and the freeholders. The other area falls outside the LLDP and 
therefore is on communal land controlled by village headmen. In 
comparison' to THA residents the'inhabitants, of these areas may be judged 
as having greater 'security of tenure once having paid a fee to settle, 
since the. former technically have a lease with a one month notice period, 
and the majority are'ýin breach of contract anyway. On the other hand the 
LLDP, administration was-inýconflict with the CCDC, over this situation as 
they maintain that' their land cannot officially be used ýfor urban 
settlement', and-that the farmers should not be allowed to -let or lease 
land to "squatters" (LLDP, interview, August 1982). 
The legal 'situation is possibly confused; however'the CCDC was not 
entirely complacent about these spontaneous boundary settlements. In fact 
settling in this way has previouslyý_, been the main way to lobtain 
compensation and a plot in a THA. According to the CSR survey in 1980 
nearly ýall the so-called squatters were employed, many of them in the 
construction and' service -sectors, and less than 10% were self-employed. 
The majority were working for large 'private firms in the city, alhough 
nearly 'a third worked for government authorities or parastatals. Even 
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though construction employment is not very stable, it is evident that 
despite its peri-urban-locations this population could not be described as 
Imarginalized', or characterised as part of the informal sebtor., Instead 
the evidence suggest5that this, population can to some extent be viewed as 
low income consolidators, in terms of Turner's (1968) model of patterns of 
urban residence. 'The 'squatters' interviewed in 1980 were often people 
who had moved from a rented or shared room in a THA on getting married or 
having children, in order to, obtain,, more space at a lower cost and be 
eligible for resettlement in a THA (Pennant, op cit). Combined with the 
employment, data this clearly implies a relatively stable population which 
is- adjusting itself according to local circumstances and changing 
life-style aspirations, as the model suggests, although as, Pennant (ibid) 
points out it is unlikely that they wil1 reach the further stage of middle 
income status-seekers. 
The estimated population-in all these spontaneous settlements in 1980 
was 7-12,000, of which between 6-10,000 were on LLDP land, and, less than 
1000 were within the city boundaries (the true squatters). The CCDC's 
position on housing at the time indicated that this population was likely 
to grow, leading to further encroachment on agricultural land (when large 
areas of urban land are unused) and more conflict with the LLDP. A 
further small squatter settlement had emerged within the-city boundaries 
by 1986, although on the whole the determination- to prevent internal 
illegal dwelling had preserved the city's relative freedom from this 
aspect of urban development. However one can speculate that the city 
authorities will find it convenient to allow peripheral and therefore 
largely 'invisible' spontaneous settlements. 
7.4 Transport 
.- 'Lilongwe's role as a national transport 
focus isý assured by its new 
railway connection and the improvement of its road links to Kasungu and 
the north, to Mchinji, and-to Dedza and thence to the Southern Region. 
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The railway means that it now enjoys. the same advantages as Blantyre in 
this sphere, with the caveat that being further, from the sea, costs will 
in theory be higher. However Lilongwe is currently very important in 
Malawi's external transport affairs due to the, continuous disruption of 
the country's traditional rail links to the Mozambique coast by the 
activities of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Road transport 
from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia is now vital, and Lilongwe is a 
natural internal node for this redirected traffic. -Improvement of road 
transport north to Tanzania is also now a national priority; again this 
will certainly benefit Lilongwe's transport role in comparison to 
Blantyre's (Metcalfe, personal communication, 1986). This situation is 
however disastrous for Malawi's economy as a whole, and the hopefully 
short-term advantages gained by the city in this respect, must be to some 
extent offset by factors which are depressing all econon; ic development 
(including urban) throughout the country. 
The new airport is well suited to servi ng the whole of Central 
Southern Africa and would have benefited enormously if it had been chosen 
to function as the main internal link in the air network for the SADCC 
grouping. However this function has gone to Harare, and the facilities at 
the new airport are under-used, -although British Airways is again 
operating a route to Malawi, which had been stopped because of the expense 
of flying smaller jets to Blantyre's Chileka airport which could not 
accommodate wide-bodied jets. 
Lilongwe's internal transport network and system is less 
satisfactory. Not all the roads planned, shown on Map 6.2, have been 
built, due to lack of funds and this decreases the efficiency of internal 
urban communications. A worse problem is the lack of cheap and efficient 
public transport which is crucial given the lay-out of the city, and 
particularly the siting of the newer THAs. 
There is no overall public transport policy for Lilongwe. The LUSP 
ý1 
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emphasized the problems of public transport, which in 1978 was reliant on 
one bus operator/Onited Transport (Malawi)). UTM had only about 10 buses 
on 5 routes at that time. which was totally inadequate for the growing 
population. In addition it is very expensive relative to the income of 
the majority of the population (TPD, 1978a). The level of charges was 
theoretically 2 tambalas/km (5) but this increases to 50t/km between the 
old and new town (TPD, interview, 1982), and by 1986 the situation had not 
improved, since the cost of commuting in from the newer THAs along the 
airport road was 50t each way. However more buses have become available 
(Metcalfe, personal communication, February 1986). Public transport 
serving upper and middle income residential areas is virtually 
non-existent since the bus company finds it too expensive given the 
relatively low level of demand (CCDC, interview, 1982). 
The problem led to the Ministry of Trade allowing private mini-buses 
to operate within the city boundaries in 1982 (ibid). However these are 
too expensive to satisfy the needs of most of the population, and by 1986 
several of these new enterprises had folded (Metcalfe, op cit). One of 
the major criticisms contained in the 1978 LUSP pertained to the 
inadequacies of Lilongwe's transport system, particularly the expense and 
inflexibility of the bus network (TPD, 1978a, Section 1-7). 
7.5 Population Growth in Lilongw 
The development of Lilongwe as Malawi's capital city has be en 
accompanied by very high population growth rates (see Chapter 3). Apart 
from the initial transfer of government employees from Zomba and 
Blantyre, and of asssociated institutional employees such as the 
diplomatic missions, there has been an influx of people to take advantage 
of new employment opportunities. 
It is difficult to assess exactly how fast the population has been 
growing in terms of a strict definition of natural increase of the 
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existing urban population, combined with X in-migration of people not 
previously associated with the city. The issue is not only complicated by 
massive boundary changes since the 1966 census, but also by the 
resettlement of thousands of "rural" people from within the new boundaries 
to outside locations (see 7.3 above). This has led to widely differing 
estimated of intercensal population growth, which not only affect the 
order of future projections for the city, but also overall estimates of 
national urban growth. 
Preliminary 1977 census data gave Lilongwe's population as 103,000, 
implying an intercensal AAGR of 16.2% (Malawi) N. S. O., 1978), but the 
final report recorded a population of 98,718. On the basis of varying 
estimates of the population living inside the 1977 boundaries in 1966, the 
1966-77 AAGR has been calculated at between 7.3% and 15.8% as shown in 
Table 7.8. The lower estimates depend on calculations regarding the 
population outside the 1966 municipal boundaries which have been assumed 
to represent more accurate pictures of the true 'urban' population of 
Lilongwe at that time. The more conservative approach to this issue (see 
note a in Table 7.8) only adds to the 1966 urban population those people 
who lived sufficiently close to the city's edge to have reasonable access 
to its services. 
In order to gain a picture of the rate of migration to Lilongwe for 
future planning purposes, it is very important to have an idea of the size 
of the pre-existing population within the new boundaries, whether this was 
urban or essentially rural in character. It is assumed here that the 
figure of 21,000 is a fair estimate of the truly 'urban' population of 
Lilongwe in 1966, taking into account the restricted nature of the 
original boundaries, and this figure is accepted in official documents 
(e. g. TPD, 1978a; TCPD, 1980b). The estimate of 45,380 includes 
large numbers of rural households who happened to be occupying farms 
within the designated area. 
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TABLE 7. B 
Estimates of Population Growth in Lilonqwe 1966-77 
1966 population 1977 
X AAGR 
Census data Adjusted data 
census 
popn. 1966-77 
19,425 98,718 15.8 
21,000(l) 98,718 15.0 
45,380(2) 98,718 7.3 
Notes: 1. Estimate of the 1966 population, living within 
1977 boundaries, who had direct access to Lilongwe's 
urban services (TPD, 1980b, Table 3-2). 
2. Estimate of the 1966 population resident within 1977 
boundaries (TPD, 1978a). 
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-, A 15% AAGR from 1966-77 is generally viewed as being much too-high 
(TPD, interview, August 1982; CCDC, interview, -August 1982), since many 
people living in the area , chose. to remain as the city developed. 
However the lower figure of 7.3% is also misleading. Itýwould imply that 
4ilongwe's AAGR in that period had been only, slightly higher than 
Blantyrels, which is untenable consideringý-the initial- transfer of 
gpvernment. institutions,. combined with the evidence of-, massive increases 
in-THA, populations involving people -who moved to-ILilongwe afte 1966 
(see 7.5.1 below). 
- The main problem lies in estimating-the- number of households living 
outside, the 1966 boundaries, but within the 1977 boundaries, in 1966, who 
were -subsequently resettled, outside the city. -The CCDC operated a 
massive, resettlement and compensation programme as-people were moved to 
make way for new developments , and *areas were re-zoned. Their freehold 
title of all land negated any legal claim to land, under traditional 
tenure and 10,515 families were resettled between 1966-81. - About 30% of 
these-were resettled from within the, 1966 municipal boundaries. However it 
has not been possible to ascertain what-proportion of resettled households 
chose to,. be resettled. outside the new city area. In 1974 it was stated 
that ! 'over 6000 families had to be moved to make way for the constructon 
of the new capital. Some were resettled in rural areas but accommodation 
had to be found for those who wished to remain. in the city. To house 
these, people; to cope with the rapid growth of population.... and to 
prevent slums developing it was decided to set aside areas, where people 
could build their own, houses [THAs1II (Richards, 1974, P-38). As 
previously mentioned the allocation of most plots in the THAs has been to 
people compulsorily resettled, from other areas in the city and therefore 
new in-migrants have found it very difficult to obtain plots. Data from 
the CSR survey suggest,, that less than 20% of resident plotholders in 1980 
obtained this tenure statusImmediately if they moved into Lilongwe after 
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1966. On the other hand the CCDC estimated the average size of resettled 
households as 6, implying a total resettled population of over 60,000 
which is greater than the maximum estimate of the 1966 population. 
Therefore a large proportion of those resettled must have moved into 
Lilongwe after 1966. The right to a THA plot has involved the 
establishment of a claim to some length of previous residence and it 
appears that whilst many people must have become tenants in the THAs when 
resettled, some went to the 'squatter' areas outside the boundaries, thus 
making them eligible for eventual relocation to a TRA plot (Pennant, 
1982), and others have been relocated outside the city altogether. 
Data on original tenure status for 1980 THA residents who lived in 
the new Lilongwe area before 1966 allow a rough estimate to be made of 
those who were living under traditional tenure before 1966. These would 
correspond to people outside the 1966 municipal boundaries who chose to be 
relocated within new Lilongwe, as virtually all the land surrounding 
the old municipality was customary land (ibid). The CSR survey data 
suggests that in 1980 about 770 households, or 5% of all households in 
the THAs were in this category. This implies that the majority of the 
households living outside Lilongwe in 1966 under conditions of traditional 
tenure, who were included in the 'urban' population estimate of 45,380 
(perhaps 4000 households), were resettled elsewhere and therefore that a 
more realistic base figure for the 1966 population is around 24,000 (see 
Figure 7.2). It is also likely that some of the 1980 TRA population who 
were recorded as tenants, or staying with family or relatives before 1966, 
may also have been renting or staying with people living under traditional 
tenure, although many of these would have been living in existing low 
income settlements, and would have been included along with original 
plotholders and plot renters as part of Lilongwe's 1966 census, population. 
A maximum estimate of the 1966 base population assuming all these people 
were outside the 1966 boundaries is about 28,000. Although this analysis 
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population resettled from tenancies, or from staying with friends 
a.. and relatives (many of these were probably really included in the census figurO. 
population resettled from traditional tenure and 'other' tenure b. within Lilongwe. 
C. census figure. 
Fig. 7.2 
URBAN POPULATION & AAGR's FOR LILONGWE 1966-77 
ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT BASE POPULATION ASSUMPTIONS 
19646 1977 
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can only be a guide to the true growth rate, it suggests that Lilongwe's 
true A: AGR from 1966 to' 1977 was in the range of 12-13% as shown in Figure 
7.1. 
This evidence clearly indicates that Lilongwe did indeed experience 
very rapid in-migration during the intercensal. period. Further support 
for this high growth rate is given by data on Lilongwe's THA population, 
according to the year of initial residence in Lilongwe. This suggests a 
fairly steady AAGR of the THA population between 1965-80 'of 14-15% 
(calculated from Table B3'in Pennant, op cit), and it seems fair to assum -e 
that this sector of the population 'is'g'rowing faster than the medium and 
high income population. 
Lilongwe's growth rate was''therefore very high"irom 1966-77 and 
mostly due to in-migrati6n. Even allowing - for the initial' ýelement of 
'transferred' population it appears that the low income population as 
represented by those living in the'TRAs was siill increasing rapidly up'tO 
1980 at least. It should also be noted that' these estimates do not 
include the 7-11,000 (depending on 'varying estimates of family sizý) 
living in the bordering spontaneous settlements. If these are included 
the number of people directly involved in the city is larger than official 
estimates. Some evidence suggests tha It this element mayý'be very 
significant indeed: over 128,000 people reported themselves as having been' 
resident in Lilongwe a year before the 1977 census, which is over 30% 'more 
than those recorded within the city in 1977. Employment statistics 
gathered by the National Statistical Office also indicate discrepancies": 
the average number' of employees recorded in Lilongwe for the three years 
1976,1977 and 1978 was 31,764, compared to only 24,861 recorded there by 
the 1977 cenýus. Since'employment statistics from the NSO in Malawi are 
usually suspected of being underestimates (Pennant, op cit) these figures 
are even more significant. The only feasible explanation, as suggested by 
Pennnant (ibid), is that thousands of people dependent upon employmentýifi 
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Lilongwe are living outside the city, but are being registered as urban 
employees by their employers, and report themselves as resident in 
Lilongwe when asked, although the census enumerated them as rural 
residents. 
Population projections used by the LUSP estimated Lilongwe would grow 
at 8% per, year until 1984, and at 6% per year to 2000, giving a population 
of , about 
450,000 at the end of the century. Given past trends, it appears 
that these must be regarded as underestimates, especially for the 
short-term. A CCDC survey estimated the THAS's population in 1982 as 
135,000. Even assuming that the THAs house nearly three-quarters of the 
population (the highest estimate, assumed in housing projections), this 
implies a total population of over 185,000 in 1982 compared to the 
projected number of about 150,000 and an AAGR from 1977-82 of about 13%. 
The TPD however emphasizes the need to limit Lilongwe's population 
growth to the projected rates, as even this would create an enormous 
strain on urban services. In 1978 it was stated that "the problems of too 
rapid urban growth cannot be overemphasized. The reduction of Lilongwe's 
annual growth rate from 8% at present to 6% by 1984 is a, vital move 
towards avoiding the plethora of problems which beset many large cities in 
other developing countries" (TPD, 1978a, p. 1-28). Yet it was also 
recognized that population densities in the Central Region were reaching 
critical levels, and, in combination with the reorganization of areas 
within the LLDP, this, _was 
likely to cause rural-urban migration. This 
latter factor was likely to become particularly evident after 1983 when 
the LLDPIs population was projected to reach about 600,000 at which point 
land shortages would have a significant "push", effect. According to the 
original master plan "unless density is increased by a reduction of the 
size of allotment there will be approximately 8000 persons displaced from 
the [LLDPI area annually .... and about 2,000, more 
from other areas of high 
population, many of whom will attempt to find. work in the nearest urban 
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areas. As a result, 
Viljoen, 1968, ' quoted 
rural-urban drift from 
published, this factor' 
growth by now. 
squatting could become a major problem" (Gerke and 
in TPD, 1978a, p. 1-29). Whilst Aargeý-scale 
the LLDP was not evident in 1978 when the LUSP was 
is likely to be adding significantly to Lilongwe's 
Overall therefore Lilongwe's growth has been very rapid. Furthermore 
it appears that this situation is likely to continue, with growth rates 
exceeding official projections; ks%i-s- is bound to exacerbate existing 
problems, and create new ones. By 1986 the housing crisis had grown 
steadily worse for example (and the very low'income levels of the THA 
population was reflected in a massive default rate on payment of 
development charges and rents) (Metcalfe, personal communicatiori, - February 
1986). 
7.5.1 In-Migration to Lilongwe: area of origin 
Whilst detailed information on area of origin is no't given in the 
1977 census, the available data indicate that the population of Lilongwe 
district grew faster than natural increase in the year 1976-77, and 
therefore that net in-migration had occurred. However the 3.2% growth 
rate registered was not exceptional in Malawi; seven out of the country's 
24 districts (including Blantyre district)' grew faster than Lilongwe 
district. Mchinji, Kasungu and Mwanza in particular attracted large 
numbers, because of their new tobacco estates, and Lilongwe district's 
growth rate was actually lower than the Central Region average of 3.4%. - 
There are doubts about Malawi's exact rate of natural increase which 
makes it difficult to estimate the net in-migration balance to Lilongwe 
district, which would help to indicate what proportion of the city's 
migrant population is 'local', and how much comes from other districts. 
This is important as it relates to Lilongwe's geographical impact on the 
population, as well as to the distribution of income from the capital's 
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new employment opportunities if migrants make remittances to their areas 
of origin. These factors are significant in terms of the spread effects 
generated by the city and will therefore affect any analysis of the 
spatial distribution of the costs and benefits of the capital project. 
A natural growth rate of 2.6% was recorded in the 1970-72 population 
sample survey, but the 1977 census data indicated a 2.3% rate, and an 
overall growth rate of 2.9%. This latter rate includes the effect of net 
return migration by Malawian workers from abroad, which the census report 
assumes to have been quite extensive. However the 1977 census report also 
states that the 2.3% natural increase rate must be an- underestimate, and 
that 2.6% is probably more correct, for although return migration is 
reflected in an improvement of national and many district sex ratios, 
the degree of return migration is not thought to be sufficient to explain 
the discrepancy between the natural increase and overall growth rate 
recorded in the 1977 census. One attempt to estimate the impact of 
migrant return suggested that 2.7% was a reasonable adjusted intercensal 
natural increase rate (TCPD,, 1980a)(6). 
Return migration is unlikely to have been a major factor in Lilongwe 
district's growth as it had the lowest proportion (4%) of its de jure 
population abroad in 1966 of any district (Hill, 1982). The 1977 census 
data also show" that the proportion of district's enumerated population 
resident abroad 12 months previously was negligible (Malawi, N. S. O., 
1978, Vol. 1, Table 5-3). 
On the assumption that Lilongwe district's natual growth rate was 
between 2.6% and 2.7% per year therefore, a rough migration balance can be 
calculated, as shown in Table 7.9. It is realistic to believe that most 
of the net in-migration to the district was directed towards Lilongwe 
city, as the density of rural population was one of the highest in Malawi 
(comparable to that of Blantyre district) which would discourage migrants 
to the rural areas of the district. Also the LLDP effectively controls 
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TABLE 7.9 
In-Miqration to Lilonqwe District 1966-77 
Population Population In-Migration Balance 
AAGR assumptions 1966 1977 no. WN 
3.2% (NI + in- 
migration)(2) 495,524 704,117 - - 
2.6% (NI) 495,524 662,860 41,527 6.2 
2.7% (NI) 495,524 670,067 34,050 4.8 
Notes: 1. In-migrants as X of total 1977 population. 
2. AAGR taken from 1977 census data. 
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land-use in part of the district and land registration prevents migrants 
obtaining land there. 
Table 7.9 suggests that a substantial number of people have com, e/from 
other parts of Malawi, and that -therefore the city has exerted a 
considerable level of attraction outside its immediate district. It is 
also evident that a proportion of Lilongwe's population increase was 
fuelled by local intra-district migration, as its population increased by 
well over 60,000 from 1966-77 (excluding natural increase of the estimated 
1966 population). Past analyses of the local element of migration in 
Lilongwe's growth have asserted that it is the most important component of 
total in-migration, and therefore that the city's growth has primarily 
been fed by its immediate rural hinterland ( TCPD, 1980b; Hill, 1982). 
However it is clear that these analyses have overestimated the 
significance of local migration: in the case of the TPD estimate this was 
due to the use of inaccurate preliminary census data on Lilongwe district, 
as well as a 2.95% asssumption for increase before internal in-migration. 
Given that there will have been natural increase amongst the migrant 
population, Table 7.9 suggests that the majority of Lilongwe's growth from 
migration has been caused by migration from other districts, and only 
perhaps 20% of migrant households are from Lilongwe district. 
The CSR survey in the THAs also found long-distance migration to be 
very significant. Table 7.10 shows the district of origin and time of 
migration to the city of surveyed THA household heads: only 9% reported 
that they had come from the district of Lilongwe itself. This survey does 
not show the true distribution of Lilongwe's population according to 
original residence, as it only pertains to a sample survey. 'However given 
that the majority of Lilongwe's population lives in these low income 
settlements, the results of the survey are considered to be significant. 
Most importantly the table shows that after 1970 the development of the 
new capital has attracted migrants from every district in the country, 
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TABLE 7.10 
Date of Moving to Lilanqwe by Residencg Immediately Before Migration 
Heads of Household, Areas-4,9_, 21,22,25 
DA TE OF M16 RAT1 0N 
DISTRICT OF Before 1966 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 All y ears 
PREVIOUS % x x x x % % % x % 
RESIDENCE Rural Urban Rura l Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Chitipa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.3 0*. 0 0.9 0.0 
Karanga 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 
Nkhata Bay 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.9 0.3 2.1 0.1 1.8 0.1 
Rumphi 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.6 0.1 1.4 0.1 
Mz i mba 4.2 1.2 4.9 2.1 5.3 1.1 4.3 2.7 4.6 2.0 
Total 
N. Region 4.8 1.2 11.2 2.1 11.3 1.4 10.8 2.9 10.1 2.2 
Kasungu l. B 0.0 3.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.4 0.0 2.0 0.6 
Nkhota Kota 1.8 0.6 1.4 0.0 1.7 0.5 2.4 0.0 1.7 0.5 
Ntchisi 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.7 O-B 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.2 
Dowa 3.6 0.0 2.1 0.7 1.4 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.7 0.6 
Sal i ma. 1.8 0.0 4.9 0.0 4.2 0.8 2.1 1.3 2.8 0.9 
Lilongwe BA (13.9) 13.3 - 7.6 - 7.3 - 9.0 3.5 Mchinji 1.2 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.4 0.3 2.3 0.6 1.8 0.4 
Dedza 10.8 1.8 7.3 0.7 8.1 1.1 6.7 0.3 7.2 0.7 
Ntcheu 7.8 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.6 0.3 7.5 0.3 7.1 0.2 
Total 
C. Region 37. (16.3) 40.9 3.5 34.2 5.4 32.6 3.3 34.0 7.6 
Mangochi 10.8 0.0 5.6 2.1 5.3 0.0 5.8 0.6 6.2 0.5 
Machinga 4.8 0.6 4.9 0.0 3.9 0.6 5.7 0.3 5.5 0.4 
Zomba 3.6 1; 2 5.6 1.4 ý-9 2.2 3.9 1.2 3.9 1.5 
Chiradzulu 1.8 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.7 0.0 
Blantyre 0.6 5.4 1.4 6.3 2.8 19.9 2.1 18.7 2.7 15.7 
Mwanza 0.0 0.0 0.7, 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Thyolo 1.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.7 0.3 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.1 
Mulanie 0.0 0. '0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 
Chikwawa 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 
Nsanjit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total - 
S. Region 22.9 7.2 23.8 10.5 20.7 23.0 24.7 2 1.0 24.1 1 8.4 
Zambia 1.9 2.1 2. 5 1.5 1.8 
Other 
countries 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.3 
Total 1 100 100 10 0 100 100 
sample n 166 142 361 665 1334 
Source: adapted from Pennant, 1982, Table B2 
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which indicates that its impact has been national. It is clear that 
Lilongwe's attraction for migrants before 1966 was less widespread, as no 
surviving migrants were recorded from seven districts before this date. 
It is also evident that a distance decay effect operates with respect 
to the origin of migrants, with more coming from those districts closer to 
the capital (see Map 7.2). Migration from Blantyre district does not fall 
into this pattern however, and urban-urban migration from Blantyre to 
Lilongwe was the most significant single component of migration after 
1970. The relative significance of Mzimbals rural and urban areas may be 
explained by the low level of opportunities in rural areas there (which 
are not covered by a specific agricultural project), and the location of 
the Northern regional capital Mzuzu in the district which has clearly 
experienced emigration to Lilongwe in the same way as Blantyre and Zomba. 
However from 1966-70 when the' new capital project was only just 
beginnning, migration from the rural areas of Lilongwe district formed the 
largest single component of growth in the THA population. This may 
indicate the importance of proximity in the process of the diffusion of 
information about employment opportunities in Lilongwe. - The local 
population would obviously have been more easily able to take advantage of 
the initial demand for construction labour for instance, although as 
knowledge of the demand spread this advantage would lessen as competition 
from other migrants increased. 
This factor may suggest that the proportion of the city's total 
population from Lilongwe district -is higher than- the THA-survey alone 
indicates, in line with the prior interpretation of census data. This is 
because many government employees'are housed in subsidized low'and medium 
density housing and would not be included in the CSR survey. Many would' 
have been simply transferred from Zomba or Blantyre, and thus an even 
larger proportion of the total population than indicated by Table 7.10 
will have come from there. Yet the relocation of goverment and natural 
t 
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expansion in government administrative employment created many new jobs. 
In addition accompanying institutional establishments like the CCDC, the 
bank headquarters and various government ser vices would also have 
provided new job opportunities which included subsidized medium-density 
housing. Depending on the skill level demanded, it may be that the local 
population, again was able to take advantage of its greater accessibility 
to these new opportunites in the early stages of the new capital's 
development. However no statistics on the origins of households in other 
residential areas exist to test this hypothesis. 
There is relatively little change in the pattern of migrants by_ 
district and by rural or urban origins in the three time periods 1966-70, 
1971-75 and 1976-80, apart from the fall in the proportion coming from 
Lilongwe district and the rise in the proportion from Blantyre City. 
During the 1970s it appears that about a fifth of new households moving 
into the THAs came from Blantyre and this is clear evidence that Lilongwe 
has had some success in providing a counter-attraction to Blantyre in 
terms of the opportunities provided for the low income population. 
The regional pattern of in-migration to the THAs after 1966 shows in 
fact that'the Southern Region provided just over 40% of sampled migrants, 
with a further 40% from the Central Region and 13% from the North. As 
Table 7.11 shows the number of migrant household heads from Blantyre alone 
out-numbered all those from the Northern Region. However when the 
distribution of the economically active population is taken into account, 
the impact of the new capital, in terms of the propensity to migrate to 
it, has been fairly evenly spread across the country as there is a certain 
degree of correspondence between the pattern of economically active 
people, and the proportion of migrants by origin. At a regional level the 
Southern Region shows the larges discrepancy, with 50% of the nation's 
economically active population but only 40% of in-migrants to Lilongwe. 
The division between rural and urban origins by region however shows 
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TABLE 7.11 r 
Economically Active Population by Reqion and Rural and Urban Areas 1977 
and In-Migrants to Lilongwe's THAs 1966-80 bV Area of Oriqin-, 
X total X THA in- X of rural X all % urban 
ý 
X all 
econ. migrants econ. rural in- econ.. active urban in 
REGION active by origin active migra'n'ts in region migrants 
POP. 
NORTHERN: 11.7 13.2 
Rural 10.9 11.1 12 15.8 
Urban 0.8 2.1 9 8.6 
CENTRAL: 38.6 40.0 
Rural 36.0 35.9 39 51.2 
Urban (2.6)1.8 4.1 (29) 9 17.0 
SOUTHERN: 49.9 41.2 
Rural 44.4 23.0 49 33.0 
Urban: 5.4 18.2 62 75.0 
Blantyre 4.1 14.0 47 57.0 
Other urban 1.3 4.2 15 18.0 
ABROAD 4.5 
Notes: 1. Excluding Lilongwe. Source: 1. data from Table 7.10. 
2. Malawi Govt, 1977 Population 
Census, Val 2. Table 4.1 
295 
that here the impact has been more uneven, except in the Northern Region. 
The proportion of rural and urban in-migrants to Lilongwe from the Central 
Region are both significantly higher than that region's repective 
proportions of the national economically active rural or urban population. 
On the other hand there has been a much lower than average propensity to 
migrate by rural inhabitants of the Southern Region, but a higher 
propensity amongst its urban inhabitants, although as can be seen this is 
largely due to migration from Blantyre. Overall it is clear that the 
impact of Lilongwe has been most felt in the urban system and that this 
has been experienced in all three regions, since the proportion of all 
migrants from urban areas in each region (and Blantyre) is about three 
times the proportion of the total economically active population found in 
those urban areas. 
In 1966 the sex structure of Lilongwe's population was skewed in 
favour of males (127 males: 100 females). There was a slight improvement 
to 120: 100 by 1977 due to a slightly higher rate of female in-migration 
than male. The LUSP asserts that the provision of subsidized housing for 
the significant number of government employees has helped to improve the 
balance, as wives can then join their husbands, but it is also felt that' 
this is to some extent offset by the shortage of housing for low income 
groups which discourages household heads from bringing all their family 
(TPD, 1978a). Less than 10% of THA household heads surveyed were female, 
but the overall sex ratio in the THAS was estimated to be about 118: 100, - 
similar to the city average. This indicates that the imbalance is not 
confined to the THAs but occurs in other income/residential groups. 
There has not yet been any survey in Lilongwe on the migrant 
population's length of stay within the urban area, nor on the crucial 
factor of the level of remittances to area of origin (7). In 1982 the 
CCDC was of the opinion that most of those even on short-term construction 
jobs are choosing to remain at the end of their formal employment. The 
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CCDC I felt that this was a problem, particularly as at 
ihe 'time ýhe 
'been completed thro wing many I more construction of the airport had Just 
construction worker's out of a job (CCDC, personal' communication, Augu-st 
1982). The issue of the permanency of m, igration is a crucial factor 
affecting a city's development as it has ramifications in terms of housing 
and welfare provision, and long-term growth. This issue has received 
little attention and is an area'wherefurther research'i's'needed. 
7.6 Conclusion 
Although the CCDC'managed to achieve a, notable rate of growth I in the 
early stages of Lilongwe's development, it is clear that financial 
stringency became more and more of a problem during' the Corporation's 
lifetime. It recorded a total loss of UP556, ooo in 1978-80 (Economic 
Planning Divison, 1982), and all expansionary development''activitles in 
the 1980s were cut back. The 1982 Economic Report stated that _p'rospects 
for Lilongwe's further development were not improving and that the CCDC 
was unlikely to be able to meet future demand for housing and commercial 
premises. The transfer of control over Lilongwe to the City Council in 
1984 would not have''changed the situation in-essence, and the completion 
of the remaining elements of the capital are still being delayed, and the 
necessary provision for continued population growth in housing, transport 
and other infrastructure continues to lag far'behind demand. 
The rapidity of population growth in Lilongwe since the initiation of 
the I project has caused'many pI rokems in the low income housing 'seicto'r. 
The government has chosen to adopt a site-and-service approach to housing. 
Although this type 'of approach has won a considerable amount of support 
from some Third World governments and their advisers (e. g. see Martin, 
1975; Muwonge, 1980; Lloyd, 1981) it has also been criticized for 
off-ýlodding government responsibilities on to those least able to afford 
the cost of building their own houses (Ward, 1984Y. Given -the financial 
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circumstances of the Malawian goverment it is arguable that, whilst such 
criticism is undoubtedly valid, there was very little choice in real 
terms. Nevertheless it is apparent that the responsibility for low income 
housing has been neglected, even if allowance is made for financial 
problems. As discussed in Chapter 6, the CCDC could be seen as an 
inappropriate body to fulfil this responsibility as its commercial outlook 
and its need to rely on high interest commercial loans made it difficult 
for it to prioritize THAs when allocating funds. In addition the lack of 
allocable plots in the THAs has partly been caused by mismanagement which 
has allowed plot leases to ba,., given to unqualified people, who thereby 
profit from the housing shortage. Thus although in practice the solution 
to the low income housing problem was to some extent inevitable, the 
magnitude of the problems faced by the poor in Lilongwe 
_(S 
unjustifiable. 
The welfare of Lilongwe's low income population has apparently been a 
low priority since it is evident that it generally loses out where it is 
in conflict with planning guidelines. This has led to the establishment 
of the external "squatter settlements" which illustrate that the city 
+0 
authorities are prepared to foist their responsibilities on i others as 
long as the city's internal image can be maintained. 
The rate of in-migration to Lilongwe has been high. As expected the 
distance from Lilongwe has played a part in the process of migration, but 
overall the impact by region has been fairly equally spread according to 
the distribution of the nation's economically active population. 
Migration to Lilongwe from Malawi's other urban centres has however been 
higher than their relative share of the economically active, and many of 
them have come from Blantyre since it has a large proportion of the 
national urban population. Altogether about a quarter of sampled migrants 
to the THAs from 1966-80 came from other urban centres, of which 
three-fifths came from Blantyre. This may imply a greater willingness to 
migrate amongst urban residents in general, although previous urban 
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residents may also be more qualified to take advantage of job 
opportunities in Lilongwe. On the other hand the rate of urban-urban 
migration might also be interpreted as evidence of unemployment and 
under-employment in the urban system. 
Lilongwe's spatial impact will also be affected by processes of 
innovation diffusion. As the North is the poorest region it might have 
been expected that the rate of out-migration to Lilongwe would have been 
relatively high. Yet since the influence of Lilongwe appears to have been 
higher in urban centres, therefore in absolute terms its impact on the 
Southern Region has been much higher than that on the North, because the 
former has a higher share of the country's urban centres and people. 
This last point relates to the general role of Lilongwe as a regional 
growth centre, which is the central theme of the next chapter. 
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Notes for Chapter 7 
1. The main research on Lilongwe was I conducted during visits to Malawi in 
1980 and 1982. Some of the information presented ' in this chapter 
relates to the situation in 1982, but wherever possible more recent 
infomation is'presented. 
2. This area pre-dates the'new capital project'having -been set aside for 
light industrial and commercial concerns in the mid 1950s (Pennant, 
1982). 
It is notable that Richards also describes the location of low income 
housing as being "sited within easy reach of industrial and commercial 
areas, to make travel easier for workers in industry and commerce" 
(1974, p. 40). As discussed above, this is not the case and it is 
apparent that Lilongwe's publicity material has, not surprisingly, 
attempted to present a picture of the new capital's development that 
is not always accurate. 
This term in itself is open to differing interpretations of course 
(see Bromley and Gerry, 1979), but is generally used here in terms of 
the ILO (1972) definition. 
5.100 tambala =1 Kwacha. 
6. The 1966 census reported about 250,000 Malawians working abroad 
(primarily in Rhodesia, South Africa and Zambia), plus a similar 
number of dependents. However it is thought that some of the migrants 
had become virtually permanent emigrants (Clarke, 1974) and most of 
the dependents have also been considered to have become citizens of 
other countries (Hill, 1982). A World Bank report on the Malawian 
economy (cited in' TCPD,., 1980b, Section 3.1-1) estimated that there were 
still about 250,000 Malawian labour migrants in the early 1970s, but 
by the end of 1976 about 155,000 were estimated to have returned. 
This was largely due to the effects of a ban on recruitment to South 
Africa after a plane carrying returning migrants crashed in 
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Francistown in 1974, and changing policies towards foreign migrant 
labourers in South Africa. However recruitment rose again after about 
1976, and it is estimated that therefore the net return of migrants 
was about 150,000, implying a national natural increase rate of around 
2.7% (TWD, op cit). 
7. It was not possible to conduct my own survey since permission could 
not be obtained. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Lilongwe's Growth Centre Role: Government Policy and Private Investment 
8.1 Growth Centre Theory and Malawi: contextual problems 
Lilongwe's potential role as a growth centre is one of the major 
elements and justifications 'of the new capital project, as. discussed in 
Section 5.2. This has been a feature of new capital programmes in several 
countries. Kaluwa (1982, p. 67) compares Malawi with Brazil, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and, Tanzania in this respect and states that "whatever the exact 
form of the strategy, and whatever the immediate detailed objectives, this 
policy is based on the growth pole (or centre) idea which, relies on urban 
concentrations to generate economic spillovers in the hinterland and 
beyond". gOwever such a view ignores the specific aspects of growth 
centres-which. theoretically enable them to act in this way (as reviewed in 
Chapter 1) as urban concentrations cannot be seen as synonymous with 
growth centres. The problem is supmed up by Mlia (1975b, P-394): 
"A capital, is obviously not a propulsive industry with strong forward and backward linkages and relocating a capital may not be the most effective and efficient way of reducing perceived regional imbalances in development in any given country. " 
Although the concept of a growth centre has tended to become more 
diffuse in the literature (see Moseley, 1973) the statement by Mlia 
reflects the original formulation in which the idea of propulsive 
industries is important. When analysing a growth centre's performance in 
terms of this aspect, one problem lies in defining what is a propulsive 
industry. In global terms it is obvious that this will vary over time as 
economic and 'technological circumstances vary - for instance in the 
current recession the classic industrial complex of coal/iron and 
steel may no longer fit the propulsive industry, category, whilst highly 
sophisticated industries related to the information technology boom may. 
In the context of Malawi of course, neither of these examples is relevant, 
and the problem has to be related to the local resource base, the nature 
of demand and the current low level of the industrial base. However it 
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remains necessary that to have a real growth centre impact, an industry 
ýould have to be relatively large in order to have a significant effect on 
sectors dealing with its inputs (including labour) and outputs, which 
implies that it must be in some way integrated into local supply and 
demand structures. Demand for its products would have to be sufficient to 
allow it to expand, thus maintaining growth in associated sectors. It is 
unlikely that any one industry in Malawi would have sufficient potential 
to affect the urban economy of Lilongwe significantlys so a number of such 
concerns would probably be necessary. Furthermore their growth rate in 
terms of both output and employment would need to be higher than that 
experienced by enterprises in Blantyre, since it is part of the stated 
policy line to counter its 'inequitable' development and strive for a 
reduction in regional imbalances (Mlia, 1975b). 
It is possible to split the types of industries which might have 
strong potential for growth into three categories depending on their 
demand characteristics. One type could be industries geared to export 
products which are in high demand outside the country. Another would be 
industries which serve the whole country with products which have a 
rapidly growing national demand. A third category is industries whose 
demand comes from the city or local regional population only, where the 
level of demand is again high and expanding. 
In relation to these above categories it is important to reiterate 
some of the basic factors affecting Malawian economic development. Malawi 
is land-locked, and transport to the sea is expensive and insecure due to 
constant disruption by anti-government forces in Mozambique. Apart from 
the processing of cash crops, there are few local resources which could 
fo I rm' the basis of a competitive industry which had a large overseas 
demand. This latter point was central to the failure of the ambitious 
Viphya Wood and Pulp Project, which was planned as an important element of 
Malawi's early development programme to generate huge employment and 
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overseas earning opportunities with the export of wood, pulp and possibly 
ethanol products. Huge timber-plantations were planted on Viphya Plateau 
in theýNorthern Region (1) but during the 1970s it was gradually dropped 
from development policy publications as it was realized that the export of 
these products could not have a competitive edge, in the world market. 
Malawi's labour force, although cheap, is mainly unskilled and this, 
combined with its, landlockedness, means it is- unlikely to attract the 
multinational industrial investment which has occurred in some parts of 
the less-developed world (although hardly at all in Tropical Africa). Its 
potential for more'basic industrialization for export within the Southern 
African regional sub-system is also very limited, because of the 
competitive advantages of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Overall therefore 
Malawi, and -thus Lilongwe, is in a very weak, position to develop new 
export based industries. 
There are also'major barriers to industrial development for internal 
demand'on a national basis. The population of Malawi is very small and 
income per head is one of the lowest in the-world. Consequently effective 
demand for all but the most basic maufactured consumer goods is very low. 
There 'is little indication that this is likely to rise rapidly in the 
future, as smallholder prices paid by ADMARC tend to be well below market 
prices (Kydd, 1982: Ghai and Radwan, 1983; Kliest, 1980) (although there 
has been some improvement recently), and the government is maintaining its 
rigid rural '-'and , urban wage restraint policies. Although income 
distribution is quite skewed (Humphreys, 1973), there are too few people 
in the upper brackets to allow any large-scale industrial-development 
aimed at this section of the market. As a corollary to these problems the 
demand from the industrial sector for inputs is usually too small to allow 
the emergence of non-consumer based industries'(intermediate and capital 
goods) which need -economies of scale to be economically viable. This in 
itself is a major hindrance 'to the development of-propulsive-industries 
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which have forward and backward linkages. 
I All these arguments are also relevant to development of industries 
based on demand from the city and its hinterland. However the very rapid 
growth of a concentrated, urban, and largely wage-earning population is 
likely to induce'many types of-industrial development to satisfy the 
sudden increase in local demand. Whether any such developments have the 
potential for long-term growth and can help to spread and generate other 
activities is another question - and if- industrial output, only kept pace 
with- local population growth this would only maintain Lilongwe's position 
with respect to Blantyre (assuming the same happened there andýtheir 
future population growth rates were according to7, policy predictions) 
rather than'help to close the gap. 
This preceding analysis does not intend to deny the possibility of 
any sort of industrial development in Malawi. During the 1960s and 1970s 
in fact high rates of growth wextexperienced in manufacturing. However 
from 1975 the manufacturing sector in Malawi has been far less buoyant, 
and in some areas there has been stagnation or actual decline (see 
Appendix 8.1 for a more detailed analysis of Malawils"post-independence 
industrial performance). 'What it is intended to suggest isý that perhaps 
one of the most important flaws in the application of growth, centre 
policies in countries such as Malawi (Tanzania is in- many ways a similar 
example) is that the nature of the entire economy makes it extremely 
difficult to identify or establish 'propulsive' industries. 'Furthermore 
it might be argued that, these being so rare, the government is in a weak 
position to influence their location for-regional equity principles since 
this might reduce their growth potential. 
Lilongwe's regional development role involves not only its impact on 
its surrounding region, but also acting as a counterbalance to Blantyre, 
whose predominance in commercial and industrial development is presented 
as inequitable-in ýgovernment documents. The following sections of this 
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chapter therefore consider government", industrial policies in, ' relation to 
these points, and present an analysis of the two 'cities' economic 
development since the capital-project began. Since Malawi is very much 
committed to the ideals of free enterprise,, in the''spheres of commercial 
and industrial development, private enterprise is a very important 
economic force. - Decision-making by private investors is'therefore the 
most important 'unknown' variable in deciding the overall question"of the 
development of Lilongwe--versus Blantyre', and the attitudes of private 
entrepreneurial decision-makers to the new capital, whether they are 
resident in Malawi-or abroad--,, -are crucial to-its future. This issue was 
therefore one of the main research, topies-, of this study, and the results 
are presented in the latter sections of this chapter. 
8.2 Government Industrial Policy and Future Industrial Prospects 
Industrial policy in Malawi has tended to be, of a general nature, 
with relatively few specific directives aimed at influencing the nature or 
location of industry. This partly reflects the government, commitment to 
'free enterprise' and the-emphasis on private investment as the engine of 
growth in this sector, which precluded too much government interference. 
To some extent pragmatic consideration of the constraints on 
industrialization has also coloured policy formulation and implementation. 
Malawi's national development strategy is based firmly on the agricultural 
sector and the 1971-80 Statement of Development Policies clearly places 
industrialization in a relatively minor role. 
The basic objectives of the government's industrial development 
policies are to complement its programme in the 'natural resources sector 
by expanding the range of economic'activities, providing additional income 
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and employment opportunities- and relieving pressure on the balance of 
payments. This expansion is being brought about by creating additional 
value added. in exports of. primary products and by replacing imports with 
domestic manufactures. In the words of the government this is not an 
"industrialize at all cost -policy" (. Economic Planning Division, 1971, p. 74). 
The government does-generally, encourage private investment in this 
sector with. liberal tax. and. tar. _, 
iff arrangements (see Appendix 8.1). 
There is also some effort to increase local participation, although there 
is no question of stipulating any minimum level of Malawian participation 
in joint ventures. , The main strategies. here have been the entry of 
parastatals such as the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), which was 
specifically created for this purpose. The MDC and ADMARC both have 
wholly owned subsidiaries as well as holdings in private firms. In some 
ways Press (Holdings) Ltd. also plays this role of improving local control 
or investment in strategic industrial areas. This is arguably a private 
Presidential holding (see Chapter although Njolwa (1982) has termed 
it a quasi-public enterprise. 
Another strand of Malawianization has been the imposition of 
restrictions on Asians. This has taken the form of legally restricting 
them first to a selection of larger towns, and then to only Blantyre, 
Lilongwe and Zomba (although recently it has been mooted that Mzuzu should 
be added to this list)(Metcalfe, personal communication, February 1986). 
The most significant impact has been on trading establishments, but is has 
also affected the few. industrial concerns run by Asians outside the three 
main towns. 
Malawi's emphasis on an export-oriented, agro-based strategy has led 
to determined efforts to keep wages low. This is hoped to restrain 
inflation, maintain an international competitive edge, help employment 
generation and restrict rural-urban migration. This may be attractive to 
industry (minimum wages in 1982 being only 35 tambala per day in Lilongwe, 
;s U7 
and 40 tambala in Blantyre) but - the strategy necessarily includes price 
control as well. Only 8 essential items are controlled by legislation, 
but a large part of locally produced goods are controlled by convention 
and ministerial decree (2) which may well have an unfavourable impact on 
industrial, development, (Kydd, 1985). 
8.2.1 Policies Affecting Industrial Location in Malawi 
Government provision of serviced industrial plots, forms part of its 
package of incentives for industrialists. At independence these were only 
provided on any scale in Blantyre, but they are also now established at 
Liwonde and Lilongwe. It is obvious that the location of these plots 
involves a conscious government decision on the spatial impact of the 
manufacturing industry, and this has been used to encourage the regional 
spread of industrialization to Liwonde and Lilongwe. The provision of 
sites in Lilongwe has clearly been beneficial to its industrial 
development in line with government policy, but, as will be seen, 
expansion of Blantyre's provision has prevented Lilongwe achieving any 
long-term advantage in this respect. Liwonde's development was also 
specifically related to the need to spread investment, but was largely a 
failure due to its uneconomic location (see Chapter 4), which is 
specifically criticized by Njolwa (op cit), the principal economist in the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism. 
The principal direct means of influencing the location of industry, 
particularly between Blantyre and Lilongwe, has been industrial licencing. 
All manufacturing enterprises over a certain size have to apply to the 
Ministry of Trade for permission to establish or expand (3) a concern. 
These submissions relate to a specific plot, and in 1970 it was decided to 
use industrial licencing to promote Lilongwe's growth pole role. This 
departure from the government's previously laissez-faire approach to 
private industrial investment was reiterated in the 1971-80 development 
plan: 
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"the Malawi government is now more conscious , of the need to ensure 
that private sector operations are consistent with national 
development strategy, as evidenced by the decision taken in 1970 tQ 
promote industrial development in Lilomwell ( Economic Planning 
Division, 1971, p. 77, emphasis added). 
With specific reference to the need to counteract theý"primatell city of 
Blantyre this plan also stated that * "the new industria1'location 
policy .... requires all new "footloose" industries to be sited in 
Lilongwe" (ibid, p. 121, emphasis added). The following reference is also 
made to this policy in the 1978 Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan: 
"through the granting of industrial licences, -large and 
medium-scale industries are encouraged 
, 
to locate in Lilongwe, 
rather than elsewhere" (TPD, 1978bSection 2, p. 216, emphasis 
added). 
Before discussing the implementation of this policy it is worth 
noting that the strategy appears never to have been very clear-cut. There 
are for instance distinctions to be drawn between being "required", 
"promoted" or "encouraged" to locate in Lilongwe, and between 11footlooseff 
and "large and medium-scale" industries. It is thus difficult to know 
exactly how to measure the success or failure of the policy, although 
generally it obviously implied the manipulation of industrial licencing to 
favour Lilongwe, and disadvantage Blantyre. The policy was central to 
enabling Lilongwe to attract sufficient industrial investment in the face 
of Blantyre's competitive edge, to act as a growth pole and counteract 
Blantyre's industrial dominance. 
Throughout the 1970s however the policy was never implemented with 
any vigourt and even the weak government commitment that existed appeared 
to dissipate. It is generally accepted that the Ministry of Trade did not 
often exercise its right to refuse licences on any grounds (Njolwa op cit, 
p. 15) (4) and thus even more rarely on locational criteria (Kaluwa, 1981, 
p-7). Nevertheless some firms did have pressure put on. them through the 
licencing procedure to locate in Lilongwe, rather than their initial 
choice of Blantyre. The Town Planning office in Blantyre said in 1982 
that theoretically industrial concerns had had to prove that they had to 
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be in Blantyre to gain permission to establish \, there. It was felt that 
one unfortunate result of -this, in terms of national manufacturing growth, 
was that because most applicants preferred a Blantyre location, some 
entrepreneurs had decided not to invest at all as they would not go to 
Lilongwe. The number 'involved was probably small, but there are no 
exact data on this or the'employment and'eapital investment lost (Blantyre 
Town Planning Office, interview, 1982). 
By the early 1980s the policy had been further relaxed, perhaps 
completely. ' The most significant evidence of this is seen to be the 
government's decision to develop a major -new industrial estate in 
Blantyre Ubid; Kaluwa, op cit, p. 9). One"advantage Lilongwe had had 
was the greater availability of industrial plots, "whilst Blantyre's 
provision was coming under pressure to some extent. Yet'in 1981 a large 
new estate with rail access was started in Blantyre, ' at Chirimba out 
towards the airport (5). The fact that this project had been approved 
by the government in 1970, at about the time it was beginning to, promote 
its pro-Lilongwe industrial policy, might be taken as further evidence 
that commitment to the latter was-always more rhetorical than real. ' On 
the other hand it is possible that the delay in implementation'of Chirimba 
was am indirect part of this policy. However, unfettered private 
decision-making has been the main determinant of the distribution of 
manufacturing investment between Blantyre and Lilongwe. This view is 
shared by Kaluwa (op cit, p. 9) who states that: 
"considering that the government still anticipates growth of'the 
manufacturing sector in Blantyre- since a new industrial estate is 
being developed at Chirimba to be occupied - 'it cannot be 
said that there is an all out effort to coerce industries to locate 
in Lilongwe" (emphasis in original). 
The goverment's attitudes to this policy are in conflict, with the 
recommendations of the LUSP which made it clear that it was regarded as a 
very important aspect of Lilongwe's development. The first recommendation 
made in respect of employment and'industry was "to continue the policy of 
--------- --tz 
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discriminating - in favour-- of Lilongwe when granting industrial licences', 
(TPD, 1978a, Section 2, p. -2.17). The planners added that this should be 
in theýshort-term-only, but clearly supported a strong-line on the policy, 
and did-, not anticipate the-relaxation-, if not- reversal, which occurred 
with the-establishment of the Chirimba estate.. 
It- appears that despite a stated commitment, toiregional, equity, the 
government, is still strongly influenced, by considerations of economic 
efficiency which entails continued support for Blantyre. Further evidence 
of this is the location of the-industrial estate for the new Small-Scale 
Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM), financed by the 
EEC. Although there was a debate about, whether it, should be located in 
Blantyre or Lilongwe, it was eventually decided to locate it. in the former 
because there were more potential small entrepreneurs there, -(Ministry, of 
Trade, Industry and Tourism, interview, 1982). As stated by Oksal (1982, 
p. 8): 
"the choice of Blantyre for its [SEDOM's] first industrial estate 
shows that the agglomeration effect on location choice is still a dominant factor in Malawi". 
Although the scheme may be extended'to Lilongwe in the future,, Blantyre 
has obviously gained yet another competitive edge, and it is, probable that 
most SEDOM participants will be predisposed to locate in Blantyre after 
their-period of training. 
8.2.2 The Industrial Development Programme (IDP) 
By the second half of the period covered by the 1971-80 development 
plan the Ministry of Trade felt that a more comprehensive and planned 
approach towards the problems of industrialisation in Malawi was 
necessary. The government requested 'assistance from UN agencies in 
preparing such a plan, which resulted in the preparation of a set of 
guidelines by a UNDP/UNIDO team-in May 1980. This was followed by the 
publication of sector programmes for the Industrial Development Programme 
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(IPP) by the Ministry in February 1982. A document on locational analysis 
was also submitted by one of the IDP advisers in June of that year. The 
terms of reference for, the team were generally, not far removed from, the 
basic approach in the 1971-80 development plan (see Appendix 8; 2), with 
directives aimed mainly at -the encouragement of national industrial 
development and no mention of the special needs-of-Lilongwe. Theýmost 
specific, directive was to. provide flexible, guidelines for- future 
manufacturing development, and a logical order of, priorities., This 
representedý quite a significant departure for ýthe -government (if the 
guidelines are ever implemented) as previously there had. been1ittle 
attention to the type of industry established,. inMalawi. 
One of the main problems the team had, to tackle was that the 
government stillýexpects, private enterprise to remain the strategic, sector 
for. industrial investments, but the Ministry of Trade has. few means of 
involving them-in industrial, planning. Even the MDC which, is theý, most 
important parastatal involved in! the industrial-sector, does notcome 
under the control of this-Ministry. This_ caused problems in -terms of 
Lilongwe's industrial development, as the-government has not been able, or 
not been prepared, to direct the type and share of industrial investment 
there. -Some of the general, policy recommendations made in the IDP are 
relevant to this issue of government control- It is suggested that the 
government must. become, more directly involved in the industrial sector and 
participate equally in the IDP programme along, with the private sector. 
It was also recommended- that the institutional, structures through, which 
the manufacturing sector can be encouraged and directed, should be 
strengthened, and that the, government should assist local entrepreneurs 
more by providing finance on reasonable terms. One of the-strongest 
proposals is that industrial licencing should be used more strongly,, and 
that licencing,, policy should-be based entirely on the IDP guidelines. It 
is also stated however that economic viability must be the most, important 
312 
criterion for determining applications. 
Another problem facing those preparing these proposals was that 
Malawi's economic prospects at the beginning of the 1980s, and therefore 
those of the manufacturing sector too, were "not bright" (Oksal and 
Edwards, 1980, p. 9). Two years later when the sector programmes were 
published it was stated that the manufacturing sector had been virtually 
static from 1980-82, and that there had been almost no investment by new 
companies since 1975 (ýconomic Planning Div, 1982)., Furthermore Malawi's 
general circumstances (e. g landlockedness, low internal demand, few 
resources) were admitted to be severe restrictions on any industrial 
growth, and manufacturing growth was expected to remain based on 
export-oriented agro-industry. Much of this is of course location-bound, 
and its activities were not felt to be amenable to planning as they 
depended entirely on the outside world and the climate (ibid). 
These factors alone did not bode well for Lilongwe's industrial 
development in the 1980s, but the nature of the IDP has further 
implications for Lilongwe's growth centre role. The IDP is meant to be 
consistent with the national development objectives outlined in the 
1971-80 development plan, and IDP advisers have stated that regional 
development should therefore be an objective of the programme (Oksal and 
Edwards, op cit). Yet this issue does not emerge in the list of overall 
objectives given in the guidelines, where emphasis is placed on the need 
for economic efficiency. Nor is it addressed in the 1982 sector 
programmes. Table 8.1 shows the major projects assessed by the IDP as 
being the most feasible during 1981-85. None of these was specifically 
earmarked for Lilongwe, although some could be located there, and the only 
mention of Lilongwe in the sector programme is with respect to the 
possibility of a new brewery (see Appendix 8.3). The largest project by 
far is for fertilizer production, which was planned to be based on the 
electrolysis of water. This would rule out Lilongwe which suffers from 
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TABLE 8.1 
Potential Industrial Projects 1981-85 
(at 1980 prices) 
Potential Products 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
W000,000) 
Net Output 
per year 
W000,000) 
Employ- 
ment I ICOR 
GFCF 
/emp 
W000) 
Fertilizer Manufacturing 56.2 10.0 192 5.6 293 
Ethanol Production (Dwangwa) 3.0 1.0 26 3.0 115 
Polypropylene bag-making 2.4 0.8 120 3.0 20 
Zomba Sawmill Expansion 2.2 0.4 150 5.5 15 
Tannery 1.6 1.0 40 1.6 40 
Solvent Extraction of 
Vegetable Oils 2.4 O. L 40 4.0 60 
Used Oil Refinery 1.3 0.7 22 1.9 59 
Total 69.1 14.5 
F-5 
9 
-0-1 
4.8 117 
Notes: 1. ICOR: incremental capital to output ratio 
Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1982, Annex 5.2.3 
II 
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water shortages. No location is mentioned in official documents for this 
project, which is 'so dominant in this assessment that the other projects 
would hardly affect the overall figures, except in employment. However 
one, -source gives Lirangwe (in the Southern Region south of Blantyre) as a 
potential site (Blantyre Town Planning Offic6, interview, 1982). 
. By 1982 only two of the suggested proposals had been initiated: the 
Ethanol Company Ltd. began producing fuel alýohol'6om sugar for mixture 
with petrol at Dwangwa on the lakeshore, and a feasibility study had also 
been completed for a large-scale glass industry project for which 
potential investors were available but no specific site had been chosen 
(Economic Planning Div, 1982, p. 45). Presumably however if the other projects 
become operational some may be sited in Lilongwe. 
The paper on locational analysis submitted-to the Ministry of Trade 
also did not'give any particular emphasis to Lilongwe. - 'Whilst' it was 
mainly a theoretical paper it also appeared to assume that'current 
government policies will effect decentralization without further 
assistance. Thus it is stated: 
"So far the' forces of agglomeration have been effective, in 
attracting the industries into Blantyre metropolitan area. But the 
Government policies of deconcentration intend to change this 
pattern and preate new growth poles such as Lilongwe. Kasunqu, 
Mzuzu, etc. " (Oksal, 1982, p. 1, emphasis added). 
This reference to other growth poles beside Lilongwe is mysterious', as it 
is not evident in other government documents (6). Development plans for 
the post 1981 period cannot be'assessed (7) and 'therefor'6 one can only 
speculate whether this statement reflects a real policy change by the 
government by nominating other centres as 'growth poles', or whether it'is 
a personal interpretation of the country's efforts' at regional del , opment 
(8). Either way, since Oksal is one'of the'main contributors to'the IDP, ' 
it is possible that Lilongwe's position will'be further' weakened if 'it 
to compete with other centres besides-Blantyre for industrial 
investment. Oksal makes no specific recommendations but he does say that 
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care needs to be exercized when granting licences for medium-scale 
industries (large-scale industries being regarded as, resource-oriented) as 
"they tend to concentrate in or around the urban areas with sizeable 
markets, such as Blantyre and, to a certain extent, Lilongwe", (ibid, p. 8). 
Again it is arguable that this implies that there should be some diversion 
of resources from Lilongwe. 
Overall whilst the implementation of the IDP should increase the 
government's ability to direct the process of industrialization in Malawi, 
it also suggests that government policies in the near future are going to 
be even less committed to the promotion of Lilongwe as a manufacturing 
centre. 
8.3 Aspects of Development in Blantyre and*Lilongwe 1964-82 
One of the major aspects of Lilongwe's regional development role is 
supposed to be the provision of a countertattraction to Blantyre, since it 
is the dominance of this city which is stated to be the major regional 
inequality in the country. Analysis of this aspect of Lilongwe's 
development therefore must relate its performance to that of Blantyre, in 
order to assess its effectiveness in this role. This section will 
therefore examine their experiences in certain economic spheres for which 
comparative data are available: building and construction, employment, and 
applications for industrial licences. However even for this limited range 
of economic indices data problems exist, as will be discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
In order to set the context for comparison of the two towns since 
independence, two sets of economic data are presented in Tables 8.2 and 
8.3 which illustrate the initial massive economic gap between them. Table 
8.2 shows the results of a survey conducted by the Blantyre Planning Team 
of all Blantyre's commercial, trading and industrial establishments in 
1972. Gerke and Viljoen (the authors of the orignal Lilongwe master plan) 
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TABLE 8.2 
Commercial, Trading and Industrial Establishments in BlantrVe 1972 
Number and Percentaqe of Total Employment by Location 
Type of Establishment 
Blantyre 
CBD 
Limbe 
CBD 
Other 
Locations Total 
X Total 
Employment 
Retail 193 122 372 687 9.1 
Wholesale 68 38 51 157 1.5 
offices and Banks 168 87 161 416 21.3 
Other Commercial 19 10 is 47 O. B 
Markets I 1 1 3 
Total Commercial and 449 258 603 1310 31.7 
Trading 
Large-Scale Industry 130 2-111.6 
Small-Scale Industry 574 2.5 
Total Industry 704 26.1 
Notes: 1. Includes commercial travellers, travel and forwarding agents, 
auctioneers. 
Source: Blantyre Planning Team, 1973 
TABLE 8.3 
Commercial and Trading Establishments in Lilongwe CBD 1968 
Type of Establishment Number 
General Dealers 28 
General Dealer and Restaurant 3 
Tea Room/Restaurant 3 
Hardware, furniture etc. 10 
Clothing and Materials a 
Other 6 
Total Retail 58 
Wholesale and Warehouses 6 
Banks and Offices I 
Market is 
Total Commercial and Trading 83 
Source: data from Gerke and Vilioen, 1968 
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conducted a similar survey of commercial and trading establishments in the 
CBD of 'old Lilongwe' in 1968 (Table 8-3). The two surveys are roughly 
comparable since there were very few commercial and trading enterprises 
outside the CBD in Lilongwe at that time, and although Gerke and Viljoen 
did not quantify Lilongwe's industrial sector they reported that it was 
very limited: with one or two exceptions the industrial area contained 
no manufacturing industries and consisted mainly of truck terminals, 
storage depots for farm produce, and some service industries (e. g. motor 
and engineering repair shops) (Gerke and Viljoen, 1968). Even allowing 
for the 4 year gap between the surveys, the evidence for Blantyre's 
economic superiority is overwhelming and it is in this context that the 
towns' relative performance in subsequent years should be viewed.,. -,, 
8.3.1 Building and Construction 
This sector has been one area in which Lilongwe has successfully 
competed with Blantyre since it was designated the new capital. However 
as will be seen this success has fluctuated, and there are significant 
differences between investment by the private and public sectors. 
Figure 8.1 shows that from 1972 on the value of building plans 
passed in Lilongwe has been considerably higher than those for Blantyre 
(see Appendix 8.2 for a discussion 'of data sources and problems of data 
discontinuities). It will be seen later that this does not accurately 
reflect the number of buildings actually completed -but it is obvious 
that Lilongwe's new status did cause a massive upswing in this sector. 
However the private sector data for 1968/69 to 1976/77 show that Blantyre 
tended to predominate in this sphere over that period, and that the 
overall increase for Lilongwe was 4ue,, to government, rather than private 
investment. 
The differences between Blantyre and Lilongwe in planned public 
sector investment from 1969-77 are shown in Figure 8.2. This is 
disaggregated into government plans (from the Ministry of Works) and 
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statutory bodies' plans (e. g. MHC, MDC, CCDC). Whilst yearly values have 
fluctuated considerably, the share of planned statutory body investment in 
Lilongwe was generally much higher than in Blantyre from 1973. Also 
relatively little government building investment was planned for Blantyre 
during this period, and that planned for Lilongwe was significantly higher 
from 1970. This again illustrates government commitment to 'Lilongwe, 
rather than Blantyre over this time. 
Actual performance in, 
'the 
building sector up until 1977/78 however 
shows a different picture. The data illustrated in I Figures 8.3-8.6 are 
admittedly incomplete but some inferences can be drawn 
from them. First, although one would expect a time lag between' plans 
being passed and completed, it is evident that, ý'apart from private 
buildings in Blantyre, there are significant disparities between actual 
performance and planned activity. Thus up until 1977 around half ' of 
Lilongwe's total, and half of Blantyre's public, planned expenditure was 
not completed. It seems. fair to say that the public sector's building 
plans tended to be overý; optimistic in relation to itsýcapabilities- 
therefore (in terms 'oi*finance and/or technical factors). The fact that 
the CCDC's planned investment in Lilongwe fell sharply in the mid 1970s 
(as shown in Figure 8.2) is also indicative of , these problems. The, 
explanation of the gap between the private sector's planned and completed 
building in Lilongwe may also be that decision-maýers were over-confident 
about the new capital, although alternatively muýý`-Ofl-the planned 
expenditure may have been related to public sector contracts which had to 
be shelved or modified (9). Secondly actual private sector investment in 
Blantyre was much higher than in Lilongwe, although goverment investment 
in Blantyre was relatively much smaller. 
After 1977 the published data for planned buildings are not 
disaggregated, but from 1977-83 the pattern of a disparity between the 
value of total planned and actual building in both cities continued. 
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However it cannot be discerned whether one or both sectors was responsible 
(see Figures 8.7 and 8.8). There also appears to have been a surge of 
04 
private investment in Lilongwe after this date, overtaking the governent 
A 
share which decreased in relative and absolute terms. It is assumed that 
this reflects completed projects by the CCDC's subsidiary property 
companies which, (as discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7-3) attracted 
finance for a short-lived building boom (10). Although this 'boom' had 
ended by 1983, and Blantyre again overtook Lilongwe in this sector, it 
brought-the total value of private buildings completed in Lilongwe from 
1971-83 to K47.8 million, compared to K40.7 million for Blantyre. 
Data on the types, of buildings planned in the two cities are 
available only for the period 1968-1976/77, but during that time there 
were significant differences (see Figure 8.9). The proportion of 
industrial plans in Blantyre, for example, was about two and a half times 
that in Lilongwe. Also the share of government plans in all building 
categories in Blantyre was much smaller than in Lilongwe, where the 
government accounted for 50% or more in each case. On the other hand the 
types of buildings, completed, in each city up until 1978 were not very 
different (Figure 8.10). 
Whilst* most official data on this sector are'confined to -buildings 
only, Figure 8.11 presents available data on all construction (including 
engineering, repairs and maintenance work) in the two cities from 
1974-82. It is evident that Blantyre attracted nearly as much overall 
construction investment'as Lilongwe" , over this period. , In'combinatioý'with 
the above evidence it appears that whilst on the one hand Lilongwe has 
experienced very significant growth and development in its building and 
construction sector, it has not entirely dominated the urban scene in this 
respect, since Blantyre has continued to receive significant investment 
which, in certain sub-sectors has exceeded Lilongwels. 
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8.3.2 Employment 
By 1980 employment in Lilongwe was dominated by-the tertiary sector, 
as shown in Figure 8.12 which gives a sectoral breakdown of employment in 
Blantyre and Lilongwe for that year. For a capital city this is not 
unusual: this sector has experienced rapid growth from the transfer of 
civil servants from Zomba and natural expansion of the administration. On 
the other hand growth in tertiary sector commercial employment has been 
much less significant, and available data suggest that community, social 
and personal services (most of this being government employment) accounts 
for about a half of Lilongwe's total employment, and around 80% of its 
tertiary sector employment. 
The tertiary sector is also an important component of Blantyre's 
employment, but here secondary sector employment, of which the majority is 
in manufacturing, is roughly of the same magnitude. By comparison 
manufacturing is a very small component of Lilongwe's employment, where 
the secondary sector is dominated by building and construction. 
Generation of jobs in this latter category in -Lilongwe 
throughout the 
1970S was second only to that in community, social and personal services-. 
It is, unfortunately, impossible to analyse and compare Blantyre and 
Lilongwe's employment structure and growth from the beginning of the new 
capital project, because disaggregated data were only published from 1974. 
Much of Lilongwe's new employment in building and construction and 
government services must have already occurred by that year, and it is 
assumed that there must have been a sharp rise in overall employment 
during the early 1970S. The importance of these two sectors was certainly 
already established by 1974, as can be seen from Table 8.4. Detailed 
breakdowns of tertiary sector employment can only be shown for 1975 and 
1976 (11), but this suggests that the structure of Blantyre's tertiary 
sector employment is very different from Lilongwe's, with much greater 
relative and absolute employment in commercial rather than administrative 
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TABLE 8.4 
Employment bV Sector: Blantyre and Lilonqwe 1974-80 ('000s) 
Y EA R 
old series new series 
SECTOR OR INDUSTRY Town 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
PRIMARY Blantyre 1.5 0.9 1.7 2.9 3.5 3.2 2.7 
Lilonqwe 0.4 0.6 0.3 5.0 5.4 6.5 6.1 
-K-nufacturing Blantyre 14.6 1B. 6 21.7 13.9 15.2 21.9 22.0 
Lilongwe 1.6 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.7 
Electricity and Water Blantyre 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.9 
Lilongwe 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 
Building and Construction Blantyre 6.6 8.0 6.1 6.1 7.7 8.7 7.0 
Lilongwe 9.5 7.7 8.9 6.4 8.9 9.9 11.1 
TOTAL SECONDARY Blantyre 22.4 27.9 29.2 21.3 24.2 32.4 31.0 
Lilongwe 11.9 10.6 12.3 9.0 12.1 13.3 15.1 
Whole, sale, Retail, Blantyre 7.4 6.4 
Hofels and Restaurants Lilongwe 2.1 1.9 
Transport, Storage and Blantyre 6.8 6.6 
Communications Lilongwe 1.3 1.7 
Finance, Insurance and Blantyre 2.1 2.6 
Business Services Lilongwe 0.4 0.5 
Community, Social and Blantyre 8.5 6.6 
Personal Services Lilongwe 16.4 17.1 
TOTAL TERTIARY Blantyre 23.8 24.9 22.1 24.8 25.8 30.6 35.2 
Lilongwe 15.0 20.2 21.2 14.7 15.4 19.5 23.3 
TOTAL ALL SECTORS Blantyre 47.7 53.8 53.0 49.1 53.5 66.3 68.9 
Lilongwe 27.2 31.4 33.7 28.7 32.8 39.2 44.5 
Notes: a) Official employment data only disaggregated by location from 1974. 
b) Disaggregated tertiary sector data only available for 1975,1976. 
Sources: Kaluwaj 1981, Table 2. 
NSO, Employment and Earnings Annual Reports 1975,1976. 
NSO, 1983, personal communication. 
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or welfare services. This is illustrated in Figure 8.13 which also shows 
that government employment in Lilongwe's tertiary sector is more important 
than in Blantyre. 
A change in employment coverage (see footnote to Appendix Table 8-7) 
between 1976 and 1977 makes it impossible to calculate real growth rates 
for 1974-80. Growth obviously occurred in all employment sectors for both 
cities during this period. However downward fluctuations also occurred 
and most significantly there was a large recorded fall in nearly all 
sectors between 1976 and 1977. Some of this may be accounted for by 
re-allocation between sectors. Lilongwe, for instance, saw a massive 
increase in recorded primary sector employment in 1977 and a fall in 
recorded tertiary sector employment. Most of the former is accounted for 
by landscape gardening which employs thousands to-maintain the garden city 
image, and it is assumed that this element was re-allocated from services 
to the primary sector in 1977. Another 'factor may be that the 
re-organization of coverage caused a general dislocation in the rate of 
returns from employers in the- first year or two, or some other 
organizational factor caused underestimations (12). It is difficult to 
assess how much of the recorded fall in Blantyre and Lilongwe's employment 
was genuine, and how mucfi was caused by the reorganization of coverage, 
but it may be that both played a part.. 
Recessionary conditions in Malawi in the early 1980s also 
saw a fall in secondary sector employment (Figure 8.14). The implication 
is that employment in this sector is quite fluid and responds rapidly to 
general economic conditions, and it is probable 'that this will have been 
reflected in secondary sector employment-in both'Ci , tie's'during-the'1980s. 
Table 8.5 gives the 1974-76 and 1977-80 employment growth rates in 
both cities. Bearing in mind suspicions about the new series data, one 
can only make general' comments on the 
-b'as'isý'ofý't-hese data. It appe ars 
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that employment growth has been rapid in both cities, and higher in 
Lilongwe than Blanytre. Secondary sector growth in Blantyre has been high 
and fuelled mainly by increasing manufacturing employment. Impressive 
growth rates in manufacturing, and building and construction employment 
have also been experienced in Lilongwe. However the high growth rate of 
manufacturing employment there reflects a very low initial base, and 
absolute increases were less than 1000 in both periods (Table 8.4). 
Lilongwe's tertiary sector employment has also grown rapidly, but although 
Blantyre recorded negative growth rates in the earlier period, it has also 
experienced expansion in this sector overall, and the absolute increase 
there from 1974-80 was greater than that in Lilongwe. 
Overall there has been little change in the share of national 
employment held by each city (Table 8.6). The most significant change has 
been a large rise in the share of tertiary sector employment in both 
Blantyre and Lilongwe. Blantyre's dominance in terms of national 
manufacturing employment is clear, whilst Lilongwe's share is only 6-7%. 
Blantyre's overall share of national employment fell to just under a fifth 
by 1980, but this was not due to competition from Lilongwe but from the 
growth of employment in the agricultural estate sector, as Lilongwe's 
share remained static at 12%. 
A more sophisticated analysis of Blantyre and Lilongwe's employment 
growth by shift-share techniques has been made by Kaluwa (1982) for 
the period 1974-79. For both cities hp concluded tha total tertiary and 
secondary sector employment shifts were negative in relation to national 
growth in these sectors. The implication that employment growth is more 
dynanmic outisde the countryls'major urban centres is a positive factor in 
terms of regional and rural development, yet it is surprising that the 
massive investment in Lilongwe did not boost employment generation there 
to a rate beyond the national average. For the secondary sector the 
results of Table 8.6 support this conclusion: Kaluwa proposed that this 
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TABLE 8.5 
Average Annual Growth Rates in Employment in the Secondary and Tertiary Sectors 
Blantyre and Lilongwe: 1974-76 and 1977-80 
1974 1976 1 1977 1980 
SECTOR Blantyre Lilongwe ri Blantyre Lilongwe 
percent 
SECONDARY: 
of which: Manufacturing 
Building and 
Construction 
14.2 
22.2 
-3.2 
1.7 
19.9- 
-3.2 
13.3 
16.5 
4.7 
18.8 
14.4 
20.1 
TERTIARY -3.6 18.9 12.4 16.6 
TOTAL ALL SECTORS 5.4 11.3 12.0 15.7 
Source: calculated from data in Table 8.4 
TABLE 8.6 
Percentage of Malawian Secondary, Tertiary and Manufacturinq Employmgnt 
in Blantyre and Lilongwe 1974 and 1980 
1974 1980 
SECTOR Blantyre Lilongwe Blantyre Lilongwe 
SECONDARY 43 23 41 20 
Manufacturing 55 6 56 7 
TERTIARY 25 16 32 21 
TOTAL ALL SECTORS 
I 
(including primary) 21 
1- 12 19 12 
-ý -- 
Source: calculated from data in Table 8.4 
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had occurred because the performance of agro-based industry had been good, 
and because there had been investment in major construction projects 
outside the cities. Thus even the, construction boom in Lilongwe generated 
jobs at a slower rate than the national average (ibid, P-73). However 
Kaluwals conclusion about the growth of tertiary sector employment in the 
two cities appears to be in error, given the rising, share of this sector 
in total employment between 1974-80. ' 
Future employment in Blantyre is going to depend Jargely on the 
private sector's performance. So far there is. no evidence that employment 
in any sector in Lilongwe has been at Blantyre's expense; instead national 
economic factors such as lay-offs in the, manufacturing industry during 
critical periods are most significant. The importance of private 
manufacturing and commercial services in Blantyre's employment suggests 
that the recession will depress employment growth, here during the 1980s 
however. 
In Lilongwe these factors will also have an effect. However, it has 
become evident during the early 1980s that Lilongwels. large building and 
construction sector is decreasing in importance, as the new capital is 
completed or plans are postponed. Kaluwa (op cit, p. 81) found that "a 
number of major, building and construction companies representing 
thousands of employees had or were in the process of winding up". He 
assumes that these may. be replaced by some smaller companies, and. that 
employment will at best remain static in this sector, but more 
realistically this process would probably cause an absolute reduction. 
According to the Town Planning Departmentýin Lilongwe (interview, 1982) 
redundant construction workers are unwilling to leave Lilongwe,, if they 
were initiallly in-migrants, because they do not wish to appear to-have 
failed to established themselves, or want to save more money. They are A 
likely therefore to_ be absorbed into the informal sector for. the most 
335 
part. 
There are also constraints on future public secto'r 'employment, 
particularly in the important area of community, social and personal 
services. According to Kaluwa (1982, p. 82) "given current budgetary 
constraints and 'that most''of central government employment that is 
supposed to be in the capital is already there-I total government 
employment is not likely to be'a growth sect-or in any way. " Some 
expansion is'bound to occur in, ceni'ral administration of course, but the 
high growth rates of the 1970s are unlikely'to be maintained. 
There appears to be a feeling in"both official and academic circles 
ifi' Malawi that employment prospects in Lilongwe now largely depend upon 
growth in the secondary sector (TPD, 1978&)Kaluwa, 1981,1982). Tertiary 
sector' employment is regarded as being dependent on expansion of 
'I"cautonomous"j6bs: these are defined by KalUwa' as' being manufacturing, 
electricity and waterl building and construction, and also the no6-local 
(-e. g. central administrativeY element Of 'Community, social'and Personal 
services. On this basis Lilongwe's future employment prospects do not 
appear I bright. The predictions for government employment and building and 
construction are poor, 'electricity and water employ'few people, and "the 
manufacturing industry category is .... still too small in Lilongwe t-0 make 
a major contribution to total employment growth for at least a few years" 
(Kaluwa, 1982, P. M. However autonomous growth of the tertiary-sect6r 
appears to be a'feature of 'Third Worlýl urbani'za'tion, and the predictions 
rday be ; too'gloomy. A possible facto Ir in Kaluwa"s approach may' be 'a 
misinterpretation of'growth in community, social and'persohal services 
during the 1974-79 period. He states that "in relative' terms, Lilongwe 
has not had the expected edge in performance over Blantyre precisely 
because this dominant public employment has not shown any persistent 
upwards'trend". 'Yet Table '8.4 and Figure 8.14 show that the tertiary 
sector as a whole (of which community, social and personal services are 
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the dominant element) has shown an upward trend, and failure to acccount 
for the differences between the old and new series of- employment data must 
have affected'Kaluwals analyis. 
Despite this, -the combination of a decrease in the building, and- 
construction 'sector, and probably some restrictions'on public, employment, 
suggest that informal sector employment is likely to become more important 
in Lilongwe. ' Lilongwe's population was still growing rapidly in the early 
1980s, and formal employment opportunities are unlikely to keep pace. No 
specific-surveys have been conducted on 'the informal sector,,, but'it was 
estimated that in 1977 it acounted for around 10% 'of tkie-economically 
active in Lilongwe (and also in Blantyre) (Kaluwa, 1981, '1982) (13). This 
is a low proportion compared to many 'Third World' cities and it is not 
clear why this should be. It is possible-that this is an underestimate 
and without more reliable data there is little point in speculating about 
the -cause. The general prospects for employment in Lilongwe,, andý to -some 
extent in Blantyre, from 1980 on do however suggest that the informal 
sector is likely to have expanded in both cities. 
The unreliability and restricted coverage of the data base makes it 
difficult to draw any certain conclusions about Lilongwe's employment 
performance with respect to Blantyre. Undoubtedly there has been-an 
expansion of employment opportunities and it seems 'that 'overall 
employment in Lilongwe has grown slightly 'faster than in Blantyre, 
although the absolute gap, between the two has increased. The improvement 
in Lilongwe's relative position from 1974-80 was primarily due to- a large 
expansion of primary' employment (mainly ýin landscape ýgardening), a 
slightly higher increase in the tertiary sector, and a temporary expansion 
of building and construction employment. The' nature of Lilongwe's 
employment growth has done little to challenge Blantyre's position as the 
country's 'economic capital'. 
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8.3.3 Industrial Licences 
The last economic index for which there is reliable comparative data 
for Blantyre and Lilongwe is their share of industrial licences. The 
number issued for Lilongwe and Malawi from 1967-82 is shown in Table 8.7. 
For 1967-74 the data available for Lilongwe only show those licences which 
were still operational in 1979, and therefore do not cover enterprises 
which were never established or had folded by this date. The later data 
are taken direct from the Ministry of Trade's files, and licences for 
Blantyre are also shown for comparison. The pattern of licences issued 
over time is very varied. 1970 saw a particularly high number, and there 
is some suggestion of an upward trend in the late 1970s and into the 
1980s. Also Lilongwe was getting more licences than previously during 
this period, and although Blantyre received more licences than Lilongwe, 
it was closely rivalled in some years. A more detailed analysis of the 
implications of the shares of industrial licences accounted for by each 
city is made in the following sections, in relation to a survey of the 
manufacturing sector. 
8.4 The Private Sector and Lilongwe's Growth Centre Role 
The designation of Lilongwe as both the new capital and the most 
significant element of the government's strategy for regional development 
has given the city a dual role. By becoming the administratiýve capital 
Lilongwe has experienced several advantages in terms of its potential as a 
growth centre. It has received much public investment associated with its 
administrative role which would not have occurred if it had merely been 
designated a growth centre. For instance Lilongwe's general 
infrastructure (e. g. roads, water supply, power supply) have been greatly 
improved. Regional transport developments which, as previously argued, 
largely accompanied Lilongwe's capital city status, are also of great 
economic advantage for a growth centre. The population increase 
experienced since Lilongwe became capital has mainly been fuelled by its 
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TABLE 8.7 
Industrial Licences Issued by LoEation 1967-82 
LOCATION 1967 1968 196? 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974. 
All Malawi 9 10 20 33 13 11 16 Is 
(Operational in 1979) - (6) (16) (32) (8) (11) (13) 12 
(Lilongwe: operational 1979) - (1) (. 3) (7) (1) (1) (0) (0) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
All Malawi 8 14 12 21., 16 18 is 25 
Lilongwe 25 3 91 4 6 3 12 
Blantyre 15 4 11 10 9 12 10 
All Malawi Lilongwe 
= 
Blantyre 
Total Licences 1968-74 121 n. a. n. a. 
Operational irr 1979 98 '13 n. a. 
X operational in 1979 10ox 13X n. a. 
Total licences 1975-82 132 44 62 
X total licences ' 100% 33X 47% 
number of new enterprisesi 122 36 60 
% new enterprises 10ox 30X 49% 
Notes: 1. Several of the licences issued were for expansion etc., rather than 
for new enterprises. 
- unreliable data 
n. a. not available 
Sources: Oksal and Edwards, 1980 (for 1967-74 Malawian licences); Kaluwa, 1982, 
(for other 1967-74 data); Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism's 
Industrial Licence files 1975-82. 
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new status also, as the major areas of employment which have generated 
this increase 'are in g6v&ýment administration and services, construction, 
and the primary sector employment associated with maintaining Lilongwe's 
garden city image. ' This has increased the size of the local market, and 
again because Lilongwe is the capital, the population includes many 
relýtively well-paid government employees which could attract businesses 
gearea to exploiting' this small, but important, section of the national 
market. 
Access to the government should also theoretically encourage the 
location of new businesses in the capital. Yet a further positive factor 
for the city's prospects is the publicity I associated with the capital 
project. Logical analysis of monetary costs and 'benefits are by no means 
the only criteria for private sector investment location: previously in 
Malawi the blatantly obvious choice of Blantyre for urban-based 
development may have led to the neglect of alternative, and possibly 
equally profitable, sites. Private investors may also consider the 
availability of social facilities for higher-paid employees. As a growth 
centre alone, Lilongwe would not have received the degree of publicity it 
has done, nor the prestigious type of development associated with its new 
CBD, hotels and restaurants, and this should have enhanced the private 
sector's perception of the city as a location for investment. 
The advantages accrued by Lilongwe becoming the capital city are 
however a one-off boost to its development. The initiative of the private 
sector still remains of primary importance to its economic role, unless 
the government becomes much more involved in the industrial and commercial 
sectors. As yet the government has not specifically invested in any 
industries or businesses to promote Lilongwe's economic development and 
clearly sees this as the private sector's role. If Lilongwe is to fulfil 
both aspects of its dual role therefore, a major factor is the investment 
decisions made by private decision-makers. 
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A major part of this research was directed towards an empirical 
examination of private business in Lilongwe, in order to evaluate this 
sector and its, decision-making in relation to Lilongwe's growth Centre 
role. However this analysis of Lilongwe within a growth Centre framework 
should not appear to imply full acceptance of the value and efficacy of 
growth Centre,. strategies as a whole, or more particularly within the 
context of Malawian economic circumstances. Furthermore it is not 
accepted that Lilongwe's growth Centre_ role_, is a, central aspect of the 
new capital programme:, there is much evidence to suggest that this is a 
largely justificatory and rhetorical argument. Thus the surveys in 
Lilongwe could be. seen as a largely qualitative approach to testing 
certain hypotheses related to Lilongwe's development., In these terms the 
two major research hypotheses could be briefly detailed as: 
The growth and nature of private investment in Lilongwe, since its 
designation as a growth centre, has allowed and actively enhanced the 
city's potential to act as a growth centre as postulated by growth 
centre theory. 
2. A growth centre role for Lilongwe is actively and deliberately 
promoted by government policy relating to private investment. 
The null hypotheses would therefore be that private investment in Lilongwe 
has not developed as predicted by growth centre theory; and that the 
government has not actively promoted Lilongwe's growth centre role. 
Two surveys of private investment were carriea Out. The first, 
conducted in 1980, was a postal questionnaire to a sample of Lilongwe 
businesses. The second, conducted in 1982, involved interviews with 
industrial enterprises in Lilongwe and Blantyre which had been established 
sin*ce 1975. 
8.5 Postal Questionnaire of Private Sector Businesses in Mon we 
The Lilongwe postal questionnaire covered a stratified sample of all 
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types of businesses, using the August 1980 business register file which 
listed 576 private sector businesses in Lilongwe. A total of 201 
questionnaires were sent out from which 61 responses were received, 
representing just over 10% of the city! s total private sector enterprises 
(see Appendix 8.4 for a more detailed description of the methodology 
used). The register showed that there were far more small than large 
enterprises in Lilongwe, but it was significant that the larger firms in 
all sectors tended to be better respondents, and this factor should be 
borne in miný when interpreting the results. 
The format of the questionnaire used is reproduced as Appendix 8.5. 
Topics covered included the nature of the enterprise and the type of 
product(s) or service involved, the date of establishment, initial and 
subsequent capital investment and labour usage. The original motivation 
for choosing Lilongwe was addressed with particular reference to its 
designation as capital (14). Specific attention was paid to the sources 
of inputs and destination of outputs in order to examine the spatial 
extent of Lilongwe's economic impact, the degree 'of internal linkage 
between businesses, and links with Blantyre. Several questionsrelated to 
general attitudes to Lilongwe as a site for investment, including for 
instance the likely impact of the airport (which was not operational in 
1980), and assessments of profitability. 
8.5.1 Sectoral Analysis of Private Sector Businesses in Lilongwe 
All firms were asked to detail what type of activities they engaged 
in. Several of the large enterprises were involved in more than one sector 
- for instance wholesale businesses sometimes also operated retail 
outlets, as did some manufacturers. Multiple answers were categorized 
under each separate heading, so Table 8.8 shows a greater total of 
activities than sampled firms. 
From these results it appears than in 1980 there were more private 
sector enterprises in the tertiary sector in Lilongwe than in the 
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TABLE 8.8 
Surveyed Firms by Sector: Lilonqwe 19BO 
SECTOR Number % 
Manufacturing 18 22 
Construction 5(1) 7.51 
Construction Services 6 7.5.15 
Electricity and Water 3 4 
TOTAL SECONDARY 33 41 
Transport 5(2) 9 
Petrol Stations 2 2.5 15.5 
Garage Repairs 3 4 
Other Repairs I I 
Wholesale 12 15 
Retail 13 16 31 
Restaurant/Bar 4 5 
Hotel 
Finance Services 2 '22.5 
Community, Social and 
Personal Services 3 4 
TOTAL 81 1 100 
Notes: a) Total number of replies was 61 
active, here shown in brackets. 
b) Construction services includes 
consultant engineers, etc. 
including 3 firms no longer 
quantity surveyors, 
i 
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secondary sector. Retail and wholesale enterprises together were 
numerically most represented, after which came, manufacturing , 
firms. The 
significance of manufacturing enterprises within the private sector shows 
that this -sector has grown rapidly since Gerke and. Viljoen's survey in 
1968 (cf. Table 8-3), and is undoubtedly a positive indication in. relatio, n 
to Lilongwe's development. However it should be noted that there was a 
particularly high response rate from this sector (which was almost 
entirely, made up of medium or large-scale firms). 
Construction companies accounted for 15% of the sample, as did 
transport and related services. Lilongwe's central position and improved 
transport infrastructure should have, enhanced its role as a distributive 
centre, and this seems to be reflected by the proportion of transport and 
wholesale companies found in the private sector. 
Private business and financial services were poorly represented, in 
the sample, which suggests that the, focus of such activity remains An 
Blantyre. However, the headquarters Of some large public financial 
institutions have been established in Lilongwe as part of the capital 
project (e. g. Reserve Bank of Malawi, National Building, Society). 
The majority of businesses were locally owned,,, about 10% were foreign 
or multi-national companies, and around 25% . were 
forms of,,, Joint 
Malawian/foreign partnership. The latter two types of ownership tended to 
be concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors, accounting 
for around 50% of all such enterprises (14 firms)., Five other non-local 
firms were in financial services and wholesale. The degree, of foreign 
investment in Lilongwets key economic sectors has many implications for 
its growth centre role, such, as the leakage effect from repatriation of 
profits. 
8.5.2 Labour Usage 
One of the most important aspects of Lilongwe's regional development 
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role is its impact on employment. Agriculture is of course the main 
activity of the vast majority of the economically active in Malawi, and 
urban development is unlikely to have much impact on its spatial spread, 
which is affected mainly by policies specifically directed at the rural 
sector. Urban centres do however form concentrations of wage-earning 
opportunities and higher incomes, and these were highly polarized 
spatially in Blantyre at independence. 
Analysis of national employmenet statistics has shown that Lilongwe 
has had a qualified success in providing an alternative focus for urban 
wage employment, and thereby has also provided an enlarged local market. 
The questionnaire provided further information on employment in Lilongwe 
in the private sector. It appeared relevant to enquire into the sources 
of Lilongwe's labour, as this is an aspect of the regional impact of the 
city. It was expected that inevitably most employees would be recruited 
fairly locally, but evidence of labour being drawn from further afield 
than Lilongwe district would support the government's assertion that the 
city's spatial impact would be more widespread (15). Thus some of the 
advantages of new employment would be displaced from Lilongwe itself. 
The majority of sampled private sector businesses were small-scale. 
employers, with under 20 employees. 85% of respondents who reported their 
initial numbers of employees fell into this category, though the 
proportion had fallen to 64% by 1980. Nearly every firm, in all size 
categories had expanded its employment since the date of initial 
establishement, as shown in Table 8.9. Although the small-scale sector 
remains so predominant (nearly a quarter of those surveyed still had less 
than 6 employees) the evidence that the development of the new capital has 
been associated with employment expansion throughout the private sector is 
clearly encouraging. 
Even in the Malawian context however, only five of the sampled firms 
could be categorized in 1980 as large-scale employers (more than 60 
employees). Despite the small number of such firms, their employment does 
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TABLE 8.9 
Labour Usaqe in Lilonqwe 
Initial and Subsequent Numbers Empl yed 
initial nos. with subsequent 
Number of no. of subsequent no. of % 
Employees firms f irms increase firms f irms 
I-5 26 58 21 
i 
12 24 
6- 10 a 1,13 a 11 22 
11 - 20 4 9 3 9 is 
21 - 40 3 7 3 9 18 
41 - 60 2 4 2 3 6 
61 - 100 0 0 0 1 2 
101 - 200 2 4 2 1 2 
> 201 0 0 0 3 6 
No. usable replies 45 39 49 
Average no. employees 17 413 
Total employees reported 745 100 '2365 100 
Employees by Origin 
locally recruited 
(Lilongwe city elsewhere 
and district) Malawi transferred Exoats. 
Frequency (no. firms 11 
reporting) 42 37(11) It 13 
Average no. employees 57 9(10) 16 2.5 
% enumerated employees 80% 12% 7% ix 
Notes: 1. Not all firms indicating origin of employees gave figures. Averages, * 
are based on those that did. 
2. Figures in brackets indicate number of firms which indicated 
recruitment was exclusively non-local. 
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have a very signif icant ef f ect on the average employment f igures shown in 
Table 8.9. As two of them did not estimate the ir initial number of 
employees, this adds a further distortion to the averages although 
controlling for this-factor still gives an average of 45 employees by 
1980. The other three had experienced significant expansion with at least 
a doubling of employment. Yet excluding the five large-scale employees 
altogether, the average size of the rest was found to have increased from 
8 to only 15. Although, still a high proportional increase, -obviously the 
bulk of absolute employment expansion, is occurring amonst a small number 
of large firms. 
It is significant, given the future prospects of the construction 
sector, that the two largest firms by far were both construction companies 
(employing 790 and 424 people respectively)., Such firms may, within, the 
Lilongwe context, have partially fulfilled the role of 11propulsive 
industries", and both assessed the return on their -investment in a 
positive light. Yet ideally the impetus of a growth centre should, be 
maintained by a propulsive sector with long-term growth prospects, and the 
Lilongwe economy cannot rely on the construction sector for future 
sustainable growth impulses. If the survey can be regarded as 
representative of Lilongwe's , private sector therefore, the great 
significance of construction companies implies that apparent successes in 
its growth centre role in the employment realm must be qualified by the 
fact that much of it has been caused by a component which must decline in 
the future. 
Two of the other large7scale firms cannot be regarded as particularly 
suited to a "propulsive" role. They are ., both long-established companies 
(dating from 1938 and 1947) and thus employment expansion has- occurred 
over a very long period. one is the local branch of Malawils, major 
transport company, providing both public passenger and freight transport. 
The other is a branch of a metal products-manufacturing and processing 
company which, since 1975, has only opened a new spares outlet in Lilongwe 
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and regards its'prospects there as poor. In both cases the - headquarters 
remain' in Blantyre and neither indicated that the focus wa's likely to 
change. 
The last of the five large companies is involved in assembly and sale 
of machinery largely related 'to the construction sector, and had 
established in Lilongwe in 1976. This company had transferrred its 
headquarters from -Blantyre to Lilongwe in 1980, and indicated that 
Lilongwe's status had been an important element in that decision, not only 
because of the local construction boom but also because of the importance 
of "direct contact with policy-makers". Its operations were not only 
linked to Lilongwe's construction, as it had' major dealings with several 
government departments and projects (e. g. National Rural Development 
Programme, Public Vehicle Hire Organization) and supplied a national 
market with 25% of its sales in Lilongwe, 25% in Blan'tyreý, 48% elsewhere 
in Malawi, and 2% in Mozambique and Zambia. It appears that I out of the 
sampled large-scale employers this firm displayed the most significant 
potential for future growth. However its local employment impact has been 
restricted'because most of its employee's "were transferred . from Blantyre 
when the headquarters were moved. 
Table 8.9 also shows that most employees, as expected, came from 
Lilongwe and Lilongwe district. The majority of sampled firms (37) also 
indicated that a proportion of 'their employees had come from futher 
afield. In most cases the number was very small, but surprisingly 11 
small-scale firms stated that all their employees fell into this category. 
Transfers (mainly from Blantyre) had occurred in about 26% of sampled 
firms, but apart from the, company 'discussed above the numbers were 
generally small and only accounted for 7% of total employment in the 
sample. Yet in terms of the spread of income opportunities this factor 
may be more significant than this initially suggests as transferred people 
are likely to be in more skilled and better-paid jobs. This hypothesis is 
to some extent supported by general comments made about location in 
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Lilongwe. Although recruitment of non-skilled employees was easy, two 
respondents made specific reference to problems with the 
quality/skill-level of locally recruited staff. One felt that its entire 
operation was jeopardized because as fast as it trained local staff they 
were 'poached' by other companies, due to severe shortage of skilled or 
semi-skilled labour in the area. 
8.5.3 Decision-Making by Lilongwe Enterprises 
The parliamentary statement of 1966 referring to the choice of 
Lilongwe for the new capital was expected to have had an impact on 
investment decisions after that date. Part of the questionnaire was 
designed to test the government's apparent assumption that the 
redesignation of Lilongwe's status would encourage investment there. 
Of the 58 surveyed firms the vast majority (over 80%) were 
established after 1966 (see Table 8.10). 1976 was the peak year for new 
firm establishments. For those businesses in existence before 1966 
capital status could not have affected their decision although one 
enterprise stated that there had been a suspicion that this might occur. 
The others were asked whether they would have invested in Lilongwe if it 
had not become the capital. Table 8.11 shows that 50% of responding 
firms would probably or definitely have invested in Lilongwe anyway. A 
further 20% were uncertain whether Lilongwe's status had affected their 
decision. Thus about 30% of investors felt that the fact that Lilongwe 
was the capital was an essential attraction. This is a fairly significant 
proportion and suggest that capital status does confer some advantage to a 
city in the competition for investment. Even amongst those who might or 
would have invested anyway, six respondents stated that Lilonge becoming 
capital had been an extra- attraction, and one of those pointed out that 
they would not have located their firmts headquarters there otherwise. 
These replies however give no information on the qualitative factors 
which had motivated investors. Therefore a more general question on 
motives was included, which was left fairly open in order not to restrict 
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TABLE 9.10 
Date of Establishment of Sampled Businesses 
DATE Number DATE Number 
Before 1966 0 1974 2 
1967 2 1975 4 
1968 3 1976 8 
1969 3 1977 2 
1970 3 1978 6 
1971 4 1979 5 
1972 2 1980 1 
1973 2 TOTAL 56 
Notes: 1. Two not available. 
TABLE 8.11 
Impact of Capital St tus an Decision-Making 
If Lilongwe was not capital Definitely Probably Total 
Would have invested 16 9 25 
Would not have invested 10 6 16 
Don't know/Uncertain 99 
TOTAL 50 
TABLE 8.12 
Factors Affecting Decisions to Locate in Lilonqwe 
FACTOR no. reporting 
Demand 7 
Supply I 
Communications/Access 3 
Construction Development 10 
Regional Agricultural Development 9 
Administrative Factors 6 
Capital Status 5 
Note: some respondents gave more than one factor 
influencing their decision (number of individual 
respondents = 33). 
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respondents to a speciA range of f aictoýýs presupposed to be signif i, cant. h 
33 enterprises established after 1966 responded to this question, some of 
which gave more than one major reason 
'for choosing Lilongwe. The replies 
fell into fairly clear categories as shown in Table 8.12. It was evident 
from these replies that Lilongwe's status per se had been a much less 
important factor than the general economic development associated with the 
town's growth. However the most significant specific factor cited was the 
construction boom caused by Lilongwe becoming capital. Many 
establishments which had located in Lilongwe after 1'966 were const , ýuction 
firms or consultants, and these all stated that their primary motivation 
was that there was a large demand for their services for the construction 
of the new capital. 
The huge increase in Lilongwe's population was another major factor 
cited, and this was encouraged by the expansion of public sector and 
construction job opportunities, most of which occurred because Lilongwe 
became the capital. Similarly the new capital programme was the direct 
cause of many of the transport development which have improved Lilongwe's 
accessibility. 
This survey in Lilongwe gives some support to the proposition that 
private investors find it advantageous to locate close to the government. 
Six respondents made reference to the importance of proximity to the seat 
of government. This included not only ease of access to public 
decision-makers but also the need to maintain a close link when the 
government was the most important client. Whilst five specifi6 references 
to Lilongwe as the national capital were made, this was generally because 
it was assumed that if this had not happened, an associated factor which 
also influenced the location decision would not have occurred. 
It is significant that the second most important motive cited for 
location in Lilongwe was agricultural development in the Central Region. 
This was obviously important for firms involved in trading and processing 
tobacco, although it was made plain that the government decision to open 
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new tobacco auction floors in Lilongwe was highly significant. This may 
of course have been partly due to the government's -desire to promote 
economic development in Lilongwe, rather than a chance factor, although it 
is , not mentioned in policy documents as being part of the new 
capital/growth centre strategy., However, there were also general 
references to Lilongwe's advantages because it was at the centre of an 
agriculturally developing area., Most respondents in this category had a 
specific link with agricultural production (e. g. transport,, processing), 
although two had no direct link but felt that agricultural development in 
the surrounding region would inevitably, encourage the growth and 
development of the city itself. 
It, is apparent from the, survey that, the capital city project, as a 
whole (including associated infrastructural development) has influenced 
some of those who decided to locate in Lilongwe after 1966. Much of this 
was due to Lilongwe becoming a focus of government investment and 
population growth, rather than because it attained the status of capital. 
It is also apparent that there was some potential for development in 
Lilongwe already, based on the expansion-of agricultural production. in its 
hinterland. 
8.5.4 Alternative Investments 
This survey also tried to establish whether- investment in,., Lilongwe 
had been at the expense of investment elsewhere. If, Lilongwe had 
attracted investment which otherwise would not have occurred at all, -this 
was an overall advantage but if there would have been alternative, similar 
investment in Blantyre,, then the main advantage, is in terms of_, region. al 
equity. On the other hand, if the alternative investment would have been 
elsewhere in Malawi, there has been, no real gain for either regional 
or overall national development. 
About a third of all respondents felt that their choice of Lilongwe 
had definitely or possibly been at the expense of alternative-#vestment 
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elsewhere, as shown in Table 8.13. Most of this alternative invstment 
would have been in Blantyre. Seven respondents were definite that this 
would have occurred: thus Lilongwe has had some success in attracting 
investment from Blantyre, although this has been fairly limited. There is 
also some indication that Lilongwe has*attracted a few investors away from 
other location (sites specified were Mzuzu, Salima and Mangochi), although 
two of these responses pointed out that their answer was based on the 
hypothesis that a new capital might have been constructed elsewhere. 
On balance investment in Lilongwe has therefore represented a net 
gain to the national economy, and its impact on the regional spread of 
investment has been largely positive, since its main alternative rival was 
Blantyre. 
43 of the sampled firms indicated the magnitude of their initial 
investment in Lilongwe. 50% were-fairly small-scale enterprises with less 
than K25,000 initial capital investment (Table 8.14). Only seven of the 
firms answering this question had established in Lilongwe before 1966; the 
majority (77%) had made their initial investment after 1970, including all 
but one of the firms which had made an initial investment of over 
K100,000. This suggests that, Lilongwe -is now attracting more major 
investors. However two of the three firms investing over K250,000 are 
related to the agricultural sector and their investment was not motivated 
by Lilongwe's growth and development per se. By far the largest 
investor was a tobacco processing firm. There is a clearer link between 
the development and growth of the city and some of the firms which made 
subsequent major investments of over K100,000 after 1966. These include 
two construction firms, the bus company, a firm of accountants, and a 
company producing and repairing machinery and vehicles. 
8.5.5 Location of Decision-Making and Branch Operations 
Blantyre has always tended to house the headquarters of local 
multiple branch firms, and the local headquarters of multinational 
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TABLE 8.13 
Alternative Investment Locations 
LaCATIaN 
Bla tyre r Elsewhere None 
AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT Definite Possible Definite Possible 
Same 4 3 1 29 
Less 2- 1 1 
Enlargement of 
Existing Premises I 
Notes: number of answers = 45. 
TABLE 13.14 
Initial and Subseguent Inv... s, tment (Kwacha '0000) 
Average 
0-0.99 1-5 5-25 25-100 100-250 >250 
I 
Investment no. usable 
num ber ofr ms K'000 answers 
Initial 
Investment 3 5 14 10 3 94.3 43 
Subsequent 
Investment 1 3 842 4 87.3 22 
354 
companies. Many of the new enterprises which have opened in Lilongwe 
since, 1966 are branches of an existing enterprise (Kaluwa, 1981). In this 
sample survey 25 businesses (43% of the total) fell into this category. 
Of these 10 had only one other branch which, with one exception', -was in 
Blantyre. Another 10 had between two to five other branches, and six 
larger firms had, over 19 branches --(16)ý Investment decisions are 
primarily made at the firms'--head offices. It was hypothesized that 
Lilongwe would benefit if there was evidence that multiplebranch firms 
were choosing to locate or relocate their headquarters,, there, since this 
would, herald a shift in the locus -of private decision-making power, away 
from Blantyre. Also head offices are usually larger than branches, and 
relocation may also lead to heightened perception by-key personnel-of 
investment opportunities in-Lilngwe., A possible factor encouraging the 
location of headquarters in -Lilongwe would be accessibility to the 
goverment but this has to overcome the'general inertia-against-relocation 
from existing head offices in Blantyre, and the advantages of being in the 
largest commercial and industrial centre. 
The results of the enquiry into these issues showed-that-Blantyre 
remains the focus of private decision-making. Altogether 23-- of the 58 
firms stated that their decision to locate in Lilongwe had beený made, in 
Blantyre (including some non-branch operations). In 22-cases the decision 
was made in Lilongwe, six were-made elsewhere in Malawi, and-five-abroadý 
17 multiple branch firms had their head offices in Blantyre and-with one 
exception the decision to open a branch in Lilongwe had been, -made, there,. 
The Malawian Development-Corporation had-been involved in this exceptional 
case, and it was-reported that the Lilongwe branch had resulted from a 
decision made by the government in Parliament-in Zomba. 
Seven establishments had their head offices-in Lilongwe, and in every 
case this was due to transfer from another location after 1966. it is 
assumed therefore, that Lilongwe's capital status had some impact, although 
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it'is still in'a weak ' position compared to Blantyre. Of the six largest 
companies, five still have theirý headquarters in Blantyre and'ohly one is 
in' Lilongwe (transferred from 'Kasungu). However five of the 
establishments with Lilongwe head offices had transferred from Blantyre. 
One of these' was the national library service (categorized as private in 
the business register) which felt that it had to be, in the capital, two 
were local "private firms, and one was a multinational with its main 
headquarters in'*Nairobi. "All 'of these retained a branch in Blantyre, ' but 
one construction firm had closed down'its operation there. The two other 
multinational companies in*the survey had kept their local head offices in 
Blantyre. 
The survey also attempt6d to'discover whether the establishment of a 
branch in Lilongwe represented an'overall gain to the national'economy, or 
whether it was due to the transfer of investment and business from a less 
advantageous location which was closed down. "In general 'there was no 
evidence that Lilongwe's gain had been at another's expense (17). 
8-5.6ý'Linkages and Integration 
The establishment and growth of' new 'commdrcial, 'and industrial 
premises are crucial aspects of a growth centre's role. Theoretically 
these developments sh6uld'be mutually reinforcing in order td enhance a 
local multiplier'ef f ect. In other words the establi'shment of enterprises 
which require locally' produced inputs and stimulate the devel: opment of 
other local concerns which will deal' with their outputs should'encourage 
self-sustaining growth in the'local economy. The concept of backward and 
forward linkages is, in theory, central to to the successful development 
of a growth centre. -If inputs are largely'derived from'outside the 
local/regional economy; and outputs do not're4uire'local' ýprocessing-or 
services, or their end use is not directly productive then it is possible 
that the multiplier effect of 'new investment will'be dissipated, because 
its benefits are being accrued in locations outside the regionthat the 
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growth centre is supposed to stimulate. 
The sampled firms were asked to indicate the sources of their inputs 
and destination of their outputs, as well as the types of'local firms they 
felt were directly related to the operation of their enterprise. The 
response to this section of the questionnnaire was rather variable, and 
the accuracy of answers was in some case suspect. However this was not 
unexpected as the questions had to be fairly complex; this obviously 
discouraged some respýndents but altogether 35 (65%) of those sampled did 
fill in this section, including most of the larger firms which are the 
most important in this regard. 
The general results showing origins of inputs and use of outputs are 
shown in Table 8.15. The proportion of inputs derived from the 
categorized locations gives some picture of the spatial impact of the 
multiplier effect of these firms. 
overall it appears that this is very varied with inputs being derived 
both locally from Lilongwe itself, and the surrounding district; from 
Blantyre; from elsewhere in Malawi, and also from abroad. The multiplier 
has not been confined therefore to the city itself or its immediate 
hinterland. Yet for all types of inputs it is significant that, few 
enterprises were using inputs which came from 'elsewhere in Malawi', and 
that where this was reported the proportions were low. This suggests that 
the wide-ranging regional impact on production which government policy 
statements envisaged has not occurred. For instance the government 
suggested that Lilongwe's development would stimulate development as far 
away as the Northern Region, the country's least developed area. Such an 
expectation was suspect even in theory however, as there is no basis for 
expecting a relatively small growth centre to generate economic spread 
effects over such a distance. It is more important that Lilongwe's 
commercial and industrial development has few supply links with the 
economy of the Central Region as a whole, which is also included in the 
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TABLE 8.15 
Reported Input Sources and Sales Destinations of Firms Operatinq in Lilongwe 
X Inouts from Each Source lTnf; il nn- 1 
SOURCE 0% 1 1-27 1 21-40% 1 41-60% 61-80% 181-1 firms Category 
no. of firms report ing reporting ,ý Input 
Lilongwe 3 1 17 
Lilongwe District 2 3 Constr- 
Blantyre 4 1 6 uction 
Elsewhere Malawi 4 1 
Abroad 3 1 2 
Lilongwe 
; Lilongwe District 
ý 
6 2 Machinery- 
Blantyre 6 2 9 and 
Elsewhere Malawi B I Equipment! 
ýAbroad 2 61 
I Lilongwe 4 1 
Lilongwe District 4 
Blantyre 1 3 7 Vehicles 
Elsewhere Malawi T 7 
road 5 
[ Lilongwe c 5 
Lilc ngwe District 
I 
3 1 Component 
ýBlantyre 6 1 7 Parts 
! Elsewhere Malawi 5 
Abroad 4 3 
ongwe 12 
Lilongwe District 12 1 1 2 Raw 
Blantyre 14 2 1 17 Materials 
Elsewhere Malawi 13 1 3 5 
Abroad 8 1 3 5 
ý Lilongwe 7 1 1 2 
Lilongwe District 10 (1) 1 Manufac- 
Blantyre j 5 1 4 1 1 12 tured 
Elsewhere Malawi 12 Goods 
Abroad, 5 1 1 1 2 2 
Lilongwe 5 2 3 2 2 7 
Lilongwe District 9 4 2(2) 2 (2) 
Blantyre 10 5 4 3 3 26 SALES 
Elsewhere Malawi 13 6 3 3 (1) 
Abroad 23 1 1 2 
, 
Notes: some respondent§o combined source locations (e. g. Lilongwe city plus district, 
or 'elsewhere Malawi including Blantyre). These are shown in brackets. 
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category 'elsewhere in Malawi'. Instead local links are mainly within 
Lilongwe district. Blantyre and external sources 'of supply are as 
important, and in some cases more important. In relation to its growth 
centre role therefore, the spatial impact of Lilongwe's demand has been 
restricted and in terms of promoting regional equity some of it has been 
counter-productive because it has been directed to Blantyre or abroad. 
Lilongwe itself figures as an important supply source for some 
inputs. ' Two'constru6tion companies estimated that they derived 90% of 
their inputs from within the city. This is a-positive result given the 
importance of the construction sector, 'although it is somewhat offset by 
the fact that two other respondents obtained 90% of their inputs from 
abroad, and one received 50% from Blantyre 
Foreign supply sourbes were also significant for'machinery, equipment 
and component parts. Even raw material inputs were often being obtained 
from abroad. 'Almost half of all firms responding reported that the vast 
majority of these inputs were foreign and nearly -'a third received all 
their raw materials from abroad., This highlights the problems of, applying 
growth centre strategies in less-developed countries, where local 
circumstances' hinder production of significant inputs, and 'thus the 
multiplier'effect, of new investment is to some extent dissipated. ýHowever 
four out of seven establishments reported that over 50% of, their supplies 
of component parts came from Lilongwe district, including the city. Local 
suppliers also supplied'all'the raw materials, for four of the sampled 
firms. This largely involved food inputs bought within the city (e. g. for 
hotels),, whilst tobacco formed an important element of 'raw material 
supplies from Lilongwe district (18). 
Whil'st Blantyre was only cited by one firm as a supplier 'of component 
parts, it was' the source of 50% of vehicles used by three other 
businesses. Local sources' supplied the other 50% and 75% of another 
respondent's vehicles however. Blantyre was also an important source of 
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manufactured inputs. Inevitably these were also often obtained from 
abroad as well, whilst just under half were supplied with the majority of 
their manufactured inputs by local sources. 
Whilst many inputs were received from foreign sources, hardly any of 
the sample had export sales (the major exception being the tobacco firms). 
The local market was very or quite significant for most firms (with about 
a quarter of respondents supplying the Lilongwe city market only), but 
well over half were also supplying a much wider market. Blantyre figured 
most significantly again in this pattern of demand, appearing to be a more 
important market for Lilongwe than the whole of the rest of Malawi 
(excluding Lilongwe and Lilongwe district). However half of all firms 
were selling some of their products to 'elsewhere in Malawi'. Thus to 
some extent Lilongwe has become a centre for national and regional 
distribution, and it was often the larger, more important firms which were 
involved in this national and regional market. 
The patterns of supply and demand for Lilongwe 'according to the 
sample survey were rather varied, but they are at variance with its 
proposed growth centre role. The main linkage with the Central Region 
beyond the immediate Lilongwe district is as a supplier of tobacco, and as 
a market for Lilongwe's goods. Lilongwe has also some role as a national 
centre of supply. Its central positioh gives it an advantage over 
Blantyre in this respect and the improved access of the Central and 
Northern regions to urban goods and services, with lower transport costs, 
should represent some benefit to regional development. 
Apart from these spatial linkages, the questionnaire also sought to 
establish the nature and degree of integration that existed within 
Lilongwe city. The sampled firms were asked to specify what types of 
other establishments in Lilongwe dealt with their inputs or outputs, or 
supplied them with services. The frequency with which specified 
categories of linkages were mentioned is shown in Table 8.16. It is 
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TABLE 8.16. 
Linkaqes between Firms in Lilonqwe 
TYPE OF Deal with Deal wi , th 
ENTERPRISE inputs outputs Opened Extended 
no. of firms reporting 
Industry 8 8 2(2) 1 
Transport 7 11 17 1(1) 
Wholesale/Retail 11 11 5 
Other Services 12 10 2(3) 
Agricultural 5 7 
TOTAL 43 47 
Notes: a) Total number of responses = 49. 
b) Figures in brackets are possible rather than certain. 
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evident that some backward and forward linkages do operate within 
Lilongwe's commercial and industrial sectors, but the degree of 
integration which emerged from the survey was rather low, although there 
is no theoretical quantified expectation to, compare it with. Many 
respondents. only specified one category of activity which they felt was 
directly complementary to theirconcern; in other words there was only one 
local forward or backward linkage mentioned. Only a small minority 
indicated that their operations were fully integrated into the local 
economy by specifying a range of linkages, covering a variety of secondary 
and tertiary activities. Overall each broad category of complementary 
sectors was mentioned.. by 15-20%,. of respondents, and the frequency was 
generally below 20%. 
It was also possible to identify some patterns within the categories 
specified. For instance in the industrial sector-the main type of 
activity providing-both forward and backward linkages was construction. 
One criticism of the new capital city was that the associated construction 
development would, have no spread effects in the local-economy,. Williams 
(1978, p. 293) cites one local politician who hoped that foreign businesses 
would leave brick-making to local people because "that is the-only way in 
which they. benefit from the construction of the.. capital, by making 
bricks". The survey responses suggest that this analysis was too 
pessimistic. -Although some of these linkages were between non-local 
companies, many were links to Malawian companies, some pf which were quite 
small. However as the construction sector declines,, these links may well 
be weakened.., 
-On the other hand linkages 
between manufacturing. firms were limited. 
Most of.. those specified by manufacturing companies related to other 
sectors such as transport of their inputs and outputs, repair of vehicles, 
and, the use of financial services such as banks and accountants. Banks 
were the. most frequently identified link in the 'other services' category, 
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but -a range -of other commercial services dealt with respondents' inputs 
and outputs, including for instance architects, government licencing 
departments and customs offices, and insurance. The government per se 
was specifically mentioned as a 'complementary activity' in this category. 
Although several respondents claimed links with agricultural 
activities, few specified the exact nature, although food and tobacco were 
mentioned as inputs. There was only one specific mention of a forward 
link to agricultural production which was the provision of wagons to local 
farmers. 
Theoretically the development and expansion of Lilongwe's economy 
should encouragethe establishment of new enterprises as agglomeration 
economies emerge, and levels of demand for goods and services increase. 
Although the survey suggested that this is occurring, as -yet it appears -to 
be fairly limited. Sampled firms were asked whether the existence of 
complementary enterprises in Lilongwe had encouraged their establishment, 
and whilst just under a half of the 44 respondents felt that this was 
true, the others were negative or uncertain. Several of the sampled firms 
also stated that their activity-had, encouraged the establishment or 
expansion of other enterprises (see Table 8.16), but again these were in a 
minority, representing only about a third of respondents. 
8.5.7 Control of Exports and Imports 
One specific aspect of Lilongwe's commercial sector where Blantyre 
retained complete dominance was in the, field of external trade. Almost 
every firm that used foreign-material inputs primarily obtained them from 
Blantyre: 20 respondents -indicated that-Blantyre-was their main source. 
The materials were either bought -from Blantyre firms, obtained from 
headquarters or a branch office there, or through Blantyre import agents, 
or a combination of these. Only three, respondents obtainedimported 
materials from sources in Lilongwe, although a further-seven imported 
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foreign materials directly for their own use. 
Economy activity in Lilongwe is not generally directed to an export 
market, but the three respondents involved all made their exports through 
Blantyre headquarters. Two were involved in the tobacco industry, and 
both made clear statements to the effect that their presence in Lilongwe 
was entirely dictated by the opening'of the tobacco auction floors, but 
that purchased tobacco continued to be processed in and exported from 
Limbe in Blantyre. 
8.5.8 Private Sector Attitudes to Investment in Lilongwe 
Towards the end of the questionnaire questions were included which 
aimed to assess the sampled firms' attitudes to, and confidence in, 
Lilongwe. Such information is essentially subjective 'in character and 
therefore difficult to quantify and analyse, but it offers more insights 
into Lilongwe's future prospects and problems in terms of private'sector 
investment than the more factual questions about firms' existing status. 
Two-thirds of respondents stated that they had not encountered any 
problem due specifically to location in Lilongwe. However the remaining 
third had, and their answers were probably made in the' context of 
comparison with Blantyre, the most viable alternative site and one in 
which several branch operations already had" experience. The most common 
and identifiable complaints related to material availability and price, 
transport, and trained staff. In several cases unfavourable comparisons 
with Blantyre were made directly. For instance one third of complaints 
related to material availability in Lilongwe, and it was clear that-delays 
in receiving spares and components were a real problem. These are often' 
Imported, and since imports generally came through Blantyre, it is obvious 
that the 'commercial capital' retained a clear locational advantage for 
companies reliant on imported parts. 
The opening of the new international airport 'at'-Lil: ongwe in 1- 982 will 
have helped to reduce this problem as some imported goods are 
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airfreighted. This factor should also 
, 
have improved Lilongwe's 
competitiveness in terms of other transport problems, as there was some 
indication,,. that another disadvantage of Lilongwe was the necessity of 
meeting foreign visitors in Blantyre. 
A further identifiable aspect was dissatisfaction with,, housing, 
recreation and consumer goods provision for staff in Lilongwe, in 
comparison with, Blantyre. The continued location of head offices, in 
Blantyre also emerged as a problem, in relation-to obtaining consultancy 
work in one case and to co-ordination of offices and staff in another. 
Unless Lilongwe can offer specific alternative advantages, Blantyre 
is likely to continue to receive a higher share of future private 
investment.. In this context, it is signficant that very few respondents 
indicated that there were particular advantages in locating in Lilongwe 
when asked to assess the return on their investment. On the whole the 
answers to this question did not indicate any marked, enthusiasm in the 
private sector for Lilongwe. The most common remark, was that returns had 
been 'adequate' or 'fair,. Only, 10% felt that they had been good or 
worthwhile, whilst a similar proportion expressed, real dissatisfaction. 
Of the latter it is worthy of note that the most extreme response came 
from a company in the, construction sector, which was operating at a loss 
and felt that once construction stopped in Lilongwe the city would "only 
be occupied by civil servants and tobacco people in season". Such a view 
conveniently discounts the majority low income population of the! city of 
course (and was probably made by an expatriate), but. it is in line with 
the argument that Lilongwe's industrial and commercial progress has 
largely been fuelled by a single 'propulsive' sectort and cannot be 
maintained. 
The most positive factor emerging from- these answers related to 
Lilongwe's agro-industrial potential, but was referred to by only three 
firms. The expansion of regional agricultural surpluses, and the 
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establishment of the new auction floors were mentioned as factors 
enhancing Lilongwe's future growth potential by these respondents. 
Another positive factor for the future was the airport. The majority 
of firms felt that once Lilongwe had become the major focus for 
international air flights (which it now has), this would improve their 
prospects as shown in Table 8.17. Also just over a quarter of those 
replying were sure that the airport's impact would encourage further 
investment in their enterprises. Five branch enterprises also anticipated 
the transfer of company headquarters to Lilongwe once the airport became 
operational. The advantage of the airport however did not altogether 
outweigh the perceived benefits of head office location in Blantyre, as 13 
firms felt sure that there would be no transfer, whilst a further six were 
uncertain. 
8.6 Results of 1982 Manufacturing Survey in Blantyre and Lilongwe 
A survey of new manufacturing enterprises in Blantyre and Lilongwe, 
conducted in 1982, provided further insights into industrial location 
decison-making in Malawi. This survey was conducted by personal 
interview, and the method provided much more detailed and exacting 
information about how firms made their decisions. Several factors 
influencing these were thus identified which had not emerged from the 
earlier postal questionnaire. 
In particular it was possible' to tackle the sensitive issue of 
government pressure to locate in Lilongwe. The government's ability and 
stated intention to use industrial licencing as a means of promoting 
Lilongwe's development is the only direct policy measure published in 
government plans, aimed at the private sector. As there were no studies 
on how this policy had been implemented apart from general statements that 
it had been little used (Njolwa, 1982; Kaluwa, 1981), it was felt that 
research into this issue was important as it related to both the 
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TABLE 8.17 
Impact of Lilonqvfe's New Airport 
Improve Firm's 
Pros ects 
Encourage Further 
Investment 
ANSWER no. % no. % 
Yes 27 54 14 28 
No 10 20 14 28 
Uncertain 13 26 22 44 
TOTAL 50 100 50 100 
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government's commitment to Lilongwe's growth centre role and the 
effectiveness of such policies. 
The research was confined to industries which had received licences 
after 1975, the year when Lilongwe was designated capital. The Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Tourism (MTIT) gave access to files containing all 
industrial licences issued from 1975 to August 1982. Applicants for 
licences have to provide detailed information on a range of issues 
including the nature of their product, the location-and number of the plot 
they wish to occupy, their proposed sources of investment, the nature and 
sources of employees, and the exact origin and type, of inputs including 
import requirements. The appplication form is reproduced as Appendix 8.6. 
Question 18 on this form pertains specifically toýthe policy of enforcing 
the location of footloose industries in Lilongwe, as -it demands an 
estimate of additional costs incurred by location in Lilongwe if the 
application was for a location other than Lilongwe. - Granted licence, 
forms, for which research access was given however, only detail the firmls, - 
products and plot site. 
Over the period under study 132 industrial licences were granted, of 
which 62 were in Blantyre and 44 in Lilongwe. Thus Blantyre accounted for 
almost half of all licences, and Lilongwe for a third. Blantyre has 
obviously remained the most favoured location for new manufacturing 
investment, but it appears that Lilongwe has become a major focus. On the 
other hand several of Lilongwe's licences related to, the same enterprises 
applying to produce different products on the same plot, and its relative 
position in terms of the number of different. enterprises licenced over 
the same period is somewhat weaker with only 36 compared to 60 in 
Blantyre. With three exceptions, the firms in each city were different. 
Blantyre and Lilongwe's domination of the urban system in terms of 
manufacturing is almost total. Mzuzu and Liwonde each received just four 
industrial licences in this period, and Zomba only one. Nearly all the 
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others applied to agricultural estates. 
The range of manufacturing products licenced in both Blantyre and 
Lilongwe was very similar (Table 8.18). The most important type of new 
manufacturing in each was metal fabrication and light engineering. In 
some cases this was directly related to providing inputs for the 
agricultural sector. Despite the seeming importance of Lilongwe's 
agricultural hinterland, this was most common in Blantyre where a half of 
licences for general metal products (excluding light engineering) related 
to this sector, compared to just under a third in Lilongwe. 
Textiles and food and agricultural processing were the next most 
important types of new manufacturing in both cities. In Lilongwe three of 
these industries were related to the tobacco industry. 
The firms' licences showed the industrial area and plot number on 
which they had permission to build or expand. These were located from 
plans kept in the town planning offices in Blantyre and Lilongwe. In 
Lilongwe there are three main industrial areas: a light industrial site on 
the north-western edge of the old town, and Areas 28 and 29 on either side 
of the road to the airport to the north-west of the new CBD. The latter 
is a heavy industrial area with railway access. There are also some 
industrial plots in the old town, as well as Biwi Triangle south of the 
old town (although none of the licences in this period were for Biwi 
Triangle). 
In Blantyre there is a more complex pattern. There are essentially 
two CBDs here because of the old split between Blantyre and Limbe. 
Between them there are industrial areas including Ginnery Corner, Chichiri 
and a heavy industrial area, Nyambadwe. There is also a major industrial 
area in Limbe which has rail access. 
One of the major problems encountered in this exercise proved to be 
tracing firms. First many which had been granted a licence had not 
proceeded and the plot was undeveloped. This was particularly significant 
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TABLE S. IB 
New Manufacturinq Production in Blantyre and Loilonqwe 1975-82 
Blan tyre Lilo qwe 
TYPE OF MANUFACTURE no. % no. % 
General metal fabrication, 
assembly and light engineering 1,5 24 14 
1 32 
Chemicals 7 11 2 4 
Plastics 4 6 J# 3 7 
Electrical 4 6 2 4 
Furniture 1 2 1 2 
Textiles, clothing and leather 12 19 10 23 
Food and agricultural 
processing It Is 8 is 
Printing and paper 1 2 2 4 
Construction 1 2 1 2 
Miscellaneous 6 10 1 2 
TOTAL 62 100 44 983. 
Notes: 1. Includes 5 separate licences for same firm an same plot. 
2. Less than 100% due to rounding. 
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in Blantyre where 15 firms (25% of all licences) which were visited were 
not established, compared to 7 in Lilongwe. Secondly several of the 
Blantyre firms either had box numbers instead of plot numbers on their 
licences, or had plot numbers which did not correspond to the plans. 
Furthermore sometimes there was no-one available to interview, and return 
visits were not always fruitful-. Altogether over 60 plots were visited 
including all those in Lilongwe. In the time available visits in Blantyre 
were concentrated in Chichiri, Nyambadwe and-Ginnery Corner, and Limbe was 
excluded. 30 successful interviews were conducted, of which 21 were in 
Lilongwe and 9 in Blantyre. 
8.6.1 Competition for Plots 
One of the most significant results of the survey emerged not from 
the interviews 'but from the absence of'so many industrialists from their 
plots. This led to inquiries at the land evaluation offices in Blantyre 
and Lilongwe. It was found that there are signifidant'differences in'the 
nature and cost of industrial plots both within and between the two towns, 
and that this was clearly having a significant-effect on industrialists' 
behaviour., 
Much of land in Blantyre-is freehold, the exception being land 
developed relatively recentl , y. "", All land-, in', Limbe is 'freehold, for 
instance, including industrial"areas. In Lilongwe however 'all land 
belonged to the CCDC, which leased it out. Although'the annual ground 
rent is fairly low, the initial development charges made in Lilongwe are 
quite' high (see Appendix 8-7)., * In 1982'the CCDC expected to make 'an 
initial profit of about K14,000/ha on industrial land, at the time it was 
first 'leased (Department of- Land Evaluation, interview 1982)., - The- 
attraction of acquiring an asset in the form of-freehold 
land-is-clearly 
an advantage for Blantyre. Furthermore there 
is'evidence'that some of the 
freehold'land there often changes hands at very, cheap rates. One land 
evaluation 'officer in Blantyre' estimated that rates of 
K5000/acre were 
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common.. Although, some plots in Limbe,, which often belong to Asians', were 
being sold for about K15-20,000/acre, even this is clearly competitive 
with Lilongwe's heavy industrial areas given the fixed asset acquired., 
It became clear from the interviews that Asian industrialists in 
particular had preferences for certain industrial areas and that economic 
considerations alone were not paramount. Limbe is the main centre for the 
Asian community and freehold plots here appear to be preferred. The 
importance of residential and community ties emerged several times in the 
interviews in both towns. In Lilongwe the light industrial areas near the 
old town (Area 7) is greatly preferred to the more distant Areas 28 and 
29, as it is more accessible. The competition by Asians for land in this 
area which is nearer their homes in the old town, and is cheaper than 
land in the heavy industrial area further north, had become intense, and 
Most had been taken up. This had led to the CCDC departing from its 
normal practice of charging fixed rates, and a few plots of land in Area 7 
had been put out to tender. According to the land evaluation department 
this was presented as sensible commercial practice given the shortage of 
land for Asian entrepreneurs in Area 7. However it was clear that some 
Asian industrialists felt discriminated against, and it is evident that 
this view is supported by the general antagonism often displayed towards 
the Asian community in Malawi. As a significant proportion of medium and 
small-scale industrial licences went to Asian businesses, psychological 
and political considerations may discourage their expansion to Lilongwe. 
Another important factor which emerged in relation to land costs in 
Blantyre and Lilongwe is that in Blantyre the land market was operating in 
an unorthodox fashion during the 1960s and 1970s. For instance 
industrial land at Ginnery Corner and other areas is held on leasehold 
from the government (and by 1982 there were virtually no plots left). 
Ground lease charges are extremely low, and bear little relation to the 
value of the land, and in some cases it appears that no development costs 
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are charged (Blantyre Land Evaluation Department, interview, -1982). 
Moreover there are curious anomalies in the levels of rent charged on 
developed plots. According to a report, of the Land Evaluation Department 
(OPC, (Valuation), 1978, p. 8): 
"The first point that strikes an enquirer into the ýlevel of 
transactions [in Blantyre] is that there seems little in the way of 
a precise pattern, thus one finds a factory at Ginnery Corner 
rented at K400 per month and another a mile along the same road 
being three times the size rented for K300 per month on the same 
basis". 
Although the report does not speculate on the cause, it does point out 
that some transactions examined were between connected persons and 
disclosed an element of gift, and secondly that there was evidence that 
the government had sold plots freehold, during the currency of a lease, 
for prices well below their true value. Three examples given in Ginnery 
Corner had all been sold for about 10% ofthe estimated market value 
(ibid). There is therefore a strong implication that corruption and 
patronage have an important influence on the Blantyre industrial land 
market. Since this is generally operating to depress costs there this is 
clearly a disadvantage for Lilongwe in terms of competition as land there 
was entirely controlled by the CCDC (and now by the LCC), and less open to 
such practices. 
These factors must be borne in mind when a straight comparison is 
made between theoretical (ie. officially posted) industrial land costs in 
both areas. It became clear from these enquiries that during the 1970s a 
shortage of industrial plots had occurred in Blantyre. Ho w real this 
shortage was is difficult to ascertain but it appears that this was used 
by the government, more than persuasion under the aegis of the footloose 
industries' section of the licencing act, to encourage industrial 
development in Lilongwe. Thus by making it more difficult to find a plot 
in Blantyre, the government hoped that entrepreneurs would take the 
alternative of Lilongwe. However none of 
the firms interviewed in 
Lilongwe which had originally preferred Blantyre, said that they could 
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not find a -plot in Blantyre. It is, arguable therefore that this 
(unstated), aspect of government policy had not been successful in 
achieving its'aims. On the other hand it is possible that it had had a 
negative effect, on development by discouraging investment in Blantyre, 
which was not ýcompensated for by alternative, investment, in Lilongwe. 
Furthermore, it had led to a significant degree of 'land speculation. 
Althoughý:,, some of the'non-developed plots visited, were, only "'recently 
licenced and may have been awaiting development, it seemed a fair 
assumption that others had never been intended for development as they had 
had-licences for some years. - Such activity may have'depressed industrial 
development in Blntyre, but is also, indicative of'a general preference for 
Blantyre since it would: ýnot-be worth'doing-if industrialists were willing 
to go to Lilongwe where there were more plots available. Town planners 
are apparently unable to force licencees to develop their plots (Town 
Planning Office-1, Blantyre,, interview, ý1982). 
The development of' the new industrial estate at Chirimba in Blantyre 
which-has'bden aided by EEC 'funds has been seen asa, relaxation of this 
aspect of, government policy. However industrial plotsýinýChirimba will be 
more'expensive than in Lilongwe, because-the". EEC loanýhas determined that 
costs must be recouped over a 20 yearý'period, and the anomalies present in 
other industrial areas should therefore be avoided. At the time of the 
survey it was too soon to know how this will affect industry's attitudes 
to Lilongwe. On the one hand the Land Evaluation Department. felt that 
this would be a boost to Kanengo's (Area 29 in Lilongwe) development, 
especially when the airport 'became fully operational. Sev6ral freight 
licences had been applied for in Lilongwe in anticipation of this. On the 
other hand there was a strong feeling-' amongst those -interviewed 
in 
Blantyre, and among some in Lilongwe, that land in-Lilongwe was more 
expensive than in Blantyre. Residential land 
in Lilongwe is anyway- more 
costly, 'being possibly 20-30% higher than in Blantyre 
(ibid). Housing 
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costs were frequenly cited as a major aspect of choosing not to locate in 
Lilongwe, and, this was sometimes combined with the point that there was 
also insufficient low income housing for employees there. The combination 
of factors such as general economic preference for the more developed 
Blantyre, freehold land, the (admittedly unquantifiable) effects of the 
anomalies in the Blantyre land market, housing, and discrimination against 
Asians may easily outweigh the theoretical cost advantages of Kanengo's 
industrial land against Chirimbals. 
This issue of industrial land and its availability appears therefore 
to have formed part of the government's overall strategy towards Lilongwe. 
However not only, is this, an, indirect influence which appears to have 
achieved little-except undesirable side effects, but also it has now been 
relaxed. 
8.6.2- Firms Affected by Government Policy II ýý 
, Only five businesses interviewed in Lilongwe had been affected by 
government influence to locate there. One of these was a Press Holding 
subsidiary'and therefore could not-have located elsewhere. In another the 
managing director had2previously been employed by Press, and although, then 
resident in Blantyre he stated that he--had to start up, in Lilongwe. The 
others-however had all. applied for existing plots in Blantyre and had been 
refused licences unless they went to Lilongwe., These three-ýwere the only 
ones for which direct evidence was found of the government using their 
powers under the Industrial Development Act (19). 
, The reaction and attitudes of the three firms involved varied 
considerably. They also represented three distinct types of ownership and 
were producing very different products, suggesting that implementation of 
this policy had not been directed at aiy specific areas of the 
manufacturing sector. One was a relatively important metal products firm 
producing railway trucks and hydraulia'appliances which was a Malawian 
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registered company. Another was a subsidiary of a Monaco registered 
company, which was producing plastic products. This firm was partly 
controlled-(30%) by, the MDC. The third was. a textile company owned by 
Asians. 
, -The first firm had battled with the Ministry- of Trade-and Industry 
for two years for permission to establish in Blantyre. "This had been 
refused, and no licence was-available 'unless they set up. in Lilongwe. 
Eventually the firm capitulated and received two licences in 1976: one for 
Lilongwe but the- other for Blantyre. The manager clearly felt that the 
market could not- support ý. two branches, and expected the Blantyre 
development to, beý the mainstay- whilst ýthe , -Lilongwe branch was, an 
unfortunate necessity. ýIt became , clear that one of the reasons why, this 
firm had been singled out-was that, there was indirect'government interest 
in the- firm, as PressýSteel Industries -(part of-Press -Holdings) had 
planned to-buy Anto the firm by initially taking a 50% interest-by, 1982, 
and, eventually taking it over by 1984. However -Press, pulled -out. of 
negotiations in 1981,,,. leaving the firms with an--initially, unwanted 
Lilongwe plant. It seems safe to assume that Presslsýinterest was part, of 
the reason for insisting on a Lilongwe location, not only 'because- of 
Bandals, influence but also becaue Press ýSteel Industries was already 
established in Kanengo. The recession in Malawi had made the operation of 
two, plants, totally uneconomic by 1982 and-significantly, -the decision had 
been made to, close the Blantyre plant and increase production in,, Lilongwe. 
Despite this, theý manager expressed a personal preference. for-Blantyre, 
the implication being thatýhe believed consolidationýin Blantyre would not 
be politic and might be refused. Overall however this example- had 
benefited Lilongwe in the long run, at Blantyre's expense, particularly as 
the Blantyre plant's production also involved agricultural sector inputs 
such as maize mills. 
The second firm had also been refused a Blantyre licence. ýHowever 
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here the manager felt that in retrospect, location in Lilongwe was a 
better choice. This could be seen as an example of how Blantyre's obvious 
economic dominance affects foreign decision-makers, who lack detailed 
knowledge of the Malawian economy and-do not perceive that'an alternative 
may exist. In addition to this Blantyre had also lost its competitive 
edge in'two areas-since the firm was established in 1976. Previously raw 
material imports had come in via, the Tete road from Zimbabwe to Blantyre 
but the activities of the MNR in Mozambique had led to these being 
re-routed through Zambia. In the mid 1980s the importance of this factor 
has undoubtedly remained. Secondly'Blantyre had been- the company's main 
market but the firm had become increasingly involved in suppplying 
sanitation and water development schemes throughout the country. 
Accessibility to the government (which accounted for 50% of its business) 
and a central position had become important advantages, and overall the 
manager was very positive about location in Lilongwe. 'This- firm also 
provided an example of something which emerged'from interviews with other 
firms which had been successful in Lilongwe. They often expressed a far 
more positive attitude towards Lilongwe as a whole, and sometimes this 
took the form of specific support for the goverment's stated strategies 
of regional development. ýThus once perception-of Lilongwe had been 
enhanced by personal economic successi to'some extent- this led' to the 
assumption that-, this '-proved that Lilongwe was economically viable for 
other investors. This attitude was even expressed by firms which admitted 
that-Blantyre had been, considered for"investment, ý'and it-was interesting 
to note how perceptionsýhad been created-'which appeared to override'''any 
considerations that many--, firmsl,, needs could still be better'suited-in 
Blantyre. 
- The-Asianýtextile, firm on the other' hand was strongly-opposed-to 
Lilongwe. - The-manager's original-, 
business'--interests'and residence was 
still in Limbe in-Blantyre, and a-factory-for the textile concern had even 
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been completed on one of, his plots there. However when the 'licence 
application was made the Ministry of Trade and Industry had issued it for 
a plot in Area 7 in Lilongwe. Although a building had been erected on 
this plot, the manager had not started any form of production. He stated 
that the strength of his ties to Limbe, and the fact that his main market 
was in Blantyre made it impossible for him to continue in Lilongwe and the 
shed had been leased to another company whilst he endeavoured to persuade 
the Ministry to change its mind. 
The implementation of the government's policy, in these three cases 
had obviously had markedly different effects. It is also apparent that 
the government has chosen to use its powers in very few cases, as the 
interviews in Lilongwe covered the majority of new industrial 
establishments since 1976 and none of the others had been affected. Nor 
had any of those seen in Blantyre encountered any oppositioný- In two 
cases the government decision appears to have been made because of their 
involvement through a parastatal or quasi-parastatal (MDC and Press). ., 
8.6.3 Residential and Family Ties 
The most frequently mentioned motive for location in either Blantyre 
or Lilongwe in this survey did not relate to general economic, issues at 
all. In all 14 firms emphasized that theirý choice of location was 
basically determined by where the licence applicant already lived. In 
several cases this was combined with the fact that the licence either 
represented expansion of an existing production line (e. g. pasta 
production on a plot with existing flour mills) or was a new line for an 
entrepreneur who had several other different business interests in one 
town. Some interviewees felt that this factor so determined location that 
other variables such as market, supply and political pressure were largely 
irrelevant in industrial decision-making in Malawi. However this issue 
was generally confined to small and medium-scale industrial operations, 
378 
where the manager was also the owner, and could clearly not afford to 
divide time between two locations. The importance of family labour to 
Asian-owned enterprises reinforced this effect. Residential and family 
ties to one location sometimes dated back for decades. It was interesting 
to note however-that those in Lilongwe who, advanced this argument did not 
tend to express negative views about Blantyre, but, simply felt that since 
they were already there and had a house it was a logical choice, whilst 
those in Blantyre often expresssed very negative opinions about Lilongwe, 
particularly in terms of how expensive land and housing were, and how dull 
the social life in comparison to Blantyre. ' 
The significance of these factors has obvious implications for a 
government- attempting to -decentralize industry and commerce for the 
purposes of regional equality. In these circumstances it is conceivable 
that no matter how economically- competitive a- new 'growth- centre may 
become, the continued development of the core is a foregone conclusion 
S 
becaue of ts social hold on large numbers of potential and existing A. 
entrepreneurs. 'It is arguable that in Malawi there areý, veryýfew-footloose 
industries if the effects, of this 'social inertial are'taken, into account. 
Domestic industrial 'investment'originating outside, Blantyre and Lilongwe 
is 'largely confined to ý agricultural: -'estates and-although foreign 
investment 'may avoid this problem, thereý has -been -very little new 
foreign investment in the industrial'sector in, Malawi, since 1975 which was 
not expansion of existing-premises. 
8.6.4 Economic Factors 
Although social 'reasons were the single most significant locational 
factor'emerging from-'the- surveys many interviewees, also had distinct 
economic preferences for either Blantyre or Lilongwe (often in, combination 
with their residential, ties). In Blantyre five firms mentioned the 
importance-of, economic factors such as the greater 'size of the Blantyre 
market, and'in particular they perceived-Lilongwe as being more expensive 
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for both industrial and residential land. One of these firms had tried a 
feeler'shop in Lilongwe" for its repair services, but had clo , sed it after 
lack of response. 
It also appeared that the activities of important large-scale firms 
in Malawi were used as an indicator ofý'Lilongwels viability. This picture 
did not emerge from this survey alone but also from general observation. 
For'instance the fact that Press'fi6d eventually decided not to transfer 
its headquarters to Lilongwe'was'deemed as highly significant. 'Also the 
lack of significant investment by David Whitehead (a long established and 
important textile firm) was also held against Lilongwe. The National Bank 
of Malawi had also kept its 'head office in Blantyre and the scenario 
behind, this decision is worthy of'comment. The bank is 80% Malawian owned 
(47%''Pr6ss and 33% ADMARC) but Standýrd, Bank has a 10% share, as does 
Barclays which also holds the management 66nýract. ` When the Malawi 
Congress Party headquarters were transferred to Lilongwe apparently 
significant pressure was put on the bank to follow suit. Yet despite the' 
indirect government involvement in the bank, the' management-held out 
against the move on the basis that the majority -of bank business'was in 
Blantyre (76% in 1980), and-that'the auditors who-prepared an independent 
surveyýof the-economic arguments were strongly opposed to it. 
Where the 'size of the local market was an important factor Blantyre 
naturally dominated as a favoured*location. 'H6wever, -two'interviewees (one 
in each city) were of the opinion that most industrial concerns inMalýwi 
(even 'quite small ones) catered for''the national' market, and "that 
therefore the issue of the local urban market wI as largely irrelevant. 
Other firms did not necessarily make the point in this way, but many did 
emphasize that their market 
was Malawi-wide and that therefore 
distribution was an important factor. In this context Lilongwe had a 
clear advantage over Blantyre (although sometimes this' had-meýnt that an 
industrial plot had been taken in Lilongwe to act merely as a distributing 
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point for goods manufactured in Blantyre). Four firms felt that, this had 
been an advantage of location in Lilongwe, but in two cases this had only 
been realized after location in Lilongwe due to the refusal of Blantyre 
licences. Again this implies that lack of perception of Lilongwe's 
advantages may be hindering its development. 
The growing Lilongwe market had also encouraged the development of 
branches of existing Blantyre firms. In one production in Lilongwe had 
been restricted to vehicle assembly and other types of general metal 
production directly aimed at the local urban market, when its original 
licence had included production of agriculturally-related products as 
well. This decision had been made apparently bpeause the latter were 
insufficiently profitable. However tobacco production in Lilongwe's 
hinterland and the auction floors were factors which had determined the 
location of three industries in the heavy industrial zone of Area 29. 
Only 5 of the firms interviewed in Lilongwe made any allusion to the 
impact of Lilongwe becoming the capital, and this was never the primary 
motive for their choice. The factors mentioned in this context were that 
the massive population increase had heightened demandý, and therefore 
profitability, that government contracts and offices were more accessible, 
and that the airport would be helpful. . 
At the time of the survey there had been a number of policy measures 
implemented aimed at redressing the severe problems facing the, Malawian 
economy. Some of these had caused problems to industrialists in general 
and frequent reference was made to import controls, exchange controls and 
high import duties (which had led to one firm temporarily ceasing 
operations). In addition the constant disruption of transport from the 
ports of Nacala and Beira in Mozambique, or from Zimbabwe to Tete, was 
also affecting some firms' production. Too much competition. in the 
textile sector was also mentioned by one firm, and an Asian firm 
complained of a lack of family labour for management positions. 
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Apart from these general problems, the only others mentioned were 
directed at Lilongwe. As in the postal questionnaire complaints were made 
about the lack of high density and medium density housing for employees, 
and also of the difficulty of obtaining skilled labour. The issue of the 
CCDC putting Area 7 Plots out to tender was' also ýre'garded as-' a 
disadvantage in Lilongwe. 
The issue of Malawian policy to Asians had determined location of one 
firm in Lilongwe. This belonged to an Asian who had previously had 
numerous trading conerns in several small trading centres. As these were 
'Malawianized' he ended up operating in Salima, and then in 1978 had to 
make a choice between Blantyre, Lilongwe or Zomba. This was obviously the 
case of a 'footloose' entrepreneur, and the choice of Lilongwe had been 
made because he feared that eventually Asians might be restricted to the 
capital city alone. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The introduction to this chapter analysed the general conditions and 
constraints within which Lilongwe's development as a growth centre has 
occurred. The national context was shown to impose constraints on the 
implementation of a classical growth centre strategy based on industrial 
development. Furthermore Malawi has experienced stagnation or decline in 
national manufacturing production and employment at times in recent years. 
Another problematic factor, highlighted in the IDP guidelines, is the 
government's unwillingness and weak institutional capability to direct the 
process of industrial development. 
The government's commitment to Lilongwe as the new capital city- has 
been strong however and this has been reflected by growth in building and 
construction, and employment. The construction boom in Lilongwe has been 
a central aspect of its development. It has entailed huge capital 
investments (in Malawian terms) which have led to associated growth in 
382 
employment, and also to the establishment of construction-related 
companies, including some with limited backward linkages to firms 
producing construction inputs. Although there is a very large gap between 
planned and completed buildings, Lilongwe has outstripped Blantyre in this 
sphere. Public sector investment in particular was dominated by Lilongwe 
until 1978, although after this date Blantyre's share of completed public 
sector buildings has been roughly equivalent to Lilongwe's. The private 
construction sector has continued to, invest more in Blantyre than Lilongwe 
in most years however. The 1979-82, surge in private construction 
development in Lilongwe is related to the establishment of the CCDC's 
subsidiary property companies, and this success. has to be qualified by the 
financial problems these companies created for the city's planning and 
investment institutions. 
Lilongwe's successes in the sphere of employment are, also mainly 
related to its role as the capital, and to the importance of the 
construction sector, rather than to any transformation which would allow 
it to challenge Blantyre's economialrole. Tertiary sector employment in 
government rather than commerce, has, registered by far the-greatest 
absolute increase, 
'and 
also the highest relative increase over, -the years 
for which data are, available. -High employment,, 
in construction completely 
dominates Lilongwe's secondary sector - this was already established by 
1974, when relevant data first became available, and was maintained at a 
high level until 1980. 
, 
However although data are unavailable for later 
years, other evidence, sugests thatIthis very important area., of employment 
has been, falling during the 1980s. Manufacturing employment growth has 
been small in absolute- terms, although the very jow initial base has 
meant that growth rates have been high. Blantyre on the. other hand has 
also experienced very high growth rates in manufacturing employment, 
despite the periods of stagnation and deeline,, already noted, and the 
absolute gap between Blantyre and Lilongwe has greatly increased, whilst 
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there'has been little change in 'their relative positions. Commercial 
employment in Lilongwe has also remained relatively insignificant compared 
to-'Blantyre'where total tertiary employment growth, although slower -than 
Lilongwe's; has still been' significant. ' Government employment in the 
tertiary and primary sector, and construction employment "have undoubtedly 
given a huge boost to Lilongwe which means it now represents a significant 
Urban market. However although the initial loneý-offl boost occasioned by 
the transfer'of government employees and the onset'of construction -must 
have greatly 'improved Lilongwe's employment position*relative to Blantyre 
between'1966 and -1974, overall Blantyreýhas*more or less'kept"pace since 
then, and thus its attraction for demand-based investment has not received 
any further-serious challenge. 
As'a growth centre, '-part of Lilongwe's role is to-improve'regional 
equality. In order to'do this it must, not' only equal Blantyre's rate of 
development', ' but also outpace it. There is no doubt that the spectrum of 
government-'investment 'and involvement in transforming Lilongwe from a 
regional to the national capital has led to a ýposition where there is 
another major urban focus in the country now, whilst before Blantyre's 
dominance was overwhelming. There has been a spatial spread of 
urban-based development therefore, and development associated' with' its 
capital status per ýse has enhanced Lilongwe's abilityýto act as a growth 
centre-in certain respects. This, conclusion is supported by the evidence 
from the business survey in 'Lilongwe, '-where, developments associated with 
Lilongwe's capital status, which would not necessarily have accompanied 
its designation as a growth centre, were'found to have had a strong impact 
on the decision to locate in-Lilongwe 
(e. g. the railway, the air port, the 
construction boom', and population growth). In other words, the fact that 
Lilongwe had become the national capital did cause a spread in regional 
development, and in some ways got the city's growth centre'role "off the 
ground". 
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On the other hand some of the ways in which this initial boost 
occurred do not comply with the needs, of a growth centre. For instance 
the nature of employment growth means that-some of it is unsustainable. 
As the construction sector decreases in importance, it is possible that 
Lilongwe will fall behind Blantyre, and thus. that the regional gap will 
widen again. Thus private business development in Lilongwe is crucial for 
both its employment prospects and its economic role. 
The evidence collected in the two surveys shows that there are no 
simple answers to the two hypotheses formulated about Lilongwe's 
development as a growth-centre. Certain aspects of the development of its 
commercial and industrial sectors do correspond with theoretical 
expectations, but at best the evidence is weak or qualified. For instance 
the construction -sector has been, active enough to fulfil the role of a 
propulsive sector as-indicated by frequent reference in the surveys to the 
importance of this sector in attracting private investment, and to some 
extent in encouraging the establishment of related activities. --. 
Yet this 
role cannot be sustained and is already in decline. -iAlso whilst there is 
some evidence of backward linkages in the internal economy for inputs this 
is fairly limited. .. I 
, Given the small commercial and negligible 
industrial base Lilongwe 
initially had, growth in-these sectors represents a-large and encouraging 
increase. Most of this has occurred in small or medium-scale enterprises. 
Although a few larger-scale firms have- also located in Lilongwe, -no 
evidence emerged from the -surveys ýOf the development of any industry or 
group of industries which might take over the role of a propulsive sector'. 
Thus the nature of Lilongwe's economic development has not encompassed any 
particular element which can be identified as being likely to maintain 
the 
impetus of its growth. The evidence of the development Of intra-urban 
linkages between firms, whilst perhaps a positive indication for some 
sustained economic growth, is insufficiently strong 
to produce a major 
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stimulus to the-economy. In this context the continuing strong 
involvement of Blantyre firms in several areas of Lilongwels, economy is 
directly contrary to, the need to spread development away from, Blantyre. 
The spatial spread of Lilongwe's external links also appears rather 
limited, mainly being concentrated within Lilongwe district, or upon 
Blantyre. The evidence for urban-rural links,, in terms of the impact of 
the city on its hinterland's economy, is to some extent conflicting. 
There appears to be a positive perception of the potential of Lilongwe's 
rural hinterland-and. this undoubtedly encouraged the establishment of 
several firms. Apparently even if Lilongwe had not become the capital, 
this factor would have fostered growth there. - 
Yet the nature of 
manufacturing development had involved Very. few links with the wider 
agricultural- economy of the, Central, 
'Region, 
and one of the few firms 
issued a licence for such activity had chosen to confine itself to 
production directed at the urban- market alone. Apart from offering a 
market for rural produce and acting as a service centre, Lilongwe could 
presumably have benefited the regional economy by producing inputs which 
were cheaper (because, of lower transport costs) and more, accessible than 
alternative sources. However an interview at the-LLDP offices made clear 
than any question of such links, -ignored a practical reality of 
the 
institutional set-up of Malawian agricultural deelopment. Whilst the LLDP 
project managers made it-clear that the hugely increased market demand., for 
food products in the, city was a major benefit to the project's producers, 
who, could obtain, higher prices than by selling to-ADMARC, the question of 
inputs linkages was met with some . -amazement. 
It was pointed-. out that 
farmers'- inputs all over the country (e. g. seed, fertilizer, wagons etc. ) 
were nearly all provided'by'ADMARC from its subsidiary AGRIMAL in Blantyre 
(LLDP, interview, 1980). It is assumed that this monopoly is more 
effective amongst, project farmers than others, yet there are several 
important projects relatively close to Lilongwe 
(a fact emphasized in 
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government statements) which are likely to be the source of most effective 
demand for urban-produced inputs. In this context it becomes easier to 
explain the lack of such development in Lilongwe, but at the same time 
damages the notion tht Lilngwe can have a productive input role to the 
regional agricultural economy. 
In terms of Lilongwets ability to counteract Blantyre, perhaps the 
most damaging evidence is the private sector's perceptions of the two 
cities. This is not to say that the evidence is overwhelmingly in 
Blantyre's favour - the airport, and access to the government for example, 
have clearly enhanced Lilongwe's position. In general however it seems 
that the private sector actively favours Blantyre, even though such 
perceptions can be altered once a firm has established in Lilongwe. The 
importance of non-economic considerations in decision-making also tends to 
operate in Blantyrets favour. 
In terms of the second hypothesis relating to government policy, it 
is notable that the impact of the stated government policy to promote 
Lilongwe (the use of the Industrial Licencing Act) has been less strongly 
implemented than the policy of restricting available industrial land in 
Blantyre which does not appear in published planning documents. In the 
case of the former policy the evidence is conflicting in terms of the 
impact on the individual investor: however even though it has obviously 
been implemented only rarely, given the small number of licences issued 
each year, it must have had at least a small impact in Lilongwe's favour. 
On the other hand given the strength of Blantyre's industrial dominance 
this has been insufficient to promote significantly Lilongwe's competitive 
position, and in addition has not been applied in any coherent fashion to 
specific types of industry. Instead it appears that indirect government 
influence (e. g. through the MDC) is an important factor in deciding which 
firms should be pushed to Lilongwe. Whilst this type of government 
influence is by definition limited in the private sector, an important 
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area of governmental promotion of Lilongwe has been the location of 
certain other investments which goverment decision-makers influence. Two 
clear examples are Press Steel Holdings and the tobacco auction floors. 
There is no way of knowing whether these decisions ocurred becauffiit was 
felt that, as a matter of public policy, Lilongwe as capital should have 
these functions, or whether it was a deliberate and considered promotion 
of its growth centre role. The auction floors have had a very important 
role in attracting tobacco-related investment and form one of the clearest 
urban-rural links for Lilongwe (although private investors appear to be 
unconvinced that the duplication of tobacco floors was a good idea). 
However the decision not to move Press headquarters to Lilongwe is an 
indication thatt whatever the motive, continued goverment promotion of 
this type has weakened. 
Restrictions on industrial land availability in Blantyre are more 
easily categorized as deliberate (if indirect) promotion of Lilongwe. The 
impact of the policy has been shown to have largely misfired for a variety 
of reasons. The continued perception of Lilongwe as a high-cost location 
by private investors, and the development of Chirimba show that any 
potential this strategy may have had is anyway now dissipated. Lilongwe's 
future prospects in the industrial sphere are also not encouraged by the 
formulation of the IDP guidelines, where no attention is paid to its 
special needs. 
In terms of the two hypotheses formulated, it is considered that 
overall, if one takes a long-term perspective, the null hypotheses must 
be accepted. This is because there apears to be no evidence that in the 
future Lilongwe will be able to maintain the economic growth experienced 
so far, and also because there is much evidence that Blantyre will 
maintain the existing gap between them, and possibly even widen it. In 
addition the varied elements of government promotion of Lilongwe's 
economic role during the 1970s, ad hoe and unconvincing as they were, now 
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appear to have ended. Yet acceptance of these conclusions must be 
qualified by acknowledging that Lilongwe has been transformed economically 
between 1966 and today. Its impact on its regional economy may be 
limited, but it has provided another signiticant urban focus besides 
Blantyre. Notably many of its successes have occurred partly because it 
became' the capital city. The investments which, have occurred due to 
consideration of status and prestige have played a major part in 
Lilongwe's commercial and industrial development. Furthermore the massive 
population'growth"associated with a surge in the dominant area of tertiary 
sector employmentand in Construction, ' which again relate to its capital 
city statusi has undeniably'attract'ed private' investment. Capital city 
status per se has not been the cause (as clearly shown by Zomba's 
experience), " but the creation of a new capital- citj -has' led to 
development, althougli not necessarily that expected of a growth Centre. 
4 
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Notes for Chapter 8 
1. In-its initial stages it was proposed that the establishment of the 
new capital and the growth-of new industries would have beneficial 
effects on this development as, illustrated by the following statement: 
"This [Lilongwe and, its new industries] will affect more especially 
future development on the Viphya Plateau where several thousand 
workers will be employed in the production of wood pulp and related 
products" (Malawi, Government, -1965, p. 10). , 
2. The eight controlled items are - sugar, meat, matches, petrol, 
medicines,, hoes,, ý 'milk and infant foods, and Carlsberg beer. 
Commodities which haveý no, control or recommended price are limited 
largely to fashion goods, certain- restaurant meals, custom-made goods 
and-those products for which the manufacturers have avoided requesting 
price inereases, (Njolwa, 1982, p. 21). 
3. This includes expansion of prem.., ises-on an existing plot or on a new 
site, and development of new products., More ýdetails about ýthe 
operation of industrial licencing in Malawi are given, in Appendix 8.1. 
4. Njolwals analysis, although not directed at the locational aspects of 
licencingýper se, is critical, lof, 
the government's laxity as he fqels 
that, opermission has, often. been granted to, economically non-viable 
projects. -ý ý- I _. -ý !ý- 
5. It 'is of ýinterest to, note 1 that , this was associated with a-large 
traditional, Housing Area development at nearby South Lunzu. This 
was established during the'1970s, but as with the Kanengo industrial 
estate in Lilongwe, -ýthe time-lag 'between the development of 
this 
residential area and the associated planned industrial employment has 
been too long, causing considerable inconvenience for South Lunzu 
residents who-are farýaway from any alternative employment. 
6. Njolwaý(1982), the Ministry of Trade's principal economist,, also makes 
reference to these centres as 'growth poles"., However 
his paper was 
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presented a month after Oksalls was submitted, and the section on 
locational analysis merely paraphrases Oksal's paper. 
7. One problem is that the government produced two plans for the 1981-85 
period: one reflecting the economic crisis, and another which depended 
on obtaining substantial aid, if this' turned out to be forthcoming 
during the period. I have not been able to assess either of these 
documents. 
Kasungu, for instance has received some investment in a large new THA, 
and the nearby elitist secondary school"(see Chapter 4), whilst Mzuzu 
has a large new hotel. 
A large proportion of private construction work in Malawi is for the 
government. 'From 1974-77'the share was'70% by value of work done, and 
from 1970 to 1982 (when a new system of coverage was introduced)it was 
40%. However this included engineering, repairs-and maintenance as 
well as building, and no locational break-down is available. 
10. These companies are regarded as part of the private sector, despite 
considerable CCDC involvement (CCDC, Annual Report 1980). No* CCDC 
buildings per se were built after 1979 (NSO, 1984). 
11. Employment and Earnings Annual Reports are'not published regularly in 
Malawi. In 1984 the latest available report was 1976 which gives 
detailed structural breakdowns, ' including the tertiary sector. Kaluwa 
(1981) gives some figures for 1977 and' 1978, - and 1979 and 1980 data 
were the most recent available from the Commissioner of Statistics 
(personal co=unication, 1984). 
12. Personal enquiries about the anomalies at the Ministry of Labour, and 
to Kaluwa (who has written on employment in Lilongwe) did not yield 
any satisfactory solution. The National Statistical Office just 
stated that the two series were not compatible. 
13. This view is opposed to that of employment planners who felt that the 
informal sector in Lilongwe was unlikely to exceed 10% of total 
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employment (Kaluwa, 1981, p-17). 
14. This topic was addressed in several ways and by more than one 
question as a cross-check, because it was suspected that, although 
unavoidable, the mention of Lilongwe's capital status as a possible 
motive might induce respondents to some form of 'post-hoc 
rationalization', leading them to cite it as a motive when originally 
it was not. 
15. Such evidence of course could depict the spatial extent of both 
spread and backwash effects. The economic effect of out-migration of 
potentially productive labour on the area of origin would depend on a 
number of variables, including the marginal productivity of labour 
there, and the value of cash remittances. 
16. Another firm which answered this question was an Asian business which 
had 'once had branches in five other small, centres, which had been 
closed due to the restrictions on Asian trading 
17. A possible exception was Malawi's main food supermarket chainýwhich 
had reduced its operations in Zomba whilst expanding them in, Lilongwe. 
- Zomba's stagnation in demand was caused by'its loss of capital'status. 
18. The original source of tobacco, sold onýthe Lilongweauction floors 
would not of course be confined-to Lilongwe district alone, but it is 
at this point that processing firms enter into the trade. 
19. Others affected in this way but-who simplyýchose not to invest at"all' 
were obviously not available for interview. The 'intimation that this 
had occurred sometimes has'already been made (Section. 8ý2.1)., and 'is 
clearly'a negative aspect of the policy. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This'study of Malawian urbanization contains two" major elements. 
First it has provided a geographical- analysis of the growth and 
development of urban centres in the country from the beginning of the 
colonial period to the 1980s. 'The study'of urbanization in Malawi has to 
some extent been neglected, due'to'the overwhelming predominance and 
importance of the rural sector, and the interest generated by aspects'of 
its political life. The, provision of a'detailed study of the urban sector 
was therefore an'important'objective,. '' Thisýlargely empirical element of 
the study has provided the basis for critical, "theoretical discussion of 
the nature of 'the urban process in Malawi., "The'second element ofithis 
study utilizes a variety of'approaches to Provide'6omparative'and'eritical 
analyses of specific aspects of Malawian urbanization'. Many of the 
theoreticalýconsiderations discussed in'the introduction have mouldýd'the 
direction of this se66nd"blement which inýparticulýL'r''presents'explanatoýy 
'insights into two ýmajor issues' of' Malawian''-urbanization: - its 
underdeveloped nature atýindependence, "and -the creation, of a'new capital 
city as the most'important government urban policy-after independence. 
9.2 -Urban"Processes During the-Colonial Period --. 2' %, 
It has been shown that only a-very low level of urbanization occurred 
during-the colonial period, and that'the'urban hierarchy-which had'evolved 
was characterized by a, low level 'of differentiationýevenýwhen compared to 
other coloni'Al -territories. At a macro-wlevel these , factors'-are 'most 
comprehensively'explained by adoption of structUralibtlapproach to the 
analysis of 'Nyasaland's economic development. Within 
'the' context of 
British colonial transformation'of its Southern-African -possessions, 
involving changes in the mode'of production, ' the accumulation of surpluses 
and thb'redirection of' colonial economies to becoming Primary'commodity 
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exporteis involved -in an international -economic system, Nyasaland - was 
relatively neglected. 'Without a major, mineral-resource base Nyasaland was 
not the-profitable proposition that, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa were--for British and other- investment capital. -The 
development of'-white- settler agriculture-in Nyasaland experienced many 
problems in the early decades of-colonial, rule and never g. enerated, large 
surpluses. The-number of white settlers in-Nyasaland- was too small to 
cause the partial conflict between the interests of external, and internal 
capital which had transformed the South African economy and to some extent 
the Southern -Rhodesian economy by the 1960s. These-underlying structural 
factors meant that Nyasaland experienced very little economic, development 
which would generate or demand, major, urban-based industrial and commercial 
development. -, ýNearlyý allý. that-did occur was inevitably and easily 
accommodated in the urban centre originally associated with the emergence 
of, estate agriculture in, Southern Nyasaland, i. e., Blantyre. 
, Nyasaland was essentially,, an economic backwater. The colonial 
authorities had little incentive'to expend- more than a basicminimumýto 
maintain administrative control and this formed-the, major force, v, for , 
the 
emergence of central places, - few of, which. -, merited the term 'urban'; 
Consolidation of these', settlements into, -functioning, urban, centres was 
hampered -notf, only by -lack of economic stimulus but "also by the 
considerable fluidity of administrative foci in the firstýcolonial decades 
as the location of. district administrative centresý, changed` regularly. 
Nyasaland's-dire economic, -circumstances have-been highlighted in-several 
historical studies, 'and its status', -is, lcharacterized by the,, - descriptive 
titles it has, been given: the Cinderella of Central-Africa, ; Lyfdý imperial 0 
slum (Vail, -1974), and 'everybody's hinterland' (Fetter, 1982; 1983). 
However Nyasaland's'unattractiveness for investment did not mean that 
it was, unaffectedýby wider structural-changes. The7imposition of. colonial 
taxation and the introduction of new consumer needs, combined with a lack 
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of cash earning opportunities in the domestic economy, forced hundreds of 
thousands of Nyasas into the Southern African migrant labour system. It 
has been argued in this thesis that this contributed a further depressive 
effect on urbanization in Nyasalandý. by a process of displacing those with 
the highest propensity to urbanize. Throughout the colonial period 
Nyasaland's involvement in the migrant labour system was both cause and 
effect of its continued economic underdevelopment. Once firmly 
established, migrant labour flows' on this scale have been shown to have 
markedly deleterious-effects on the development of peasant agricultures, 
and simultaneously prevent the transformation of economic and political 
structures which would have been necessary if the- migrants were to 
participate productively within their own society (1). 
It has been shown that Nyasaland's level of'urbanization was low even 
when compared to countries with more similar economic bases to-ý its own 
(Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). The difference may partly be explained by 
the lower level of colonial economic development in Nyasaland,,,, ýas well as 
its involvement in the migrant labour system. -However, ', Nyasaland -also 
experienced the imposition of a formalized political and economic bond 
with neighbouring territories in the form, of,,, the 'Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland for '1953-63, which has here, been argued -to', -have had 
significant effects-on-its economic and urban development. -The Federation 
placed, Nyasaland in a subordinate relationship to stronger economies which 
in turn were still satellites-of the colonial metropole. - Despite-, the fact 
that there were some economic benefits in-this arrangement for-Nyasalandj 
analysis of the strengthening of dependent links centred in particular on 
Salisbury, the Federation's capital, has demonstrated that Nyasaland'had 
been further relegated to the status of the periphery, of-a periphery., ý The 
main urban centres, Blantyre and Zomba, ý through 'which 
Nyasaland's 
surpluses were- channeled to the metropole and colonial 
decisions were 
exercised, were also weakened in this process. To a 
large extent they 
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merely became intermediaries in the structures through which international 
wealth and power transfers flowed, with Salisbury exercising many of their 
former functions. In adddition there is. evidence that whilst Salisbury 
experienced a major boost as a centre for commercial and industrial 
investment, Nyasaland's urban centres (which in this context largely means 
Blantyre alone) were greatly disadvantaged by the weakening of the 
territory's separate political and economic identity which, it is argued, 
had offered a degree of protection from Salisburyl, s competitiveness. 
These macro-level aspects of Nyasaland's. colonial urban development 
therefore need to be related to the regional and global economic and 
political forces which largely determined its status in, and relationships 
with, the capitalist metropoles. However at a more particularistic level 
analysis of the spatial patterns and nature of urban centres requires, the 
adoption of approaches which embrace the effect of local geographic 
factors and the perceptions, of key, decision-makers. 
The development of the Shire, highlands as the major centre of 
European estate agriculture was, determined partly by its environmental 
acceptability to the settlers and its relative accessibility. to-the major 
export route, the River Shire. It was inevitable that the major colonial 
administrative and commercial centres should locate in this area. However 
the unusual fact that the capital, city was spatially separate from the 
largest urban centre can only be understood in terms of the subjective 
perceptions of early colonial decision-makers, in particular Hawes and 
Johnston. Thus the choice of Zomba as capital has been shown to have 
involved considerations of its scenic location and a certain animosity 
between colonial administrators and the settler farmers. Although this 
meant that the polarization of urban development was less complete than in 
some other countries, it probably depressed Blantyre's potential growth 
and development by removing the extra fillip that an administrative focus 
would have added. The administrative function alone, on the other hand, 
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never proved to be sufficient to attract significant economic functions to 
Zomba. 
At the level of the district centres administrative-considerations 
largely determined their location., The non-nucleation of these centresi 
which tended to have their administrative, service and economic functions 
spatially separated, may have been one factor preventing the development 
in some centres of more specific, and complex central place-functions. The 
missionary centres, many of which located in remote areas partly due to 
denominational rivalry, further served to splinter the spatial occurrence 
of central place functions, as several of these developed into service 
centres in their own right. The generally -very low level of monetary 
demand from the rural hinterlands of most centres, due to-the early 
neglect of and low level of development of peasant cash-crop agriculture 
in most areas, must however have also depressedý the development of 
economic service functions in the administrative centres. 
At independence in 1964 Malawi inherited an urban system which 
exhibited two major characteristics: the split between Zomba and Blantyre 
at the top of the urban hierarchy, and a very low level of functional 
differentiation among the centres which formed the rest of it. Lilongwe 
and Mzuzu had some functional distinction as regional capitals, -and 
Lilongwe had also benefited from the-growth of peasant tobacco cropping in 
the Central Region. 
9.3 The Post-Colonial Urban Experience 
- In terms of Malawi's post-colonial urban experience this study-, 
has 
concentrated in particular on the transfer of the capital city from Zomba 
to Lilongwe. Thisýhas been, the major element of urban policy-in Malawi 
since independence, but a secondary aspect has-been -the development-of a 
specific programme directed towards the smaller centres at 
the-Iower end 
of the urban hierarchy. A further major consideration Anvolves the 
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question of how fast the process of'urbanization has been proceeding in 
Malawi since 1964. 
By the end of the 1970s when Malawi's 1977 census data became 
available it was usually suggested that Malawi was experiencing extremely 
rapid urbanization, and it appeared that this was true of all levels of 
the urban hierarchy. Whilst other African countries also experienced very 
high rates of urbanization at this time, it appeared that Malawi's was 
even faster at 8.4% per year from 1966-77. Yet it has'-been shown that 
most of the smaller urban centres in the country did not experience rapid 
growth over this period. Whilst Lilongwe's growth has been spectacular 
for special reasons, and Blantyre and Mzuzu have also experienced 
significant rural-urban migration it is suggested that a false impression 
of Malawi's urbanization has been accepted by many. In fact the Malawian 
government's policies to discourage urbanization may have been to some 
extent successful. 
Analysis of income data for rural and urban households in Malawi, 
largely based on the works of Ghai and Radwan (1983) and Christiansen and 
Kydd (1982; 1983), has shown that the income incentive for rural-urban 
migration in Malawi appears to be very small for the bulk of migrants 
who would be unable to get skilled jobs (although it should be noted 
that income inequality as a whole is very marked, as there are few 
controls on higher income levels (Humphrey, 1973; Ghai and Radwan, op 
cit)). The analysis of census figures taking into account boundary changes 
etc., has indicated that urbanization has been occurring at a much lower 
pace than many thought (especially if Lilongwe's impact is excluded as a 
special case). Yet the large overestimate of the problem caused by the 
impression given by census data certainly affected the government's 
perception as evidenced by its quoted statement 
(see Chapter 4) about the 
perils of continued rapid rural-urban migration and its maintenance of the 
rigid wages policy. Government policies to encourage the development of 
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district centres to, divert migration from larger centres were thus to some 
extent based on, false assumptions, although of course this is no reason 
not to maintain the programme (although as shown in Chapter 4 it is 
suffering from 4 number of problems, nctleast of which is lack of funds). 
Overall therefore the impression that Malawi has been experiencing 
some of the fastest urbanization in Africa since independence is not 
sustainable. More recently the, government itself has recognized this as 
shown in the following statement: 
"In total, the poor and 
, 
scattered provision of social and economic 
services in the rural areas increases the migration of rural 
populations to the urban centres. But one should say that 
compared to other developing countries, this migration pressure 
is still on a low level. 
All the more it is now urgent to take action to influence 
this process, in such a way to- reduce the migration from the rural 
areas, though it will not be Possible to stop it compI2121yt- 
(Malawi Government, 1983, cited in Christiansen, 1984, p. 148 
(emphasis added)). 
However it is inherent in the last sentence that the government still 
retains the view that migration needs to be stopped. Christiansen (ibid) 
argues that such a view is not entirely justified. The government's 
negative stance on urbanization appears somewhat unwarranted, given the 
still low level of urbanization in the country. The need to develop the 
small district centres in order to achieve a more balanced hierarchy and 
spread of urban services, and the fact that population pressure on land 
may eventually lead to muchý more rapid migration and gre ater d emand for 
urban employment should be recognized. Maintaining poverty income levels 
in both the rural and urban sectors in order to contain urbanization (and 
allow high profit levels in estate agriculture) may have had some success, 
but clearly can be criticized as a policy which is hardly conducive to 
"development" in terms of the raising of living standards for the majority 
of the Malawian people. 
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9.4 Lilongwe: Comparisons and Conclusions 
The transformation -of Lilongwe effected by its development as 
Malawi's capital city has led to major changes in its population size,, 
employment structure and administrative and transport roles. Whilst 
several factors can be suggested to have influenced this decision, 
including Lilongwe's central position and theoretical potential as a 
growth centre and problems associated with Zomba's location, it has been 
argued that the initial stimulus for the move came from President Banda, 
whose personal motives cannot be, ignored. Therefore analysis of Lilongwe 
within an essentially positivist framework whick links it to theoretical 
considerations concerning its geographical location, transport 'role, 
relation to other urban centres and the nature and extent of the market in 
its agricultural hinterland can only give a partial explanation of its' 
choice. These factors do however give the context'within which the final 
decision was made, and furthermore are important influenbes' on' its 
economic development role. It is proposed to draw the final conclusions 
about the decision to develop Lilongwe'as an. ew capital city within the' 
context of a comparison with other new Afri: can capitals, whi - ch helps to 
focus discussion on some of the opinions expressed here about the factors 
involved in this -decision, by drawing attention to'certain elements of 
similarity and contrast in the experience of other African'countries. Iý 
Since independence' several African, countriesýhave relocated their 
capital cities. Some of the factors that lay behind these decisions"'are 
relevant to Malawi, although there are exceptions. ' One' 'problem"faced by 
most African countries is that their capital, cities ard'ess6ntially 
located according to colonial economic and administrative, imperatives. In 
many cases this led to the creation, of peripheral dapitalst"often on the 
coast, which were suited 'to the outward-looking, export-oriented' 
adminstration. Another problem, as suggested by Hamdan (1964), is that 
capitals often acquired a "'regional" rather than national character, as 
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they were so located that they tended to be identified with particular 
sections of the population (for instance the Yoruba in Nigeria, or the 
Kikuyu in Kenya). Also as centres of investment colonial capitals 
sometimes formed the nodes of regions ýwhich benefited from the 
infrastructure and 'development' associated with concentrations of 
European settlement (for instance the 'White Highlands' in Kenya, and the 
Shire Highlands in Malawi). Furthermore these cities are "the most 
evident fingerprints of Europe on African life" (ibid, p. 239), which may 
tend to detract from their perceptual appeal as symbols of independent 
national pride. 
Whilst these issues were not problematic for colonial governments, 
new national governments could less afford to appear obviously remote from 
their populations, or to ignore possible regional 'Jealousies caused by 
imbýýalances in resource allocation in favour of the core area centred on 
the old capital. Although most countries have retained their old 
capitals, which, represent major centres 'of fixed'capital, Mauritania, 
Botswana, Tanzania and Nigeria, apart from Malawi, have transferred their 
capital cities, and recently the Ivory Coast has followed suitý 
As in Malawi centrality has been one- factor influencing the location 
of the new capitals in Nigeria, Tanzania and- possibly the Ivory' Coast. 
Zomba's location -is not really peripheral in"the sense'that Lagos or Dar 
es Salaam are, but Lilongwe,, Abuja and Dodoma all have a clear advanatage 
over the, old capitals in*terms of their central locations. 'Even Gaborone 
is located fairly centrally in' relation to the distribution of'Botswanals 
population, although not; in terms of national" territory. 'For Tanzania 
ideological 'considerations related : to the ujamaa policy emphasized the 
centrality factor. TheýCapital Development Authority in Tanzania'states 
that Dodoma 'is, "at 'the heart of 'Tanzania's ujamaa 'effort .... and a 
government amongstý the people -is able to share their problems and 
progress, and, thus serve them better" (CDA, 1974, p. 6, quoted in Hoyle, 
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1979). 
, On the other hand Mauritania chose a coastal location for its new 
capital. Mauritania's new capital, programme was dictated by the fact that 
it had previously been administere&from an external-centre: St., Louis in 
Senegal. Botswana had suffered the smae problem as its colonial capital 
was Mafeking in South Africa. Mauritania's choice however still reflected 
the country's geographical and political needs. Alternative sites such as 
Rosso, Port-Etienne (now Nouadhibou),, and the more- central Tijigja and 
Afar were either too1naccessible, in such a large and sparsely populated 
country, or too close to either. the old colonial associations of Senegal, 
or to the threat of Moroccan interference. Nouakchott was at least on a 
main road and offered the advantage of being in the nomadic zone but 
relatively close to the sedentary southern population, and thus- not 
antagonistic to either of the major sections of the population (Pitte, 
1977). 
- In Nigeria where ethnic rivalry-is a severe problem, ýthe location of, 
the new capital was clearly influenced by the need to choose 4,, neutral 
location. Thus 'Abuja is in an,. area not-inhabited by any of, the major 
ethnic groups. To some extent ethnicity also played, a part in the"choice 
of Gaborone in Botswana, as it wasýaccessible, to six of the eight major 
tribes (Best, 1970), ý without-'being too 'closely associated with, a 
particular tribal territory, as -for example Serowe would have been 
(Gardner, personal 'communication, -1986)., However in Malawi, the capital 
transfer has shifted-the, administrative, focus-in favour of the, country's 
strongest ethnic, faction, "and the--,, President's strongest support base. 
This may -reflect Banda! s politicaltmotives'or, even subjective attachment 
to his 'home' area. Such factors appear, toýhave operated in, the, Ivory 
Coast too, 'Where Yamassoukro, near Houphouet-Boigny! s birthplace has been 
chosen as the site of their, new capital 
(West, Africa, 1983). 
The planning and finance of new ýcapitals alsoý provides-some 
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interesting comparisons with Malawi. 'Apart from Nigeria all the countries 
involved-are poor even by African standards (2). Mauritania and Botswana 
had-little, choiceý in incurring the cost'of their new, capitals, but, both 
Nouakchott and Gaborone were planned on a, smaller scale than Lilongwe. 
The cost of Dodoma in Tanzanaia however, has led to internal criticism 
about expense (CDA, 1975) which has ýbeeni far greater than-originally 
expected. - Dodomals completion was planned for, 1980 but building has been 
severely curtailed by'lack, of finance,,, andýalthough it is now the official 
capital,, Dar es Salaam remains the- seat of government. As in, Malawi, 
Dodomals cost-can onlyý'have served, to exacerbate the repayment and foreign 
exchange, problems faced byýTanzania, -and'here up until, the middle, of 1986 
ideological commitment%, discouraged-, the government from accepting IMF or 
World Bank terms to alleviate its financial position,, as,, Malawi did--in the 
early 1980s. .ýIj1,1 1 
In Nigeria Abujals plannedýenvironment, carries strong, connotationsýof 
a massive-prestige project,, where considerations, of expense, or--indeed the 
opportunity to'develop a new, --ýform 'of 'African' city -in harmony with 
indigenous income levels and aesthetic preference<have, -been'spurned in 
favour of the most modern ý'Westernl. construction and planningInfluences 
on all aspects,, of,, Abujals-., development,, from, - transport, to office 
buildings, -to the, nature of, -the-drainage,, - system (Moore, ' -1982).,., However 
whilst Abuja was planned in a time, ofýconsiderable financial-, optimism in 
Nigeria, more recent years have seen aconsiderable''change'due'to theýoil. 
price falls, and it appears that this-is'delaying Abujals, progress. ýý- 11 
, Abujals planning was done by, foreign consultants,, and. ýIthis dependence 
on outside planningl,, formsý a common element in new capital construction, 
and was also true for -Malawi. ' Ilthough Lilongwe's Master Plan was partly 
changed by local planners, it has been argued', ' that the, South African 
influence on the plan remained strong leading to zoning and transport 
problems which need not have arisen. The dependence'on,. outside planners, 
. 
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which also" occurred in TanzAnia; is, an obvious, paradox *when it is 
considered that these new capitals, -are all meant to ýbe symbols of 
independence and national pride. Doherty (1976) has been heavily critical 
of' the implications 'of this' factor for' Dodoma. ý He'feels that "the 
privilegedý position and newlyý acquired wealth And power' of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie would be threatened by the implementation of a 
thorough-going social r6volution. ý.. *In the 'context of town'plannifik, the 
type of planning which perpetuates social distinctions-and'inequalities is 
recognized and accepted;: the ideological orientation of 'the capitalist 
based consultant planners'and that ofithe, indigenous bureaucratic stratum 
thus coincide and 'are -mutually supporting" (ibid, 'p. 11). On the-other 
hand Dodoma has been planned, to include mixed -neighbourhoods 'of, 'urban 
villages' which at least''in'theory should help to promote the community 
values'ass6ciated with Tanzania's brand of African socialism. Dodoma 
should also"'have, extensive -busways and a greater degree, ýof integration 
betweeen the old town site' and new capital centre than in Lilongwe'ý thus 
allowing-pedestrians easy-dcoess to, the functions of' both -(CDA,? '1976). 
Tanzania's proposals forýDodoma therefore appear to beýmore appropriate to 
its circumstances than is the case 'in 'Malawi, although a continued 
anti-squatter 6entiment'is common to'both new capitals. 
Gaborone's development included' strict zofiing, of 'even residential 
lands as in Lilongwe. Both' Botswana and Malawi' had a history of 
residential segregation-. on, ýL 'racial basis, and, -'this is- obviously a 
reflection of that Southern *'African, legacy. ' ý'Both countries had the 
opportunity to achieve', moreýbalanced', mixed residential*neighbourhoods as 
planned in-Dodomal and whilst, segregation on income criteria may not be as 
contentious as racial'segregation,, it-is'indicative of'an elitist'approach 
not wholly ýappropriate- to *any supposedly democratic and popular 
government. 
Nouakchott'lon the, other'hand has'been, called "modest by'the standards 
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of other formerý West African colonies". The majority of the housing 
consists of simple one-storeyed traditional dwellings, and. Mauritanials 
nomadic, cultures are represented by tents stretching right up to the city 
limits with many people commuting between urban, jobs and true encampments 
40-60 miles away (Wolfers, 1975). Much of Nouakchott's early growth was 
due to the effect of the 1968-73 drought which -led to the influx and 
increased sedentarization of previously nomadic people (Pitte, 1977). In 
1975 Wolfers (op cit) commented that there is a closer affinity*between 
Nouakchott and the rest of Mauritania than between most African capitals 
and their largely rural hinterlands. Whilst Tanzania in particular, and 
perhaps Malawi given-the rhetoric devoted to Lilongwe's supposed'impact on 
its rural hinterland, may have cause to feel envious of this affinity 
which is being specifically planned for in Dodoma, the now forced nature 
of this 'affinity' in the 1980s, accelerated further by the more-recent 
drought can only be viewed with sadness because of its cause. 
The issue of Lilongwe's growth centre-role can also be compared, to 
the strength and nature of the regional development role governments have 
expected of their new capitals in other-countries. Neither, Mauritania or 
Botswana considered directly the', regional planning implications, of their 
new capital sites, andýalthough, Gaborone and Nouakchott have grown rapidly 
and provided newleentres of urban employment -and'investment which might 
not have otherwise developed, there is little evidence that a wider role 
was envisaged. On the other hand the planning, of Dodoma and Abuja 
coincided with the upturn in interest given to -regionalýplanningissuesj 
and like Lilongwe, this forms a component of Tanzanials,, and Nigeria's 
capital projects, although the emphasis differs. 
Dar es Salaam and Lagos both represented a similar problem to that of 
Blantyre in Malawi, in terms of their overwhelming attractiveness for 
urban investment to the, detriment of other urban centres. In their case 
the problem was further exacerbated by also being the national-capital. 
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Dodomals development is clearly hoped to counterbalance Dar es Salaam, and 
a general aim of Tanzania's urban policies is to divert urban growth from 
Dar to a series of urban growth centres (Hoyle, 1979). ' The Capital 
Development Authority in Tanzania also emphasizes Dodomals ability to 
stimulate development in its surrounding region and states that "one of 
the principal reasons for the decision to transfer the national capital to 
Dodoma was to stimulate economic and agricultural progress in Tanzania's 
central, underdevloped but potentially productive heartland (CDA, 1976, 
p. 19). The CDA also conducted a major regional study of the 2500 square 
mile Capital City District in order to assist the implementation of the 
regional development programme, and suggested a number of projects which 
would be necessary if the capital was to become part of a truly developing 
region. Although there is no specific outline of an overall industrial 
policy directly related to 'growth centre, theory, 'there has been an 
effort to pinpoint regional resources which could be utiliied as 
industrial raw materials. It is apparent that Tanzania had a considerable 
commitment to achieving Dodomals potential as a growth centre, but there 
is as yet little evidence to show that is has suCceedbd. ' ' As that 
country's balance of payment problems deepened, during the 1980s, its 
ability to fund the Dodoma programme has' been limited, -'and Dar continues 
to grow rapidly and is still the most favoured lcoation for urban 
investment. I 
In Nigeria the original White Paper on the new capital emphasized 
centrality as the main criterion for Abujals choice'(Nigieria, G. 6vernment 
Committee, 1976), as the most fundamental objective' of'the new capital is 
to accelerate unity and integration of the nation (Africa, 1983). However 
it also made the point that Abujals development would be accompanied by an 
enormous number of new job opportunities and that it would form a growth 
point for the surrounding region. Yet there was no attempt, to go beyond 
this general statement to identify regional resources which might form 
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inputs for the capitaits' economy, nor I of the specific forward linkages an' 
urban industrial base'might have with its hinterland, as there'was'i'n 
Tanzania. Furthermore whilst the Minister' for the Federal Capital 
Development Authority stated in 1983 that Abuja would be not only a 
political capital but also a commercial and industrial centre, this was*on 
the grounds that "as it is the capital it 'will attract investment from 
several quarters" (Africa, op cit, p. '63), ' rather than any implication that 
its economic development would be guided or planned to; fulfil a more 
specific regional role. It appears that, to 'an even 'geater"degree than 
has been suggested for Lilongwe, the point made about Abujals growth point 
role in the White Paper was made without any real commitment or 
consideration of the theoretical elements of growth centres. ' Indeed it 
has even been suggested in Nigeria that"' indýstriaiization in'Abuja should 
not be an important element of that city's - development (Moore, 1982). 
Also as in Malawi where there -is evidence of continued lcommiýment to 
maintain Blantyre'"s economic 
'development, "Nigeria also expects Lagos'to 
remain paramount as a metropolitan centre, and has designated it as 
11special area" so that it is assured of continued Federal investment. 
The decision-making and planning for Lilongwe thus has' certain 
comparable aspects to other new capi'tais 'in Africa. '"'The theme of 
centrality or at least the need to be accessible to major sections of the 
population is common to all for example. However each of iýe ýew capitals 
have specific' characteristics which are uhique''and refleA the''po*liti'c'al 
and cultural values of 'their nations, and the historical backgrou I nd t10 
their inception. Political motivations involv4a' must differ" ab6ording to 
local ideologies and governments: in Tanzania the'refore the ideology 
behind'ujamaa has played a part'in Dodoma's planning In Nigeria Moor ,e 
(ibid) has strongly argued that political motivations for Generalqo&3*#% 
were paramount to the initial decision to create Abuja, and that later 
Shagari'S perceptions of Nigeria's political tension further Promoted its 
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development. However for Malawi the link between the national leader and 
the capital city programme has been even more clearly definedt-than 
elsewhere (for a more detailed comparisonýbetween Lilongwe and-other new 
African capitals see Potts, 1985b). 
In conclusion there are clearly two elements- -to Lilongwe's 
development since independpnce. These are its Aevelopment, ý as -a new 
national administrativeýfocus and secondly, growth and changes that have 
occurred in its urban'economy. The focus in this study in terms of the 
latter element has particularly been on whether these. are compatible with 
Lilongwe's expected growth centreý functions and its, ability to compete 
with Blantyre for urban investment. 
Lilongwe has undoubtedly succeeded in becoming, Malawils capital city, 
replacing Zomba in both physical and perceptual terms. The nation: now has 
a new central focus, which has considerable symbolic appeal as, -, a national 
achievement, and as concrete evidence of a, shift away from,, colonial 
development patterns which had for so long favoured the, Southern,, Region-. 
In the Malawian context Lilongwe has now become a major city, although its 
very rapid growth has not been unaccompanied, by problems. The CCDC's role 
in Lilongwe's development was central but it, has, been shown that thisýbody 
faced a number of institutional and financial difficulties. However it 
has to be rememebered that ýthe CCDC-was facedwith implementing-a plan 
which had a strong South African influence, -even after some- redesign by 
local planners. As South Africa also maintained itsýinfluenceýthrough 
personnel in the CCDC itself, and was the source, of, the original loan,, it 
has been directly and indirectly influential on Lilongwe's development 
from inception on. , This has been combined. with-theýfact that, Banda's 
close association with the project determined that its . visual, appeal, was 
linked to his personal prestige. , 
Lilongwe is- thus, characterized by 
artificial segregation of residential zones, and a new CBD and national 
administrative zone which is not integrated with the old town, and 
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separated from low -income residential areas. The peripheral location of 
the newer low income" areas16 an obvious parallel with the morphology of 
the apartheid city (Davies, 1981). Apart from the 'contentious 
implications "of -: §uch zoning'in' an independent African country, the 
practical ramifications'for the majority low income population are very 
difficult when', th6 state has'neither the 'funds nor the commitment to 
provide 'sufficient '-public 'transport capacity'and subsidies necessary to 
make siich a'system efficient. Ignoring local 'realities in this-way'for 
whate'ver'r6ason (political or aesthetic) is quite unjustifiable. , "' 
The provis'ion'of low income housing has also been shown to be a-major 
short fall of the"new capiial'programme'ý Criticism on this point should 
however -be 'tempered" byý', Irecognition'that'the choice of site and service 
schemes was the most appropriate" for'Malawils circumstances. Despite the 
arguments that such programmes shift the cost of construction onto the 
shoulders of those least able to bear it, and also recognizing that the 
simultaneous' 'subsidization of "medium' income housing for -government 
employees misallocates scarce resources, it has to be accepted, that the 
CCDC's'financial'situation would 'have 'rendered any other option largely 
inviable and'thus further heightened the housing problem. ' Nevertheless 
the CCDC, faced with'massive competing, "claims on its, finances and guided 
by essentially commercial considerations" to--favour potentially profitable 
investments could be reagrded as institutionally, incapable of fulfilling a 
commitment to low income'housing schemes which'do-not bear a profit. The 
possibility of corruption, 'as suggested, ýbk the 6vidence-on unorthodox and 
illegal plot allocation in-ýthe low income housing areas, ' is''thereby 
heightened and this'presumably' has allowed- some sort of-monetary'return 
(ie. ' the housing shortage could be both cause, and effect of corrupt 
practices) - although' it' is impossible to determine'how far the CCDC was 
directly involved. 
Thus whilst the'estdblishment of capital development authorities for 
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new capital progrmmes yields some benefits, low income housing may be 
neglected unless the authority either has a real commitment (perhaps 
ideological or politically imposed) to this issue, or government funds are 
specifically assigned to it either underthe auspices of the authority, or 
an, alternative body. The latter option may also yield advantages if its 
nature is likely to attract aid funds specifically for low income housing. 
The CCDC in Lilongwe, as a profit-seeking parastatal, had not attracted 
aid funds which might have been available for some of its responsibilities 
- and furthermore found it difficult to raise loans on external markets at 
soft rates. As- has been shown this caused the CCDC to incur large debt 
repayment problems, as well as unorthodox commercial practices, to raise 
funds through property companies, which have involved a financial burden 
being placed on both the government (because-of rescheduling of government 
loans owed by the CCDC) and the national banking sector which guaranteed 
property company dividends. 
,. It has also been demonstrated thatýthe costýof-the Lilongwe programme 
has far exceeded the original ýestimates - ,a ýfurther 'common element 
amongst new African capitalsý. Some of the projects whichýhave, been argued 
to be directly associated withýLilongwels new, status such as the airport 
and railway, have attracted, -overseas aidýin: the form of'soft loans, but 
the analysis of the proportion- of development -expenditure 
Lilongwe has 
commanded must lead to the conclusion that it, has-contributed, inýno small 
part to the foreign exchange and, balance of payments- problems, faced 
Malawi by the late, 1970s, -, which led to theý, imposition, of anýausterity 
budget during tle 1980s and the intervention, of the. IMF and World, -Bank. 
Analysis of the fulfilment of Lilongwe's growth centre'ýfunction, as 
examined by the testing of hypotheses regarding its'economic development 
in Chapter 8,, toý some extent setsýaside the question of whether growth 
centres have any theoretical validity. Growth,, centres clearly fall within 
the context of the trickle-down diffusionist model- of neo-classical 
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development theory, but throughout the, less developed world such an 
idealized concept of the development process has become increasingly 
questionable as regional and income inequality increase. Although-growth 
centres lend themselves particularly well, to the implementation of 
regional planning policy, there are now many instances of growth centres 
which have-not worked, and their continuing popularity must in part be due 
to the 'absence of any -alternative policy-oriented theory. A major 
problem, 'despite the obvious appeal of-the theory, is the very imperfect 
understanding of how the processes of-the industrial multiplier effect-and 
trickle-down work . (Thomas, 1972; Appalraju and Safier, 1976;, Mackie, 
1982). It is therefore perhaps not, very surprising that countries like. 
Malawi have seized upon the model, but have paid little, attention to the 
creation-of theýspecific conditions, that might promote such mutliplier and 
trickle-down effects. 
Dependency theorists have opposed -the concepts -of. -diffusionist 
development theory. Their, model-of underdevelopment-in which surplus is 
extracted from less developed countries through, a chain of, urban centres 
to their sub-metropoles and thenceito the industrialized metr. opoles of, the 
capitalist world, essentially see, urban centres as exploitative in 
nature, in direct opposition to the tenets of growth centretheory. The 
impossibility, of full development of capitalist industrialization in the 
Third World is also central to their theories. - Howeverý Malawi cannot be 
expected to have paid much attention to these ideas given the ideological 
nature of the state, which is essentially capitalist and does not pretend 
to pay even lip service to the popular concept of African socialism. -- 
Warren's (1973 ) arguments that capitalist industrial development is 
possible in the Third World were also developedý within a Marxist 
framework. Whilst these might be viewed as giving credence to the concept 
of the industrial, development effect in growth centres, they do 'not 
however support their regional development role given that this theory 
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emphasizes the exploitative and painful nature of the capitalist process. 
The description of Lilongwe as a growth' centre therefore was no 
guarantee that the regional development envisaged by policy makers would 
take place, ýeven had local conditions been conducive -to theoretical 
success and, had the government been more committed to the policy. However 
as discussed in Chapter 8 Malawian economic circumstances-in'many ways 
call the application of such a theory into question. Attention has"been 
drawn to the small size of the economy as a whole, -the paucity of the 
domestic market which places a-severe demand constraint on the industrial 
sector, and the lack-ofýlocalýindustrial and capital'resources which make 
it virtually impossible-to identify a "key propulsive industry" which 
could serve as an industrial,! inductorl in Lilongwe. These factors'ar6 by 
no means unique to Malawil-and'it is'suggested, that, many African countries 
(including Tanzania for example) should recognize that-even if they! accept 
the validity of growth*centre the6ryi, this does not in,, itself meanýthatlit 
is an appropriate regional'. planning tool for, all countries. 
The drastic falls-in industriall. production and'employment-l-'in the 
second half of the 1970s, ý in-Malawi also did not bode well for Lilongwe's 
industrial development. - A'furtherýproblem, beyond Malawils, control: but 
very relevant to an industrial', process which' must largely, -depend on 
imported components, is the general-instability of the-'Southern African 
region as a whole, - which has caused'continuous disruption, of its vital 
transport routes. 
Apart from these-general considerations'however-iit, ý, -is,, also"eviderit 
that the government itself, has taken an ambiguous-stance on Lilongwe's 
growth centre, as opposed to, its national administrative, -role.,., 'Policies 
to induce industrial development in; Lilongwe, 'and, in particular to-reduce 
Blantyre's competitiveness,, have-taken the form, of -the -control of 
industrial licences and the limitation-,, of industrial land-availability in 
Blantyre, but it has been-shown' that neither of these policiesýhave been 
412 
effectively used, and both have now been relaxed. There has also been no 
apparent attempt to ensure thatý týe industrial''lic6nees granted in 
Lilongwe would lead' to the establishment''of industrial concerns with 
regional links, such as production of agricultural inputs. Even the 
Industrial Development Guid elines'of "the '1980s, pay no special attention 
to Lilongwe's industrial development, and make' no-'mention 'of its growth 
centre" role. The fact that ADMARC essentially, controls agricu , Itural 
inputs from AGRIMAL in Blantyre"obviously decreases'the potential for such 
development anyway, ' and further highlights the problems of the small 
market which makes "such a monopoly *possibl'e 'arid 'potentially more efficient 
in allowing for economies of scale. On the other hand Kydd-'(1985, p. 34) 
has stated that inputs supplies to the'agricdltural sector havebecome less 
efficient and that there is a ease for reducing ADMARC's dominant position 
in this respect, 'by either 'permitting or promoting'competition., If this 
should occur, perhaps due, to World Bank pressure- which in particular has 
paid attention 'to reorganization of' Malawis parastatals, ''this'-could 
greatly improve the prospects for real links betw"ednýtilongwe'sý-industrial 
Iý4 sector and its rural hinterland. 
This study has also illuminated certairi, factors' relevant' to-private 
decision-makers in the industrial sector which it'is clear' the government 
had not taken into-account. Lon`g-ýstanding ', residential ties, and the 
perception of land costs in Blantyre and"Lil'6ngwe"'were clearlyýimportant 
to such decisions., The behaviour of key induitrial'concerns, particularly 
Press, were also'viewed as influential factorsý`ifi'determining Lilongwe's 
competitive position.,, ' Unorthodox land transactions, in Blantyre'"also 
distorted'the theoretical': advantage-that-Lilongwe might haveýlhad`in this 
sphere. The perceptions"of discrimination in the Asian community were 
also important in decision-making, although-essentially unquantifiable. 
Such factors may well'-operate in other cOuntries, -although being largely 
behavioural, local- ethnic' and residential'patterns ý'would make' their 
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effects very variable. II 
, However whilst Lilongwe has clearly not succeeded as a growth centre 
in the classical sense, it is here proposed that its economic role within 
the urban hierarchy in Malawi has been- greatly enhanced since its 
development asthe capital.. As, has been, shown there is evidence that-in, 
some spheres, Lillngwe's record has equalled or exceeded Blantyre's. The 
A 
massive construction has been a major factor - as indicated by the 
analysis of building plans passed and, completed in both cities. Despite 
Blantyre's competitiveness -in the private sector for building, 
unsurprisingly -Lilongwe's public building and statutory body construction 
programme has attracted far, more resources, although construction has 
often been delayed. Rapid, growth rates of., employment have been recorded 
in all sectors, although- these, have varied over- the .., years. The boom in 
construction employment, combined with -4uge increases in the'number of 
tertiary sectorýemployees, many related to Lilongwe's administrative rolei 
have greatly boosted- internal demand for the,, service sector and 
internal industrial, production - for local demand. Lilongwe has also 
provided a -market 
for local agricultural producers for-food., ýýAlthough 
clearly the geographical,. extent of this impact is limited, t-. it was- one 
factor identified by LLPP, officials as ai, benefit to their, programme. 
Furthermore analysis of the nature of the, industrialýsector does indicate 
the existence of internal backward and forward linkages on a small-scale, 
and the operation of an, in44strial mutliplier effect, of,, which, local 
industrialists are aware. ýAlpo whilst ýthe evidence of linkages to 
Lilongwe's agricultural, hinterland are . largely disappointing ) an 
important 
element of Lilongwels, industrial, sector has been, the establishment, of 
the tobacco auction floors in, competition, with Limbe,, as a direct result 
of government policy. This at least does-provide, an ýimportant, backward 
link to the rapidly growing tobacco production, sector. -,, 
Although Lilongwe's industrial sector-does remain small in comparison 
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to Blantyre, and all the evidence suggests that the latter's 
competitiveness has re-asserted 'itself and will- be maintained, Lilongwe 
does now have an established industrial base' which has reduced the 
polarization of such 'development in Blantyre. Kydd (1985) states that 
there was a surprising degree of buoyancy in Malawi's import-substituting 
consumer goods industry in 1984, which he links, to the raised real incomes 
of the upper third or so of peasant farmers resulting from the maize price 
increases in particular. 'Relaxation of price controls on many basic 
industrial products such as clothing, soap, furniture, stock feeds, and 
mattresses in September 1983 Ubid) may have also played a, part, and 
therefore Lilongwe's newly established industrial base may be improving, 
as the key constraints of profitabiity and demand have eased slightly. 
The surveys undertaken have also established that Lilongwe's 
transport development has played a part in attracting industry. The 
railway has allowed the development of a heavy industrial zone for 
example, although its construction has been argued to'be largelyýa, result 
of the new capital aspect of Lilongwe's development, rather than its 
growth centre role, and its extension to the Zambian border can only yield 
real benefits for Lilongwe if it-is eventually connected with the Zambian 
network. Interestingly the new international airport, which might-be seen 
as less directly influential on industrial development, which-has been 
criticized as a prestige project and which is undoubtedly underutilized, 
does however' seem to be perceived within Lilongwe as a major benefit. 
Several industrialists felt that their operations could be expanded when 
it became operational (as it now is). Perhaps more significantly in terms 
of Lilongwe's economic role in the urban hierarchy as a whole is the fact 
that, although Blantyre has clearly retained its position as the centre 
for industrial decision-making as the locus of most multi-branch firms, 
headquarters, there was a clear indication that several firms felt that 
the airport (rather than Lilongwe's capital status) was sufficient cause 
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for transfer of their headquarters to Lilongwe. 
There is therefore a relationship between the two elements of 
Lilongwe's development outlined above. Its development as the national 
capital has involved major infrastructural investments which have fed 
directly and indirectly into the creation of a stronger and more varied 
economic base. Thus although it is proposed that a new capital programme 
per se cannot be used as a surrogate for a regional development policy, 
in Lilongwe's case associated projects have boosted its economic 
development. The relocation of the administration has drawn with it an 
allocation of transport and construction resources which have allowed a 
degree of deconcentration within the urban system. Zomba's failure in 
this respect therefore was not a definite indication that administrative 
development could not entail economic spin-offs. Lilongwe has not 
succeeded in the strict terms of a growth centre, but within Malawi the 
dominance of the agricultural sector must dictate that essentially rural 
development programmes and policies, and attention to the smaller service 
centres, should be the prime focus of attempts to promote greater regional 
equality. It is probable that Blantyre will remain the most economically 
efficient place for much urban-based investment, but Lilongwe can now 
provide a degree of competition, and has succeeded in providing a new 
national focus more likely to create a feeling of national pride and 
identity than the entirely colonial creations of Blantyre and Zomba. 
Notes for Chapter Nine 
1. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia it was necessary deliberately 
to underdevelop peasant agriculture in order to force labour into the 
market in sufficient quantities (Arrighi, 1970; Bundy, 1979). However 
in many parts of Nyasaland conditions for migrant labour were already in 
force. Even where settler agricult"re demanded local labour the colonial 
1% 
government sometimes had to intervene to prevent migration out of the 
country in order to maintain local supplies, although massive Alomwe 
immigration from Mozambique greatly eased the settlers' labour problems. 
2. The Ivory Coast of course has greater financial capabilities but its 
new capital programme is not yet clearly defined. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
Estimates of Migrant Labour from Nyasaland- 
Methods of estimating the total , available male 
labour force for 
Nyasaland varied and this effects the calculation of the proportion of the 
labour force abroad at any one time. For, the earl " 
ier years in Table 2.2 
the criteria used was merely the adult male labour force and it is 
difficult to tell whether any age limits were set or allowance made for 
those unable to work through illness etc. It seems likely that no upper 
age limit was set as for the year 1945 (a census year) a total of 390,000 
adult males was estimated to be living in Nyasaland (the de facto adult 
male population) and the estimated male labour force, is given as 513,000. 
The missing 123,000 is the number givenýas working abroad (including some 
in this particular year still on military service becaue of World War II). 
It is possible that some underestimation of the proportion of the true 
male work force abroad occurred then, because the estimated total male 
labour force probably included a section who were too old or , 
unfit to work 
and who would remain in Nyasaland. Only able-bodied men would be likely 
to obtain jobs abroad. From 1948 on the estimates made were', for 
"able-bodied manpower" and so the calculated percentages are likely to be 
more accurate representations of the proportion of the male labour force 
absent in each year. 
The estimation that over a third of the male labour force was absent 
in the years after the war was made, on the basis of data, taken directly 
from the Colonial Report records. Aý1958 estimate by the 'Jack' Report, 
the federal economic survey of Nyasaland, was rather less: 20-25%. 
However this calculation was made on the basis of an estimate of adult 
male taxpayers as a surrogate for the Nyasaland male labour force, which 
would include some unable to work. Also this estimate of 615,000 included 
an unknown number of the 153,000 absent in Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
at that time, and a 'guesstimate' of 75,000 is used in order to arrive at 
a percentage absent figure (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959). 
This is regarded as less accurate than using the contemporary colonial 
records. 
a 
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APPENDIX 2.2 
The Recruitment of Migrant Labour from Nyasaland 
The conditions under which migration occurred from Nyasaland varied 
according to the destination. Southern Rhodesia was always the most 
important, oestination, followed by the Union of South Africa, and then 
Northern Rhodesia. , 
The main destination for the-few workers ýgoing to 
'other territories' was Tanganyika. 
A certain proportion of those who went to Southern Rhodesia, went 
under contract but the majority simply left Nyasaland and found a job 
there when they arrived. In 1938 it was estimated that only 3,000 of the 
72-75,000 Nyasa male workers in Southern Rhodesia were contract labourers. 
The proportion of contracted workers did gradually increase although very 
few organizations were, permitted to recruit in Nyasaland, and those that 
did usually operated under a quota system. WENELA was one such, and in 
1946 the Southern Rhodesia Agricultural Native Labour Ltd. was allowed to 
recruit up to 5,000 workers.. Later the main Southern Rhodesian recruiting 
body was the Rhodesian -Native Labour Supply Commission, which, for 
instance, had. a quota of 8,000 workers in 1954 which had increased to 
14,000 by 1958. A few selected Rhodesian companies. could also recruit 
workers, and in 1956 a special allowance was made to permit the 
recruitment of up to 8,500 labourers for the Kariba dam, -although only 
2,843 and 2,203 were obtained in 1956 and 1957 respectively. It is 
probable that the Nyasa worker preferred in fact, to work uncontracted,, as 
a contract impliedthe imposition of various restrictions on his freedom to 
come and go, and use of his wages. Often it proved impossible, to fill the 
quotas permitted as in the example of the Karibaýrecruitment drive. In 
1947 a Tripartite Migrant Labour Agreement between Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland'was established and enforced from 1949 until its 
termination in 1960. This governed the conditions of work of, uncontracted 
labourers and was geared more to the protection of economic' and social 
life in the migrant's country of origin than to his-own individual 
interests. It provided for deferred pay and regular family remittances 
and repatriation after two years of, all- single or unaccompanied men. 
Despite encouragement of family migration by the Nyasaland authorities, 
the general rule even for uncontracted workersýin Southern Rhodesia was 
for men to migrate alone leaving their. family in. Nyasaland. Supportýof 
their dependents was enforced by this agreement, and backed up by the 
system of identity certificates which had to be obtained before any 
departure. This allowed the issuing officer to identify those with family 
obligations and to ensure that some provision was made for dependents; for 
instance, by the preparation and planting of 'gardens' as Malawian 
agricultural plots are usually termed (Nyasaland, 1959). 
All migrant workers to the Union of South Africa were contract 
labourers, and WENELA was the only body allowed to conduct recruitment in 
Nyasaland for the Union. Recruitment to South Africa fell over the period 
in question: in 1960 14% of the male migrants from Nyasaland were in South 
Africa, compared to 33% in 1947 (the respective proportions in Southern 
Rhodesia being 71% and 56%). Absolute numbers also displayed a downward 
trend from 1947-53. However in 1961 more identity certificates were 
issued to migrants going to South Africa than to those going to Southern 
Rhodesia (Table 2.4). This reflects the downward trend of applications 
for certificates to Southern Rhodesia from 1956 on, which may partly have 
been due to the relatively more permanent nature of migration to Southern 
Rhodesia as some workers did take their families 
(a situation obviously 
impossible in South Africa). Official reports also attributed the fall to 
"unsettled conditions in Rhodesia and the increasing difficulty 
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experienced by Nyasaland Africans in obtaining secure employment" 
(Nyasaland, 1960, P-32). This latter factor can be related to 
the underdevelopment of the Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia, which by the 
1950s had made it much easier for employers to obtain local labour in that 
country (Clarke, 1974). 
The WENELA quota was increased from only 4,000 in the late, '1930s to 
12,750 in 1946. The quota fell thereafter, presumably reflecting labour- 
needs in Nyasaland, but then rose steadily and was finally abolished in 
1960 to relieve the unemployment which occurred in Nyasaland in that year. 
This unemployment possibly occurred as a result of the drop in employment 
opportunities in Southern Rhodesia as mentioned above. It was also about 
the same time tht new migration to Southern Rhodesia peaked that WENELA 
began to fill its quota allowance; up until 1955 WENELA had never 
succeeded in doing this which may have indicated a reluctance to migrate 
to South Africa if alternative, and especially non-contract, opportunities 
were available, despite the higher wages offered. One can only speculate 
as to why earlier quotas were not filled. Possible factors at work, were a 
dislike of apartheid (a factor which definitely caused African Nyasas to 
resent the Federation which they felt might allow the spread of this 
system); the greater distance and less familiar climate which had to be 
contended with; and the non-availability of casual employment without a 
contract. Nyasas only represented a small proportion of South Africa's 
foreign labourers, and by 1962 the mines had reached temporary saturation 
point and recruitment dropped (Nyasaland, ý 1962). The number of 
foreign-born male Africans in South Africa (who would mostly be employees) 
in 1946 and 1960 has been estimated at 435,000 and 483,960 (Clarke, 1978, 
p. 56). If this is compared to the numbers of Nyasas estimated as being in 
the Union for those years they represented only 8% and 6% of these foreign 
males. Mozambique and Lesotho were far more important sources at that 
time: at least 173,000 Mozambiquans being in South Africa in 1954 
(Wastberg, 1963). Nyasaland was, however, an important source of labour 
amongst those who came from further north. In 1952 23% of the 31,000 
Itropicals' (foreign Africans recruited from north of latitude 220 S) 
employed in the South African mines were from Nyasaland, compared to 16% 
from Tanganyika, 10% from South West Africa and 6% from Barotseland 
(Wilson, 1972). By comparison, Nyasas formed approximately 30 % of the 
foreign able-bodied male Africans in Southern Rhodesia in 1951, and this 
had increased to about 40% by 1958 (Report of -the Advisory Commission, 
1960, Appendix VI). 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Components of Population Growth in Blantyre 
The 1977 census provides information on the under one population 
still alive, born in Blantyre. A total of 8,243 were reported, of which 
7292 remained in the city whilst the remainder were resident elsewhere. 
To estimate the total number of births it is necessary to adjust for 
infant mortality, estimated in the World Bank demographic survey which is 
the most reliable source, at 136 per thousand in urban areas (Hill, 1982). 
The adjusted figures are 9364 and 8283. As a cross-check the number of 
births expected from reported fertility rates for urban areas in the 
Southern Region (of which Blantyre accounts for three-quarters of the 
population) was calculated on the basis of the estimated mid-year female 
population in the appropriate age groups: this gave &figure of 9156 which 
is in reasonable agreement with reported births. The average of the two 
figures (9364 and 9156) was used as an acceptable, approximation. The 
death rate for Blantyre was taken as that calculated from reported urban 
deaths in the Southern Region which was 11.1 per thousand. 
The mid-year population had to be calculated as it is the most 
applicable figure on which to estimate crude birthý rates. This was done 
on the basis of the 1977 census figure for the city (219,011) and the 
population which reported that it lived in Blantyre a year prior to the 
census (192,666). There is reason to believe that the latter was an 
underestimate as urban-rural migration has been undercounted (see Section 
3.2.4). However using the average of the two years would help to smooth 
out this imperfection to some extent. 
The crude birth rate calculated by this method, (total births per 
mid-year population) was 45 per thousand, almost identical to the national 
urban rate. When related to the crude death rate thi's gives a natural 
increase rate of 3.49% per year. 
The AAGR for Blantyre from 1966-77 was 6.4%. This growth rate 
appears to have been very steady throughout the intercensal period. Using 
data from the 1972 Blantyre City Population Sample Census, it is possible 
to calculate the 1966-72 and 1972-77 AAGRs as well. These were 6.5% and 
6.4% respectively. Relating the 3.5% natural increase rate to the total 
growth rates implies that net in-migration must therefore have accounted 
for around 55% of Blantyre's intercensal growth. 
Sources: 1. Malawi, National Statistical Office, Malawi Population Census, 
1977, Final Report, Volume 1; Zomba, 1980. 
2. Malawi, National Statistical Office, Blantyre City Population 
Sample Census, September 11-October 11,1972; Zomba, 1974. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
Categories of Urban Functions 
Three cate gories of urban functions were defined for the analysis of 
central places. The first category included a number of facilities which 
were assumed to*be the most important factors in determining the level and 
potential of the 'private' urban economy or commercial and industrial 
development. The centres were ranked according to their appointed values 
for the following services: retail and wholesale services, petrol and 
vehicle repairs, public transport, water and electricity, postal 
facilities, banking facilities, and hotel/rest-house availability. 
The second category relates to services which are part of the 
administrative and welfare structure of the centres. Their administrative 
functions depend largely upon their historical status in the colonial 
administrative structure, and most urban centres are the seats of the 
district administration. Yet relatively few have been designated as 
'towns' and have the advantage of being administered by a specifically 
designed urban institution: the Town Council. Other services included 
were protection, justice, health, education and community facilities. 
These are mainly provided by government, although religious missions also 
provide some facilities in the last three categories. 
Urban centres also act as focal points for the rural economy and the 
provision of these services is one of their most crucial roles in an 
agriculturally orientated economy. Thus a variety of services were 
considered: for example the location of agricultural project 
administrative offices and higher order veterinary services, of forestry 
and fishery stations, and of the produce depots and market of the 
government's agricultural marketing concern, ADMARC. The values assigned 
for the various functions are shown in Appendix Tables 4&, 4b, 4c and 4d. 
These functions and values are as used by the Town and Country Planning 
Department (1979). 
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TABix 4b 
POIRTS RETAIL AND WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION & CRAFTS 
D. C. Food market with permanent buildings 3 
Roadside market with no permanent buildings 2 
Grocerýies small I 
Carwteens small I 
Bars 1 
Maize mill I 
Saw mill 2 
Carpenter 2 
Other Craftsmen 2 
Specialist shops 3 
General stores - large 
Supermarkets 
Wholesale 3 
FIRST ORDER SECOND ORDER THIRD ORDER FOURTH ORDER 
30 + Retail 20-29 Retail 10-19 Retail Less than 10 retail 
Points points points points 
4 C. P. Point 3 C. P. points 2 C. P. 1 C. P point 
Points Points 
Tt, BI-E 4c 
Football Ground 
Children's playground 
Homecraft vorker 
Social Centre 
Co=unity Development Facility/library 
Hall 
CCAP Church 
R. C. Church 
Nosque 
-Artrllean -6hurco 
Public telepbone 
TABIE lud 
OTHERS INCLUDE: - 
Piped Water Supply 
Electricity Supply ( Escom - 3rd order i. e. counts at 2 points) 
Training Establishments (not T. T. or University) 
Research Establishments 
?. TP 
YICP 
Brick works 
Customs Post 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
Transaction flow analysis 
Transaction flow analysis interpets data on exchanges of information 
between areal -units. 
It allows all important or salient interactions to 
be identified, instead of only nodal flows. Salient flows are those of 
greater than expected strength, given the magnitude of total, interaction 
with the whole system of both the origin and destination. The expected 
interaction is based on the assumption of origin-destination independence 
and ignores the effect. of distance. , It is related to the proportion of 
Al tnteiactigns r We. centEe rigelved 10% o 
opliyed 
at each goiRt 
eoa num er n eractions ma en 
'system, 
t en_ is expecteg 
to receive -10% of the interactions made from each individual centre. 
If this value' is exceeded''by what- i's regarded to be a significant 
proportion then the interaction is considered salient. In terms of an 
analysis of telephone"calls this 'means that the proportion of calls from 
origin to destination is expected to be equal to the total proportion of 
all calls received at that destination. Bo , th direct and indirect 
associations can be, identified. Mutually salient centres would both have 
made more than the expected number calls to bne another. An indirect 
association would indicate that the salience wiis only one-way i. e. a 
centre would be indirectly 'associated with another if'it only received 
more than the expected number of calls, but did not send more. 
The'measure of salience used is called'the relative acceptance index, 
which is calculated from the following equation: 
AE 
RA 
E 
where A-is the actual number of transactions from on6'centr6 to another, 
and E is, the expected strength. of trafisactions between them: 
calls received.. x calls sent 
E 
all calls in system 
For this study an RA >, 2 was regarded a&Isalient. 
The method wasdeveloped by Savage and Deutsch (1960) and has been 
identified as being a useful indicator "of the- mutual relevancer of 
political units to one, another and of their potential, cohesion! l (Deutsch, 
1964). 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
Regression Analysis of Telephone Data 
The general supposition behind gravity model analysis is that 
interactions between centres, whether in the form of flows of goods, 
services, peopleý or information, will be strongly influenced by their 
relative 'mass' and the distance between them. The form of the regression 
equation generally used for this sort of analysis is: 
log(flowi, A+ blog(massý) + clog(mass3) + dlog(dist,: j 
The independent 'mass' variable used in the Malawian analysis is the 
population of each centre taken from the 1977 census. Hirst (1975, p-277) 
felt that population would be of limited predictive power as a measure of 
mass in Tropical Africa as it is often found that population size is not a 
"very discriminating variable in terms of the socio-cultural patterns, 
political power and economic activity of an urban system in the early 
stages of development". However attempts to improve upon the crude 
population mass variable, using numbers of telephone subscribers or 
central place mass in terms of functional importance, were generally found 
to decrease the explanatory power of the mass variable in Malawi. Hirst 
used a measure of industrial structure as his mass variable, extracted 
from a principle components analysis of the features of Tanzanian towns. 
A similar surrogate was not possible in the Malawian case as statistics 
are not produced for industrial employment in any but the largest towns. 
It was also found that the general practice of logarithmically 
transforming all the variables in the equation was not a satisfactory 
manipulation for the Malawian data. This manipulation is usual in such 
regressions as it tends to 'smooth' the difference between values when 
there is a large gap between the maximum and minimum- and thus tends to 
improve the total explanatory value Aielded (i. e. the rý valueli tHowever the range of population size for alawian towns was too sma o merit 
this treatment as it was found that this slightly decreased the variance 
explained. Instead the size values were divided by 100 in order to make 
the co-efficients more comparable to those for other values. The other 
variables were logarithmically transformed, the dependent variable being 
taken as the logarithm of calls between each urban dyad, thus yielding 
1024 dyads. As this formulation led to'a significant number of dyads 
being ignored, since no calls were registered, checks were done to ensure 
that the relative degree of importance of the dependent variable was not- 
affected by this manipulation. This was done by giving all 0 recorded 
interactions the value of 1 which could-be logarithmically transformed. ' 
comparison of the two sets of regressions showed that in fact the number 
of 0 interactions did not affect the results in any significant way. The 
distance variable was taken as the simple straight-line distance between 
centres. This was assumed to be a fair measure, rather than the more 
complex road distance, for telephone interactions. Hirst (op cit) for. 
instance found that further manipulation of, the distance variable in 
Tanzania only yielded very slight improvements in his regression model. 
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APPENDIX 4.5 
The Relationship between the District Centres Development Programme 
and other projects 
There is an attempt to tie in the district centres plan with-the 
operations of two rural development programmes which have ramifications 
for the centres' development: the National Rural Development Programme 
(NRDP) and the Rural Growth Centres Project (RGCP). The first is a 
national programme formulated and administered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and National Resources to improve production opportunities for 
the entire rural smallholder population, 80% of which was not covered'by 
existing major projects. This is administered through 8-10 
Agricultural Development Divisons (ADDs), with their headquarters at 
Karonga, Mzuzu, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Salima, Liwonde, Blantyre, Ngabu with 
possible plans to include Mzimba and Ntcheu. In addition the country is 
sub-divided into 180 Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) with a corresponding 
number of local small centreD for administration (Ministry of Agriculture 
and National Resources, 1976). These centres obviously provide a very 
useful foundation on which to base the "rural centres" of the DCDPIs 
proposals, as well as indicating which higher-order centres should be 
favoured, and should automatically ensure that these have special ties 
with ongoing rural developments. The development of these centres and the 
40 planned rural projects which will cover on average 4-5 EPAs, is to be 
completed in phases over ten years, starting in the early 1980s, and can 
therefore be linked with the phasing of the district centres programme. 
However there is some evidence that despite the compatibility of the two 
projects there has been a lack of attention to the need to ensure that 
they do not conflict. For instance the consultants for the DCDP indicate 
that instead of the district capitals of Mzimba, Nkhotakota and Ngabu, the 
nearby non-urban centres of Euthini, Dwangwa and Bangula should become 
sub-regional centres. The reasons given are that Euthini, although very 
low on most indices, falls within an areas of high agricultural potential 
because of tobacco estate development, whilst Dwangwa has a similar 
advantage over Nkhotakota because it is the Centre of the latest sugar 
development in Malawi. Ngabu falls just within Blantyre's sphere of 
influence and was therefore rejected in favour of the railway Centre of 
Bangula. However both Ngabu and Mzimba have special status under the 
NRDP, the former as an ADD headquarters, and the latter as an ADD 
sub-centre which may be promoted to headquarter status (ibid). Euthini 
only has EPA Centre status, whilst Bangula has not been selected under the 
NRDP. Similarly Dwangwa has not been selected as an EPA probably because 
it has little association with smallholders, whilst Nkhotakota has. 
Considering the emphasis put on the necessity of linkages between rural 
and urban centres by the consultants as a way of providing growth in both 
primary and secondary sectors, it is surprising that at the level of 
sub-regional centres, three centres may be neglected despite the existence 
of institutional facilities which definitely give them an advantage in 
this respect. 
The Rural Growth Centres Project is co-ordinated by the Development 
Division of the Office of the President and Cabinet, and financed by the 
German government (OPC, Development Division, 1980a). The project has 
three main objectives: to create focal points of development in remote or 
underdeveloped areas by providing social and economic services to the 
rural population; to give rural people an opportunity to participate 
better in local development activities and thus contribute to 
administrative decentralization; and to contribute to the integration of 
development activities of the various Ministries in rural areas (OPC, 
1978). The stress is particularly on improving service provision in 
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remote areas, on average not less than 40 miles from District Centres, as 
can be seen from the location of the 10 pilot centres in Appendix Map 
4.1. There may therefore be a political motivation behind the project as 
most of these centres are very near international borders. However this 
does mean that areas that might otherwise have been neglected by the 
proposals of the DCDP in terms of national coverage are provided with 
centres which generally fulfil the role of 'rural centres'. In addition, 
15 more centres were proposed for development from 1983/84, over a period 
of 5 years, to be located in areas so far not covered by the pilot 
centres, and efforts have been made to co-ordinate the choice of centres 
with the NRDP (OPC, -ul, 1980b). The centres will be provided with health and 
community centres, market and workshop areas, post offices, rest-houses 
and staff houses; and roads and water supply will be improved with the aim 
of making "the centres so attractive that residents do not leave the area 
to settle elsewhere where these services are provided - especially in the 
urban areas" (OPCl Development Division, 198 . Oa, Section 1). 
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APPENDIX 5.1 
Blantyre's Role in the Malawian Economy 
The estimates made by the Blantyre Planning Team for 1972 suggest an 
extraordinary degree of economic concentration in Blantyre. The estimate 
made for the, share of monetary GDP accounted for by Blantyre alone was 
66%. If the 24% contribution of agriculture to monetary GDP is 
excluded, this suggests that other activities outside Blantyre generated a 
mere 10%. This is obviously a very extreme situation. The method of 
calculating Blantyre's share could not be examined and therefore any 
analysis of the accuracy ' of this particular figure cAn only be 
speculative. There are for instance conceptUal problems involved in 
allocating some elements of GDP to a specific location (e. g. rail 
transport, the army). 
However in 1972 public services accounted for only 12% of monetary 
GDP, whilst industry, 'other services', and net indirect taxes contributed 
63%. It is feasible that Blantyre could have generated a very large 
proportion of the last three categories of production. 70% of the 
industrial and 'other services' categories was made up'from manufacturing, 
building and construction, distribution and banking and finance, and the 
vast majority of these by value would have been concentrated in Blantyre. 
For instance, in 1972, the value of buildings completed in Lilongwe was 
only 15% of that in Blantyre (NSO, 1978, Tables 10.9,10.11). In addition 
transport, which would have been less concentrated in Blantyre accounted 
for only 3.5% of monetary GDP. Considering that Blantyre would have also 
produced some proportion of public services as its share of government 
administration had not yet been affected by the move to Lilongwe, it may 
be that this estimate of its share of monetary GDP is not unre asonablep 
and certainly it can be assumed to indicate the rough magnitude of 
Blantyre's dominance of the economy at that time. 
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LONG-TERM BORROWINGS 
APPENDIX 6.1 
CCDC Loans 1980 
I 
1980 1979 
KK 
Government of the Republic of South Africa to 
Malawi Govt. and on-lent, 
Bears interest at 4% per annum and is repayable in a 
further 35 equal bi-annual instalments of capital 
and interest. 0 
Malawi Government: 
- Bears interest at 4% per anum and is repayable in a 
further 39 bi-annual instalments of capital and interest 
- Bears interest at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in 
twenty equal annual instalments of capital and interest 
commencing July, 1981. 
.1 - Bears interst at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in 
twenty equal annual instalments of capital and intereýt 
commencing November, 1982. 
- Bears interest at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in 
twenty equal instalments of capital and interest 
commencing September, 1983. 
Citibank N. A. 
Bears interest at 2.25% over the three month London 
inter-bank offered rate for Eurodollars and is repayable 
in a futher eight equal bi-annual instalments of capital. 
Bears interest at 2.25% over the three month London 
inter-bank offered rate forr Eurodollars and is repayable 
in a futher nine equal bi-annual instalments of capital. 
The loan is guaranteed by the Malawi Government. 
Bears interest at 1.875% over the three month London 
inter-bank offered rate for Eurodollars and is repayable 
in twelve equal bi-annual instalments of capital 
commencing April, 1980. The loan is guaranteed by the 
Malawi Government. 
4. Edesa 
10,539,247 10,539,906 
6,119,889 8,097,547 
1,445,939 1,327,762 
21661,233 2,437,230 
5811243 573,137 
974,807 1,18L, 172 
1,668,182 1,997,550 
10,523,903 10,195,329 
Bears interest at 10% per annum and is repayable in 
full in December, 1985. Edesa has the option at any 
time to require CCDC to transfer to Edesa 5,000,000 
10% preference shares in Capital Hotels Ltd. in 
settlement of the loan. 523,372 510,680 
Airport Development Ltd. 
- Bears interest at 8% and has no fixed terms of repayment. 848,087 , 2,828,556 
6. Old Mutual 
- Bears interest at 11.5% per annum and is repayable 
in 
thirty equal bi-annual instalments of capital and interest 
commencing March, 1981.309,615 
TOTAL BORROWING (LONG-TERM) 38,195,577 39,673,869 
source: CCDC, 1980, Annual Report. 
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APPENDIX 8.1- 
Malawian Industrial Development Since Indenendence 
In 1964 'Malawi's 
" 
industrial base was very limited, with the 
manufacturing sector reýtricted to tobacco and tea -processing on 
agricultural estates and a range of small, very basic manufacturing firms. 
The industrial sector as a whole (1) accounted for 13% of GDP, but the 
monetary manufacturing, sector for only 4% (Njolwa, 1982). 
Over the next ten years or so the industrial sector experienced very 
rapid growth rates, averaging 13% per year from 1964-73. This was partly 
due to the rapid expansion of estate agriculture which has occurred after 
independence (see Table A8.1), engendering a corresponding expansion in 
what may be termed agro-industries for export (AIE) (Oksal and Edwards, 
1980). The low initial national industrial base, and the construction 
boom for the new capital are other factors which, contributed to the rapid 
growth. -1, 
The rest of the manufacturing sector is largely accounted for by 
industries producing for domestic demand. Like many other less-developed 
countries Malawi accorded priority to an import-substitution strategy in 
early development policies. The government's general industrial 
development policy as set out in both the Industrial Development Act of 
1966 and the Statement of Development Policies 1971-80 is mainly aimed, at 
encouraging and enhancing the growth of the manufacturing, sector by 
private local and foreign investors and/or joint ventures with Malawian 
corporations. An extremely liberal approach has been adopted-in terms, of 
taxation and control on industrialization, and free repatriation-of: all 
profits is allowed after a 50% corporation tax (2). There was still 
plenty of scope for fairly basic manufacturing based on local demand and 
sometimes indigenous resources,, and government incentives certainly 
encouraged the establishment of a number of manufacturing enterprises, in 
the early years of independence which remain very important within the 
local industrial framework (3). 
Table A8.2 shows the structure of manufacturing output in 1973 when a 
national survey was taken, and this illustrates the importance of basic 
processing and import-substitution activities. However 
import-substitution strategies in the less developed world face many 
problems, and as elsewhere "proved to be of a limited scope in Malawi" 
(Njolwa, op cit, p. 4). By the end of the 1960s most -of the 
opportunities for large new ventures in demand-based industries, had-been 
taken up (Malawi Government, 1971, P. M., From 1968-75 it. ýis estimated 
that only 20-25% of new gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing 
went to new projects, the rest being expansion of existing industries 
(Oksal and Edwards, 1980). Analysis of these problems by Njolwa (ibid), 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry's principal economist, emphasizes- the 
restrictions imposed by the small size of the domestic market resulting in 
the perpetual protection of inefficient industries. Also the goverment's 
approach has been mainly beneficial to foreign comanies, and often costly 
to the local economy due to the heavy, and often government-subsidized, 
importation of capital and intermediate goods by foreign and local firms, 
and because the tendency to overvalue the local currency,, in-- order to 
facilitate these imports, made primary product exports less-competitive in 
the world market. 
As the weaknesses of the import-substitution strategy became 
apparent, I industrialization became only a secondary objective as Malawi 
opted for an outward-looking, export-oriented development strategy based 
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upon agriculture. Up until the mid '1970s the industrial contribution to 
Malawi's economic growth was impressive. It accounted for 18% of, GDP 
increase from 1964 to 1976, when its share of GDP had grown to 17%, and 
the manufacturing sector's share alone had increased to 13%., Total 
industrial employment had grown from'34,500 in 1968 (4) to 61,300 in 1976 
(23% of domestic wage employment), of which the private industrial sector 
accounted for 54,500. These official figures 'only included private, 
enterprises with more than 20 employees, and industrial''employment in 
smaller enterprises was estimated at a further 35,000 (Njolwa, 1982, 
p. 10), bringing total industrial employment to about 96,000. On the, other 
hand this was only about 5% of the 1976 estimated'economically active 
population of 1.7 million. 
I From 1973-76 however industrial growth slowed, averaging 5% per year, 
and the manufacturing sector in Malawi has been much less buoyant since 
about 1975. The index of gross manufacturing output in several categories 
actually fell in 1976 as shown in Table A8.3. From this table it can be 
seen that steady growth occurred in all manufacturing categories to 1975, 
but after this there is much less evidence of a strong upward trend, and 
downward fluctuations occur in all categories over the following seven 
years. In particular, 1982 saw falls in all but two categories (footwear, - 
clothing and textiles; export industries), neither of which appeared to 
expand much, if at all, in the following ten months of 1983. The 
strongest sector appears to have been the food, beverages and tobacco 
category - however it is worth noting that official statistics included, 
sugar production (much of it now for export) in this category, 'and that 
the production of a huge new sugar project (begun at Dwangwa in 1977) was 
fir 
, 
st included in 
- 
1981. Reclassification of this element would'improve 
the performance of the export industries,, and depress that of the food, 
beverages and tobacco category. 
This is to some extent reflected in 'TAble A8.4 which use&a limited 
body of data produced-by Oksal and Edwards (1980) which divides Malawian 
manufacturing into agro-industries for export (AIE, 'including sugar), and 
manufacturing for domestic demand (MDD). This shows that from 1969-75 the 
net ouptut growth of AIE was more buoyant than MDD, and according to Oksal 
and Edwards (ibid) this trend probably continued. Net ouptut for both 
sectors has been growing slower than gross ouptut, possibly due to the 
faster rate of price increases of imported inputs and a possible 
understatement of costs, and therefore overstatement of net output, in 
years prior to 1973. This might increase the net growth of MDD from 
1969 to 1975, but from 1975 to 1979 it could have been even lower than the 
3.4% gross rate shown (see footnote to table). It is therefore estimated 
that the share of monetary GDP accounted fok by MDD has remained static, 
or decreased slightly from the 17% share in 1972. 
Lack of detailed and reliable data on the growth of the manufacturing is 
a' problem (ibid). However one fairly good data base is industrial 
licences. These are the principal government control mechannism on new 
manufacturing investment in Malawi. The licencing is governed by the 1966 
Industrial Development Act and was originally designed primarily to 
regulate sectoral investments, avoid investments in saturated domestic 
markets, prevent the establishment of uneconomic firms, and restrict firms 
with large import: value-added ratios. All industries engaging more than 
10 persons, or using more than 25 horse-power machinery have to apply for. 
licences before they set up, or before expanding an existing enterprise. 
Table A8.5 and A8.6 show the industrial mix of granted licences between 
1967 and 1981, as well as theirastimated capital cost and number of 
employees. The numbers of licences granted per year shows no upward trend 
after 1970, averaging out at about 14-15 per year, nor is any significant 
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trend displayed in investment or employment. Specific large-scale 
projects associated with the AIE sector (two of which are related to 
Dwangwa) account for the figures for 1977,1978 and 1981. The pattern 
therefore parallels that of the indices of manufacturing output, since 
there is a time lag between establishment and output. 
In terms of the sectoral mix of new production, the food and 
beverages sector, and clothing and textiles are important. However 
agricultural implements and engineering had the largest number of new or 
expanding enterprises over the period, although average capital investment 
here was quite low. The investment and employment impact of the 
above-mentioned projects is again evident. Overall employment generation 
has been unimpressive, and productivity per employee-is also estimated to 
have stagnated in all categories, except in tea processing which has 
experienced a marked improvement (ibid). Employment in manufacturing, and 
also in building and construction registered a marked decline in the early 
1980s as shown in Table A8.7. This parallels the general picture of 
declining output: the sharp fall in manufacturing employment in 1977 may 
be linked to the 1976 manufacturing slump. 
A slowdown in the growth rate of the manufacturing sector was 
probably inevitable, given the constraints on import-substitution in 
Malawi already discussed. However other factors have contributed to the 
unfavourable performance since 1975/76. One problem is that the AIE 
sector may be facing supply-side constraints. Expansion of estate acreage 
has fuelled its development and the current land shortage implies 
restrictions on this growth and not break-through in productivity. appears 
imminent (ibld). In the short-term there is also no expectation that any 
alternative cash crops are likely to challenge or even supplement tobacco, 
sugar and tea. 
The slow growth, which in some areas has amounted to stagnation or 
decline,. in manufacturing in Malawi during the later 1970s and early 1980s 
means that the climate for industrial decentralization, let alone the 
development of a growth pole, has not been good. Without the provision of 
massive financial incentives to encourage new enterprises in specific 
areas (which is beyond Malawi's means) such projects need to operate 
within an expanding. industrial sector, because the alternative is the 
forced 
, 
relocation of existing enterprises. This would not only be very 
expensive but also impossible. within the context of Malawi's commitment to 
free private enterprise. -The general economic climate 
in Malawi during 
this period, which led to the intervention of the IMF has not encouraged 
substantial new private investment. A significant constraint has been the 
recessionary policies implemented by the government to control credit 
expansion and redress imbalances in the trade accounts. Deposit 
requirements on import orders, and out-backs in the availability of-bank 
overdrafts have squeezed business cash balances. Also the shortage of 
government funds and continued high imported inflation, especially (during 
the period examined) in fuel, has affected demand. 
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TABLE A8.1 
Estate Production Growth l9bO-81 
vo ume rv a u e 
AAG*R-X- -AAG R% - AA b-R7 " C- fýN 
PRODUCT 1960-69 1970-81 1960-69 1970-81 
Tea 3.7 5.4 2.1 11.7 
Tobacco 11.2 16.3 1 "20.5 37.6 
Sugar - 23.. 5 19.0 
Source: Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, adapted fr6m Tables I and 2. 
TABLE AB. 2 
Sources of Manufacturing Output 1973 
SOURCE X of manufacturing output 
Tobacco Processing 13 
Tea Processing 7 
Food Processing 16 
Textiles, clothing and footwear 17 
Beverages 10 
Metal works and vehicle assembly 
Drugs and cosmetics 
Sawmilling and wood furniture 7 
Paper and-printing 6 
Non-metallic minerals 6 
Notes: 1. e. g. sugar, meat, drain, milling, bakeries, canning. 
2. Including cotton fibres for export. 
Source: data from Nialwa, 1982. 
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TABLE-A8.3 
Index of Manufacturinq Out-put-- 
1970 = 100 
Manufactures produced mainly for the Domestic Market 
Consumer Goods mainly for. the Intermediate 
Domestic Market Goods Mainly 
Food Footwear for Building 
PERIOD Beverages Clothing Other - and Export 
& Tobacco & Textiles Goods Total Construction, Total Inds. Total 
Weight_ 
_ _ý 
(33) 
- - 
(14) 
._ _ 
(15) (62) 
- 
(18) 
- 
(80) (20)_ 1 (1 CIO) 
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ! 00.0 1 100.0 
1971 112.3 118.1 110.8 113.2- 103.1 111.0 109.7 110.6 
1972 127.6 118.8 108.0 120.9 122.9 121.3 125.4 122.0 
1973 169.4 115.2 142.4 150.4 147.6 149.9 137.7 147.4 
1974 192.1 120.1 175.1 171.7 129.0 1621.1 131.6' '156.0 
1975 225.7 130.2 187.3 194.8 157.6- 186.5 '154.0 '. 8o. 'O 
1976 238.6' 109.9 176. 'B 194.6 129.6 179.8 172.3 178.3 
1977 259.8 126.2 190.2 212.8 142.9 197.1 207.3 199.1 
1978 274.4 148.3 234.3 236.2' 166.8 220.61 217.3, ', 219.9 
1979 273.9 169.2 '205.2 234.7 172.4 220.8 220.2 220.7 
1980 292.9 149.4 259.7 252.5 150.4 229.5 201.6 223.9 
1981 374.5 170.6 273.0 303.9 124.3 263.5 180.6 246.9 
1982 370.1 181.4 180.8 281.7 98.4 240.5 199.8 232.3 
1983 
January 232.3 190.5 213.2 218.2 70.6 195.0 190.2 186.1 
February 196.7 188.1 182.4 191.3 85.7 167.5 170.4 168.1 
March 209.0 190.5 168.4 195.0 103.0 174.3 179.6 175.3 
April 330.9 158.5 263.0 275.6 119.1 240.4 137.4 219.8 
May 431.9 169.1 330.3 348.0 90.8 290.1 163.0 ; 264.7 
June 515.8 194.4 306.0 392.5 120.0 
1 7,31.2 185.8 '"02. 
July 528.9 IBI. 5 365.2 410.9 146.6 351.4 184.6 318.0 
August 493.8 196.9 379.6 399.1 222.6 359.4 235.3 334.6 
September 672.0 250.7 352.3 501.0 141.6 420.1 250.3 . 
386.1 
October 304.6 1 177.4 11 311.5 
427.5 
1 
113.6 356.9 199.7 1; 
Lý , 
725.4 
Notes: 1. High production of sugar, edible ails and fats caused the inde- to rise. 
Source: NSO, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, nji adapted from Table 9. 
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TABLE ABA. 
Selected Statistics an Periormance of Manufacturinq Sector 
(AIE and ADD)l 
Agra-Industries Manufacturing for 
for Export (AIE) Domestic Demand (MDD) 
AAGR in net output in 
constant prices 1969-75 10% 6% 
AAGR in gross output 
1975-79 n. a. 3.4% 
AAGR in employment 1969-75 8.3% 7.7% 
X monetary GDP: 
1964 n. a. 11% 
1972 n. a. 17% 
average 1972-80 n. a. 15-17% 
Notes: 1. The ratio of net output of AIE: MDD was estimated in 1980 at 55: 45. 
2. Net output growth has been estimated at 6.3% for,, 1969-75. HoAever 
the UNDP/UNIDO project team felt this was in error, given that the 
gross output figure is lower. - 
3. MDD was estimated to account for about 35,000 jobs in 1980, about 
10% of domestic wage employment. 
Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1980. 
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TABLE AB. 5 
Industrial Licences Issued 1967-'Bi' 
YEAR OF ISSUE Number. 
Cap it a 1' 
W000) Employment 
1967 9 626 440 
1968 to 1550 402 
1969 20 2700 950 
1970 33 8487 7488 
1971 13 1595 426 
1972 11 861 387 
1973 16 2862 810 
1974 is 3966 770 
1975 11 2041 200 
1976 12 2281 226 
1977- 15 614643 5399 
1978 24 155714, '2875 
1979 16 1999 goo 
1990 13 1430 n. a. 
1991 17 s e. 9600 449 
Notes: 1. Estimated capital cost of projects. 
2. Estimated number of jobs created. 
3. Includes large Dwangwa sugar project costed at K59 million. 
4. Includes large Limbe Leaf Co- * Ltd. enterprise of K5. L3 mill4on. - 
5. Includes ethanol project at Dwangwa costed at K6.84 million. 
TABLE A8.6 
Industrial Licences Granted by Sector 1967-79 
SECTOR Number Capital W000) Employed 
Chemicals 16 3539 592 
Clothing and textiles 2B 2894 1274 
motor assembly and parts 8 3453 1:; 8 
Plastics 9 2048 198 
Timber and furniture., 25 2961 906 
Electrical 7 436 98 
Agricultural implements 
and engineering 35 5748 1606 
Paper products 4 598 66 
Food products and beverages 32 63337 5391 
Tobacco processing 11 161422- 9516 
Tea processing 4 681 151 
Miscellaneous 30 3009 217 
Notes: 1. See footnote 3, Table A8.5. 
2. See footnote 4, Table AB. 5. 
Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1920. 
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TABLE AB. 7 
Employment by Sector in Industry 196G-82 
YEAR 
Mining & 
Quarrying 
Manuf- 
acturing 
Electricity 
& Water 
Building & 
Construction 
old series 
1968 17429 1499 15472 
1969 826 17691 1530 17362 
1970 492 19463 -1737- 19539 
1971 600 21760 2168 17771 
1972 . 
764 231ý8 2457 18209 
1973 763 25640 2884 21127 
1974 865 26792 2529 22827 
1975 891 31361 2664 21065 
1976 1098 36015 3027 21l2B 
1977 509 31417 2751 22283 
new series 
1977 588 33749 2751 23250 
1978 564 35629 2922 31529 
1979 562 38437 3481 33570 
1980 605 39652 4030 32749, 
1981 572 35366 4124 24481 
1982* 609 31397 4272 247275 
Notes: * estimates 
In 1977 there was a change in the coverage of employment. The 
old series (1968-77) covered all government employees, and 
companies with 20 or more employees in' the private sector (which 
included statutory bodies and commissions). From 1977 onwards 
the private sector coverage was broadened to include all 
businesses regardless of size. There was also reclassification 
, 
of same enterprises between sectors, although there is no 
specific information on this. The effect on the industrial 
sector can be estimated by comparing the 1977 old series data 
with the 1977 new series data, but this does make it di ff i-cult, 
if not impossible, to compare pre- and post-1977 employment 
statistics. 
Sources: NSO, Reported Employment and Earnings Annual Reports, 1970,1976 
NSO, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, September 1979, Quarterly 
Supplement 
Malawi Government, Economic Report 1982, Table 9.1 
NSO Monthly Statistical Bulleting 1983, Quarterly Supplement. 
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Notes to ApPendix 8.1 
1. The industrial sector includes manufacturing, building and 
construction, mining and quarrying, and electricity and water. The 
latter two categories however form only a small proportion of 
industrial production (respectively 0.5% and 5.5%'in 1964, and 0.6% 
and 6.7% in 1973). From 1974 onwards mining and quarrying production 
is included in the official category of manufacturing, but this has 
little impact on comparison of manufacturing output before and after 
this date. 
2. In 1979/80 Lever Brothers (Malawi) Ltd. thus repatriated 94% of'-post 
tax profits to the London head office (Njolwa, 1982, P-3). 
3. These are mainly represented by Lever Brothers (Malawi) Ltd., David 
Whitehead and Sons (Malawi) Ltd., Portland Cement Ltd., Agrimal 
(Malawi) Ltd., Carlsberg Brewery (Malawi) Ltd., and Southern Bottlers 
. 
Ltd. Their main products are respectively food, clothing, building 
materials, agricultural implements, and beer and beverages. 
This was the first year in which employment statistics were published 
for both the government and private sectors. Although employment 
statistics from 1968-76 are strictly comparable, from 1977 the 
coverage was changed and thereforecaution must be exercised in 
comparing time-series data. 
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APPENDIX 8.2 
Terms of Reference for the Industrial., Development Programme 
1. To encourage the development of manufacturing, industry , 'by 
private 
investors and/or joint ventures with Malawian companiesand statutory 
corporations. 
2. To ensure industry develops to the maximum extent possible consistent 
with optimum allocation of scarce resources and on the basis of 
long-term comparative advantage. 
3. To. provide administrative, legal and physical frameworks conducive to 
manufacturing development. 
To provide flexible guidelines for future manufacturing, development 
and a logical order, of priorities. 
To ensure that foreign , investors,, are aware of manufacturing 
opportunities in Malawi. 
APPENDIX 8.3 
Other Signýficant Potential Industrial Prole ts in sector'Projzramme 
J., _Expansion of natural rubber output. 
2. bairy expansion in Blantyre. 
3. Expansion in plastic products output. 
4. - Ceramics and glass production. 
5. Cement production expansion. 
6. New foundry: K1.25 million. 
7. Rolled steel products. 
8. Particle-board or fibreboard plant. 
9. Textile expansion in polyester. 
10. Lilongwe brewery, 1987. 
11. Pulp/paper/wood and panel mill at. Chinteche (uncertain) for local demand. 
i 
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APPENDIX 8.4_ 
Sample Survey of Lilongwe Business Enterprises 1980: Methodology 
This postal questionnaire survey covered a stratified sample of all 
types of businesses operating in Lilongwe in 1980. The data base for the 
sample was the business register of Malawi, which covered all registered 
businesses operating in the country, with their addresses, and includes 
virtually all formal private and public sector operations (including for 
instance agricultural estates). Private sector operations are 
distinguished from the public sector by a numerical code, and include 
quasi parastatals (e. g. Press). The register' is 'arranged by type of 
business, rather than location. For instance, all manufacturing 
enterprises are listed together and sub-divided into textile industries, 
agricultual industries, chemical industries, metal products, etc. 
Similarly construction concerns form another category, as do wholesale and 
retail outlets, pqtrol stations and general garages, and so on. 
This formulation meant that a systematic sample of enterprises in 
Lilongwe from the register would cover every type of business, and each 
category would be represented in the sample in proportion to its real 
numerical significance in the city. It also covers a complete size range 
of firms in terms of employment and capital invested. Whilst 
accepting hat large-scale business must be the most significant element in 
a growth centre's internal economy, smaller-scale enterprise is also 
important. This is the level at which local entrepreneurs will dominate 
and is also theoretically very susceptible to local spread (or backwash) 
effects initiated by other larger enterprises. 
The August 1980 business register file listed 576 private sector 
businesses in Lilongwe. As the rate of return from postal questionnaires 
is notoriously low, it is best to have as large an initial sample coverge 
as possible. Combining this point with the practicalities of available 
time and cost, an initial sample of a third was chosen, by selecting every 
third Lilongwe private business on the file. 
Although it would have been preferable to use a pilot survey to 
design the final questionnaire the time involved would have been 
prohibitive. Local help was solicited in formulating the questionnaire, 
and in particular the accompanying letter. Questions about motivation and 
attitudes are highly sensitive issues. There is understandably, some 
controversy over the desirability of the Lilongwe project in the private 
sector, particularly in Blantyre. It was therefore necessary to emphasize 
in the accompanying letter that the questionnaire was for private 
research, and no company would be mentioned by name in the final 
presentation. 
201 questionnaires were sent out. Those who had not replied after 
a certain period were sent a reminder letter. Altogether 61 replies were 
received - thus the response rate was 30%, reasonable for a postal 
questionnaire. Thus the survey covered just over 10% of all business 
concerns in Lilongwe. The spread of non-respondents through the 
categories of businesses obviously affected the overall representativeness 
of the sample. Although they were fairly scattered throughtout the 
various types of businesses represented, it was significant that larger 
enterprises in all sectors were much better respondents than small 
concerns (e. g. tailors or grocers), perhaps because the latter had less 
time and labour to devote to such a non-productive activity, or because 
they were more suspicious of' its motive. As there were far more 
small-scale businesses than medium or large-scale on the register, this 
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does not matter too much although this factor should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
The questionaire coverd a very wide range of variables. Some 
respondents did not answer some relevant questions or their answers, were 
inadequate. Thus the results for various questions refer to varying 
numbers of respondents, and cover only those answers which were felt to be 
accurate. The maximum possible number of answers to each question was 58, 
since three responding businesses were non-operative. One of these 
businesses had closed, and another had never opened due to lack of capital 
but was still on the register. The third was a construction company which 
had just been liquidated. These indicate some inaccuracies in the 
national business register and many more non-operational firms are likely 
to have been amongst the non-respondents of course. The case of 
' 
the 
construction company is noteworthy because of the decline in Lilongwe's 
construction sector generally. 
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APPENDIX 8.5 : Questionnaire for 1980 Postal Survey in Lilongwe 
Name of business 
Lilongwe address ............... ........... 0 .................... 
2. Describe the main types of activities undertaken by the. 
enterprise: 
- Manufacturing or processing ................................... 
0.... 0.... 0.. 0............ 00............... 
&.. 0......... 
rackaý; ing or mixing of products ................................. 
.. 0.. 0900...!.. 0.............................. 
0........... 0. 
- kssembling of component pzxts .................................. 
0 .......................... * ..................... .0.......... 
- Trading ................................. o ..................... 
............................... 0 .................. *0 .......... 
- Transrortý, tion ................................................ 
............................. * ....... * ......... 0 .............. 
- Retail outlet (shop) .......................................... 
0.0............................... 0........................ 
Restaurant .................................................... 
0.. 0.0...................................................... 
Financial (i. e. banking, insurance) ........................... 
.................... 0....................................... 
- Other (specify)....... ...... 0 ...... 
.......... 0-0 ...... 0.0 .................... 
3. When was this enterprise in Lilongwe started? Date ............. 
4. is your enterprise a) Lultinational 
b) Yalawian 
c) joint Lalawian / foreign 
d) other (specify) 
Are there aýiy other branches of your enterprise operating 
elsewhere in Malawi (including elsewhere in Lilongwe)? 
Yes Ro If No see Question 9. 
Locatiqn of other branches: (names of towns or villages) 
. ............................................................ 
2.............................................................. 
3............................................................. 
.. * ......................................................... 
Were the other branches of the enterprise set up before or 
after the establishment of the Lilongwe branch? (please give 
dates of first operation) 
Before Date After Date 
Branch .......................... .......................... 
......................... 0 
.......... 0............... .,........................ 
................................ 
ýIj"1414-AiAý - ctaa IýWs 1 
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Have any branches of the enterprise elsewhere in Malawi been c., a -d. 
closed or reduced in size since the establishment of the 
Lilongwe enterprise? 
Closed Reduced 
Branch ................... 
............ *0a. 0... 0. 
0a. 00.. 00.. 00.0*.. *.. 0.00. 
00.......... 000 
,*, **, *,........................... 
Where is the headquarters bf the enterprise now? (tick) 
a) in Lilongwe at this enter. rise 
b) in Blantyre. 
C) elsewAAere in 1 .4 
'alawi (location ................ 
d, '; HQ outside Malawi (state town & country 
..................... so ... [I 
State original location of headquarters before establishment of 
enterprise in Lilongwe, if different from above: 
Blantyre 
Other (specify) ................................. 
Impact of Lilongwe's ca-pital status. 
9. Was the enterprise in Lilongwe established before or after the 
Government's decision to move the national capital to 
I. ilongwe in 1965? (tick) 
Before [] After 
Where was the decision to invest in Lilongwe made (tick) 
a) In Lilongwe, by head of this enterprise 
b) At another branch/Headquarterb in Malawi located in: 
Blantyre 
Zomba 
Other ........................................... 
c) At HQ outsideMalawi 
location and name: ......................... 
d) Other (specify) ........................... 
10. If the enterprise was established before the official 
decision to make Lilongwe the national capitals was it ever 
sus-pected by this enterprise, before 1965: that Lilongwe 
would become Malawils capital city? 
Yes II No 
11. If it was suspected that Lilongwe might become the capital 
city, did this affect the decision to invest in Lilongwe? 
Yes IIKo Uncertain [ 
12. If the enterprise was established after 1965, would it have 
begun in Lilongwe if Lilongwe had not become the 
national capital? (tick) 
es No 
- Definitely ......... 
- Probably ........... 
- Uncertain .......... 
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13. 
,., 
3: r lilonZwels status did, affect the decision to looate thore, 
'tIn. what ways %as it expected that location in the national 
capital Wouý-d, bc a&v&&"voLxs to 4ýRp- ezbe. rprise? 
.. 0.0........... 0.................... 0............... 
A U If this Lilongwe enterprise would not have been established 
if Lilongwe had not become the national capital, would an 
alternative investment elsewhere in Iralawi have been made? 
yes [ no uncertain (tick) 
alternative location ................................... 
Would the value of this alternative investment have been teh 
same, less or more than amount invested in Lilongwe? 
same I more less (tick) 
Would alternative investment Jýý-ve been an entirely new 
enterprise or enlargement of4existing enterprise? 
new II enlargement 11 
15. State value of initial fixed carital invested in Lilongwe 
enterprise: 
value in Kwachas .............. 
Has there been any subsequent fixed cal; ital investment? 
yes no value subsequent investment 
Kwach, -. s............. 
16. State number of employees employed when first established 
... .. S...... "i ."S 
At present time ............... 
17. How is labour obtained (tick) T-leare -! -, Te no. in each 
category. 
a) locally recruited (from within Zilongwe district)ý. 
b) from elsewhere in Malawi. [ 
transferr9d from other branches 
branch ........ ......... 
d) from outside Malawi. 
Integration. 
18. What sort of eriterprisesexist in Lilongwe which are 
complementary to the product '): ý service your enterprise 
provides (i. e. that produce inputs for your operation, or 
process, sell,. transport outputs; other than services such 
as electricity, water, roads etc., ) 
Type of firm Deal with Provide 
outputs inputs 
Industries ........ -- ... 0 ... 0.1 
11 
Craft enterprises ............ 
Trade companies 
(e. g. export cos. ) ..................... 
Transport firms ................. o 
........ .. J 
question No. 18, cont'd..... , ."-, 
N.. &......... 
A 
448 
QUES TI 01,11' AIRE cont Id 
Question No. 18, continld: - 
8. Type of f irri, 
Wholesale / retail 
- page 
Deal with 
ou puts 
Provide 
inpute 
outlets .................... LI 
Other services (e. g. Govt. 
licensing offices, 
customs, banks) ........ o ............ 
Agric.,, livestocký 
forestry (e. g. 
ADMARC., private 
outlets for food, timber) ........ ......... 
19. Did existence of complementary enterprises encourage your location in lilongwe? (tick) 
yes II no I uncertain 
2C. Have other enterprises in lilongwe been opened or extended due to the location of your enterprise in lilongwe? (tick) 
yes no I uncertain [I 
Type of firm Opened Extended 
-Industries ......................... 
-Craft enterprises ........................ 
-Trade companies ....................... 
-Transport firms ...................... 
-Wholesale / retail 
outlets ....................... 
-other services .. ..... ... o .. .......... 
-A, -,, ric. Iivestdck forestry .. .... ..... o ........... 
21. '. ', 'here are original sour ces of inputs needed for the 
activities of your ente rprise (please estimate % of each 
input from each area) 
LIDONG"WE LII-OKGWE BLArTYRE E13YEFME I-BROAD 
DISTRICT 11,1XIII (SPECIFY) 
(SPECIFY) 
-Construction inputb % % % % 
-ILachinery & equipment % % % % 
-Vehicles % % % % % 
-Component parts % % % % % 
-Auxiliary 
materials. % % % % 
-Raw materials % % % % 
-Manufactured goods (i. e. shop goods) % % % % % 
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22. What perce. nt;; (,! e of Products or services are sold by the 
enLexprise to eustomex-s / er-tcrpvises in: - 
1I1ONG'. ',,,, 'E I. IL0jT , GVIE BI. 071TYRE ELS. E1111ILRE ABROAD DISTRICT IN M-ALA1,11I 
Estimated 
percentage per 
year 
23. How are f oreign materials obtained, and f oreign exports made? 
a) Through Blantyre f irms 
Imports Exports 
(tick) 011 
b) Through your Blantyre 
operations. 
C) direct through a Blantyre agent 
d) direct 
e) other (specify) ..................... 
0.................... 
f) no f oreign raw materials 
24. Are enterrrise buildings: (tick) 
a) owned and built by enterprise 
b) owned by enterprise and built 
by construction firm 
C) rented from Government 
d. ) other specify .......................... 
IS land on which buildings are located (tick) 
a) owned by enterprise 
b) rented from Goveý=ent 
C) rented from other* body (specify) 
211. Have you encountered any -articular problems due to your 
location -in lilongwe rather than elsewhere in Mlalawi? 
dr (ticki yes No 
1,1, atu. re of problem ........................................ 
.......................................................... 
26. Will the location of an international airport at Lilongwe 
improve the commercial prospects of your enterprise'? 
(tick). yes no E tncertain 
Is it possible that further investment in thu enterprise 
will occur when the airport is built? 
(tick) yes no uncertain 
If the enterprise's headquarters are elsewhere, might they be 
moved to Lilongwe when the airport is built? 
(tick) yes no uncertain 
27 How do you assess the return mc4e on your investment made 
in Lilongwe 'f 
.. 0.......................................................... 
.... 0.................................................. 
25. Lny other comments? ......................................... 
............................................................ 
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APPENDIX 8.6 
Industf1al -Licence Application 
Form Ministry. of Trade, ln&stry and Tourism* 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ACý 
(CAP- 51 1 01) 
3NDUSTRIAL DEVELMIEVT 
LLES 
PAM, I 
APPLICATION kR INDUSTRIA LICENCE UNDER SECTION OF THE ACT, 
Name of a plicants 
2ý Name unde which applicant proposes to operate in Malawi 
goes 06001.1 4 10 *aa0000a0 40 000000a0000000o0a0i0aa000090 
? ostallddreFss 
*so* Deed, 4 #so 
; 
'600060 090 *0 -6 ago 00 
Proposed 'Iocaýon of manufacturing establishment (s)l 
Plot Number: Town: 
Districtt *esse 
5o List of prod it is proposed tomanufacture: 
........... 
0. *0o4e. 00s. a0a-.! ' 44 000000-0.00*. a. 00aa0&09G0000.9.0a0.0.0 aA 
6. Estimated nýmber of"persons to be employedi 
of machinery and equipment'to be Tii, Estimated horse-p C 
used in manufacturi 
-0 ft 0 -0-ý* t. 0o0o00V. 
'v 
o0a0000 
z1o 
0ý4 s. j ýa000a O'gv 0 41 
0ý 
0ý 
0 .0.0 000.0 so .. * _ý Wese . -S . 040 -1 so- 004roll 
SIG "CF APPLICANT 
Cif B tory Status or 
an ,; 
(owneri dd ptq). 
*0 00 
no "'. Z. 
1.1. .I/ ''?, 0- ... ýi i; 4 
! I, - .'.., 
;. J, 
2/v oaao9 *'1 
N "z 
- 
11A 
PART 13. 
1HEOFMATION BE UIRED IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION L 
(Note: Please connult the explanatory rotes on the last page of 
this form before answering the following questions) 
WI at steps haVe been taken to acquire land and/or 
buile4nge 
***moos 000 **. *'. *6 so. 09000&9006096090aA, 
a0000 *0 0 
1$ f060 Is 900000.0.60a000009 sip * 60 41 0 
00a00C9 01.0 .r00 . 04 0.06 @., Po* *&*so 0009 
1 00 00 Do 0 . 4to #%?. .00o0a, 090096C0000$006f00o009a is 6000a 
so** oi'o. *f-s-o- goes 4110 9.0. foe 6`0.40 008 09.00 0.00 0.00 *. *** sale 0*0 
2e Estimated date of, oommencement of manufacturing operations 
Estimated number-Aif persons to be employed: 3- 
Malawiaris Others Total 
)Ianagerial ........ 
'Other skilled 
1 11 
Unskilled ...... I, o*e*9** 
Estimated total"bost of salaries and wages, both in cash 
and kind (per month)t 
Paid to '. L'. ', Ialaw4ns X Paid to others K... 
Total salarie* and wages (per month): X ..... kg #off -*egos*** 
Give details 
ýf 
the type and timing of training for Malawians 
and the numb7 to be trained by category: 
00*a0-0. &o0 .' 16o.... 
's, two 0.0 0 fee go *00.0 Wo. 0.0000 06.0008000 o 0.06,00.9 . 
.. .0v Of . 
0.0 o'0''0o000"o0"0""6'00" 
** o0'0. 
of .... ... .... ý. so fees 
0.0 o000.0 -001,0 00060&og0aa00P0.00a. 0.0 
00000. &00 
'/. so. 
00.0.0 -@to. d. *.. a# 0.000 
09 
g' 
.a of 00 . '& .4? 09. a. 
4, .0S&. *ý&,.. 9.4a0 . 'o ... *go#** 0 . *., got 
0.0 of 0a 
is 
000 g-ý. 0i0 sees. so. **so** 00a1, a00004 
9ý4` ý* A-. 4! ý. o We 16 00 
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Esti\mted annotil cons-umprbýýn of raw materials: 
A52 
Produced 
Unit Quantity il Imported 
Ralawi Mat, -; rials 
ASTicultural 
( op(rify) 
1.0 0006 .0.0. -0&. 00a*000.0. a-00a0000 
2 
d'o 00-01a9&90000-*0-0-000-00F-0-0000 
4a 0 
SiA 0000aaa.. a. 4o60o&0a000C, 'o 00.000*0.40 .a99. [ a*a0000 
............ 00c000a000c909a900.6 0 6.0 10 0a000a 
TOTAL 
AGRIC4TURATj 
MATERý&LS 
I-IiI-I 
Produ-ced--- 
I 
Unit Quantity In Im '--ted Total 
malawi M erials Value 
Mineral 
(specify 
1. &.., ý 
a0a. a. 0. a. "-*00.00 so . 40 0*0 0ý --*a0. *&. 0. a a- aaC, -1 q, 00.00 
0.0 
aoa 
1,0 0.90.4 0* . vogeý., ý. , ... ý-0.00 0.0.90 0-0 oebeuel. 
5- *es -0. 
-040 00C. i, ve00. a . 91 0. Cbee 
, 
pAle 0. &*, De 0. 6 0 .. >ojoooo*lo 0 
. 1 
0 bo. * 6. ß, . 000/0.0.09 0.0 . 10 -0 0. -00 . 00.. -9 
TOTAL 
MINERAL 
MATERIALS 
AP) Otber raw 
inaterials 
(. specify) 
1. ............. 
0.0.0.0 ... &... 4p 
TOTAL 
OTHER RAW 
, -MATERIALS 
I.. 
0-. e. &&Ia*&. 0... 0. j-0.00sa00.. 00. tý 10 GLO 0 j. 0 
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Estimated annual oonsumption of bought in components and semi- 
Manufactured goods: 
1. 
3e 
4 
5- 
84 
90 
Type of 
C omponent 
Unit Quantilly Produ--ed 
in 
Malawi 
imported Total 
Value 
oleo. 00 000&4, -2 0 a. 0. S-9.0.01, C, a00a0a0 
S6&6 1- -009 0.00 6041. so*# 
,j0.0.9,4.0. 
0. .a. 0.0.0, a. 0. .3 -aa0.. 0.0. a. I. 064. It .0*a. . .000.004.0 0. P4,0 
0.0 .0 .900. .66a. 000.0* ....... 0.6.000 .. -0.0.0. *. 0. 0a09.,.,. a0 60.0, Of esp. 0.0 
Estimated annual transpQrt costs Q so Doe &. ** 60 00 04 a U66.0.0 96069909P 
&. 40. *fee sea. *. 0*00 
600 
. 
e. C. 0 .6........ a*0a6a60604, 
Estimated annual consum2tion of othIr industrial materials 
and services: I 
Unit Quantity Produced Imported Total 
in Value 
Malawi 
ELectricity OCKWH ................... ........... ............. am 
2,, Water 000 gls ......................... ....... too. 
tons Oc ,0r*0-000*0.0 * 9.400000000000 3- Fue 1 (specify 
type) gals 
4- OtbBrs 
(specifY) 
, 
Estimated annual eosts ef administ4tion-. 00 ýtoofte ob*, * et 40.9 JA', ". 
6 lk 0 
99,964. v 0. *. *.. 4'. et 4.0.4, p 
. 
006. f. 
.. 
A-u-4.0.000. e. 0.000,0090q. 0«9 
0* *v 0. bog 64a 0. * ir-ge 0&. -0 *of .. 0 0** 00.. 00. ses 
4,0 .»00004400-0-000.00,. 0.0.4.0.0-41. 
e. 0.469.. 0-0.4.. e. 0.0 's .0 18 .00000000000b0 
f 
ASA 
-5- 
Estimated si)ps for the first year of -12roductions- 
ill 
. 
2* 
3* 
4* 
5-7 
---6. 
Product:. -Ili ng Onantity S ol. d in F, -zp-rt Total 
(specify) '--3: ir-6 Malawi Sales 
For Unit Value 
30C0000 -D 00060 
6, C 
ý... a.. ý. .*..... 0 'beem696096 
60*0 
Fstimated annual sal. cs if plant and equipment 
at maximum m2it: 
PrIlduct SL-lling 
(specif. Y) Price- JPRv 
Unit 
Quantity Sold I 
Mala 
-: -sN wo. Tking 
E:: ported Total 
Sales 
Value 
4, t60.00C. a. 0... 
. 
2,, ", 0.0. a0a. I&. ---a4a11C, .ý.,. f, .0.06.0. -1 .r.. -a000a0.4, a0000& 
00asc06000 so aie 0.00a01', Wa g, .: 11 - r. .c0c gas, ao 
4g Iav011, .1616a60a01............ 
f 
9 go 0.0 0000 
aAa901 11" 0 11 a00a 11 1010a0fctaq00000ao4; a 
What annual. percentage g. -owth in sýes do you ex7., cct-' 
10% etc). atoooo. f a. *. a. we* -e 4*mp oeoo&oo --*o9o! io9 (efg. 2%, 4%, 1 
Applicant Rcma: t-ks if any) avvaaaoa...... 
0 00 aa -L! - 
A4 aaa0a000a004000aaza0a0.0.6 .0 
00a 407 0Caa! 0............. aaaao0 9*j,, *,. 'a 
6 
14% Present urices of prcduc-ýs similar to 
those applicant 
proposes to n. isnufactpre; 
I>roduct (SpecifY) 
20 0 
3, o @, 'Zar . 1.00 04. t.. - 0. 
Selling Price Per Unit 
For Similaý goods For similar 
already produced goods - 
in Malawi presently 
being 
imported 
40.600. t40009--. 
e0., 0000.40. a-000.000 lb 0 
4h 
ID 
.u. s6090.. -9.0.60.. j. G. 0.499--00,00.0.4e00 
Estimated value of capital to be employed: 
Value 
(41 
iv) 
V) 
vi) 
vii) 
viii) 
ix) 
X) 
(0) 
Fixed Cavital: 
Building ............ a00.0 
Machinery 
Vehicles ......... r, a. 0- it -a. 00.6-&-0.0-F. C. v. 0. C00.0.0.4) 00a00*I 
Tools) Fiocturesý 
F'urnituze ......... 
ao30 
Other 
Tstal F\2. ed Capital ýZum of 
t t itN V-i) Working CapitaL 
Stocks of materia and work in 
pmeress 0*0*0* 1 
Stocks of finished 
ýoods 
....... 
Amount owing from deýtors 4.0-ofe. 0.0 
Cash in hand and at 
ýank 
otal Gross Workin Capital 
sum of vii to-XT- 
Deduct amount owing to ditors-&-e-o. -. e- 
Total Ret Working Capital 
Total Caktal ErinlovArl' II Tý+ y. T, _1,.: r' --4 L. - 
I 
A55 
I 
1 -1 
456 
-7- 
sources of funds to cover total capital 
Nature of Funds (Specify 
-rate of 
interest on loan funds) 
Sources 
/ 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
(I 
loyed 
VALUE (K) 
xternal Total 
ources Value 
(A) Loan Finance Name & Country 
of lender 
a) Long term-loans. 
(over 5 years) ............ 
0160.0.81.6,6.1. a4 e` .000.0.0.0400000a0C0 
sees 0.040*00, off 0& 810*6 00 feet 0** foe 04DOOO&SO 
1b) Medium term loans 
(I to 5 years) 
94696 -0 . 3.0.6.1 . 0.0.6. a sees, 0 
Short term loans 
and credits 0 31 a 
(less than I year 
(13) FAui-by nnance Source 
00&000.. 00.. a0&04 .0.04&. 00q& ý. 0000v00. a. 0 0a0.. 00. 
0a0 
*09... 00p.. 0,. 4 .. 00,0ai, .0. -00 10 .p**0. ** a -0 .0.00aa [ 
0-0.00C0&. 0.0. * -v. 0-... 00. 0V-0-00*. 0. # 00&*0.0 .ý", 
/ #I ... 
protection and rebates: 
State whether applicant pr Ooses to apply fors 
(a) Tariff Protection 
(b) Rebates of duty "3- imported materials Ye #No. 
0 
If - you Chosen location for ma ctu'ring -d-e--other-than 
Jilonrde, state the additional c sts you would expect 
to In ,r by sitting at Lilongwlespecify the nature and 
',. zanounrof cost increases)t i 
. t. . 000.6000 0-0 . 0! 00 4F. 0.0*0000e. oo -0*0.0. &00.0.0. 
r.. 00a4 
10 000.0a0-0.0. a, v9000aa09*00a0e0@a 
. 0. 
,& 
4j. 0a. 000&. 
00.. 0a*0.0r00a00000&0*. 0.0. a&..... 60*0 
1/0;. "I 
.. 00W.. 8,6 0.0 a-0ad; v -900.000000&000AI; 
*0000a000000000.000000& 
4ý. 0&000*0.00 6 see 6*00906 000.6*0 *00.00 
19. i*t arrangements will you m e to acquire necessary 
skilled technical or manager 1 manpawer7 
40 a 40 0 00a040 
9'. *., t. -. 0.0. *... 0000 00 
4.00600.00 
00 
* 
0. .4 
.. - -0 
. 0.6.000-0 . 0.00 0.000 .0 . 0090600. *. 0,. 0.0.0 . 60.. *# 
20. Names and nationalities of ýdi rectorsj partnersy 4tc. 
Fb 11 Name Status Nationality 
. 
/I/ 
1 
21. Quajifications and/or 
folio *4 see go, $# 004 
Date 
---- 
----- 
of persons listed 20s 
4r 
Siý; 
j 
.re -, of applicant* 
000 too 00ý. V*e 06000'** 
Statuf: of signatory 
ýCwner3l'directdr) managerl etc) 
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APPENDIX 8.7 
Capital City Development Corporation 
Schedule of Land Charoes - Ist October 1981 
Type of Development Area Annual Ground Rent Development Charge 
Per Per Per Per 
Acre Hectare Acre Hectare 
K K K K 
Residential 
Low and Medium 2 
9 60 148 6,000 14,826 
le 
12 
43/2 
47/3 J. 
Medium Density 
Multi Occupation 11 100 247 8,000 19,768 
Commercial 
City Centre 10 
City Centre Surround 13,16,40 1,000 2,471 60,000 148,260 
Local Centres 400 988 10,000 24,718 
Industrial 
Light Industrial 7,28,29 300 741 8,000 19,768 
Heavy Industrial 29 500 1,2-36 10,000 24,718 
Churches, Clinics, 
Community Centres Be 198 One third of 
Normal C arge 
Agricultural Land 
0-10 acres 50 124 - - 
10-100 acres 25 62 - - 
100-1000 acres 7.5 19 - - 
Over 1000 acres 5 12 - - 
NOTES 
1. Ground rek is reviewable every 7 years. 
2. Development charges are per acre pro rate. 
3. Ground rent is based on a minimum of I acres. 
Source: Capital City Development Corporation. 
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PLATES 
460 
A vicw I roll' Lhc new Lilongwe CBD looking towards the Reserve Bank 
The new National Building Society headquarters in the new CBD 
(note the intervening open land). 
461 
The road to the new airport passes some of the newer THAs 
but these are screened from sight by trees. 
A site and service house in Area 25, a new THA in 'new' Lilongwe. 
a 
462 
W 
Area ib in 'new' Liiongwe: permanent high density housing. 
Formally built housing for Africans in 'old' Lilongwe: 
the Falls Estate. 
463 
""""21 1 ""u'l d"ýý 11"'llu uuLsidu site and service houses in Area 25 -a new THA. 
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